

Canonical Optimization Problem: $f^* = \min_{x \in X} f(x)$; $X = \{x : h_i(x) \leq 0, l_j(x) = 0\}$

Lagrangian: $L(x, \lambda, \gamma) = f(x) + \sum_i \lambda_i h_i(x) + \sum_j \gamma_j l_j(x)$

Note: $\min_{x \in X} f(x) = \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} \max_{\substack{\lambda \geq 0 \\ \gamma \in \mathbb{R}}} L(x, \lambda, \gamma)$

Lagrange dual function: $g^* = g(\lambda, \gamma) = \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} L(x, \lambda, \gamma)$

Dual problem: $\max_{\substack{\lambda \geq 0 \\ \gamma \in \mathbb{R}}} g(\lambda, \gamma) := \max_{\lambda \geq 0, \gamma} \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} L(x, \lambda, \gamma)$

$\min_x x$
 $x^2 \leq \epsilon^2$
 $L(x, \lambda) = x - \lambda(\epsilon^2 - x^2)$
 $g(\lambda) = \min_x x - \lambda(\epsilon^2 - x^2)$
 $1 + 2\lambda x = 0$
 $x = \frac{-1}{2\lambda}$
 $= \frac{-1}{4\lambda} - \lambda\epsilon^2$
 $\lambda = \frac{1}{4\epsilon}, x = \frac{2\epsilon}{\lambda}$

$\forall x \in X, \lambda \geq 0 \quad f(x) \geq L(x, \lambda, \gamma)$

$\forall \lambda \geq 0 \Rightarrow f^* \geq \min_{x \in X} L(x, \lambda, \gamma) \geq \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} L(x, \lambda, \gamma) = g(\lambda, \gamma)$

$\Rightarrow f^* \geq g^*$ (weak duality)

Slater's condition: $\exists x \in X$ feasible, strictly feasible for non-affine constraints

\Rightarrow strong duality holds

Strong duality if holds at equality.

Matrix games: $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, A_{ij} is payoff to row player if he plays i and she plays j
 $-A_{ij}$ " " column " "

$\Rightarrow x, y \in \Delta = \{p : p \geq 0, \sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1\}$ are randomized strategies, then $x^T A y$ is x 's expected payoff

Model as an optimization problem: x goes first, y goes first
 $\max_{x \in \Delta} \min_{y \in \Delta} x^T A y$ or $\min_{y \in \Delta} \max_{x \in \Delta} x^T A y$

$\max_{x \in \Delta} \min_{y \in \Delta} t - (t e - A^T x)^T y + u^T x + q(1 - e^T x)$
 $t(1 - y^T e) + (A y + u - q e)^T x + q$
 $\min_{y \in \Delta} y^T e = 1, A y + u - q e = 0$

$= \max_{x \in \Delta} t$
 $A^T x \geq t e$ (P)

Strong Duality holds by Slater's condition
 \Rightarrow No advantage to going "second"

$\min_{y \in \Delta} q$
 $A y \leq q e$ (D)

KKT conditions:

$$\nabla f(x^*) + \sum_i \lambda_i^* h_i(x^*) + \sum_j \gamma_j^* l_j(x^*) = 0 \quad (\text{stationary})$$

$$h_i(x^*) \leq 0 \quad \forall_i \quad (\text{primal feasible})$$

$$l_j(x^*) = 0 \quad \forall_j$$

$$\lambda^* \geq 0 \quad (\text{dual feasible})$$

$$\lambda_i^* h_i(x^*) = 0 \quad \forall_i \quad (\text{complementary slackness})$$

Strong Duality \Rightarrow KKT
 x^* is primal opt, λ^*, γ^* are dual opt

$$f(x^*) = g(\lambda^*, \gamma^*) = \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x) + \sum_i \lambda_i^* h_i(x) + \sum_j \gamma_j^* l_j(x)$$

$$\leq f(x^*) + \underbrace{\sum_i \lambda_i^* h_i(x^*)}_{\leq 0} + \underbrace{\sum_j \gamma_j^* l_j(x^*)}_{=0} \quad (\text{primal feasible})$$

$$\leq f(x^*) \quad (\text{primal feasible})$$

$$\Rightarrow f(x^*) = f(x^*) + \sum_i \lambda_i^* h_i(x^*) + \sum_j \gamma_j^* l_j(x^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \lambda_i^* h_i(x^*) = 0 \quad \forall_i \quad (\text{complementary slackness})$$

$$\Rightarrow x^* = \arg \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} f(x) + \sum_i \lambda_i^* h_i(x) + \sum_j \gamma_j^* l_j(x)$$

$$\Rightarrow \nabla f(x^*) + \sum_i \lambda_i^* \nabla h_i(x^*) + \sum_j \gamma_j^* \nabla l_j(x^*) = 0 \quad (\text{stationarity})$$

KKT + convex \Rightarrow strong duality

$$g^* = g(\lambda^*, \gamma^*) = \min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^n} L(x, \lambda^*, \gamma^*)$$

$$= L(x^*, \lambda^*, \gamma^*) \quad (\text{stationarity})$$

$$= f(x^*) - f^* \quad (\text{primal feasible, complementary slackness})$$