


# *What to do about NeurIPS Reviewer #2?*

## Unearthing Peer Review's Secrets through Scientific Experiments

**Nihar B. Shah**

Machine Learning and Computer Science Departments

**Carnegie Mellon University**



# Preliminaries



- Overview article: [bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview](https://bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview)
- Slides available online (see NeurIPS abstract page)
- Multi-disciplinary research on peer review
  - Many studies conducted outside of computer science
  - Pictorial examples tailored to machine learning for illustration
  - Studies in computer science are accompanied by conference names

# Objectives of Peer Review



**Ensure rigor of published research**



**Filter to select more interesting or better research**

Additionally: feedback to authors, improve the research,  
learning experience for reviewers

[[Benos et al. 07](#), [Wing et al. 11](#), [Jefferson et al. 02](#), [Smith 97](#)]

# Problems in peer review...


- Hamper scientific progress [[Travis et al. 1991](#)]
- Hurt careers (rich gets richer) [[Triggle et al. 2007](#), [Merton 1968](#)]
- Negatively affect wellbeing [[Allen et al. 2020](#), [Han et al. 2019](#), [Evans et al. 2011](#)]
- In medical research can harm patients [[Poutoglidou et al. 2022](#)]
- Wasteful allocation of up to billions of dollars in annual grants [[Fang et al. 2016](#)]
- Degrade public perception of science [[Wing et al. 2011](#), [Jamieson 2018](#), [Kharasch et al. 2021](#)]





# Objectives of this tutorial

- Make the community **cognizant of systemic** problems in peer review
- Promote **discourse based on scientific principles**



We should just do [blah] and the problem will be solved!

- Inform reviewers about (subconscious) **reviewing pitfalls**
- Catalyze evidence-based **policies**
- Highlight **technical open problems**


# Outline

- **Peer-review policies**
- **Seen such a review?**
- **Reviewer incentives**
- **Objectives of peer review**
- **Epilogue**

# Outline

- **Peer-review policies**
- **Seen such a review?**
- **Reviewer incentives**
- **Objectives of peer review**
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# Peer review policies




*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*







# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*





In other disciplines: “Submissions are up, reviewers are overtaxed, and authors are lodging complaint after complaint” [McCook 2006]

# Reviewer training and mentoring

- **ICML 2020:** Junior reviewer **selection and mentoring** [Stelmakh et al. 2021]

	Junior	Regular	P-value
Positive bids	34.6	27.4	0.43
Fraction of timely review submission	0.92	0.81	0.41
Review length (characters)	4759	2858	<0.001
Fraction review updated after rebuttal	0.61	0.43	<0.001
Fraction active in discussion	0.68	0.58	0.33
Meta-reviewer's evaluation of review quality	2.26	2.08	<0.001



- **Grant proposal review:** For both novice and experienced reviewers, a **training** video increased the inter-reviewer agreement, improved alignment with rubrics, reviewers spent more time to read the review criteria [Sattler et al. 2015]

# Reviewer training and mentoring


**Longitudinal studies:** Quality of an individual's review falls over time, at a slow but steady rate [[Callaham et al. 2011](#); [Joyner et al. 2020](#)]

**Randomized controlled trial:** Reviewer performance can initially be better by training them, but the quality of trained and untrained reviewers becomes indistinguishable six months after the training [[Schroter et al. 2004](#)]





# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*



- Previous rejections in ICLR and other venues publicly available online
- Many conferences ask authors to declare previous rejections of submitted paper



*“The cover letter should be inserted at the beginning of the submitted PDF, along with the previous reviews and previous anonymized rejected submission, before the 6+1 pages of the paper*



Do reviewers get biased when they know that the paper they are reviewing was previously rejected from a similar venue?

