



# Privacy-Preserving Set Operations

Lea Kissner

[leak@cs.cmu.edu](mailto:leak@cs.cmu.edu)

Dawn Song

[dawnsong@cmu.edu](mailto:dawnsong@cmu.edu)



- Many practical privacy problems share certain characteristics:
  - Several parties, each with a private input
  - The data cannot be freely shared
  - The parties wish to *privately* compute some function of their joint inputs
  - Often, the inputs are sets or multisets



# The Do-Not-Fly List



Airline  
Flight List

Government  
Terrorist List

# The Do-Not-Fly List



Airline  
Flight List



Government  
Terrorist List

People who must be  
removed from the flight

# Statistics-Gathering



Hospital  
Patient Lists




# Statistics-Gathering




Hospital  
Patient Lists

Welfare  
Rolls

# Statistics-Gathering



# Statistics-Gathering






# Network Monitoring



Suspicious  
Network Traffic




# Network Monitoring



Suspicious  
Network Traffic



# Network Monitoring



Attacks which appear often



# Prescription Cheaters



Alice's  
Pharmacy

Bob's  
Pharmacy

Charlie's  
Pharmacy

# Prescription Cheaters




Alice's  
Pharmacy



Bob's  
Pharmacy


Charlie's  
Pharmacy

# Prescription Cheaters




Element Reduction

# Prescription Cheaters




# Prescription Cheaters




Alice's  
Cheaters




# Prescription Cheaters



# Prescription Cheaters



# Prescription Cheaters



# Prescription Cheaters




Alice's  
Pharmacy




Bob's  
Pharmacy

Charlie's  
Pharmacy


# Prescription Cheaters




# Prescription Cheaters



# Prescription Cheaters




# Prescription Cheaters







# Prescription Cheaters



# The Ideal Model



# The Ideal Model



# The Ideal Model



# The Ideal Model

**Perfectly** secure  
with trusted third party

Alice

Bob



# The Ideal Model

Who can you trust?



# The Ideal Model

Who can you trust?



# The Ideal Model

Who can you trust?

Alice

Bob



# The Ideal Model




To increase real-world security,  
we remove the trusted party



# Outline



- Motivational examples
  - Multisets represented as polynomials
  - Polynomial operations
  - Multiset operations with polynomials
  - Use of our techniques
  - Contributions and related work
- 



● We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )

○  $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$

● We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )

○  $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$





● We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )

○  $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a) (x-b) (x-c) (x-c)$



● We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )

○  $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$





- We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )
  - $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$
- Random polynomial: each coefficient is distributed uniformly, independently in  $R$ 
  - $r_0 + r_1x + \dots + r_nx^n$

Ring  $R$



- We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )
  - $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$
- Random polynomial: each coefficient is distributed uniformly, independently in  $R$



$$r_0 + r_1x + \dots + r_nx^n$$







- We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )
  - $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$
- Random polynomial: each coefficient is distributed uniformly, independently in  $R$



$$r_0 + r_1 x + \dots + r_n x^n$$






● We will represent all multisets as polynomials over a ring  $R$  (e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}$ )

○  $\{a, b, c, c\} \rightarrow (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)(x-c)$

● Random polynomial: each coefficient is distributed uniformly, independently in  $R$

○





- Random polynomials have random roots
- How can we ensure that we can recognize 'random' elements?
- We mark a small part of  $R$  as 'valid'



Ring  $R$



- Random polynomials have random roots
- How can we ensure that we can recognize 'random' elements?
- We mark a small part of  $R$  as 'valid'

Valid





- Random polynomials have random roots
- How can we ensure that we can recognize 'random' elements?
  - We mark a small part of  $R$  as 'valid'
  - Thus random elements 'look random' with overwhelming probability
  - One scheme: valid format  $a||h(a)$

Valid



# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$


# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a) \\ (x-b)(x-b)(x-b) \\ (x-c)$$


# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?
- The roots of *both* polynomials are preserved
- Multiplicity of roots is *additive*

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)$$




# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?
- The roots of *both* polynomials are preserved
- Multiplicity of roots is *additive*

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)$$


# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?
- The roots of *both* polynomials are preserved
- Multiplicity of roots is *additive*

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)$$


# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?
- The roots of *both* polynomials are preserved
- Multiplicity of roots is *additive*

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)$$


# Polynomial Multiplication

- What happens when we multiply two polynomials?
- The roots of *both* polynomials are preserved
- Multiplicity of roots is *additive*
- This operation acts like a union of multiset representations!

