
# 15-780: Graduate AI *Lecture 19. Learning*

Geoff Gordon (this lecture) Tuomas Sandholm TAs Sam Ganzfried, Byron Boots States of the st

# Review

# Stationary distribution



# Stationary distribution

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$$Q(\mathbf{x}_{t+1}) = \int \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}_{t+1} \mid \mathbf{x}_t) Q(\mathbf{x}_t) d\mathbf{x}_t$$

# MH algorithm

 Proof that MH algorithm's stationary distribution is the desired P(x)

 Based on detailed balance: transitions between x and x' happen equally often in each direction

#### Gibbs

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- Special case of MH
- Proposal distribution: conditional probability of block i of x, given rest of x
- Acceptance probability is always 1


# Sequential sampling

• Often we want to keep a sample of belief at current time

- This is the sequential sampling problem
- Common algorithm: particle filter
  - Parallel importance sampling for  $P(\mathbf{x}_{t+1} | \mathbf{x}_t)$

# Particle filter example

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## Learning

• Improve our model, using sampled data

- *Model = factor graph, SAT formula, ...*
- Hypothesis space = { all models we'll consider }
- Conditional models

# Version space algorithm


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- *Predict w/ majority of still-consistent hypotheses*
- Mistake bound analysis



#### Recall iris example

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- $\mathcal{H} = factor graphs of given structure$
- Need to specify entries of  $\phi s$

#### Factors

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φ <sub>0</sub>			
setosa	р		
versicolor	q		
virginica	1-p-q		

$\phi_1 - \phi_4$					
	lo	т	hi		
set.	$p_i$	$q_i$	$1-p_i-q_i$		
vers.	r <sub>i</sub>	Si	$1-r_i-s_i$		
vir.	$u_i$	Vi	$1-u_i-v_i$		

#### Continuous factors

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φ1					
	lo	m	hi		
set.	<i>p</i> 1	$q_1$	$1 - p_1 - q_1$	$ \Phi $	
vers.	r <sub>1</sub>	<i>S</i> 1	$1 - r_1 - s_1$		
vir.	<b>U</b> 1	V1	$1 - u_1 - v_1$		

$$\dot{\Phi}_1(\ell, s) = \exp(-(\ell - \ell_s)^2/2\sigma^2)$$

parameters  $\ell_{\text{set}}$ ,  $\ell_{\text{vers}}$ ,  $\ell_{\text{vir}}$ ; constant  $\sigma^2$ 

Discretized petal length

Continuous petal length

# Simpler example

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Coin toss

#### Parametric model class

- $\mathcal{H}$  is a **parametric** model class: each H in  $\mathcal{H}$  corresponds to a vector of parameters  $\theta = (p)$  or  $\theta = (p, q, p_1, q_1, r_1, s_1, ...)$
- $H_{\theta}: X \sim P(X \mid \theta) (or, Y \sim P(Y \mid X, \theta))$
- Contrast to discrete *H*, as in version space
- Could also have **mixed** *H*: discrete choice among parametric (sub)classes

### Prior

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- Write  $D = (X_1, X_2, ..., X_N)$
- $H_{\theta}$  gives  $P(\boldsymbol{D} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta})$
- Bayesian learning also requires prior
  - $\circ$  distribution over  $\mathcal H$
  - for parametric classes,  $P(\theta)$
- Together,  $P(\mathbf{D} \mid \theta) P(\theta) = P(\mathbf{D}, \theta)$

#### Prior


• E.g., for coin toss,  $p \sim Beta(a, b)$ :  $P(p \mid a, b) = \frac{1}{B(a, b)} p^{a-1} (1-p)^{b-1}$ 