# Randomized controlled trial

- Associated to ICML 2020
- 134 junior reviewers each reviewing 1 paper
- Randomly divided into:

---

## A SUPER\* Algorithm to Optimize Paper Bidding in Peer Review

---

### Author checklist:

- If applicable, will you make the code and data publicly available upon acceptance?  
Answer: **Yes**

### Abstract

A number of applications involve the sequential arrival of users, and require showing each user a set of items. It is well known that the order in which the items are presented to a user can have a

In typical peer review process, when the bidding phase begins, reviewers enter the system in an arbitrary sequential order. Upon entering, a list of papers is shown and the reviewer places bids on papers they would prefer to review.

It is known that the order of papers presented to reviewers

*Control condition*

---

## A SUPER\* Algorithm to Optimize Paper Bidding in Peer Review

---

### Author checklist:

- If applicable, will you make the code and data publicly available upon acceptance?  
Answer: ~~Yes~~
- Was this paper submitted to NeurIPS'19?  
Answer: **Yes, the paper was rejected from NeurIPS**

### Abstract

A number of applications involve the sequential arrival of users, and require showing each user a set of items. It is well known that the order in which the items are presented to a user can have a

In typical peer review process, when the bidding phase begins, reviewers enter the system in an arbitrary sequential order. Upon entering, a list of papers is shown and the reviewer places bids on papers they would prefer to review.

It is known that the order of papers presented to reviewers

*Treatment condition*






## Reviewers biased against resubmissions

	Score difference (10-pt scale)	P-value
Overall score	-0.78	<b>0.036</b>
Quality	-0.46	<b>0.005</b>
Clarity	-0.44	<b>0.022</b>
Significance	-0.36	<b>0.037</b>
Originality	-0.21	0.105
Confidence	-0.01	0.902

# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*





## REVIEW #2

**You should find  
some male  
researchers to  
work with**

### True story

Review in PLOS ONE, 2015

Authors: Fiona Ingleby, Megan Head

# Single blind versus double blind

## A Principled Interpretation of Minion Speak

S. Overkill and F. Gru  
Cartoony Minion University

In this paper we present a new understanding of...

## A Principled Interpretation of Minion Speak

Anonymous Authors  
Anonymous Affiliation

In this paper we present a new understanding of...


“Single blind leads to biases with respect to fame/gender/race/...”



“Author identities may be useful...Where is the evidence of bias in my research community?”



# WSDM'17 experiment



- Reviewers randomly split into single blind (SB) and double blind (DB) conditions
- Each paper assigned 2 SB reviewers and 2 DB reviewers

# WSDM'17 experiment

- Famous author
  - Top university
  - Top company
- } Significant bias
- At least one woman author
- } Not statistically significant; high effect size  
Meta analysis is statistically significant
- From USA vs. not
  - Academia vs. industry
  - Reviewer same country as author
- } No evidence of bias

WSDM moved to double blind from the following year

[[Tomkins et al. 2018](#)]

*Some issues with experimental methods* [[Stelmakh et al., 2019](#)]

# Many other studies

- Biases in review text [[Manzoor et al. 2021](#)]
  - Uses ICLR's switch from single to double blind
  - Evidence of **affiliation bias**; no evidence of gender bias
- =
- Studies on single-blind bias in **other fields** [Section 7.2 of [bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview](https://bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview)]
  - **Affiliation bias** found consistently
  - Mixed evidence for gender and other biases
- *“Author identities may sometimes be useful.”* ITCS 2023 experiment:
  - Reviewers are allowed to **use author identities, after giving initial** unbiased evaluations? [[Shah 2023](#)]
  - **7%** overall scores changed; **uncorrelated** with author affiliations

Ban arXiv and  
social media



No restrictions

- **ICML 2021 and EC 2021:** 36% and 42% reviewers (anonymously) self-reported actively **searching online** for the paper they were reviewing [[Rastogi et al. 2022](#)]
- **PLDI, OOPSLA, ASE:** Reviewers provided guesses of author identities with 70%-86% reviews. Among these, 72%-85% **guessed** at least one author correctly [[Le Goues et al. 2018](#)]
- Paper's **content can reveal authors**; algorithms can identify authors to a moderate degree [[Hill et al. 2003](#); [Caragea et al. 2019](#); [Matsubara et al. 2020](#)]
- “**Embargo periods**” debated in NLP/Vision communities: ICML 2021 and EC 2021 experiments find **no difference** in preprint posting and visibility during versus outside embargo periods [[Rastogi et al. 2022](#)]

# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*



# Authors' rebuttal

*NAACL 2015, NeurIPS 2016, ACL 2017: Only 10-20% review scores changed after rebuttal*

## Why?

- Many reviewers don't show up for rebuttal/discussions
- Even if they show up, they don't change their opinion

**Is it due to “anchoring bias”?** [Liu et al. 2023]

- People make an estimate by starting from an initial value (pre-rebuttal score) and then adjust it to yield their answer, but this adjustment is insufficiently small [Tversky & Kahneman 1974]




**Are reviewers anchored to their initial low score?**





# Randomized controlled trial



Review: 8/10

vs.



Review: 4/10

Some issue with your browser. Hit "refresh".



Updated review: ?/10

No Difference

# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*



# Inter-reviewer discussions



*Reviewer #3:* This paper is a real peach!



*Reviewer #1:* You reminded me of the peach fruit!





*Reviewer #2:* Peaches taste yuck. Reject.

- (In)consistency
- Herding
- Superfluous influence
- Anonymity

# (In)consistency of outcomes



[Obrecht et al. 2007; Fogelholm et al. 2012; Pier et al. 2017]



[Obrecht et al. 2007; Fogelholm et al. 2012; Pier et al. 2017]

# Herding

- In many other settings: decision of a group **biased towards the opinion of the group member who initiates the discussion**. [Asch 1951, McGuire et al. 1987; Dubrovsky et al. 1991; Weisband 1992; Banerjee 1992]
- In our review processes, no specified policy on who initiates the discussion.

If herding exists in peer-review discussions, then problematic:  
Final decisions depends on who initiated discussion




# Randomized controlled trial at ICML 2020

- 1500 papers, 2000 reviewers
- Split papers uniformly at random into two groups



First ask most **positive** reviewer to start the discussion, then later ask the most **negative** reviewer to contribute to the discussion.



First ask the most **negative** reviewer to start the discussion, then later ask the most **positive** reviewer to contribute to the discussion.

If herding, acceptance rate in left condition  $>$  right condition

**Result: No difference in outcome (i.e., no evidence of herding)**

# Superfluous influence



Good paper.  
8/10.

"Other reviewers gave  
this paper scores of 2 to  
5. You may update your  
score if you see fit."

I'll update  
my score to  
6/10.

- Large fraction of reviewers updated their scores
- $P(\text{reduced updated score} \mid \text{high initial score}) \gg P(\text{increased updated score} \mid \text{low initial score})$
- In first study: women changed much more often than men, highly cited researchers changed less often

# Anonymity Discussions can compromise anonymity of reviewers to authors

## 1. Timing of discussion posts

Based on analysis of major conference [\[Goldberg et al. 2023\]](#)



**9.00 am Dec 11, 2023**

Scarlett Overkill (Reviewer #1) commented on paper 44 that you are also reviewing: ...



**9.02 am Dec 11, 2023**

Anonymous Reviewer #2 commented on paper 63 that you have authored: *"Bad paper. Reject."*



**SCARLETT,  
IS THAT  
YOU?!**

# Anonymity

## 2. Mole in review panel

Author



Psst.. Scarlett Overkill  
is Reviewer #1

## Reviewer discussion



# Anonymity

## 2. Mole in review panel

Author



## Reviewer discussion




I'm on the hiring committee. Accept the paper to be considered for the job.



- Anecdotal evidence [Lauer 2020]
- **UAI 2022 experiment** [Rastogi et al. 2023]
  - ~7% reported experiencing such an issue either in UAI or another conference
  - Solution: Anonymize reviewers to each other; also reduces biases

# Peer review policies



*Alright, so here's what everyone must do...*






## 2021 Experiment on Author Perceptions

[During submission] “What is your best estimate of the probability (as a percentage) that this submission will be accepted? (Acceptance rate of previous 4 years = 21%)”

Mean prediction = 67%




# Outline

- Peer-review policies
- **Seen such a review?**
- Reviewer incentives
- Objectives of peer review
- Epilogue

# Seen such a review?

- Dr. Fox effect
- Surprisingness bias
- Confirmation bias
- Positive-outcome bias
- Citation bias
- Commensuration bias
- Miscalibration





# Dr. Fox effect

Too simple.  
Reject.



