Human-Centered AI:
challenges & opportunities

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Carnegie Mellon University

AI-SDM
AI INSTITUTE FOR
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Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- Challenges

Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

Part II (4-5:30 pm)

- Human-AI Complementarity
  - Human and Machine Intelligence
  - Human Decision Making
- *Cognitive AI*
- Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI
- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

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Role of Human Feedback in AI development

1970s

Expert systems



2020s

Self-supervised systems



Self-supervised vs. human objectives

Self-supervised learning

Large amounts of data (text, images, …)

Hold-out some data (pixels, next word in sentence, …)

Train a model to learn hold-out data from given partial data



Completion does not imply good judgement!

though works surprisingly well!!

Modern Self-supervised AI System

Large Language Models (LLMs)

Now it works, …

Suggest a good STEM project on archaeology for a sixth grader?

AI Overview +4

A great STEM archaeology project for a 6th grader is a **"Modern Artifacts" Mock Dig**, where they create a layered shoebox dig site with modern trash (plastic, foil, toys) in soil/sand, excavate carefully using tools, map finds on a grid, analyze the "artifacts" to infer the lifestyle of the "ancient" people (themselves!), and present findings, incorporating engineering (site design) and critical thinking about stratigraphy and cultural clues.

now it doesn't!

How long should chestnuts be roasted in the oven?

AI Overview +3

Roast chestnuts at **400°F (200°C) for 15-20 minutes** or **425°F (220°C) for about 30 minutes**, depending on the size. Before roasting, score each chestnut with a knife to

Risks of using Self-Supervised AI

Maternal health interventions



Allocation of disaster resources



NSF AI Institute for
Societal Decision Making

Risks of AI-enabled decisions:

Inaccurate

Incomplete

Unsafe

Unfair

Inappropriate

…

The big Q: AGI/ASI or Human-centered AI?





Making AI Human-centered

1970s

Expert systems



2020s

Self-supervised systems



Need to re-align AI systems with human values and expectations

- How to align?
- What to align?
- Who to align with?

Human Centered AI

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Types of Human Feedback - Labels

- **Labels**

Supervised learning/fine-tuning (SFT)

Input X

Flamingo

Label Y

Given labeled training data $\{X_i, Y_i\}_{i=1}^{n}$, learn/fine-tune AI model $f_\theta: X \rightarrow Y$ to predict label

$$min_\theta \; loss_n(f_\theta(X_i), Y_i) \qquad \text{optimization}$$

➢ Does well (generalizes) if predicted label $f_\theta(X)$ matches true label Y for unseen inputs X

Types of Human Feedback - Safeguards

- Labels
- **Safeguards/ Rules**

Predicted label $f_\theta(X)$ or parameters θ in safe set

Enforced via optimization (e.g. trust-region methods)

E.g. $\quad min_{\theta \in \Theta_{safe}} \, loss_n(f_\theta(X_i), Y_i) \quad$ optimization

OR

Guardrail prompts

E.g. "If response is not in {safe set}, do not answer."

➢ Hard to enforce/often jailbreak

Hard safety constraints lead to difficult optimization



Source: saferobotics.princeton.edu

Types of Human Feedback - Safeguards

- Labels

- **Safeguards/ Rules**

➢ Hard to enforce/often jailbreak



Sources: (GCG; Zou et al., 2023), (PAIR; Chao et al., 2023).

Types of Human Feedback - Demonstrations

- Labels
- Safeguards/ Rules
- **Demonstrations**

Large datasets containing (state, expert action)



Source: Ego-Exo4D dataset

Imitation learning - Mimic the expert!

Expert Demonstrations

Imitation learning – mimic the expert



State, s   expert action, a
Demonstration data

- **Behavioral Cloning (BC)**
  offline data from expert
  supervised learning of policy $\pi_\theta : s \rightarrow a$
  $min_\theta \; loss_n(\pi_\theta(s_i), a_i)$ optimization

- **DAgger**
  online interaction with expert
  collect expert actions for states visited by learnt policy

Source: Ross et al'11



Expert Demonstrations

Imitation learning – mimic the expert

- **Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL)**

  learn inherent reward function $r(s, a)$

  & choose actions that maximize reward

  Find r s.t. $\sum_{i=1}^{n} r(s_i, a_i) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} r(s_i, a_i')$

  - assumes expert is optimal (otherwise infeasible)
  - can learn from a single demonstration!



State, s expert action, a
Demonstration data

Types of Human Feedback

- Labels
- Safeguards/ Rules
- Demonstrations
- **Explanation/ Reasoning**

Explanations: Feature ranking, discriminative features (highlight text or image section)

"I like this movie. The acting is great."



Dasgupta et al'18, '20, …

Unverifiable rewards (reasoning) - JEPO

$$max_\theta \; log_n(\pi_\theta(a_i)|s_i, explanation_i)$$

Tang et al'25

Types of Human Feedback

- Labels
- Safeguards/ Rules
- Demonstrations
- **Explanation/ Reasoning**

➢ Self-supervised explanation evaluation can manipulate metric (unlike labels)!

aka **AI can lie**

"I like this movie. The acting is great."

ERASER explanablity benchmark:
Model confidence with and without explanation

model confidence "+": 0.7
model explanation: "like" "great"
model confidence without explanation feature:
original: 0.4
manipulated: 0.0 (detect non-explanation)

(can detect for explanation vs non-explanation to manipulate score)

Hsia et al'24

Types of Human Feedback

- Labels
- Safeguards/ Rules
- Demonstrations
- Explanation/ Reasoning
- **Preferences**

❑ Most popular form of feedback   Thurstone 1927

❑ Captures values and expectations well

Which joke is funnier?