• *Specifying*, *e.g.*, *a* = 2, *b* = 2:

$$P(p) = 6p(1-p)$$

# Prior for *p*

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#### Coin toss, cont'd

P 8 4 2 2

#### • Joint dist'n of parameter p and data $x_i$ :

$$P(p, \mathbf{x}) = P(p) \prod_{i} P(x_i \mid p)$$
  
=  $6p(1-p) \prod_{i} p^{x_i} (1-p)^{1-x_i}$ 

#### Posterior

- $P(\theta \mid D)$  is posterior
- Prior says what we know about θ before seeing D; posterior says what we know after seeing D
- Bayes rule:
  - $P(\theta \mid \mathbf{D}) = P(\mathbf{D} \mid \theta) P(\theta) / P(\mathbf{D})$
- $P(\mathbf{D} | \theta)$  is (data or sample) likelihood

### Coin flip posterior


 $P(p \mid \mathbf{x}) = P(p) \prod_{i} P(x_i \mid p) / P(\mathbf{x})$  $= \frac{1}{2} p(1-p) \prod_{i} p^{x_i} (1-p)^{1-x_i}$ 

$$= \frac{1}{Z} p^{1+\sum_{i} x_{i}} (1-p)^{1+\sum_{i} (1-x_{i})}$$

= Beta $(2 + \sum_{i} x_i, 2 + \sum_{i} (1 - x_i))$ 


# Prior for *p*

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
#### Posterior after 4 H, 7 T

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#### Posterior after 10 H, 19 T

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# Where does prior come from?

- $\circ$  Sometimes, we know something about  $\theta$  ahead of time
  - in this case, encode knowledge in prior
  - e.g.,  $\|\theta\|$  small, or  $\theta$  sparse
- Often, we want prior to be noninformative (i.e., not commit to anything about θ)
  - in this case, make prior "flat"
  - then  $P(\mathbf{D} \mid \theta)$  typically overwhelms  $P(\theta)$

#### Predictive distribution

 Posterior is nice, but doesn't tell us directly what we need to know

- We care more about  $P(x_{N+1} | x_1, ..., x_N)$
- *By law of total probability, conditional independence:*

$$P(x_{N+1} \mid \mathbf{D}) = \int P(x_{N+1}, \theta \mid \mathbf{D}) d\theta$$
$$= \int P(x_{N+1} \mid \theta) P(\theta \mid \mathbf{D}) d\theta$$

# Coin flip example

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- After 10 H, 19 T: p ~ Beta(12, 21)
- $\circ E(x_{N+1} \mid p) = p$
- $E(x_{N+1} | \theta) = E(p | \theta) = a/(a+b) = 12/33$
- So, predict 36.4% chance of H on next flip



## Approximate Bayes


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- Coin flip example was easy
- In general, computing posterior (or predictive distribution) may be hard
- Solution: use the approximate integration techniques we've studied!

# Bayes as numerical integration

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- Parameters  $\theta$ , data D
- $P(\theta \mid \mathbf{D}) = P(\mathbf{D} \mid \theta) P(\theta) / P(\mathbf{D})$
- Usually,  $P(\theta)$  is simple; so is  $ZP(D \mid \theta)$
- So,  $P(\theta \mid D) \propto Z P(D \mid \theta) P(\theta)$
- Perfect for MH



#### Posterior


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$$P(a, b \mid x_i, y_i) =$$

$$ZP(a, b) \prod_i \sigma(ax_i + b)^{y_i} \sigma(-ax_i - b)^{1-y_i}$$

$$P(a, b) = N(0, I)$$

# Sample from posterior




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# Bayes discussion

### Expanded factor graph



### Inference vs. learning

 Inference on expanded factor graph = learning on original factor graph

- aside: why the distinction between inference and learning?
- mostly a matter of algorithms: parameters are usually continuous, often high-dimensional

### Why Bayes?

- Recall: we wanted to ensure our agent doesn't choose too many mistaken actions
- Each action can be thought of as a bet:
   e.g., eating X = bet X is not poisonous
- We choose bets (actions) based on our inferred probabilities
- *E.g.*, *R* = 1 for eating non-poisonous, –99 for poisonous: eat iff P(poison) < 0.01