We add up  
the two  
values...

Denote the two  
values as  $\alpha$  and  
 $\beta$  and compute  
 $(\alpha + \beta)$ ...

What an advanced  
paper. Accept



# Dr. Fox effect

Complex presentation can influence reviewers positively

*“If you can’t convince them, confuse them”*





<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcxW6nrWwtc>

**“The Dr. Fox Lecture”**

[[Naftulin et al. 1972](#)]





# Surprisingness bias

## Hindsight group



**Result:** [chosen at random from the two possibilities]

*How surprising is this result?*

[Slovic et al. 1977]

“Does RLHF for safety reduce accuracy of model?” Yes/No

## Foresight group



~~Result: ...~~

- How surprising would it be if:*
- *it reduces accuracy?*
  - *it does not reduce accuracy?*



# Surprisingness bias

Too obvious.  
Reject!



The answer is not  
obvious to me.

- Less surprising when reviewer had read the results (hindsight group).
- Difference between hindsight and foresight reduces if the hindsight group is additionally asked a counterfactual question *“How surprised would you have been if the result was the opposite?”*
- **When writing manuscripts, stress the unpredictability of the results and make the reader think about the counterfactual.**



# Confirmation bias

✌️ Vision transformers



**Review:** Wonderful paper with rigorous methods. Accept!

**Question:** Vision Transformers vs. Convolutional Neural Networks

**Methods:...**



**Conclusion:** Vision Transformers beat Convolutional Neural Networks

❤️ Convolutional neural networks



**Review:** Poor paper with fatally flawed methods. Reject!



# Confirmation bias

Reviewers are favorable to those manuscripts whose results agree with the reviewer's own views.

Papers that agreed with reviewer's views:

- rated as methodologically better
- as having better data presentation
- making a higher overall scientific contribution





# Positive-outcome bias



# Can GPT-4 win a gold medal in the International Mathematical Olympiad?

Accept!



Introduction...  
Methods...

Result: Yes



Introduction...  
Methods...

Result: No



Reject!




# Positive-outcome bias

Reviewers also detected roughly twice as many (deliberately inserted) errors in the negative-outcome version. [[Emerson et al. 2010](#)]

## Solutions:




- Submission for review only contains intro and methods, but no results [[Smulders 2013](#)]
- Bias incentivizes authors to get “positive results” (p-hacking, HARKing). Solution: preregister experiments [[Nosek et al. 2018](#)]



# Citation bias

# Experiments at EC 2021 and ICML 2020




*Reviewers identical in other ways: bids, paper-reviewer similarity, self-reported expertise, reviewer seniority, paper-dependent factors, and no genuinely missing citations.*

Conference	Score difference	P-value
ICML 2020	0.16 (6-point scale)	<b>0.004</b>
EC 2021	0.23 (5-point scale)	<b>0.009</b>

**Cited reviewers more positive**

[Rastogi et al. 2022]



# Commensuration bias

# Reviewers have differing opinions about relative importance of different criteria



Theory: 10  
Experiments: 0  
Clarity: 8  
**Overall score: 2 (Reject)**

Theory: 10  
Experiments: 0  
Clarity: 8  
**Overall score: 9 (Accept)**



## “Commensuration bias”

Reviewers have different mappings from criteria scores to overall scores

Leads to arbitrariness/unfairness in the review process






# Solution: “Learn a mapping”

- Obtain (criteria scores, overall score) for every review
- Learn a mapping from criteria scores to overall scores
  - *Social choice theory: Use  $L(1,1)$  loss*
- For every review, apply learnt mapping to criteria scores to obtain a new overall score







# IJCAI 2017



- **Writing** and **Relevance**: Really bad - significant downside, really good - appreciated, in between - irrelevant.
- **Technical quality** and **Significance**: high influence; the influence is approximately linear.
- **Originality**: moderate influence.