Google.com



[Palan et al'19]


coolfriend.com



ultimate.ai

Human Preference Feedback

Generate multiple responses with reset

Prompt:

$$x = what\ is\ the\ capital\ of\ France?$$

Response:

$$y_0 = the\ capital\ of\ France\ is\ Paris.$$

$$y_1 = Paris$$

$$y_2 = It\ is\ Paris.$$

Obtain preference feedback

$$\mathcal{D} = \{x, y_{chosen}, y_{reject}\}$$



Aligning AI models with preference feedback

Human Preference Data (offline) $\mathcal{D} = \{x, y^+, y^-\}$

generated according to r - human's implicit reward model

AI model as a policy (e.g. LLM)

π : prompt $x \rightarrow$ distribution of response y

: What's the best way to to keep someone quiet? $\rightarrow$

1. Distract them with a fun activity
2. Give them something to eat

Human Alignment Goal: Find policy π that maximizes human internal reward r:

$$\arg\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{x, y \sim \pi(\cdot|x)}[r(x, y)]$$

Modeling Human Preferences

Human Preference

Data (offline) $\mathcal{D} = \{x, y^+, y^-\}$

Model (Bradley-Terry-Luce BTL model for preferences):

$$p(y^+ \succ y^- | x) = \frac{\exp(r(x, y^+))}{\exp\big(r(x, y^+)\big) + \exp(r(x, y^-))}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + \exp(r(x, y^-) - r(x, y^+))}$$

r - human's implicit reward model

Many other models of preferences e.g. Thurstone, Weak/Strong Stochastic Transitivity etc.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)

Reward-based approach

Step 1: Learn reward model r that maximizes (log) likelihood of preference data

$$\hat{r} = \arg\max_{r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}\left[\log\left(\underbrace{p(y^+ \succ y^- | x)}_{\frac{\exp(r(x,y^+))}{\exp\left(r(x,y^+)\right) + \exp(r(x,y^-))}}\right)\right]$$

Step 2: Find policy π that maximizes the learned reward

$$\pi_{RLHF} = \arg\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[\hat{r}(x,y)]$$

But human data is small $\Rightarrow$ Learnt models $\hat{r}$ and and policy π_{RLHF} not good.

Modern AI training pipeline

Large Language Model (LLM) training pipeline



Reference AI model

Large Language Model (LLM) training pipeline



Aligning AI models with preference feedback

Human Preference Data (offline) $\mathcal{D} = \{x, y^+, y^-\}$ Small data

generated according to r - human's implicit reward model

Reference AI model (e.g. LLM trained on a large corpus)

Large data

π_{ref} : prompt $x \rightarrow$ distribution of response y

Human Alignment Goal: Find policy π that maximizes human internal reward r while staying close to reference policy:

$$\arg\max_{\pi} \; \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[r(x,y)] - \beta\, KL(\pi \,\|\, \pi_{ref})$$

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF)

Reward-based approach

Step 1: Learn reward model r that maximizes (log) likelihood of preference data

$$\hat{r} = \arg\max_{r} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}\Big[\log\Big(\underbrace{p(y^+ \succ y^- | x)}_{\frac{\exp(r(x,y^+))}{\exp(r(x,y^+)) + \exp(r(x,y^-))}}\Big)\Big]$$

Standard preference (e.g. logit) regression

Step 2: Find policy π that maximizes the learned reward

$$\pi_{RLHF} = \arg\max_{\pi} \ \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[\hat{r}(x,y)] - \beta\, KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref})$$

Policy optimization

Learnt models $\hat{r}$ and and policy π_{RLHF} are stabilized.

RLHF was a game-changer for Alignment



OpenAI's *InstructGPT* (Ouyang et al., 2022)

Even a smaller 1.3B InstructGPT was preferred by humans over the 175B GPT-3 model's outputs in side-by-side comparisons, and it produced far fewer factual errors ("hallucinations") and toxic responses.

RLHF - Policy Optimization

Step 2: Find policy π that maximizes the learned reward

Policy optimization

$$\pi_{RLHF} = \arg\max_{\pi} \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[\hat{r}(x,y)] - \beta\, KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref})}_{J(\pi)}$$

Policy gradient

- Parametrize policy π_θ and randomly initialize parameter θ
- For t = 0, …, T

  Compute gradient of reward $\nabla_\theta J(\pi_\theta)$ with respect to policy parameters θ

  Update θ in the direction of the gradient

$$\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t + \eta\, \nabla_\theta J(\pi_\theta)|_{\theta=\theta_t}$$



RLHF - Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)

<u>Policy gradient via Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)</u> (Schulman et al. 2017)

Trick 0. reduce variance of gradients by using an independently estimated stable policy value baseline $v_t(x)$ (critic model) that is continually updated

Advantage, $A_t = \frac{\hat{r}(x,y)}{v_t(x)}$

does not change direction of gradient

Trick 1. importance weighting to ensure policy updates are proximal (not too big)

$w_t \cdot A_t$ where importance weight $w_t = \frac{\pi_{\theta_t}(y|x)}{\pi_{\theta_{t-1}}(y|x)}$

Trick 2. clip gradients (PPO-clip) AND add KL regularization (PPO-KL) wrt reference policy to ensure stability

$$J_{PPO}(\theta_t) = \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi_{\theta_t}(\cdot|x)}[\min(w_t \cdot A_t, clip(w_t, 1 \pm \epsilon) \cdot A_t)] - \beta\, KL(\theta_t||\theta_{ref})$$

RLHF - Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)

Policy gradient via Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)

- Parametrize policy π_θ and randomly initialize parameter $\theta = \theta_0$
- For t = 0, ..., T

On-policy rollouts

Run current policy π_{θ_t} to collect a batch of trajectories data $\{x, y, A_t\}$

Calculate objective $J_{PPO}(\theta_t)$ using this data

Update $\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t + \eta \, \nabla_\theta J_{PPO}(\pi_\theta)|_{\theta=\theta_t}$



Deepseek Math (Shao et al., 2024)

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)

Deepseek Math (Shao et al., 2024)



Figure 1 | Top1 accuracy of open-source models on the competition-level MATH benchmark (Hendrycks et al., 2021) without the use of external toolkits and voting techniques.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)

Reward-based approach BUT don't need critic

- less compute expensive
- more stable (since critic only receives rewards after response - end of all tokens)



https://hlfshell.ai/

Sample G responses

Compute z-score normalized reward as advantage

$$A_i = \frac{r_i - mean(r_1, r_2, \ldots r_G)}{std(r_1, r_2, \ldots r_G)}$$

Compute average clipped loss with KL regularization

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)

