

# Take-Home Exam

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## Question 1

### An Algorithm

The algorithm is a variation of the DFS algorithm taught in class.

**The Algorithm:** In stage  $t$  of the algorithm each of the robots searches all the squares of distance  $n^t$  (say, rounded up to the nearest integer). The algorithm ends if the two robots map the same square. The order of the stages is  $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, \dots, 1$ . If the algorithm didn't end at one of the stages we simply search all board.

Notice that the number of stages is at most constant, for every constant  $\epsilon > 0$ .

**Theorem 0.1** *The algorithm provides a competitive ratio of  $n^{1+\epsilon}$ , for any fixed  $\epsilon > 0$ .*

**Proof:** Suppose that the optimal solution is of distance  $x$ . Now, in each stage  $t$  each of the robots explores (via the DFS)  $O(n^{2t})$  squares (as we have seen in class). If  $x \leq \sqrt{n}$  we'll find a meeting path in the first stage, and get a competitive ratio of  $O(n)$ .

The total distance traveled up to stage  $t$  (including the distance traveled in stage  $t$ ) is the distance traveled in stage  $t$  plus the total distance traveled in all of the previous stages. The total distance traveled in previous stages can be easily upper bounded by  $O(n^{2t-2\epsilon})$  (the number of previous stages times the distance traveled in the previous stage). So the total distance up to now is:  $O(n^{2t-2\epsilon}) + O(n^{2t}) = O(n^{2t})$ . Therefore, if  $X \geq n$ , the total distance traveled is  $O(n^2)$ , giving us a competitive ratio of at most  $O(n)$ .

Else, let  $t$  be the minimal stage in the algorithm where  $n^t \geq x$ . Observe that  $n^{t-\epsilon} \leq x \leq n^t$ . The competitive ratio is at most  $\frac{O(n^{2t})}{n^{t-\epsilon}} = O(n^{t+\epsilon}) = O(n^{1+\epsilon})$ , since  $t$  takes values between  $\frac{1}{2}$  and 1.  $\square$

### A Lower Bound

Similarly to the lower bound presented in class, consider the following instance:

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R					X				R
	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
					X				
	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
					X				
	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
					X				
	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
					X				

Quick legend: the instance represents an  $n \times n$  map, one robot is on the upper left corner, the other one is on the upper right corner (both marked in  $R$ ). An occupied square is marked in  $X$ .

Notice that there are about  $\frac{n}{2}$  corridors, and to get to middle of it, a robot need to travel a distance of  $\Theta(n)$ . If we remove the barrier between the two parts of one of the corridors, we get that the optimal solution is that both robots have to travel together a distance of  $\Theta(n)$ . However, in order to know which barrier was removed, at least one robot has to travel a distance of  $\Theta(n)$ . Since there are  $n$  corridors, in the worst case the total traveling distance of both robots (in order to find the path) is  $\Theta(n^2)$ , which gives us a lower bound of  $\Omega(n)$  on the competitive ratio, as needed.

## Question 2

1. We assume that  $i$  is equal to the  $j$ -width of the graph, and that the problem is strongly  $(i, j)$ -consistent, and we prove that there exists a vertical search order that guarantees  $j$ -bounded backtrack search. By definition, there exists a vertical order  $o$  on  $G$  with  $j$ -width  $i$ . Let  $v_l$  be the  $l$ -th variable in  $o$ . There exists  $k$ ,  $k \leq j$  and a set  $v_{l-k+1}, \dots, v_l$  of variables that depend on at most  $i$  preceding variables  $v_{t_1}, \dots, v_{t_m}$  ( $m \leq i$ ). Since the problem is strongly  $(i, j)$ -consistent, it is possible to complete the assignment to  $v_{t_1}, \dots, v_{t_m}$  with some assignment to  $v_{l-k+1}, \dots, v_l$  to a legal assignment to all these  $m + k$  variables. This way we are reconsidering only the assignment to  $v_{l-k+1}, \dots, v_{l-1}$  and giving a value to  $v_l$ , i.e. we are doing  $k$ -bounded backtrack search, and since  $k \leq j$ , it is also a  $j$ -bounded backtrack search. We will be doing such a  $j$ -bounded backtrack search for each  $v_l$ , and hence, by induction on  $l$ , it follows that  $o$  guarantees  $j$ -bounded backtrack search.
2. A counterexample for the claim:  $x \in \{3, 5\}$ ,  $y \in \{6, 10\}$ ,  $z \in \{3, 5\}$ . The constraints are  $x|y$ ,  $x|z$ . The problem is definitely  $(1, 2)$ -consistent, but it is not  $(2, 1)$ -consistent, because if we have an assignment  $y = 6$  and  $z = 5$ , then we cannot add an assignment to  $x$  to have a legal assignment to  $x, y$  and  $z$ .