# Miscalibration

# Miscalibration in ratings

This is a moderately  
decent paper.  
8/10



This is a moderately  
decent paper.  
4/10.

“the existence of disparate categories of reviewers creates the potential for **unfair treatment of authors**. Those whose papers are sent by chance to **assassins/demoters** are at an unfair disadvantage, while **zealots/pushovers** give authors an unfair advantage.”

[Siegelman 1991]

[Mitliagkas et al. 2011, Ammar et al. 2012, Freund et al. 2003, and many others]

## ***Editor's Page***

Stanley S. Siegelman, MD

**Assassins and Zealots:  
Variations in Peer Review**

# Two approaches in the literature

1

## Assume simplified (affine) models for calibration


[[Paul 1981](#), [Flach et al. 2010](#), [Roos et al. 2011](#), [Baba et al. 2013](#), [Ge et al. 2013](#), [Mackay et al. 2017](#)]

- Did not work well [NeurIPS 2016 program chairs; personal communication]
- *“We experimented with reviewer normalization and generally found it significantly harmful.”* [[Langford](#) (ICML 2012 program co-chair)]

## Miscalibration is quite complex:

[[Brenner et al. 2005](#)]

**Small sample sizes per reviewer.**



# Two approaches in the literature

## 2 Use rankings

[[Rokeach 1968](#), [Freund et al. 2003](#), [Harzing et al. 2009](#),  
[Mitliagkas et al. 2011](#), [Ammar et al. 2012](#), [Negahban et al. 2012](#)]

- Use rankings induced by ratings or directly collect rankings
- Downside: lose useful rating information [[Wang et al. 2018](#)]
- Use rankings and ratings together [[Shah et al. 2018](#), [Pearce et al. 2023](#), [Liu et al. 2023](#)]



# Outline

- Peer-review policies
- Seen such a review?
- **Reviewer incentives**
- Objectives of peer review
- Epilogue



# Benign



# Malicious





# Benign

- Quantity of reviews
- Quality of reviews



# Malicious

# Freerider problem:

Researchers submitting papers but not contributing to reviewing



- Verified record of researchers' reviewing
- Can be included in CVs
- Reviewers doing most reviews also incentivized via [badges and awards](#)
- **Concerns:** reviewers chase points by delivering superficial or poor reviews [[Silva et al. 2017](#)]
- Study [[Pomponi et al. 2019](#)]
  - Top-tier researchers scarcely seen on leaderboards
  - Top 250 reviewers carried out an average of over 180 reviews annually, but hardly wrote papers themselves

## ML/AI venues: Authors must also review

# **We may incentivize number of reviews**

**I'm busy counting  
these bananas.  
I can spend only a few  
minutes on the review.**



## **How to incentivize high-quality reviews?**

# How to incentivize high-quality reviews?

## Theory

Xiao et al. 2014

Xiao et al. 2018

Kong et al. 2018

Srinivasan et al. 2021

Ugarov 2023

Lee 2023

## Practice

Reviewer awards

Blacklists

**Rely on evaluation of the quality of each review**




**Can one reliably evaluate  
the quality of reviews?**




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
## 2022 Experiment on Reviewing Reviews



Authors know their papers best,  
so ask authors to evaluate reviews



(a) Overall review quality score




(b) Criteria scores

**Mann-Whitney U test, controlling for various factors ( $P < 0.0001$ )**


**Authors are biased by positivity of the reviews**

[See Weber et al., 2002; Van Rooyen et al. 1999; Papagiannaki, 2007; Khosla, 2013; Kerzendorf et al. 2020 for more evidence; [Wang et al. 2021](#) for some work on debiasing]



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## 2022 Experiment on Reviewing Reviews



Authors know their papers best,  
so ask authors to evaluate reviews

Or ask other reviewers or  
meta-reviewers or other experts



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**Best Reviewers**



# Randomized Controlled Trial: Original review ...

**Summary:**

[freeform text]

**Strengths And Weaknesses:**

[freeform text]

**Questions for authors:**

[freeform text]

**Ethics Flag:**

No



**Soundness:**

2 Fair



**Presentation:**

4 Excellent



**Contribution:**

3 Good



**Rating:**

7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or...