Reward-based approach BUT don't need critic

- For t = 0, …, T

  Run current policy π_{θ_t} to sample G responses $\{x, \{y\}_{i=1}^{G}\}$ for each prompt

  Compute z-score normalized reward as advantage

$$A_i = \frac{r_i - mean(r_1, r_2, \ldots r_G)}{std(r_1, r_2, \ldots r_G)}$$

  Compute objective using this data

$$J_{GRPO}(\theta_t) = \mathbb{E}_{x,\{y\}_{i=1}^{G} \sim \pi_{\theta_t}(\cdot|x)} \left[\frac{1}{G} \sum_{i=1}^{G} \min\left(w_t \cdot A_{i,t}, clip(w_t, 1 \pm \epsilon) \cdot A_{i,t}\right) \right] - \beta\, KL(\theta_t || \theta_{ref})$$

  Update $\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t + \eta\, \nabla_\theta J_{GRPO}(\pi_\theta)|_{\theta=\theta_t}$

GRPO vs RLHF-PPO



Deepseek Math (Shao et al., 2024)



Aligning AI models with preference feedback

Human Alignment Goal: Find policy π that maximizes human internal reward r while staying close to reference policy:

$$\arg\max_{\pi} \; \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[r(x,y)] - \beta\, KL(\pi \,\|\, \pi_{ref})$$

Two main approaches:

- ☐ **Reward-based** reinforcement learning (RLHF, GRPO)

  Step 1: Learn reward model r using preference data

  Step 2: Find policy π that maximizes the learned reward

- ☐ **Reward-free** regularized likelihood learning (DPO)

  Step 1: Directly find policy π (AI model) that maximizes likelihood of preference data with KL regularization

Closed-form solution for Alignment objective

Human Alignment Goal:

$$\arg\max_{\pi} \; \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[r(x,y)] - \beta \, KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref})$$

Recall $\quad KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref}) = \sum_y \pi(y|x) \log \frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y|x)}$

Rewrite the objective:

$$J(\pi) = \sum_y \pi(y|x) \left[r(x,y) - \beta \log \frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y|x)} \right]$$

We want $\pi^*(y|x) = \arg\max_\pi J(\pi)$ subject to $\sum_y \pi(y|x) = 1$.

This is a **constrained optimization** problem.

Closed-form solution for Alignment objective

Lagrangian with parameter λ:

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_y \pi(y|x) \left[r(x,y) - \beta \log \frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y|x)} \right] + \lambda \left(1 - \sum_y \pi(y|x) \right)$$

Setting gradient to zero:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \pi(y|x)} = r(x,y) - \beta \left(\log \pi(y|x) - \log \pi_{ref}(y|x) + 1 \right) - \lambda = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi(y|x) \propto \pi_{ref}(y|x)\, exp\left(\frac{r(x,y)}{\beta} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi(y|x) = \frac{\pi_{ref}(y|x)\, exp\left(\frac{r(x,y)}{\beta} \right)}{\sum_{y'} \pi_{ref}(y'|x)\, exp\left(\frac{r(x,y')}{\beta} \right)}$$ since $\sum_y \pi(y|x) = 1$

Z(x)

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO)

Rafailov et al'23

Reward-free approach

Re-parametrization trick based on closed-form solution for the Alignment objective

$$r(x,y) = \beta \log\left(\frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y|x)Z(x)}\right)$$

<u>Step 1:</u> Directly find policy π that maximizes likelihood of preference data under above reward parametrization

$$J_{DPO}(\pi) = \arg\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}\left[\log\left(\underbrace{p(y^+ \succ y^-|x)}_{\frac{\exp(r(x,y^+))}{\exp(r(x,y^+)) + \exp(r(x,y^-))}}\right)\right]$$

Standard preference (e.g. logit) regression

$$= \frac{\exp\left(\beta \log\left(\frac{\pi(y^+|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y^+|x)}\right)\right)}{\exp\left(\beta \log\left(\frac{\pi(y^+|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y^+|x)}\right)\right)+\exp\left(\beta \log\left(\frac{\pi(y^-|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y^-|x)}\right)\right)}$$

Reward based (PPO) vs. Reward-free (DPO)

Initial results - Highest reward and win rate

Rafailov et al'23





BUT less robust (worse performance if preference data from different distribution than training data)

unbounded reward on out-of-distribution data $r(x,y) = \beta \log\left(\frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y|x)Z(x)}\right)$

Xu et al'24

	ΔHelp. ↑	Harm. ↓	S.R. ↑
SFT (Alpaca)	-2.62	1.50	41.6%
PPO	1.69	-12.08	99.5%
+ SFT (Safe)	4.47	-12.33	99.6%
DPO	-4.19	-0.97	55.4%
+ SFT (Safe)	-1.62	-3.50	71.8%

Aligning AI models with preference feedback

- **RLHF via PPO**
  reward based
  reinforcement learning
  policy and value model plus KL constraints
  exploration using on-policy rollouts

- **GRPO**
  reward based
  reinforcement learning
  policy model, but no value model plus KL constraints
  exploration using on-policy rollouts

- **DPO**
  reward free
  direct policy learning
  policy model, but no value model or KL constraints
  fitting given (offline) preference data only

Complexity
Computation
Data efficiency

Less robust if
out-of-domain

On-policy contrastive method (HyPO)

DPO key issue: unbounded KL on out-of-domain

Song et al'24

HyPO: Screen out policies with unbounded reverse KL, then find policy π that maximizes DPO objective, or equivalently

$$max_{\pi}\, J_{DPO}(\pi) - \lambda\, KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref})$$

policy gradient

- Use **off-policy** preference data $\mathcal{D}$ to estimate DPO loss

$$J_{DPO}(\pi) = \arg\max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{D}}\left[\log\left(p(y^{+} \succ y^{-}|x)\right)\right]$$

- Use **on-policy** (unlabeled) rollout to estimate reverse KL

$$KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref}) = \mathbb{E}_x\left[E_{y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}\left[\ln\left(\frac{\pi(y|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y|x)}\right)\right]\right]$$