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)$$

\*

$$(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)$$

# Polynomial Addition


- What happens when we add two polynomials?

$$\begin{aligned} &(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) \\ &+ \\ &(x-a)(x-b)(x-c) \end{aligned}$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$




$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$




$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$


$$f(c) \neq 0$$



# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$




$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$




$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved
- This operations acts somewhat like a multiset intersection!

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$



$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Addition

- What happens when we add two polynomials?
- The *shared* roots of the polynomials are preserved
- The *minimum* multiplicity is preserved
- This operations acts somewhat like a multiset intersection!

$$(x-a)(x-b)(x-b) + (x-a)(x-b)(x-c)$$

↓

gcd ↘

$$(x-a)(x-b)*f$$

$$f(c) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Derivatives


- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?

$$(x-a)$$
$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)$$
$$(x-c)(x-c)$$

# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?

$$(x-a) \\ (x-b)(x-b)(x-b) \\ (x-c)(x-c)$$




$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$

$$f(a) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?
- The multiplicity of each root is *reduced* by one

$$(x-a) \\ (x-b)(x-b)(x-b) \\ (x-c)(x-c)$$




$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$

$$f(a) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?
- The multiplicity of each root is *reduced* by one

$$(x-a)$$
$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)$$
$$(x-c)(x-c)$$



$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$


$$f(a) \neq 0$$



# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?
- The multiplicity of each root is *reduced* by one

$$(x-a)$$
$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)$$
$$(x-c)(x-c)$$




$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$

$$f(a) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?
- The multiplicity of each root is *reduced* by one

$$(x-a)$$
$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-b)$$
$$(x-c)(x-c)$$




$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$

$$f(a) \neq 0$$

# Polynomial Derivatives

- What happens when we take the derivative of a polynomial?
- The multiplicity of each root is *reduced* by one
- This acts somewhat like an *element reduction* operator!
- Note that I am glossing over some of the math...

$$(x-a) \\ (x-b)(x-b)(x-b) \\ (x-c)(x-c)$$



$$(x-b)(x-b)(x-c)*f$$

$$f(a) \neq 0$$



- We use these polynomial operations to calculate multiset union, intersection, and element reduction
- We cannot use the simple polynomial operations directly
  - They can reveal extra private information
    - e.g., elements that are not in the result set
  - The calculation can be manipulated by malicious players





How can malicious players influence results?

If we are not careful about calculating intersection:





● How can malicious players influence results?

○ If we are not careful about calculating intersection:



I choose  $-f$ !




● How can malicious players influence results?

○ If we are not careful about calculating intersection:



I choose  $-f$ !



0


● How can malicious players influence results?



○ If we are not careful about calculating intersection:



I choose  $-f$ !



0 (Set of all elements)





● How can malicious players influence results?

○ If we are not careful about calculating intersection:



I choose  $-f$ !






● How can malicious players influence results?

○ If we are not careful about calculating intersection:



I choose  $-f$ !



$f$  (Alice's set/correct)



- We must use randomness to hide `extra` information and enforce correctness
- We utilize the following lemma:
  - If  $\text{gcd}(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}) = \mathbf{1}$ , and  $\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{s}$  are random polynomials such that  $\text{deg}(\mathbf{v}) = \text{deg}(\mathbf{w}) \leq \text{size}(\mathbf{r}) = \text{size}(\mathbf{s})$
  - Then  $\mathbf{v} * \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{w} * \mathbf{s}$  is a random polynomial

# Union

$S \cup T$  is  
calculated as:

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .

# Union

SUT is  
calculated as:

$$f * g$$

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .

# Intersection

$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.

# Intersection


$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

$$f * r + g * s$$

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.