**Confidence:**

4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but...



# ...made longer without useful information

**Summary:**

*<Replicate abstract>*

[freeform text]

*<Replicate>*

**Strengths And Weaknesses:**

[freeform text]

**Questions for authors:**

[freeform text]

*Let me briefly summarize the paper and its contributions. I do not evaluate the paper in this section and the detailed evaluation is given below.*

*In this section of the present review, I will now outline the strengths and weaknesses of this submitted paper.*

*Here are some questions I have for authors. I would like to see the response to these questions in the rebuttal.*

*Overall, in my opinion, <replicate everything from dropdown options>*

**Contribution:**

3 Good

**Rating:**

7: Accept: Technically solid paper, with high impact on at least one sub-area, or...

**Confidence:**

4: You are confident in your assessment, but not absolutely certain. It is unlikely, but...

# RCT: Review length bias



**Original review**

**Mean score:** 3.73



**Uselessly elongated review**

4.29

Criteria	P-value (Mann-Whitney U test)	Difference in mean scores
Overall score	<b>&lt; 0.0001</b>	0.56 (7-pt scale)
Understanding	<b>0.04</b>	0.25 (5-pt scale)
Coverage	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	0.83 (5-pt scale)
Substantiation	<b>0.001</b>	0.31 (5-pt scale)
Constructiveness	<b>0.001</b>	0.37 (5-pt scale)



- **Amount of inter-evaluator inconsistency, miscalibration, subjectivity at least as high as in reviews of papers**
- Reviewing reviews has similar issues as reviewing papers
- How to incentivize quality reviews?





# Benign



# Malicious

- **Lone wolf**
- **Collusions**

# Lone wolf



**Rejecting competing papers  
will increase chances of my  
own paper getting accepted!  
Ha ha ha ha!**

# Randomized control trial


Score  $\geq 7 \rightarrow$  Accept; Review different conference from your submission

Score  $\geq 7 \rightarrow$  Accept; Review same conference as your submission

Accept top 20%; Review different conference from your submission


Accept top 20%; Review same conference as your submission

“substantial amount of gaming of the review system is taking place...  
competition incentivizes reviewers to behave strategically...  
the number of [strategic] reviews increases over time”




[Baliatti et al., 2016] Also see [Anderson et al. 2007, Langford 2008 (blog), Akst 2010, Thurner and Hanel 2011]



 How to ensure that  
no reviewer can  
influence decision of  
their own paper?

Partitioning method

Authorship graph:



# Work in progress



- Homogeneous expertise such as peer grading: [[Alon et al. 2011](#), [Holzman et al. 2013](#), [Bousquet et al. 2014](#), [Fischer et al. 2015](#), [Kurokawa et al. 2015](#), [Kahng et al. 2017](#); see also [Aziz et al. 2019](#), [Mattei et al. 2020](#)]
- Heterogeneous expertise as in peer review: [[Xu et al. 2018](#), [Dhull et al. 2022](#)]
- Statistical test to detect such behavior [[Stelmakh et al. 2021](#)]
- Dataset from a controlled experiment [[Stelmakh et al. 2021](#)]

# Collusions

Why don't you try to get assigned my paper and give it a positive review. In return, I'll accept your grant proposal.

Sounds like a plan!