## Question 3

1. We cannot use this algorithm to efficiently manipulate Dodgson's rule because determining the Dodgson score of a candidate is  $\mathcal{NP}$ -hard, so in the iterative step of the algorithm it will be  $\mathcal{NP}$ -hard to determine whether we can place some candidate in the next available spot without preventing  $p$  from winning.
2. **The Algorithm:** Let  $A$  be the set of candidates that beat  $a$  in pairwise elections.  
 $l = 0$   
while  $A \neq \emptyset$  do

Let  $S$  be the set of voters who do not have  $a$  on top of their preferences  
 All the voters in  $S$  push  $a$  one place upper  
 $l = l + |S|$   
 recalculate  $A$   
 endwhile  
 return  $l$

**Theorem 0.2** *The above algorithm is an  $n$ -approximation to the Dodgson score problem.*

**Proof:** Let  $t$  be the Dodgson score of  $a$ . The algorithm returns (not necessarily the least) number of exchanges between adjacent alternatives which are made till  $a$  becomes a Condorcet winner (till  $A = \emptyset$ ), and so the value returned by the algorithm,  $l \geq t$ . We need to show that  $l \leq nt$ . Let  $\succ^*$  be the profile which is obtained after  $t$  optimal exchanges of places between adjacent alternatives such that  $a$  is a Condorcet winner in  $\succ^*$ . After  $t$  iterations of the while loop of the algorithm,  $a$  is ranked by every voter  $i$  at least as high as in  $\succ^*$ , and all the rest candidates are ranked in the same places, and so  $a$  will be a Condorcet winner also after  $t$  iterations of the algorithm. In each iteration  $l$  is growing by at most  $n$ , and so after  $t$  iterations the algorithm will return  $l \leq nt$ .  $\square$

## Question 4

We start with some definitions. Player  $i$  is *interested* in a piece  $X$  if  $v_i(X) \geq \frac{1}{3}$ . He is *not interested* otherwise. He is *very interested* in  $X$  if  $v_i(X) \geq \frac{2}{3}$ .

The algorithm is as follows. First, some player, without loss of generality player 1, cuts the cake into two equal pieces (from his point of view):  $A$  and  $B$ . Every player is asked to declare if he is interested, very interested, or not interested at all. The algorithm now branches as follows:

- **There are 2 players that are interested in  $A$ , and the other two are interested in  $B$ :** In this case we run the equal-share protocol<sup>1</sup> described in class on each side (with the corresponding two players). Each player is left with a piece that worth  $\frac{1}{6}$  to him, as the equal-share protocol guarantees each player at least half of the value of the whole part, which was at least  $\frac{1}{3}$ .
- **There are 3 players that are very interested in the same piece (wlog,  $A$ ):** In that case we use the following sub-protocol: player 1 gets  $B$ . Player 2 cuts  $A$  into  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  both have the same value for him (so he is interested in both). Now players 3 and 4 declare if they are interested in  $A_1$  or in  $A_2$ . Notice that they are interested in at least one of  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , since they are very interested in  $A$ . If both 2 and 3 are interested in the same piece, we give 2 the other piece, and use the equal-share protocol to divide between 2 and 3 the piece are interested in. Clearly all players get a piece that has a value of at least  $\frac{1}{6}$  to them. Else, share using the equal-share protocol the piece that 2 and 3 are interested in, and give 3 the other one. Again, all players receive a piece that they value with at least  $\frac{1}{6}$ .

Simple case enumeration shows that the cases complement each other, as it is easy to see that given a partition of the cake into two pieces each player is either interested in both parts, or very interested in one part, and since the player 1 is interested in both parts.

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<sup>1</sup>One player cuts the part into two equal pieces, the other one chooses the more valuable piece.