Jim,

1 - Governance: p9/10 covering Scandinavia of the OFFER doc. still broadly 
reflects the position.  Plans to broaden the ownership base of Nord Pool 
beyond the Norwegian and Swedish SOs to include Finnish and Danish SOs have 
not yet materialised.  

2.- Transmission owner varies by country.  In N and S, state-owned entities 
(Statnett, SvK) that were demerged from state-owned generators (Statkraft, 
Vattenfall respectively) are the TOs and SOs (bundled).   As stated above, 
NPool is 50/50 owned by Statnett and SvK.  Fingrid, Finnish SO is 25% owned 
by PVO (generator), 25% Fortum (generator), government (12%) and 
institutional shareholders (38%).  In W.Denmark, the distribution companies 
own the SO, Eltra.   

In E.Denmark, the situation is somewhat in flux.  Elkraft System (SO) is now 
to be owned the E.DK distcos, rather than the dominant generator, EK Energi.  
I note that as of 1.01.01, Elkraft System and Elkraft Transmission have been 
established as separate entities so there is some move to separate, at least 
mominally, TO and SO roles.  However, any consideration of Denmark must 
acknowledge the consumer ownership model, which is effectively reverse 
vertical integration: distcos own the dominant generators

Finnish and Danish TOs/SOs have no stake in Nord Pool (MO).

3. Participation in Nord Pool remains voluntary.  Participants can contract 
directly with NP or with each other for supply.  All tranmission, with some 
exceptions, is allocated to Nord Pool and rationed and priced through the NP 
auction.

4.  Not quite sure what you mean here.  While there are increasing moves to 
coordinate system operation between the countries, each country has its own 
balancing market arrangements.

Most of the discussion in the OFFER document on Scandinavia still looks good 
to me.  Hope this does the job.

Regards
Philip





Mark Schroeder
04/01/2001 10:38
To: Philip Davies/LON/ECT@ECT
cc: James D Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron 

Subject: Re: NordPool  

Philip - thanks  mcs

Jim - I had one more thought after speaking with Jeff, and just wanted to 
make sure that it had been considered (may have been considered and rejected 
by now).  Any thought to treating the huge debt recently rolled up in a way 
that is akin to the olds PGA trackers in the gas industry, i.e., allow 
utilities a cost of capital (even very low, e.g., 5%), than allow a fixed 
monthly recovery, plus when wholesale (or retail prices) fall below some 
specified level they can also add in some of the outstanding balance on the 
debt that has recently accumulated?  For example if the price cap is set at 6 
cents per kWh, and an additional i cent is allowed for recovery of this debt, 
total bill is seven.  If prices eventually fall to 4 cents in a competitive 
market (California dreaming!?), then utility can recover 4, plus the 1 cent 
authorised, plus 2 cents applied toward the old debt (difference between 6 
and 4).  Customers could still switch suppliers, and might seek supplier who 
will not add on the 2 cents (good for Enron), but might meet the ratemaking 
principle that utility has been given reasonable opportunity to recover its 
costs.  Also at least delays, if not a permanent solution, any possible 
bankruptcy.  Just a thought.   mcs   



Philip Davies
04/01/2001 08:49
To: Mark Schroeder
cc:  

Subject: NordPool

FYI - I will respond.
---------------------- Forwarded by Philip Davies/LON/ECT on 04/01/2001 08:52 
---------------------------
From: James D Steffes@ENRON on 03/01/2001 17:46 CST
To: Philip Davies/LON/ECT@ECT
cc: Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron 

Subject: NordPool

Philip --

I wanted to make sure that the OFFER memo on Feb 98 still was correct for the 
NordPool.

The key issues we are trying to establish are -

1. Governance
1.b Relationship of Transmission Owner to System Operator and Market Operator
2. Mandatory / Voluntary Participation
3. Energy Pool vs. Balancing Pool

If the report is still good, we can probably just pull the answers with some 
help from you.

Jim