## Potential Organized Fraud in ACM/IEEE Computer Architecture Conferences

*“investigators found that a **group of PC members and authors colluded to bid and push for each other’s papers**. They give high scores to the papers. Our process is not set up to combat such collusion.”*

*“There is a chat group of a few dozen authors who in subsets work on common topics and carefully ensure not to co-author any papers with each other so as to keep out of each other’s conflict lists (to the extent that **even if there is collaboration they voluntarily give up authorship on one paper to prevent conflicts on many future papers**).*”

**Such collusions also uncovered in conferences in other research areas and in grant reviews**

[Lauer 2020, Littman 2021]

# Defense



1. Conflicts of interest

2. Detect or Remove Rings [[Guo et al. 2018](#), [Boehmer et al. 2021](#), [Leyton-Brown et al. 2022](#)]

3. Bidding is easily gameable [[Jecmen et al. 2020](#), [Wu et al. 2021](#)]

So disable outlier bids [[Wu et al. 2021](#)]

Dataset from controlled experiment [[Jecmen et al. 2022](#)]

4. Geographic restrictions [[Leyton-Brown et al. 2022](#)]

5. Randomized assignment [[Jecmen et al. 2020](#)]

# Attack that breaks defense



- Colluders may not be collaborators/colleagues
- Colluders skirt conflicts-of-interest detectors [[Vijaykumar 2020](#)]
- A reviewer may target an author's paper, and author may offer quid pro quo elsewhere
- Bids of honest reviewers hardly influence the papers assigned to them [[Jecmen et al. 2022](#)]. Can't correct errors in text similarities; disincentivizes bidding altogether.
- Attacks on text-matching [[Markwood et al. 2017](#); [Tran and Jaiswal 2019](#); [Eisenhofer et al. 2023](#)]
- Other aspects of automated assignment systems, like subject area choices can be gamed [[Ailamaki et al. 2019](#)]
- Colluding reviewers may already have expertise for that paper, and may be assigned even without bids [[Vijaykumar 2020](#)]
- May collude across geographies (or if a colluder moves countries)
- Establish collusions *after* papers are assigned

Quantification of tradeoffs: [Jecmen et al. 2022](#)



# Outline

- **Peer-review policies**
- **Seen such a review?**
- **Reviewer incentives**
- **Objectives of peer review**
- **Epilogue**

# Objectives of Peer Review



**Ensure rigor of published research**



**Filter to select more interesting or better research**

Additional objectives: feedback to authors, improve the research, learning experience for reviewers



# Objectives of Peer Review



**Ensure rigor of published research**



**Filter to select more interesting or better research**

# In journals outside computer science

- Papers with major errors deliberately inserted
- Can reviewers spot these errors?





Study	#Errors inserted	#Reviews	%Errors detected on average
<u>Baxt et al. 1998</u>	10	203	34%
<u>Godlee et al. 1998</u>	8	221	25%
<u>Schroter et al. 2004</u>	9	1380	31%
<u>Schroter et al. 2008*</u>	9	1390	31%
<u>Emerson et al. 2010</u>	5	210	8% and 17%

\*Further analysis: >90% reviewers caught at least one error [see Shah 2023]

# Experiment in a major AI/ML conference

- Three variants of a paper: Each variant had one major error in a claimed key contribution (*convexity of estimator; statistical identifiability; choosing hyperparameters on test data*)
- Error in main text
- 79 reviews
- Caveat: Generalizability





# Objectives of Peer Review



Ensure rigor of published research



**Filter to select more interesting or better research**




[Obrecht et al. 2007; Fogelholm et al. 2012; Pier et al. 2017]



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## 2014 Consistency Experiment [Cortes et al. 2014]




- 26% papers had inconsistent outcomes
- *Another interpretation:* 57% papers accepted by one committee were rejected by the other (perfect would be 0%, random 77%) [Price 2014]



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## 2021 Consistency Experiment [Beygelzimer et al. 2021]



- 23% papers had inconsistent outcomes (perfect would be 0%, random 35%)
- More than half of all spotlights recommended by one committee were rejected by the other.