# Intersection

$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

$$f * r + g * s$$


Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.



# Intersection

$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

$$f * r + g * s$$

$u$   $u$

$u$

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.

# Intersection

$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

$$f * r + g * s$$

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.

# Intersection

$S \cap T$  is  
calculated as:

$$f * r + g * s$$
$$=$$

$$\gcd(f, g) (w * r + v * s) =$$
$$\gcd(f, g) * u$$

Let  $S, T$  be multisets  
represented by the  
polynomials  $f, g$ .  
Let  $r, s$  be random  
polynomials.

# Element Reduction

$Rd_t(S)$  is  
calculated as:

Let  $S$  be a multiset  
represented by the  
polynomial  $f$ .  
Let  $r, s, F$  be random  
polynomials.

# Element Reduction

$Rd_t(S)$  is  
calculated as:


$$f(t-1) * F * r + f * s$$

Let  $S$  be a multiset  
represented by the  
polynomial  $f$ .  
Let  $r, s, F$  be random  
polynomials.

# Element Reduction

$Rd_t(S)$  is  
calculated as:

$$f(t-1) * F * r + f * s$$



Let  $S$  be a multiset  
represented by the  
polynomial  $f$ .  
Let  $r, s, F$  be random  
polynomials.

# Element Reduction

$Rd_t(S)$  is  
calculated as:

$$f(t-1) * F * r + f * s$$

Let  $S$  be a multiset  
represented by the  
polynomial  $f$ .  
Let  $r, s, F$  be random  
polynomials.

# Element Reduction

$Rd_t(S)$  is

calculated as:

$$f^{(t-1)} * F * r + f * s =$$

$$\gcd(f^{(t-1)}, f) (w * r + v * s) =$$
$$\gcd(f^{(t-1)}, f) * u$$


Let  $S$  be a multiset represented by the polynomial  $f$ .  
Let  $r, s, F$  be random polynomials.





# How do we use this?



- These techniques are not useful without the use of encryption
    - All players share a key
    - Special (homomorphic) cryptosystem
      - Addition, formal derivative of encrypted polynomials
      - Multiplication of known polynomial by encrypted polynomial
- 



Player 1

$S_1$



Player 2

$S_2$

# Multiset Intersection Protocol



Player 3

$S_3$




$$s_1 \rightarrow f_1$$



$$s_2 \rightarrow f_2$$



$$s_3 \rightarrow f_3$$





Player 1

$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$



Player 2

$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$



Player 3

$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$



Player 1

$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$



Player 2


$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$


Each player  $i$  chooses  
 random polynomials  
 $r_{i,1}, r_{i,2}, r_{i,3}$   
 and calculates:  
 $E(f_1 * r_{i,1} + f_2 * r_{i,2} + f_3 * r_{i,3})$



Player 3

$E(f_1), E(f_2), E(f_3)$







$$E(\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i}))$$

Polynomial  
representation  
of multiset

$$E(\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i}))$$

$$E(\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i}))$$

Polynomial  
representation  
of multiset

Random  
polynomial

$$E(\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i}))$$

The players have calculated an encrypted polynomial representation of the multiset intersection!


$$E(\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i}))$$

The players decrypt the polynomial, using their shared key.


$$\sum (f_i * \sum r_{j,i})$$

Element of  
private input  
set *a*

$$\Sigma (f_i * \Sigma r_{j,i})$$










# Outline



- Motivational examples
  - Multisets represented as polynomials
  - Polynomial operations
  - Multiset operations with polynomials
  - Use of our techniques
  - Contributions and related work
- 



- We have presented efficient, composable techniques for multiset intersection, union, and element reduction
- We design fair protocols for  $n \geq 2$  players (malicious or HBC) for many set problems, including cardinality
- We design a protocol for determining subset relations
- We even evaluate boolean formulae!





- Two party set intersection (and related problems) [AES03] [FNP04]
- Set disjointness [KM05]
- Single-element-set intersection [FNW96] [NP99] [BST01] [L03]
- For most of the problems we address, the best previous result is through general MPC [Y82] [BGW88]



Thank you!