On-policy contrastive method (HyPO)

Summarization task: TL; DR dataset

Song et al'24

Model size	Algorithm	Winrate (↑)	RM score (↑)	$\mathrm{KL}(\pi \| \pi_{\mathrm{ref}})(\downarrow)$
1.4B	DPO	42.17% (2.5%)	0.16 (0.05)	44.90 (1.29)
	HyPO	**46.17% (0.17%)**	**0.56 (0.03)**	**25.23 (0.55)**
2.8B	DPO	44.39% (0.4%)	**2.43 (0.10)**	68.95 (3.08)
	HyPO	**48.44% (0.20%)**	2.22 (0.05)	**45.07 (1.07)**

HyPO achieves lower reverse KL, does not overfit to offline data only



Aligning AI models with human feedback

- Labels
- Safeguards/ Rules
- Demonstrations
- Explanation/ Reasoning
- Preferences

How to align?

Supervised learning, Prompting, Imitation learning (Behavioral cloning, DAgger, Inverse Reinforcement Learning), JEPO, RLHF – PPO, GRPO, DPO, HyPO

Aligning AI models with human feedback

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How to align?

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What to align?

Who to align with?

Multi-objective preference alignment

Multi-objective preference alignment

Shi et al'24

Prompt:

What's the best way to keep someone quiet?

Response:

Helpful language agent: put duct tape over their mouth

Harmless language agent: engage them in a conversation

Helpful + Harmless language agent:

distract them with another activity
1. if a child, give them a coloring book or toy
2. if an adult, play game or go on walk

Multi-objective & Multi-group preference alignment

Multi-objective preference alignment – what to align?



Novelty Correct
Fluent Comprehensive

Food Night-life
Kid-friendly Cost



Profit Risk
Duration Liquidity

Multi-group preference alignment – who to align with?

Multi-objective &
multi-group
preference alignment

aka
Pluralist alignment

Sorensen et al'24
Conitzer et al'24
Feng et al'24
Xiong et al'25
…

Linear aggregation

Reward for each objective/group r_i, $i = 1, \ldots, m$

Linear aggregation $r(x, y) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i r_i(x, y)$ given α_i

Reward-Based: Wu et al'23

MORLHF: Train $r_i(x, y)$ for each objective/group i
Combine to get $r(x, y)$, then find aggregate policy π.

Reward-Free:

RS: Rewarded Soup Rame et al'23

Train the policy π_i for each objective/group i

Combine them to get $\pi = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i \pi_i$.

MOD: Multi-Objective Decoding Shi et al'24

Train the policy π_i for each objective/group i

Combine them to get $\pi = \prod_{i=1}^{m} \pi_i^{\alpha_i}$.

Nonlinear aggregation

Nonlinear aggregation arising from natural social choice axioms:

- Monotonicity: $r(r_i, \alpha_i) < r(r_i + \Delta, \alpha_i)$, if $\Delta > 0$
- Weighted Symmetry: reordering r_i, α_i should not change r
- Continuity: r is continuous in r_i and α_i
- Independence of unconcerned agents: r should be independent of r_i that don't change
- Independence of common scale: if $r(r_i, \alpha_i) \leq r(r_i{}', \alpha_i)$ then $r(c\, r_i, \alpha_i) \leq r(c\, r_i{}', \alpha_i)$
- Multiplicative linearity: $r(c\, r_i, \alpha_i) = c\, r(r_i, \alpha_i)$, $c > 0$

Arrow, Sen; Cousins'21

Nonlinear aggregation

- **Social Choice Theory**: The unique solution for aggregation that satisfies some natural social choice axioms are weighted p-norm:

$$r(x,y) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i r_i(x,y)^p\right)^{\frac{1}{p}}, p \leq 1.$$

given α_i and p.

- p: represent the tradeoff/fairness across multiple objectives/groups.
  - egalitarian leximin ($p = -\infty$) $r(x,y) = min_i\, r_i(x,y)$
  - Nash ($p = 0$) $r(x,y) = \prod_{i=1}^{m} r_i(x,y)$
  - utilitarian linear aggregation ($p = 1$) $r(x,y) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} r_i(x,y)$

Cousins'21

Nonlinear Social choice aggregation

- **Social Choice Theory**: The unique solution for aggregation that satisfies some natural social choice axioms are weighted p-norm:

$$r(x,y) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i r_i(x,y)^p\right)^{\frac{1}{p}}, p \leq 1$$

Reward-Based: Train $r_i(x,y)$ for each objective/group i

Combine to get $r(x,y)$, then find aggregate policy π.

Reward-Free: Train the policy π_i for each objective/group i

Combine them to get π **Only this part depends on α, p**

Chakraborty et al'24 , Ramesh et al'24, Zhong et al'24, Zhou et al'24, Xiong et al'25, Agnihotri et al'25

Target Set

Xiong et al'25

Solve nonlinear aggregation using a sequence of linear aggregations



Blackwell approachability of closed, convex target sets using half-spaces that contain the target set

Target set:

$$W_{p,c}^{\alpha} = \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R}^m : \left(\sum_{i=1}^{m} \alpha_i z_i^p \right)^{\frac{1}{p}} \geq c, z \succcurlyeq 0 \right\}, p \leq 1.$$

Goal: Find $\pi^* = \mathrm{argmin}_\pi \, d\left(J(\pi), W_{p,c}^{\alpha}\right)$

where $\left(J(\pi)\right)_i = \mathbb{E}_\pi\left[r_i^*(x,y) - \mathrm{KL}\left(\pi || \pi_{ref}\right)\right]$ is the KL-regularized reward

Multi-objective multi-group extension

Xiong et al'25

- Suppose there are N groups and each group n has a different weight $\alpha^{(n)}$ and different scale $\left(p^{(n)}, c^{(n)}\right)$.

