MSR
A Framework for Security Protocols and their Meta-Theory

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Outline

I. Mis-specification languages

II. MSR

- Overview
- Typing
- Access control
- Execution
- Properties
- Example

III. The most powerful attacker

- Dolev-Yao intruder

Part I

Mis-Specification Languages

Why is Protocol Analysis Difficult?

- Subtle cryptographic primitives
  - Dolev-Yao abstraction
- Distributed hostile environment
  - "Prudent engineering practice"
- Inadequate specification languages
  - *… the devil is in details …*

Dolev-Yao Abstraction

- Symbolic data
  - No bit-strings
- Perfect cryptography
  - No guessing of keys
- Public knowledge soup
  - Magic access to data

Languages to Specify What?

- Message flow
- Message constituents
- Operating environment
- Protocol goals

Desirable Properties

- Unambiguous
- Simple
- Flexible
  - Adapts to protocol
- Powerful
  - Applies to a wide class of protocols
- Insightful
  - Gives insight about protocols

“Usual Notation”

$$A \rightarrow B: \{n_A, A\}_{kB}$$

$$B \rightarrow A: \{n_A, n_B\}_{kA}$$

$$A \rightarrow B: \{n_B\}_{kB}$$

How does it do?

- Flow
  - Expected run
- Constituents
  - Side remarks
- Environment
  - Side remarks
- Goals
  - Side remarks

- Unambiguous ☹
- Simple ☺
- Flexible ☺
- Powerful ☺
- Insightful 😐

Strands



How do they do?

- Flow
  - Role-based
- Constituents
  - Informal math.
- Environment
  - Side remarks
- Goals
  - Side remarks

- Unambiguous 😐
- Simple ☺
- Flexible ☹
- Powerful ☹
- Insightful ☺

MSR 1.x - Initiator

Nonce generation

Message transmission

$$\pi_{A0}(A) \rightarrow L_0(A), \pi_{A0}(A)$$

$$L_0(A), \pi_{A1}(B) \rightarrow \exists n_A.\ L_1(A,B,n_A), N(\{n_A,A\}_{kB}), \pi_{A1}(B)$$

$$L_1(A,B,n_A), N(\{n_A,n_B\}_{kA}) \rightarrow L_2(A,B,n_A,n_B)$$

$$L_2(A,B,n_A,n_B) \rightarrow L_3(A,B,n_A,n_B), N(\{n_B\}_{kB})$$

where $\pi_{A0}(A) = Pr(A), PrvK(A,k_A^{-1})$

$\pi_{A1}(B) = Pr(B), PubK(B,k_B)$

MSR 1.x - Responder

Role state predicate

$$\pi_{B0}(B) \rightarrow L_0(B), \pi_{B0}(B)$$

$$L_0(A), \pi_{B1}(A), N(\{n_A, A\}_{kB}) \rightarrow L_1(A,B,n_A), \pi_{B1}(A)$$

$$L_1(A,B,n_A) \rightarrow \exists n_B.\ L_2(A,B,n_A,n_B), N(\{n_A,n_B\}_{kA})$$

$$L_2(A,B,n_A,n_B), N(\{n_B\}_{kB}) \rightarrow L_3(A,B,n_A,n_B)$$

Persistent Info.

where $\pi_{B0}(B) = Pr(B), PrvK(B,k_B^{-1})$

$\pi_{B1}(A) = Pr(A), PubK(A,k_A)$

How did we do?

- Flow
  - Role-based
- Constituents
  - Persistent info.
- Environment
  - *In part*
- ~~Goals~~

- Unambiguous ☺
- Simple 😐
- Flexible ☹
- Powerful ☹
- Insightful ☺

How *will* we do?

- Flow
  - Role-based
- Constituents
  - Strong typing
- Environment
  - *In part*
- ~~Goals~~

- Unambiguous ☺
- Simple ☺
- Flexible ☺
- Powerful ☺
- Insightful ☺

Part II

MSR

What's in MSR 2.0 ?

- Multiset rewriting with existentials
- Dependent types w/ subsorting 

- Memory predicates 

- Constraints 

Terms

- Atomic terms
  - Principal names A
  - Keys k
  - Nonces n
  - …
- Term constructors
  - (_ _)
  - {_} _ {{_}}_
  - [_] _
  - …

Definable

Rules

$\forall x_1 : \tau_1 .$

...

$\forall x_n : \tau_n .$

lhs

$\rightarrow$

$\exists y_1 : \tau'_1 .$

...

