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Re: AVTS - System Total
>> From: Jeff Hintz [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org
Sent: Friday, June 25, 1999 10:29 AM
>> To: Ken Clark
>> Again, we need to check the FEC guidelines for
DRE machines. I
>> think that a protective counter for the
lifetime of the machine a
>> requirement by them
>> Jeff Hintz
>:-) We would fail this
requirement with the registry entry.
>I could see this being an
issue, however, and this does have a scary ring to
>it. Tab, can you
dust the FEC guidelines off the shelf and take a look? It
even be worth calling Wyle and seeing whether there is
>"interpretation" of this rule that would be favorable to
us if it exists.
>Does this counter serve *any* practical purpose
outside meeting an FEC
In the FEC Standards under the DRE Recording Subsystem
220.127.116.11.3 Public Count
Each DRE voting device shall be equipped with a counter that can be set
to zero prior to opening of the polling place, and that records the number
of ballots cast during that particular election. The counter shall be
incremented only by the casting of a ballot. It shall be designed to
prevent disabling or resetting by other than authorized persons after the
The Public Counter shall be visible to all designated polling place
officials so long as the device is installed at the polling place.
18.104.22.168.4 Protective Counter
Each DRE voting device shall be equipped with a protective counter that
records all of the testing and election ballots cast since the unit was
built. This counter shall be designed so that its reading cannot be
changed by any cause other than the casting of a ballot. It shall be
incapable of being disabled or reset.
The Protective Counter shall be visible to all designated polling place
officials so long as the device is installed at the polling
The concept of a protective counter comes from the old
lever machines that required servicing after a set number of ballots had been
cast. To a certain extent all election equipment should have a protective
counter so scheduled maintenance can be done. Punchcard and Marksense
machines are not as critical since accuracy testing can be done after the
election and if a problem is discovered the ballots can be recounted on a
I Bellevue we need the protective counter but I would not worry too much
about the ability to reset it as long as that is not possible through 'normal'
operations. If we use the registry for the protective counter I doubt Wyle
or any other certification board would be concerned.