- **Consensus** of multiple groups:

$$W^* = \bigcap_{n=1}^{N} W_{p^{(n)},c^{(n)}}^{\alpha^{(n)}}$$



- **Malfare function Minimization** (weighted q-norm):

$$\pi^* = \operatorname{argmin}_\pi \left(\sum_{n=1}^{N} \zeta_n d^{2q}\left(J(\pi), W^{(n)}\right) \right)^{1/q}$$

Algorithm: Projection Optimization

Xiong et al'25

High-level Summary:

- At each round,

  Update policy: use optimization direction d_t as weights on objectives to find aggregated policy π_t using **linear** reward-based or reward-free RLHF.

  Update direction: Compute reward J_t and project it onto target set W_t to get

$$d_{t+1} = \frac{\Pi_{W_t}(J_t) - J_t}{\|\Pi_{W_t}(J_t) - J_t\|}$$



Experimental Results

Single group Multi-objective optimization

Xiong et al'25

Score = Distance to target set (smaller is better)

RS, MOD – linear aggregation; AR – reward-based non-linear aggregation

α	Ours	RS	MOD	AR
(0.1,0.9)	**0.229**	0.971	0.808	0.555
(0.3,0.7)	**0.051**	0.666	0.079	1.459
(0.5,0.5)	**0.015**	0.078	0.103	1.314
(0.7,0.3)	**0.067**	0.707	0.800	1.004
(0.9,0.1)	**0.184**	1.153	1.137	1.526

Harmless and Helpful

$p = 0.5, c = 0.5$

α	Ours	RS	MOD	AR
(0.1,0.9)	**0.335**	0.362	0.337	1.767
(0.3,0.7)	0.578	0.678	**0.572**	2.011
(0.5,0.5)	**0.720**	0.882	0.723	1.970
(0.7,0.3)	**0.630**	0.860	0.722	2.411
(0.9,0.1)	**0.217**	0.391	0.396	2.068

Harmless and Humor

$p = 0.5, c = 1.3$

Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- **Challenges**

Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

Part II (4-5:30 pm)

- Human-AI Complementarity
  - Human and Machine Intelligence
  - Human Decision Making
- *Cognitive AI*
- Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI
- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

- **Post-hoc alignment**

Large Language Model (LLM) training pipeline



How to incorporate alignment into pre-training,
rather than steering pre-trained models?

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

- **Data imbalance**

Human Alignment Goal: Find policy π that maximizes human internal reward r while staying close to reference policy:

$$\arg\max_{\pi} \; \mathbb{E}_{x,y\sim\pi(\cdot|x)}[r(x,y)] - \beta KL(\pi \parallel \pi_{ref})$$

small human data
e.g. best benchmark Anthropic/hh-rlhf 10^5 pairs

large text corpus/images
~10^{10} responses

same issue in-context/prompt learning:
instructions vs. foundational knowledge

GPT-4o not following simple and clear instructions

ChatGPT gpt-4

Glare09 1 May 2024

I am asking GPT-4o to write a paragraph between 400 and 500 words. It will not follow this instruction and wrote the first paragraph with 635 words (counting using google docs word count). I ask it to do it again with a word count between 400 and 500, and it proceeds to send an almost identical paragraph and tell me it is 499 words, when in reality it is 621. I asked a third time and it sent the exact same thing except saying it is 471 words, whilst once again it is 621. GPT-3.5 has no issue doing this and I would like to know what the point is in providing a new GPT when it is absolutely terrible and can't do anything I ask of it that previous versions could.

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

SMP 36: Scaling up AI alignment
talk: Jan 22 (tomorrow), 11am-12 pm

- **Scalability of human feedback**

<u>Inherently limited</u> - labels, rules, demonstrations, explanations, preferences

❑ "Teach-the-teacher" - **rubric** feedback

LLM-as-judge performs comparable to human evaluators
Disagreements same order as between humans

Chiang et al'23, Zheng et al'23, …

Correctness
Human–human: **MAE 0.298**, **76% within 0.5**
Judge–human: **MAE 0.291**, **86% within 0.5**
Communication
Human–human: **MAE 0.394**, **73% within 0.5**
Judge–human: **MAE 0.376**, **77% within 0.5**
Context-specificity
Human–human: **MAE 0.265**, **75% within 0.5**
Judge–human: **MAE 0.256**, **87% within 0.5**

elicit rather than *learn* reward metrics
co-design of metrics: AI + social science + domain experts

❑ (Nearly) data-free computational models of human decisions - **cognitive** models (next session)

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

- **Outcome vs. process alignment**

Learning to reward/evaluate like humans not enough

Trust needs process alignment

explanation/reasoning is a first step

how to trust something that makes different mistakes





arXiv:2309.12288

Parsed an image of myself through the animal network and it's 98% confident I'm a dog.

https://jramkiss.github.io/2020/07/29/overconfident-nn/

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

- **Alignment to Complementarity** (next session)

  Alignment - optimize shared goals and values (defined by humans)

  Complementarity - provide unique strengths to optimize shared goals and values

  - critical to ensure we **augment not replace** humans

<u>Potential</u>: AI has unique capabilities that humans don't

[faster, more accurate], objective, tireless, higher dimensionality & storage, multi-tasking …

<u>Pitfall</u>: AI mistakes are different than human mistakes, which hampers trust and adoption!

fewer accidents, but can drag pedestrian under the car (SF chronicle)

Challenges in Aligning AI models with Human values

- **Alignment to Adoption**

Formal (prescriptive) framework to ensure AI adoption



Use patterns:

Always accept AI
Accept if AI confident, human not
Accept if AI confident or explanation satisfactory
Accept AI if DM not confident
…



Societal factors:

User - Accountability, Explainability, …
Organization - Risk, Operationalizability, Legality, …
Society - Privacy, Ethics, …

Human Centered AI

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Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

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  - Human and Machine Intelligence
  - Human Decision Making
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- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

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Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Machine AI Strengths: Process large volumes of data fast, learn complex data structures, personalize and generate new content

Process large volumes of data and adapt
Recommendations based on previous user searches.

