please look into this.  apparently a web server in portland was infected so it is no joke.  

---------------------- Forwarded by Cooper Richey/CAL/ECT on 05/09/2001 10:58 AM ---------------------------
From:	Robert Anderson/ENRON@enronXgate on 05/09/2001 11:58 AM CDT
To:	Cooper Richey/CAL/ECT@ECT
cc:	 
Subject:	Confirmed Worm Attack


The alert that we sent out yesterday was only half of what has now been confirmed as a "worm" attack. For those not familiar with the term, a worm is an attack program that automatically launches a new attack from each machine that it breaks into. This particular worm is attacking both Microsoft IIS servers (which we knew) and Sun Solaris systems.

The CERT advisory discussing the worm is attached below. The Solaris vulnerability is a bug that was discovered two years ago, and the patch has been available. Hopefully, very few of our systems will have this vulnerability, but two EBS servers that we are aware of have already been compromised.

Compromised Sun systems are used to launch further attacks and may be seen by others as Enron systems launching attacks. Please check immediately to ensure that all of your Internet facing servers have either had the patches installed or are not running the affected software.

We have contacted  the FBI to report these attacks. If you do discover any other compromised servers please make backups of all logs and files that may have been uploaded to the server. Please contact me if you have any questions at 713-853-9373.

Thanks,

Mark Thibodeaux
IT Compliance
Enron Corp.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm

   Original release date: May 08, 2001
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS
     * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and
       including, Solaris 7

Overview

   The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of self-propagating
   malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The worm
   uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and deface
   web pages.

I. Description

   Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a
   vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs software to
   attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a component
   to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris systems.
   It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home
   directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host Solaris
   system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems.

   To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of a
   two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice sadmind
   program. For more information on this vulnerability, see

          http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/28934
          http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html

   After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a
   seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems. For
   additional information about this vulnerability, see

          http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677

   Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm exhibit
   the following characteristics:

     *
Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system

May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Bus Error - c
ore dumped
May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation
Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation
Fault - core dumped
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Hangup
May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
May  7 02:44:14 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Killed
     * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600
     * Existence of the directories

     * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines
     * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and
       propagate

     Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm, such as
   the following:
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111
     * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh
     * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh
     * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f
     * /bin/sleep 300

   Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised exhibit the
   following characteristics:

     * Modified web pages that read as follows:
                            fuck USA Government
                               fuck PoizonBOx
                       contact:sysadmcn@yahoo.com.cn
     *
Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server

2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\ 200 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe \
           /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+root.exe 502 -
2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
           GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+\
           &LT;HTML code inserted here>.././index.asp 502 -

II. Impact

   Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to scan and
   compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems compromised by
   this worm can suffer modified web content.

   Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm to
   execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable Solaris
   systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
   IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems.

   We are receiving reports of other activity, including one report of
   files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine, rendering
   them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity is
   directly related to this worm.

III. Solutions

Apply a patch from your vendor

   A patch is available from Microsoft at

          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp

          For IIS Version 4:
          http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q26986
          2/default.asp

          For IIS Version 5:
          http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862
          /default.asp

   Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available from

          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp
          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools.asp

   Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun Security
   Bulletin #00191:

          http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se
          cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba

Appendix A. Vendor Information

Microsoft Corporation

   The following documents regarding this vulnerability are available
   from Microsoft:

          http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-023.asp

Sun Microsystems

   Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability:

          http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se
          cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba

References

    1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 vulnerable
       to directory traversal via extended unicode in url (MS00-078)
       http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677
    2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice
       AdminSuite Daemon sadmind
       http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html

   Authors:  Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff Carpenter,
   Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-11.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert@cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.

   CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
   Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
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    Using encryption

   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
   Our public PGP key is available from

   http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

   If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
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    Getting security information

   CERT publications and other security information are available from
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   To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
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   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.
   ______________________________________________________________________

   NO WARRANTY
   Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
   Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
   Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
   implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
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   does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
   patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
     _________________________________________________________________

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.

   Revision History
May 08, 2001: Initial Release

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