WASHINGTON, May 25 (UPI) -- Recommendations of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Commercial/Military Concerns with the People's Republic of China, first made in the committee's classified report Jan. 3 and now made public: 1. That the president report to congressional leaders at least every six months on steps being taken by the Departments of Energy and Defense, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and all other relevant executive departments and agencies to respond to espionage by the People's Republic of China as typified by the theft of sophisticated U. S. nuclear weapons design information, and the targeting by the PRC of U.S. nuclear weapons codes and other national security information of strategic concern. 2. The Energy Department implement as quickly as possible and then sustain an effective counterintelligence program. 3. Appropriate congressional committees review, as expeditiously as possible, steps the executive branch is taking to implement Presidential Decision Directive 61 and determine whether additional measures are required to put an adequate counterintelligence program in place at the Energy Department. 4. Appropriate executive departments and agencies conduct a comprehensive damage assessment of the strategic implications of the security breaches at the national laboratories and report to appropriate congressional committees. 5. Appropriate congressional committees should report legislation, if necessary, to facilitate accomplishment of the objectives set forth above. 6. That the secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, the attorney general, and the director of Central Intelligence direct their respective inspectors general and appropriate counterintelligence officials to examine the risks to U.S. national security of international scientific exchange programs between the United States and the PRC that involve the National Laboratories, and report to congressional leaders and appropriate committees by July 1. 7. That the appropriate congressional committees consider whether the current arrangements for controlling U.S. nuclear weapons development, testing, and maintenance within the Department of Energy are adequate to protect such weapons and related research and technology from theft and exploitation. 8. That Congress insist that the heads of executive departments and intelligence agencies comply with congressional notification requirements of the National Security Act. 9. The United States should insist that the PRC adhere fully to, and abide by, the Missile Technology Control Regime and all applicable guidelines. 10. The United States must vigorously enforce, and seek multilateral compliance with, the Missile Technology Control Regime. 11. The United States should work, including in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement, to establish new binding international controls on technology transfers that threaten international peace and U.S. national security. 12. That the United States take appropriate action to improve the sharing of information by nations that are major exporters of technology so that the United States can track movements of technology and enforce technology control and re-export requirements. 13. In light of the PRC's aggressive military technology acquisition campaign and its record as a proliferator, the United States should work to reduce the transfers of weapons systems and other militarily significant technologies from Russia and other nations to the PRC. These actions should include strengthening international measures, including economic incentives, to encourage Russia to become a full partner in stemming the proliferation of weapons. 14. Congressional committees develop legislation requiring the secretary of state, the director of central intelligence, and the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies to report in a timely fashion to appropriate congressional committees, including the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on technology transfers that raise a proliferation concern and on the implementation of all the foregoing recommendations for international actions by the United States. 15. Implement the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 1999. The Select Committee expects that the executive branch will aggressively implement the Satellite Export Control Provisions of the act. 16. The State Department license both exports of satellites and any satellite launch failure investigations, to protect the national security. 17. The State Department ensure that satellite export licenses and notices to Congress are acted on in a timely fashion and that exporters are informed about the progress of their applications and have access to appropriate dispute resolution procedures. 18. Congressional committees develop legislation to ensure that satellite manufacturers are not disadvantaged in areas as tax credits by the transfer to the State Department of responsibility to license satellite exports. 19. The Defense Department must give high priority to its obligations under the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for monitoring launches of U.S. satellites in foreign countries to prevent any transfer of information that could be used by the PRC to improve its missile launch capabilities. 20. Congressional committees develop legislation to make the Defense Department, not satellite firms, responsible for security at foreign launches. The satellite export licensee would be required to reimburse the Defense Department for the costs of security. 21. The Defense Department ensure sufficient training for space launch campaign monitors and assign adequate numbers of monitors to space launch campaigns. 22. Defense Department monitors maintain logs of all information authorized for transmission to the PRC and transmit that information to U.S. Defense, State, CIA, and Commerce Department officials. 23. Ensure that export control laws and regulations are applied in full to communications among satellite manufacturers, purchasers, and the insurance industry, including communications after launch failures. 24. Congressional committees develop legislation to stimulate domestic commercial space-launch capacity and competition. 25. Congressional committees develop legislation directing the Energy Department, in consultation with the Defense Department, to conduct a comprehensive review of the national security implications of exporting high-performance computers to the PRC. 26. Congressional committees report legislation directing the intelligence community to conduct an annual comprehensive threat assessment of the national security implications of export to the PRC of high-performance computers and other computers that can be clustered or combined through massively parallel processing. 27. The Select Committee recommends that the appropriate congressional committees report legislation that requires: --As a condition to U.S. HPC export licensing, the PRC by Sept. 30 establish an effective end-use verification for HPCs sold or to be sold to the PRC and, at a minimum, provide for on-site inspection of the end- use and end-user, without notice, by U.S. nationals designated by the U. S. government. --Failure to establish such a system by that date should result in the U.S. government's lowering the performance level of HPCs that may be exported to the PRC, denial of export licenses for computers destined to the PRC, or other appropriate measures. --An independent evaluation of the feasibility of improving end-use verification for HPCs in the PRC, and preventing the use of such HPCs for military purposes. 28. That congressional committees develop legislation that requires efforts by the executive branch to encourage other computer- manufacturing countries, especially those that manufacture HPCs, to adopt similar policies toward HPC exports to the PRC. 29. That congressional committees develop legislation to re-enact the Export Administration Act, with particular attention to re-establishing the higher penalties for violation of the act that have been allowed to lapse since 1994. 30. Relevant executive departments and agencies should establish a mechanism to identify, on a continuing basis, those controlled technologies and items that are of greatest national security concern. 31. Modify current licensing procedures for controlled technologies to provide longer review periods when deemed necessary for national security by any reviewing executive department or agency; and require a consensus by all reviewing executive departments and agencies for license approval, subject to appeal procedures. 32. Modify current licensing procedures for controlled technologies and items that are not of the greatest national security concern, to streamline the process and provide greater transparency, predictability and certainty. 33. Congressional committees develop legislation requiring executive departments and agencies to study, and periodically review, whether customs arrangements with Hong Kong should be tightened for export control purposes. 34. Congressional committees develop legislation amending the Defense Production Act of 1950 to require notice to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States by all U.S. companies that conduct national security-related business of any planned merger, acquisition, or takeover of the company by a foreign entity or by a U.S. entity controlled by a foreign entity. The amendment also should require executive departments and agencies to notify CFIUS of their knowledge of any such merger, acquisition, or takeover. 35. Executive departments and agencies with counterintelligence expertise conduct a comprehensive assessment of PRC espionage targeted against U.S. public and private entities. 36. Congressional committees develop legislation to authorize and direct the Justice Department to promptly share national security information, on a classified basis, with appropriate executive departments, agencies, and entities. 37. Congress require the secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury and the director of Central Intelligence to direct their respective Inspectors General to investigate the adequacy of current export controls and counterintelligence measures to protect against PRC acquisition of militarily-sensitive U.S. technology, and to report to Congress by July 1 regarding their findings and measures being undertaken to address deficiencies in these areas. 38. Congressional committees develop legislation directing the intelligence community to undertake and maintain an analysis of PRC aims, goals, and objectives with respect to the acquisition of foreign, and particularly U.S., technologies; including, for example, PRC efforts to exploit the open character of U.S. society by penetrating businesses, academic and social institutions, and political practices.  