The following was taken from Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, page 444. It is Gene Fluckey's description of his method of night surface attack after the Barb's eleventh patrol, where she was a part of a wolfpack with Picuda and Queenfish near Formosa.


To stimulate discussion of new methods of approach and attack, the following is offered, of possible interest, from our meagre [sic] experience, for what it is worth. It is a special situation of a dark night, poor visibility convoy attack.

Fault was found with the standard off bow attack in that an end around was required; usually only two targets presented themselves at the optimum torpedo accuracy range which were readily taken care of by the bow tubes; shifting nests for low parallax stern tube salvo resulted in no suitable target for the stern salvo at a satisfactory range of 1,500-3,000 yards; escorts were passed close aboard; another end around was required for the next attack; and the formation turned, or was so fouled up, another lengthy tracking period was required.

To obviate this second end around on our last patrol, we changed our off bow attack tactics so that our next shift would be a high parallax stern tube set-up, though contrary to doctrine, and we would emerge ahead of the convoy, ready for a reload and another attack. Again no stern tube target was immediately available at hitting ranges, and, while pulling out ahead, we had to cross in front of the convoy to fire the stern tubes at the leader of another column. Per usual the formation became disorganized. It was two hours before targets and escorts were sufficiently settled for another attack, and even then it was poor. Disorganization of the formation, with the targets wandering about, continually changing position, course and speed, was a distinct disadvantage.

Realizing the advantage of maintaining convoy organization, new tactics were developed and tried, which we label the "Barbarian Attack."

Briefly it consists of a quarter attack firing three bow torpedoes at the trailing ship of an outboard column. The sub then turns out at a 60 degree angle from the convoy course and opens out on the flank to 4,000 yards. Paralleling the formation at this range, fifteen minutes is utilized in tracking and reload while moving up on the next ship. This ship is then attacked from the flank or quarter with a three torpedo bow tube salvo, and the sub again opens out and reloads while tracking the next ship ahead. If this ship is not the leading ship of the column, the procedure is repeated. Assuming it is the leader, a stern tube off bow salvo is fired, and the sub pulls out ahead of formation, ready to reload the stern tubes and proceed with any type of attack desired.

The above method was tested on this patrol with such ease and lack of expected difficulties that attack was only secured to give the rest of the pack a chance. The convoy was contacted at 20,000 yards with the Barb broad on its starboard quarter. Forty-two minutes later the trailing ship was attacked.

The convoy remained organized, used same zig plan and increased speed slightly. Twenty-one minutes after the first attack, the second attack was made on the next ship up the line. Twenty minutes later, the second attack was made, and the Barb passed the next ship ahead at 2,160 yards, foregoing an attack in deference to the rest of the pack. Thus in less than 1 1/2 hours after contact, we found ourselves ahead of the convoy, without making an end around, with all tubes reload, and with two concentrated attacks under our belts. Trouble from escorts which were stationed astern, on the flank and off the bow, was nil. As we had anticipated, not seeing us they turned towards the stricken ship to drop depth charges, maintained course and speed to hold gunnery practice, or, in the case of the exploding AE, were intent upon saving their own necks. If they had turned out to chase us, we had the advantage of a head start on our departure course and at full speed before the torpedoes hit.

Consequently, to us, the tactics of this attack appear ideal in its particular sphere; no end around; the accuracy of concentrated fire; requires only one-third of the time normally used; automatically takes care of reload; minimum escort trouble; maximum convoy organization, and best possible position of sub upon completion of first wave of attacks. Obviously it is flexible and easily adaptable to special circumstances.


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