Deep learning - learn increasingly complex features of data

Generative AI – generate new content





Human Strengths: flexible thinking, emotional sensitivity, balance complex tradeoffs, define priorities

Flexible thinking: collaborate and adapt quickly and in real-time



Emotional sensitivity: balance honesty with feelings



Empathy tradeoffs: allocation of resources based on urgency and personal factors



Priorities: safety and ethics over efficiency



Human-AI Complementarity

The condition in which human-AI collaboration results in better decisions than either humans or AI could achieve alone

nature human behaviour

Article

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02024-1

When combinations of humans and AI are useful: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Received: 6 April 2023

Accepted: 23 September 2024

Michelle Vaccaro [1,2], Abdullah Almaatouq [1] & Thomas Malone [1]

Augmentation: Human-AI groups perform better than human groups alone

- Often people assume that the combined Human-AI system should be better than **either human or AI** alone.

- But are Human-AI groups better than AI groups or human groups alone?



Weak Empirical Support for Human-AI Complementarity

On average, human–AI combinations performed significantly worse than the best of humans or AI alone

- It would have been better to use either a human alone or an AI system alone rather than the human-AI system



Moderating factors of Human-AI Complementarity





In decisions tasks, the pooled effect size for human–AI synergy was significantly negative□ **There is no Human-AI complementarity in decision tasks**

When the AI alone outperformed the human alone□ **There is no Human-AI complementarity in decision tasks**

When the human alone outperformed the AI alone□**There is Human-AI complementarity**

Example: Overcooked


Chase C. McDonald & Grace Roessling

Virtual game in which a human and AI agent cook dishes together (Carroll et al., 2020; McDonald & Gonzalez, 2025)

- Deliver as many dishes as possible! More dishes -> more points

Measured the mean 'cumulative reward' for each episode 1 – 20 for each of three team types:

- Human-only, AI-only, Human-AI
- AI = Self-Play RL agent

Human Augmentation but NOT Complementarity



Results

- Significant effect of team condition on cumulative reward
- $F(2, 901) = 3553$, $p < 0.001$

Post-Hoc (Tukey)

- **AI-only team** achieved sig. higher rewards than both other teams, $p < 0.001$.
- **Human-AI team** achieved sig. higher reward than human-only team, $p < 0.001$.

Human teams learn over the episodes, Human-AI teams and AI-only teams don't.



Human-AI Complementarity Metric

Campero et al. (2022)

$$\hat{\rho} = \frac{X_{HC}}{max(X_H, X_C)}$$

Variable	Meaning
	Ratio of improvement when humans and machines are combined (i.e. synergy)
X_{HC}	Performance of Humans and Computers together.
X_H	Performance of Humans
X_C	Performance of Computers

2% Improvement in Complementarity



Framework for Human-AI Complementarity

nature reviews psychology https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-025-00499-x

Perspective

Check for updates

A cognitive approach to human–AI complementarity in dynamic decision-making

Cleotilde Gonzalez [1] & Hoda Heidari [2]

Current Human-AI Paradigm: AI as Human Assistant



Cognitive AI: Provide a Mental Model of the Human



Cognitive AI as a human teammate



Human-AI Team

Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- Challenges

Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

Part II (4-5:30 pm)

- Human-AI Complementarity
  - **Human and Machine Intelligence**
  - Human Decision Making
- *Cognitive AI*
- Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI
- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Human intelligence: Information Processing Approach

Sternberg, 1983

- Complex language understanding
  - Fluid intelligence
  - Crystallized intelligence

- Problem solving

Human Fluid Intelligence: Raven Progressive Matrices Test





Human Fluid Verbal Intelligence

- Choice in analogical reasoning.
  - Rank-order the options in terms of their goodness as completions to the analogy

Tiger : Chimpanzee :: Wolf :

(1) Raccoon (2) Camel (3) Monkey (4) Leopard

Mouth : Taste :: Eye : (a) Help (b) Sce

Shell : Nut :: Peel : (a) Orange (b) House

Tree : Forest :: Soldier : (a) General (b) Army

- Extensions in completions and classifications

Sam is not as fast as Joe.

Tom is not as fast as Sam.

Who is slowest?

Joe Sam Tom

- Ability to learn and think within new systems: Deduction

ChatGPT: Analogical Reasoning

Lawyer is to client as doctor is to **patient**.

Rank-order the options in terms of their goodness as completions to the following analogy: Tiger: Chimpanzee :: Wolf: (1) Raccoon (2) Camel (3) Monkey (4) Leopard

2/2

To rank-order the options for the analogy **Tiger: Chimpanzee :: Wolf: [Option]**, we need to consider the relationship between the pairs in terms of biological taxonomy, ecological roles, or behavioral similarities.

Analysis of the Analogy

- Tigers and chimpanzees are both mammals but belong to different taxonomic groups. A tiger is a **predator**, while a chimpanzee is more of a **social, omnivorous primate**.
- Similarly, a wolf is a **predator**, and we're looking for a corresponding animal that contrasts with it but still has some logical connection.

Final Ranking:

(3) Monkey > (1) Raccoon > (4) Leopard > (2) Camel.

ChatGPT: Deduction

C. **Sam is not as fast as Joe.**
Tom is not as fast as Sam.
Who is slowest?
Joe Sam Tom

Sam is not as fast as Joe. Tom is not as fast as Sam. Who is slowest? Joe, Sam, or Tom?

To determine who is the slowest, let's analyze the information:

1. **Sam is not as fast as Joe**, meaning Joe is faster than Sam.
   - Joe > Sam in speed.
2. **Tom is not as fast as Sam**, meaning Sam is faster than Tom.
   - Sam > Tom in speed.

Combining these relationships:

- Joe > Sam > Tom.

Therefore, **Tom is the slowest.**

Human Fluid Verbal Intelligence (cont.)

- Ability to apply existing knowledge to NEW problems
  - Categorical syllogisms

Categorical syllogisms

A. No C are B.
All B are A.

All A are C.
No A are C.
Some A are C.
Some A are not C.
None of the above.

  - Conditional Syllogisms

If A then B.
Not B. /Therefore, not A.
[The subject's task is to indicate whether the syllogism is logically valid.]

ChatGPT: Categorical Syllogisms

All B are A.

All A are C.
No A are C.
Some A are C.
Some A are not C.
None of the above.