$\exists y_{n'} : \tau'_{n'} .$

rhs

- $N(t)$ Network
- $L(t, \ldots, t)$ Local state
- $M_A(t, \ldots, t)$ Memory
- χ Constraints

- $N(t)$ Network
- $L(t, \ldots, t)$ Local state
- $M_A(t, \ldots, t)$ Memory

Types of Terms

- A: princ
- n: nonce
- k: shK A B
- k: pubK A
- k': privK k
- … (definable)

Types can depend on term

- Captures relations between objects
- Subsumes persistent information
  - Static
  - Local
  - Mandatory

Subtyping

$\tau :: msg$

- Allows atomic terms in messages
- Definable
  - Non-transmittable terms
  - Sub-hierarchies

Role state predicates

$L_l(A, t, \ldots, t)$

- Hold data local to a role instance
  - Lifespan = role
- Invoke next rule
  - L_l = control
  - $(A, t, \ldots, t)$ = data

Memory Predicates

$M_A(t, \ldots, t)$

- Hold private info. across role exec.
- Support for subprotocols
  - Communicate data
  - Pass control
- Interface to outside system
- Implements intruder

Constraints

New

χ

- Guards over interpreted domain
  - Abstract
  - Modular
- Invoke constraint handler
- E.g.: timestamps
  - $(T_E = T_N + T_d)$
  - $(T_N < T_E)$

Type of predicates

- Dependent sums



- Forces associations among arguments
  - E.g.: $\text{princ}^{(A)}$ x $\text{pubK}\ A^{(k_A)}$ x $\text{privK}\ k_A$

Roles

Role state pred. var. declarations

- Generic roles

$$\forall A \left(\begin{array}{l} \exists L: \tau'_1(x_1) \times \ldots \times \tau'_n(x_n) \\ \ldots \\ \forall x{:}\tau. \quad \text{lhs} \quad \exists y{:}\tau'. \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{rhs} \\ \ldots \quad\quad\quad \ldots \quad\quad\quad \ldots \\ \forall x{:}\tau. \quad \text{lhs} \quad \exists y{:}\tau'. \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{rhs} \end{array} \right)$$

Role owner

- Anchored roles

$$A \left(\begin{array}{l} \exists L: \tau'_1(x_1) \times \ldots \times \tau'_n(x_n) \\ \ldots \\ \forall x{:}\tau. \quad \text{lhs} \quad \exists y{:}\tau'. \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{rhs} \\ \ldots \quad\quad\quad \ldots \quad\quad\quad \ldots \\ \forall x{:}\tau. \quad \text{lhs} \quad \exists y{:}\tau'. \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{rhs} \end{array} \right)$$

MSR 2.0 – NS Initiator

$\forall A$

$\exists L$: princ × princ$^{(B)}$ × pubK B × nonce.

$\forall B$: princ
$\forall k_B$: pubK B

•

$\rightarrow$

$\exists n_A$:nonce.

$L(A,B,k_B,n_A)$
$N(\{n_A,A\}_{kB})$

$\forall$ ...
$\forall k_A$: pubK A
$\forall k'_A$: privK k_A
$\forall n_A, n_B$: nonce

$L(A,B,k_B,n_A)$
$N(\{n_A,n_B\}_{kA})$

$\rightarrow$

$N(\{n_B\}_{kB})$

MSR 2.0 – NS Responder

$\forall B$

$\exists L$: princ$^{(B)}$ x pubK $B^{(kB)}$ x privK k_B x nonce.

$\forall k_B$: pubK B
$\forall k'_B$: privK k_B
$\forall A$: princ
$\forall n_A$: nonce
$\forall k_A$: pubK A

$N(\{n_A, A\}_{kB}) \rightarrow \exists n_B$:nonce. $L(B, k_B, k'_B, n_B)$ $N(\{n_A, n_B\}_{kA})$

$\forall$ ...
$\forall n_B$: nonce

$L(B, k_B, k'_B, n_B)$ $N(\{n_B\}_{kB}) \rightarrow \bullet$

Type Checking

New

$\Sigma \vdash P$

$\Gamma \vdash t : \tau$

t has type τ in Γ

P is well-typed in Σ

- Catches:
  - Encryption with a nonce
  - Transmission of a long term key
  - Circular key hierarchies, …
- Static and dynamic uses
- Decidable

Access Control

$\Sigma \Vdash P$

r is AC-valid for A in Γ

$\Gamma \Vdash_A r$

P is AC-valid in Σ

- Catches
  - A signing/encrypting with B's key
  - A accessing B's private data, …
- Fully static
- Decidable
- Gives meaning to Dolev-Yao intruder

Snapshots

Active role set

$C = [S]^{R}_{\Sigma}$

State

- $N(t)$
- $L_I(t, \ldots, t)$
- $M_A(t, \ldots, t)$

Signature

- $a : \tau$
- $L_I : \underline{\tau}$
- $M\_ : \underline{\tau}$

Execution Model

1-step firing

$$P \triangleright C \rightarrow C'$$

- Activate roles
- Generates new role state pred. names
- Instantiate variables
- Apply rules
- Skips rules

