--------------------------vince kaminski


-----Original Message-----
From: Lin, Martin <Martin.Lin@ENRON.com>
To: Kaminski, Vince J <Vince.J.Kaminski@ENRON.com>
CC: 'vkaminski@aol.com' <vkaminski@aol.com>; Cunningham, Lance <Lance.Cunningham@ENRON.com>
Sent: Fri Oct 19 17:36:33 2001
Subject: Comments of Wolak

Wolak makes some good points.  In ERCOT, Enron is in support of nodal pricing.  I would not go so far as to say we are pushing for PJM's implementation, however, but for a market with nodal prices (and unilateral bids - aka unbalanced schedules, congestion reflect by price differentials, etc).  I was unaware PJM had such great power to alter bids.  This is something we don't want, and something for which I am not aware we have advocated.  Perhaps in Enron's promotion of locational prices, it has been retold as PJM-style locational prices.  Given that PJM is the most commonly cited example of locational prices, it does not surprise me to have the sloppiness in discussions that could lead to the rumors.

Martin

	 -----Original Message-----
	From: 	Kaminski, Vince J  
	Sent:	Friday, October 19, 2001 4:35 PM
	To:	Lin, Martin
	Cc:	'vkaminski@aol.com'
	Subject:	FW:  

	Martin, Lance

	What do you think?

	Vince

	 -----Original Message-----
	From: 	"Frank A. Wolak" <wolak@zia.Stanford.EDU>@ENRON  
	Sent:	Friday, October 19, 2001 4:28 PM
	To:	Kaminski, Vince J
	Subject:	 

	Vince,

	  I've been hearing rumors that Enron has decided to endorse
	the nodal pricing model as implemented in PJM.
	I just wanted to warn you that I'm not sure
	this is in Enron's long-term interest at all.  Let me explain
	why.  Feel free to give me a call if you'd like to talk
	more about this.

	  First, let me say that I firmly believe in locational pricing
	and specifically pricing congestion.  However, the way that PJM
	implements nodal pricing is to eliminate as much price volatility
	and reduce the transparency of the market.  Specifically, the
	PJM tariff gives the ISO the ability to mitigate to cost plus a
	%10 adder the bids of any market participant that the ISO deems
	is out of merit in one of the three zones in region.  (The fact
	that a nodal market is talking about zones should give you cause for alarm.)
	Then the ISO takes this mitigated bid and re-runs its price-setting
	software to compute new nodal prices.  The way I have (somewhat
	unfairly) decribed this price-setting process is that the
	PJM ISO decides what prices it would like
	for a given day and mitigates bids until it gets them.  This is not
	a transparent market, nor one where it makes any sense to buy
	the risk management services that Enron provides.  The
	only price volatility you have to worry about in the PJM market is
	that kind that comes about if they need imports into their control area
	to meet demand.  Under these circumstances, you need to pay the
	imports whatever is necessary to get them to come to your market.

	  However, bear in mind FERC's desire to make a large RTO on the
	East Coast.  This will effectively mean little imports
	to the East Coast RTO, so all bids can be mitigated at
	the discretion of the ISO.  Paying market-clearing prices to cost-of-service
	mitigated bids is just paying too much to eliminate price volatility.
	It effectively kills off the development of risk management at
	the wholesale and retail level.  Power marketing becomes much less
	profitable because retailers know you can always buy at cost-mitigated
	prices.

	  In short, the PJM model is not market.  It is just an alternative
	form of regulation that is politically attractive because it reduces
	price volatility, but it is not good for consumers or traders because they just
	get a higher cost form of regulation than traditional cost-of-service
	regulation. You pay market-clearing prices to cost-of-service
	mitigated bids, but under regulation you could just pay cost-of-service
	prices and eliminate the infra-marginal profits to low cost generators.

	  As we discussed during our dinner, I think the two biggest sources
	of benefits from re-structuring will come from getting the demand-side
	involved in the market and from more efficient risk management.  A
	necessary condition for both of these to occur is prices that reflect
	actual conditions in the market (including the extent of market power
	exercised).  Masking these signals dulls any incentive for market
	participants to make the investment necessary to management.  The PJM
	model is just way to have a market in name without achieving any
	significant benefits to consumers or energy traders.

	Frank