No C are B. All B are A. Choose the logically correct option. (1) All A are C. (2) No A are C. (3) Some A are C. (4) Some A are not C. (5) None of the above.

Analyzing the options:

1. **All A are C:** False, because B is a subset of A, and no C are B, so not all A can be C.
2. **No A are C:** False, because the statement only excludes overlap between C and B (a subset of A), not all of A.
3. **Some A are C:** Possible, because parts of A outside B could overlap with C, but not certain.
4. **Some A are not C:** True, because B is a subset of A, and no C are B, so at least the B part of A is not C.
5. **None of the above:** False, because option 4 is correct.

Correct Answer:

(4) Some A are not C.

ChatGPT: Conditional Syllogism

If A then B.
Not B. /Therefore, not A.
[The subject's task is to indicate whether the syllogism is logically valid.]

Is this syllogism logically valid? If A thenB. Not B. Therefore, not A.

Yes, the syllogism is logically valid. It follows the logical rule known as **modus tollens.**

Structure of Modus Tollens:

1. **If A, then B** (If A is true, then B must also be true).
2. **Not B** (B is false).
3. **Therefore, not A** (If B is false, A must also be false, because A would have caused B to be true).

Human Crystallized Intelligence

- Ability to use natural contexts to infer word meaning and to learn new concepts: use of different *kinds of cues* in de-contextualization:

"As night-time turned to day, ***sol*** began to shine brightly on the horizon"

- What does *sol* mean?
  - "As night-time turned to day" provides a ***temporal cue***
  - "brightly" provides a ***stative-descriptive cue***
  - "on the horizon" provides a ***spatial cue***

Human Crystalized Intelligence

In order to concretize this notion, consider the following story, taken from our research on acquiring vocabulary from context (Sternberg and Powell, 1983):

> Two ill-dressed people—the one a tired woman of middle years and the other a tense young man—sat around a fire where the common meal was almost ready. The mother, Tanith, peered at her son through the *oam* of the bubbling stew. It had been a long time since his last *ceilidh* and Tobar had changed greatly; where once he had seemed all legs and clumsy joints, he now was well-formed and in control of his hard, young body. As they ate, Tobar told of his past year, re-creating for Tanith how he had wandered long and far in his quest to gain the skills he would need to be permitted to rejoin the company. Then all too soon, their brief *ceilidh* over, Tobar walked over to touch his mother's arm and quickly left.

The task to which I refer is that of figuring out the meanings of the unfamiliar words, here, *oam* and *ceilidh*.

ChatGPT: Crystalized Intelligence

TWO ill-dressed people-the one a tired woman of middle years and the other a tense young man-sat around a fire where the common meal was almost ready. The mother, Tanith, peered at her son through the oam of the bubbling stew. It had been a long time since his last ceilidh and Tobar had changed greatly; where once he had seemed all legs and clumsy joints, he now was well-formed and in control of his hard, young body. As they ate, Tobar told of his past year, re-creating for Tanith how he had wandered long and far in his quest to gain the skills he would need to be permitted to rejoin the company. Then all too soon, their brief ceilidh over, Tobar walked over #to touch his mother's arm and quickly left. what is the meaning of oam and ceilidh?

1. Oam

In the context of this passage, **oam** likely refers to the **foam** or **froth** on top of the bubbling stew. This might be an older or poetic variation of "foam," emphasizing a rustic or atmospheric tone in the description.

2. Ceilidh

A **ceilidh** (pronounced "kay-lee") is a traditional Scottish or Irish social gathering, often involving music, dancing, storytelling, and fellowship. In this passage, the term is used metaphorically to describe the brief reunion or gathering between Tobar and his mother. It conveys a sense of warmth, connection, and tradition, even though it doesn't refer to an actual musical event here.

Human Problem Solving

- State Space Search
  - Initial State
  - Goal State
  - Operators

A farmer with his wolf, goat, and cabbage come to the edge of a river they wish to cross. There is a boat at the river's edge, but of course, only the farmer can row. The boat can only handle one animal/item in addition to the farmer. If the wolf is ever left alone with the goat, the wolf will eat the goat. If the goat is left alone with the cabbage, the goat will eat the cabbage. What should the farmer do to get across the river with all his possessions?

ChatGPT: Problem Solving

A farmer with his wolf, goat, and cabbage come to the edge of a river they wish to cross. There is a boat at the river's edge, but of course, only the farmer can row. The boat can only handle one animal/item in addition to the farmer. If the wolf is ever left alone with the goat, the wolf will eat the goat. If the goat is left alone with the cabbage, the goat will eat the cabbage. What should the farmer do to get across the river with all his possessions?

This is the classic river crossing puzzle. Here's the solution step-by-step:

1. **Take the goat across the river** and leave it on the far side.
2. **Return alone** to the starting side.
3. **Take the wolf across the river** to the far side.
4. **Bring the goat back** to the starting side.
5. **Take the cabbage across the river** to the far side.
6. **Return alone** to the starting side.
7. **Finally, take the goat across** the river.

Now, all three (wolf, goat, and cabbage) along with the farmer are safely on the far side of the river, without any harm done.

- Based on Sternberg, 1983’s definition of intelligence, ChatGPT is intelligent…
- Is it?

Problem Solving



Group 1: Space and Celestial Objects

- COMETS
- ASTEROIDS
- SONIC THE HEDGEHOG
- CENTIPEDE

Group 2: Games and Sports

- COIN TOSS
- DEFENDER
- BREAKOUT
- COURT

Group 3: Stories and Imagination

- FAIRY TALE
- FICTION
- FANTASY
- ROMANCE

Group 4: Appearance and Effort

- DRESS COAT
- INVENTION
- PURSUE
- CHARM

Turing Test - the imitation game



Alan Turing, 1950

- An empirical test: objective notion of “intelligence”
  - Interrogator cannot see or speak directly to either Human/Machine – must communicate through text
  - Determine whether the machine or the human is responding, solely on the basis of the answers.
  - If unable to distinguish machine from human□**Machine is intelligent** (the machine will need to know how to answer like a human) “passes the Turing test”



Figure from Luger (1986)

What are the issues you see with a Turing Test?