Rule application

$$F, \chi \rightarrow \exists \underline{n}{:}\underline{\tau}.\ G(\underline{n})$$

- Constraint check

$$\Sigma \models \chi \qquad \text{(constraint handler)}$$

- Firing

$$\underbrace{[S_1]^R_{\Sigma}}_{S,\,F} \rightarrow \underbrace{[S_2]^R_{\Sigma,\,\underline{c}:\underline{\tau}}}_{S,\,G(\underline{c})} \qquad \underline{c} \text{ not in } S_1$$

Properties

- Admissibility of parallel firing
- Type preservation
- Access control preservation
- Completeness of Dolev-Yao intruder

Completed Case-Studies

- Full Needham-Schroeder public-key
- Otway-Rees
- Neuman-Stubblebine repeated auth.
- OFT group key management
- *Dolev-Yao intruder*

Part III

The Most Powerful Attacker

Execution with an Attacker

$$P,\ P_I \triangleright C \rightarrow C'$$

- Selected principal(s): I
- Generic capabilities: P_I
  - Well-typed
  - AC-valid
- Modeled completely within MSR

The Dolev-Yao Intruder

- Specific protocol suite P_{DY}
- Underlies every protocol analysis tool
- Completeness still unproved !!!

Capabilities of the D-Y Intruder

- Intercept / emit messages
- Split / form pairs
- Decrypt / encrypt with known key
- Look up public information
- Generate fresh data

DY Intruder – Data access

- $M_I(t)$: Intruder knowledge

$$\left[\forall A\text{: princ.} \bullet \rightarrow M_I(A)\right]^I$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{l}\forall A\text{: princ} \\ \forall k\text{: shK I A}\end{array} \bullet \rightarrow M_I(k)\right]^I \quad \textit{+ dual}$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{l}\forall A\text{: princ} \\ \forall k\text{: pubK A}\end{array} \bullet \rightarrow M_I(k)\right]^I \left[\begin{array}{l}\forall k\text{: pubK I} \\ \forall k'\text{: privK k}\end{array} \bullet \rightarrow M_I(k')\right]^I$$

- No nonces, no other keys, …

DY Intruder – Data Generation

- Safe data

$$\left[\bullet \rightarrow \exists n{:}\mathsf{nonce}.\ M_I(n)\right]^I \qquad \left[\bullet \rightarrow \exists m{:}\mathsf{msg}.\ M_I(m)\right]^I$$

- Anything else ?

$$\left[\forall A,B{:}\mathsf{princ}.\ \bullet \rightarrow \exists k{:}\mathsf{shK}\ A\ B.\ M_I(k)\right]^I \qquad ???$$

- It depends on the protocol !!!
  - Automated generation ?

DY Intruder Stretches AC to Limit



Completeness of D-Y Intruder

- If $P \triangleright [S]^{R}_{\Sigma} \rightarrow [S']^{R'}_{\Sigma'}$

  with all well-typed and *AC*-valid

- Then

$$\underline{P},\ P_{DY} \triangleright [\underline{S}]^{R}_{\underline{\Sigma}} \rightarrow [\underline{S'}]^{R'}_{\underline{\Sigma'}}$$

Encoding of P, S, Σ

P Remove roles anchored on I

S Map I's state / mem. pred. using M_I

Σ Remove I's role state pred.; add M_I

Encoding of R

- No encoding on structure of R
  - Lacks context!
- Encoding on AC-derivation for R

$$A :: \Sigma \vdash R$$

  - Associate roles from P_{DY} to each AC rule

Completeness proof

- Induction on execution sequence
- Simulate every step with P_{DY}
  - Rule application
    - Induction on *AC*-derivation for R
    - Every *AC*-derivation maps to execution sequence relative to P_{DY}
  - Rule instantiation
    - *AC*-derivations preserved
    - Encoding unchanged

Consequences

- Justifies design of current tools
- Support optimizations
  - D-Y intr. often too general/inefficient
    - Generic optimizations
    - *Per protocol* optimizations
    - Restrictive environments
- Caps multi-intruder situations

Conclusions

- Framework for specifying protocols
  - Precise
  - Flexible
  - Powerful
- Provides
  - Type /AC checking
  - Sequential / parallel execution model
  - Insights about Dolev-Yao intruder

Future work

- Experimentation
  - Clark-Jacob library
  - Fair-exchange protocols
  - More multicast
- Pragmatics
  - Type-reconstruction
  - Operational execution model(s)
  - Implementation
- Automated specification techniques