

## XIA: eXpressive Internet Architecture - A Proposal for a Future Internet Architecture

15-441/641: Computer Networking

Lecture 25: What is Next?

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[www.cs.cmu.edu/~prs/15-441-F13](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~prs/15-441-F13)

## Outline

- Background
- The eXpressive Internet Architecture – a proposal
  - Example and concepts
  - Research thrusts
- XIA building blocks:
  - AIP
  - Tapa

NOTE: this lecture describes a research project  
This material will not be on the final exam

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## Key Internet Features

What we learned about the current Internet:

- Simple core with smart endpoints
- The IP narrow waist supports evolution
- Packet based communication
- All IP hosts can exchange packets
- Non-essential functions are services
- End-to-end transport protocols
- Security is not part of the architecture

**But may be there are better ways ...**

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
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## “Narrow Waist” of the Internet Key to its Success

- Has allowed Internet to evolve dramatically
- But now an obstacle to addressing challenges:
  - No built-in security
  - New usage models a challenge – content and services, not hosts
  - Hard to leverage advances in technology in network
  - Limited interactions between network edge and core
- But where do we get started?




## Three Simple Ideas

- Support multiple types of destinations
  - Not only hosts, but also content, services, etc.
  - Not having to force communication at a lower level (e.g., hosts) reduces complexity and overhead
- Intrinsic security guarantees security properties as a direct result of the design of the system
  - Do not rely on external configurations, data bases, ..
- Flexible addressing gives network more options for successfully completing communication operations
  - Include both “intent” and “fallback” address
  - Supports evolvability, network diversity, fault recovery, mobility, ..

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
## Multiple Principal Types

- Identifying the intended communicating entities reduces complexity and overhead
  - Have different forwarding semantics
- Set should be *evolvable*




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## Multiple Principal Types - Example



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## Many Alternatives!




## Using Principal Types

- Content and service addresses directly supports cross-application service selection and caching
  - Complex today: overlay indirection infrastructure, deep packet inspection, transparent proxies, etc.
- Routing protocols for hosts, content and services
  - Metrics driving by context, different concerns
  - Public internet: policies, business, ...
  - Intra-networks: usage models, super fast recovery, ...
- Add new (custom) functionality to the network
  - E.g., caching + service -> diverse multicast variants
  - Dealing with disruptions

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## Security as Intrinsic as Possible

- Communication security properties are a direct result of the design of the system
  - Do not rely on correctness of external configurations, actions, data bases




## Use of Intrinsic Security

- Name-> address look automatically provides public key associated with the address
  - May not need for separate key management infrastructure
  - Can help, e.g., with network partitioning
- Changing of addresses in session in network layer
  - Sign change with private key associated with old address
- New types of intrinsic security that might
  - Variants for services, contents and hosts; new types
  - Support for existing key management processes
- Simplify comprehensive security mechanisms

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## Supporting Evolvability: Flexible Addressing

- Introduction of a new principal type will be incremental – no “flag day”!
  - Not all routers and ISPs will provide support from day one
- Creates chicken and egg problem - what comes first: network support or use in applications
- Solution: provide an *intent* and *fallback* address
  - Intent address allows in-network optimizations based on user intent
  - Fallback address is guaranteed to be reachable



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
## Addressing Requirements

- Fallback: intent that may not be globally understood must include a backwards compatible address
  - Incremental introduction of new XID types
- Scoping: support reachability for non-globally routable XID types or XIDs
  - Needed for scalability
  - Generalize scoping based on network identifiers
  - But we do not want to give up leveraging intent
- Iterative refinement: give each XID in the hierarchy option of using intent

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## Our Solution: DAG-Based Addressing


- Uses direct acyclic graph (DAG)
  - Nodes: typed IDs (XID; expressive identifier)
  - Outgoing edges: possible routing choices
- Simple example: Sending a packet to  $HID_S$



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## Support for Fallbacks with DAG


- A node can have **multiple outgoing edges**



- Outgoing edges have **priority** among them
  - Forwarding to  $HID_S$  is attempted if forwarding to  $CID_A$  is not possible – Realization of fallbacks

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## DAGs Support Scoping and Iterative Refinement



"XIA: Efficient Support for Evolvable Internetworking", NSDI 2012

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## It Is Not Just About Architecture!

