Contacts

Office: 45-501F (5th floor of College of Computing bldg)

Email: gfarina AT mit.edu
Assistant: Katie O'Reilly

Gabriele Farina

I am interested in solid theoretical and algorithmic foundations for learning and computational decision-making under imperfect information. To achieve that, I combine and advance techniques and notions of strategicness from game theory together with modern tools from machine learning, optimization, and statistics.

I am an Assistant Professor at MIT in EECS and LIDS, additionally affiliated with the Operations Research Center (ORC). I hold the X-Window Consortium Career Development Chair. Before that, I spent a year as a Research Scientist at FAIR (Meta AI), where I worked on Cicero, a human-level AI agent combining strategic reasoning and natural language. Before that, I was a Ph.D. student in the Computer Science Department at Carnegie Mellon University, where I worked with Tuomas Sandholm. I was supported by a 2019-2020 Facebook Fellowship in the area of Economics and Computation.

Curriculum Vitae Publications Teaching

Some current research interests


No-Regret Learning Dynamics

No-regret learning dynamics for games are a fascinating theoretical problem ("can local learning result in global game-theoretic equilibrium?"), as well as currently the most practically scalable technique we know for training strong agents in large games.

Publications on this topic: [ = most representative]

ICLR 2024
(to appear)
AAAI 2024
pdf
AAAI 2024
pdf
NeurIPS 2023
pdf
NeurIPS 2023
pdf
NeurIPS 2023
pdf
ICML 2023
pdf
ICLR 2023
pdf
ICLR 2023
pdf
J. ACM 2022
pdf
Science 2022
link
NeurIPS 2022
pdf
NeurIPS 2022
pdf
ICML 2022
pdf
ICML 2022
pdf
STOC 2022
pdf
AAAI 2022
pdf
EC 2021
pdf
AAAI 2021
pdf
AAAI 2021
pdf
AAAI 2021
pdf
ICML 2020
pdf
NeurIPS 2019
pdf
ICML 2019
pdf
ICML 2019
pdf
AAAI 2019
pdf
NeurIPS 2018
pdf

Correlation and Mediated Equilibria

Most of the literature on strategic decision-making so far has focused on the task of computing optimal strategies for individual agents that seek to maximize their own utility. On the other hand, many realistic interactions require studying correlated strategies. The study of the geometric and analytical properties of correlated strategies in extensive-form strategic interactions is a fundamental question with applications to diverse settings, and is yet to be fully explored.

Publications on this topic: [ = most representative]

ICLR 2024
(to appear)
NeurIPS 2023
pdf
J. ACM 2022
pdf
NeurIPS 2022
pdf
EC 2022
pdf
EC 2022
pdf
STOC 2022
pdf
NeurIPS 2020
pdf
NeurIPS 2020
pdf
AAAI 2020
pdf
NeurIPS 2019
pdf

Team Games and Team Equilibria

Most of the literature on strategic decision-making so far has focused on the task of computing optimal strategies for individual agents that seek to maximize their own utility. On the other hand, many realistic interactions require studying correlated strategies. The study of the geometric and analytical properties of correlated strategies in extensive-form strategic interactions is a fundamental question with applications to diverse settings, and is yet to be fully explored.

Publications on this topic: [ = most representative]

NeurIPS 2023
pdf
ICML 2023
pdf
NeurIPS 2022
pdf
ICML 2021
pdf
NeurIPS 2018
pdf

Human Modeling, Robustness to Mistakes, and Equilibrium Perfection

Nash equilibrium is the most seminal solution concept in game theory. However, in some strategic interaction it is too restrictive, assuming that the agents have unlimited computational power to come up with the optimal solution to the interactions. On the other hand, in other strategic interactions it is too permissive, prescribing unsatisfactory strategies. For example, in the case of multi-step interactions, one limitation is that some Nash equilibria do not prescribe optimal play after the player or the opponent has made a mistake (sequential irrationality). Resolving these issues is important to develop algorithms that are ready to operate in the real world.

Publications on this topic: [ = most representative]

ICLR 2024
(to appear)
ICLR 2023
pdf
Science 2022
link
ICML 2022
pdf
NeurIPS 2021
pdf
AAAI 2019
pdf
NeurIPS 2018
pdf
IJCAI 2018
pdf
AAAI 2018
pdf
ICML 2017
pdf
IJCAI 2017
pdf
AAAI 2017
pdf