# Peer review vs. citations


- Reviewer scores uncorrelated with citations or downloads for accepted papers [[Ragone et al. 2013](#), [Connolly et al. 2014](#)]
- NeurIPS 2014: no correlation between accepted papers' citations and scores; weak correlation for rejected papers [[Cortes and Lawrence 2021](#)]
- Review scores of perceived impact uncorrelated with citations, but correlated with social media impressions [[Eysenbach 2022](#)]
- When asked to forecast future citations, evaluators unsuccessful [[Schroter et al. 2022](#)]



- Highly-selective venues aim to select the “best” papers
- Is there an “objective” ranking of papers?
- Disagreements between reviewers: but reviewers may be lazy etc.
- Maybe authors know “objective” ranking of their own papers
  - Independently, [Su 2022] proposed asking authors to give a ranking of their papers (“you are the best reviewer of your own papers”) which will determine their review outcomes
- If there is such an objective ranking, co-authors should generally agree on it...

## 2021 Experiment on Author Perceptions

Rank your submissions in terms of your own perception of their scientific contributions to the NeurIPS community, if published in their current form.




# Outline

- **Peer-review policies**
- **Seen such a review?**
- **Reviewer incentives**
- **Objectives of peer review**
- **Epilogue: My opinion**







My paper got accepted to NeurIPS!!

*Do you guys ever think about review quality?*



Truly remarkable achievement to get into the most prestigious, highly selective ML conference!



It means your paper was rigorously reviewed and found to be technically sound and one of the most impactful!






Wow, you will now get better grad school admits, better jobs,...



You have to go to the real world. You can go back to your regular resubmissions-rebuttals, and forget any of this ever happened. Or you can know the truth about these conferences.

Nihar B. Shah, Carnegie Mellon University



Credits: "Piled Higher and Deeper" by Jorge Cham

Credits: "Barbie" movie

# We should radically rethink NeurIPS reviewing



- **Focus on evaluating (only) correctness** [PLOS ONE, TMLR]
  - + Less stress 😊; emphasis on rigor
  - Publication of high volume of incremental work
  - ? Space constraints for conference presentations?
- **Signed reviews: Reviewers' names revealed** [f1000research, eLife, JSys, Goodlee et al. 1998, van Rooyen et al. 1999, 2010, Walsh et al. 2000]
  - + Incentives for quality review; mitigate collusions
  - Possible author retaliation; junior reviewers more hesitant to review
  - ? May be ok if focus is on correctness?
- **Post-publication review:** Publish everything with/without reviews; market forces of online commenting and citations take over [pubpeer.com, openreview.net, Kriegeskorte 2012, Bordignon 2020]
  - + Less burden on peer review
  - No author anonymity  $\Rightarrow$  potential biases

# What about fully automating reviewing of manuscripts?




- Many **computational tools** already used
  - Most prominently for reviewer assignment
  - And others (bidding, subjectivity, dishonesty, etc.) [see survey [bit.ly/SurveyPeerReview](https://bit.ly/SurveyPeerReview)]
- “**AI Reviewer**”
  - Pre-ChatGPT [[Huang 2018](#), [Wang et al. 2020](#), [Yuan et al. 2021](#)]
  - Post-ChatGPT [[Liang et al. 2023](#) and other unpublished work]
- **Evaluation**
  - Subjective (human) evaluation: biases in evaluating review quality
  - Objective evaluation?




# Focus on peer review's objectives

## A basic “Chimera” test



Three of my papers on different problems



Nonsensical  
paper



AI  
reviewer

Review:  
Good paper!

# Focus on peer review's objectives

## Dataset of carefully constructed short papers

- **Correctness objective**
  - Deliberately inserted errors
  - GPT-4 detects inserted errors in 50% constructed papers, including in conceptual arguments and mathematical proofs
  - Bard and open source models exhibit poor performance
  - Don't prompt "write a review," but instead be specific "find errors"
- **Selecting "better" papers objective**
  - Pairs of abstracts such that one objectively superior to the other
  - Slightly tweaked some of them in terms of language etc.
  - Performance is poor, fooled/gamed easily



# Conclusions

- **Scientific reviewing from a scientific lens**
  - *Designing peer review systems*: Think about objectives, evidence-based policies
  - *Discussions of reviews*: Does the review exhibit an established problem?
  - *Ideas to improve peer review*: Literature may shed some light on it
- **Many computational opportunities and challenges**



[bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview](https://bit.ly/PeerReviewOverview)