### Choosing bets

- Don't know which bets we'll need to make
- So, Bayesian reasoning tries to set probabilities that result in reasonable betting decisions no matter what bets we are choosing among
- I.e., works if betting against an **adversary** (with rules defined as follows)

### Bayesian bookie

- Bookie (our agent) accepts bets on any event (defined over our joint distribution)
  - A: next I. versicolor has petal length  $\geq 4.2$
  - B: next three coins in a row come up H
  - $\circ C: A \wedge B$

### Odds

- Bookie can't refuse bets, but can set odds:
  A: 1:1 odds (stake of \$1 wins \$1 if A)
  - $\neg B$ : 1:7 odds (stake of \$7 wins \$1 if  $\neg B$ )
- Must accept same bet in either direction
  - no "house cut"
  - *e.g.*, 7:1 odds on  $B \Leftrightarrow 1:7$  odds on  $\neg B$

### Odds vs. probabilities

 Bookie should choose odds based on probabilities

- *E.g.*, *if coin is fair*, P(B) = 1/8
- So, should give 7:1 odds on B (1:7 on ¬B)
  bet on B: (1/8) (7) + (7/8) (-1) = 0
  bet on ¬B: (7/8) (1) + (1/8) (-7) = 0
  In general: odds x:y ⇔ p = y/(x+y)

### Conditional bets

- We'll also allow conditional bets: "I bet that, if we go to the restaurant, Ted will order the fries"
- If we go and Ted orders fries, I win
- If we go and Ted doesn't order fries, I lose
- If we don't go, bet is called off

### How can adversary fleece us?

 Method 1: by knowing the probabilities better than we do

- *if this is true, we're sunk*
- so, assume no informational advantage for adversary
- Method 2: by taking advantage of bookie's non-Bayesian reasoning

### Example of Method 2

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Suppose I give probabilities:
 P(A)=0.5 P(A ^ B)=0.333 P(B | A)=0.5

 Adversary will bet on A at 1:1, on ¬(A^B) at 1:2, and on B | A at 1:1

### Result of bet

Ballin & ten works in

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A	B	<b>\$</b> 1	<b>\$</b> 2	<b>\$</b> 3	$\$_{ttl}$
T	T	1	-2	1	0
T	F	1	1	-1	1
F	T	-1	1	0	0
F	F	-1	1	0	0

• A at 1:1  $\neg(A^B)$  at 1:2 B|A at 1:1

### Dutch book

• Called a "Dutch book"

- Adversary can print money, with no risk
- This is bad for us...
  - we shouldn't have stated incoherent probabilities
  - i.e., probabilities inconsistent with Bayes rule

### Theorem

- If we do all of our reasoning according to Bayesian axioms of probability, we will never be subject to a Dutch book
- So, if we don't know what decisions we're going to need to make based on learned hypothesis H, we should use Bayesian learning to compute posterior P(H)

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# Cheaper approximations

### Getting cheaper

- Maximum a posteriori (MAP)
- Maximum likelihood (MLE)
- Conditional MLE / MAP

 Instead of true posterior, just use single most probable hypothesis

### MAP

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## $\arg\max_{\theta} P(D \mid \theta) P(\theta)$

• Summarize entire posterior density using the maximum

### MLE

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## $\arg\max_{\theta} P(D \mid \theta)$

#### • Like MAP, but ignore prior term

### Conditional MLE, MAP

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
$$\arg \max_{\theta} P(\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}, \theta)$$
$$\arg \max_{\theta} P(\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}, \theta) P(\theta)$$

• Split  $D = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ 

• Condition on **x**, try to explain only **y** 


### Iris example: MAP vs. posterior

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### Irises: MAP vs. posterior

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### Too certain

- This behavior of MAP (or MLE) is typical: we are too sure of ourselves
- But, often gets better with more data
- Theorem: MAP and MLE are consistent estimates of true  $\theta$ , if "data per parameter"  $\rightarrow \infty$