- End-to-end transport over heterogeneous networks
  - TCP works well over wired segments
  - How to better support wireless mobile users, insertion of services, vehicular, DTNs, ...
- Trustworthy network operations
  - Improve "security" broadly defined by leveraging the intrinsic security properties of XIA
  - Focus on systematic approaches to trust management and availability

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## A Couple of XIA Building Blocks

- The Accountable Internet Protocol
  - Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP). David Andersen, et al, ACM SIGCOMM 2008
  - Example of intrinsic security for host-based communication
- The Transport Access Point Architecture
  - Segment based Internetworking to Accommodate Diversity at the Edge, Fahad Dogar, Peter Steenkiste, CMU CSD technical report, CMU-CS-10-104, February 2010
  - Transport services for mobile and wireless users
  - Not part of the architecture, but can leverage many of its features


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## AIP Motivation

- Many security challenges are a result of not being able to unambiguously determine who is responsible for a specific action
  - Source spoofing, denial-of-service attacks, untraceable spam, ..
- Add accountability to the Internet architecture
- Key idea is to use self-certifying addresses for both hosts and domains
- Avoid dependence on external configurations
  - E.g. global trust authority

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## Addressing and Routing



- Addresses are hierarchical, similar to today's Internet
  - But each level has a flat address, i.e. no CIDR
- Until packet reaches destination AD, intermediate routers use only destination AD to forward packet
  - Effectively uses a pointer in a stack of domain identifiers
- Upon reaching destination AD, forward based on EID


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## Self-Certifying Identifiers

- Identifier of object is public key of object
  - Convenient to use hash of object (e.g. fixed size)
  - Need way of securely mapping user readable name into the identifier
- AD is hash of public key of domain
- EID is hash of public key of host
- Provides a means of verifying the correctness of the "source" identifiers in a packet
  - Effectively by sending a challenge to the source that it must sign with its private key

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## Example: AD verification



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## Verification Packet

- Router sends a packet V to Source containing:
  - Source and destination identifier
  - Hash of the packet P
  - Interface of the router
  - A secret signed by R
- Source signs V with its private key and send it back to R
  - But only if it recognizes the hash
- R verifies that it was signed correctly using the public key from the source field
- If they match, R add S to its cache

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## AIP Discussion

- AIP adds complexity to routers ...
  - Crypto support, caches, larger forwarding tables, ..
- ... but accountability helps address number of security challenges
  - Reduces complexity and cost in rest of networks
- Research question
  - Fast look up in large tables of flat identifiers
  - Managing keys (revocation, minting, ...)
  - Evolving of the crypto


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## Wireless and Mobile Challenges

- Network and device heterogeneity
    - “Wired” protocols stack may not work
  - Diverse network services
    - Content retrieval, mobility services
  - Relaxed synchronization end-points
    - Intermittent connectivity common case
  - Topology control
    - Handoff, multi-path
- Decouple Heterogeneous Network Segments**  
**Leverage in-network functionality**

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## Transport Access Points



- Tapa supports visible middleboxes (TAPs) that break up e-e connections in segments
- Each segment uses custom solutions for congestion, error, and flow control
- Transfer, transport layers glue segments into e-e path
  - Operate on self-certifying chunks of data (ADUs)

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## Unbundling the Transport Layer

- Tapa unbundles the “thick” Internet transport layer
  - Motivated by the “dumb middle” idea
- Segments support best effort delivery of “chunks”
  - Must support congestion, flow, and some error control in way that is appropriate for that segment
  - Chunks are a few KB and self-certifying
- Transfer layer supports best effort end-to-end delivery of chunks by stitching segments together
  - Naturally supports insertion of network services
- Thin end-to-end transport supports e-e semantics
  - Also flow, error, congestion control across segment path


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## Tapa Prototype

- Leverages Data-Oriented Transport (DOT)
  - Uses self-certifying chunks of data
  - Supports application-independent caching
- Uses diverse protocols for wireless segment
  - TCP is convenient solution for wired backbone
- Intelligent end-end transport intelligence is implemented on mobile host and TAP
  - Vehicular communication
  - Catnap battery savings

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
## Vehicular Example



- Vehicle-infrastructure suffers from frequent interruptions, short periods of connectivity
- Vehicle optimizes transfers by explicitly managing server-TAP and TAP-vehicle transfers
  - Leverages self-certifying content identifiers

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

## BW Discrepancy in typical end-to-end transfers



**Catnap leverages this opportunity to provide up to 2-5x energy savings during data transfers**

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## Tapa and XIA

- Content-centric optimizations in Tapa can be pushed “into the network”
  - Tapa can use content XIDs rather than host XIDs
  - Old APs can be listed as hints (rather than server)
- Tapa needs support from services on/near APs
  - Simple “decoupling services”, content optimization, Catnap, higher level services
- Tapa will benefit from intrinsic security properties

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## XIA Project

- More information:
  - <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~xia>
- XIA faculty
  - Peter Steenkiste, CS/ECE, Carnegie Mellon
  - Dave Andersen, David Eckhardt, Srinu Seshan, Hui Zhang, CS, Carnegie Mellon
  - Sara Kiesler, HCI, Carnegie Mellon
  - Jon Peha, Marvin Sirbu, EPP, Carnegie Mellon
  - Adrian Perrig, ETH/Carnegie Mellon
  - Aditya Akella, CS, University of Wisconsin
  - John Byers, CS, Boston University

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