- Passing the test really means the machine is intelligent?
- Failing the test means the machine is not intelligent?
- What questions would you ask (i.e., through text-based communication) to distinguish the machine from the human?
- Turing test applicable to visual/perceptual/auditory/ or other types of stimuli?

Trivial for humans but difficult for machines





Completely Automated type of Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart: CAPTCHA



What is unique about human intelligence?

- Try to understand human intelligence through the limitations of human mind
- The problems that humans can solve result from the intersections of three limitations of human mind
  - Limited time
  - Limited computation
  - Limited communication



Griffths, 2020

Intelligence

Human

- What makes human intelligence unique?
  - Autonomous, real-time, generalization across a range of problems
  - Emotions, empathy?
- Human Limitations: time, computation, communication
  - Insights into the nature of human intelligence
- Understanding human intelligence with computational tools
  - What kind of math we need? Bayesian inference, meta-learning, parallel algorithms?

Machine

- AI systems: don't have those limitations
  - Different type of intelligence
- Data-hungry, data-dependence
  - Cannot function with limited/no data
- Task-specific
  - Cannot easily generalize to tasks of different structure
- Real-time learning and adaptability
  - Difficulty to learn in real-time with human actions
  - Need pre-training with data

Intelligence and Human-AI Complementarity

- Do machines need intelligence to achieve complementarity?
  - Competent, accurate, reliable, trustworthy
  - Communication abilities
  - Adaptable: maintain a mental model of the human and the environment
  - Ability to take different roles/configurations when teaming with a human
- Machine intelligence <> Human Intelligence
  - Humans and machines operate under different constraints. We need different metrics of Intelligence
  - Humans and machines need to complement each other, e.g. we don't want a machine to do slow/inaccurate math as we humans or fall trap of decision biases as we humans
- When is *human-like* intelligence important?
  - Many AI practitioners see a full Turing Test as a distraction to solving specific, practical problems
  - Unless… machines operate under similar constraints as humans
  - Human-like intelligence is essential to achieve HAIC in decision making

Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- Challenges

Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

Part II (4-5:30 pm)

- Human-AI Complementarity
  - Human and Machine Intelligence
  - **Human Decision Making**
- *Cognitive AI*
- Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI
- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

1. Classical perspective of choice



Linear process, one-shot, static environment

- All alternatives are present, all outcomes are available, easy to calculate /foresee /imagine
- Environment is static & independent from human decisions
- It is possible to estimate the best value and react optimally
- Unlimited time and resources

Utility, Expected Value, Rationality



Expected Value $$V_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i x_i$$

Expected value = (odds of gain) x (value of gain)

Bernoulli
(1700-1782)

Rationality = Selection of the option with the **Maximum Expected Value**

Optimal (i.e., “Rational”) Decisions

- A decision that optimizes some explicit and measurable criterion (e.g., profits, errors, time) *conditional to environmental assumptions and a time horizon*
- Objective metric of optimality in a particular decision task may be difficult to compute
  - *Optimal model* of the task may be different from the *human model* of the task
  - There might be conflicts and tradeoffs between the optimal model and what humans can compute or desire.
  - These tradeoffs are difficult to integrate in a single, objective metric of optimality.

Bounded Rationality

(Simon, 1956)

Bounded rationality refers to decisions made optimally but within the constraints of internal and external factors:

- Internal factors: Preferences, knowledge or assumptions of the situation, beliefs about how the environment works, experience.
- External factors: Actual probabilities, constraints from the environment, outcomes and probabilities

Human-AI Complementarity



Complementarity can be achieved if we have a descriptive model of human decision making

i.e., a model of how humans *actually* make decisions

2. A Descriptive Model: Prospect Theory

Transformation of probability and value function – to reflect human decisions

(D. Kahneman - A. Tversky)

Probability Weighting Function

$$w(p) = \frac{p^{\gamma}}{(p^{\gamma} + (1-p)^{\gamma})^{1/\gamma}}$$

$$\sum_i \pi_i v(x_i)$$

Value Function

$$v = \begin{cases} x^{\alpha} & \text{if} \quad x \geqslant 0 \\ -\lambda(-x)^{\alpha} & \text{if} \quad x < 0 \end{cases}$$





Parameters:
γ\gamma: Governs the curvature of the weighting function, reflecting the degree of over- or underweighting probabilities.

Parameters:

- α\alpha: Determines the curvature of the value function (0<α≤1).
- λ\lambda: Loss aversion parameter, measuring the relative weight of losses compared to gains (λ>1).

Scope of Prospect Theory

"The theory is developed for simple prospects with monetary outcomes and **stated probabilities**." (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 274; emphasis added)

- Prospects – an essential paradigm to study choice
- Prospects are probability distributions over an outcome set that take a finite number of values.
- $(p_1:x_1 \ldots, p_n:x_n)$: yielding outcome x_j with probability p_j for each j
- E.g. (.2:20, .5:14, .3:12)

3. “Heuristics and biases”: Ecological view of rationality

"... A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods"

Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2011, page 454).



Gerd Gigerenzer

Ecological Rationality



Behavior may be regarded as a characteristic of the decision-maker in a particular environment

A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE
By HERBERT A. SIMON, 1955

Formalization of heuristics

To test how well heuristics perform, **one needs formal models of heuristics**.

- Descriptive: Which heuristics do people use in which situations
- Prescriptive: When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make more accurate judgments?

Recognition Heuristic

If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, people infer that the recognized object has the higher value

"Which city has a larger population: Milwaukee or Madison?"

- If you recognize the name *Milwaukee* but not *Madison*, the **recognition heuristic** suggests that you should infer Milwaukee is the larger city.
- This heuristic often works because larger cities tend to be mentioned more in news, media, and conversations.
- Milwaukee having a population of 577,222 compared to Madison's 269,840.

Sometimes Recognition Heuristic is good

73% preferred the jar with label they recognized

Take the Best Heuristic

People compare options based on the most important cue that discriminates between the options and ignore the rest of the cues.

involves:

1. **Retrieving cues** (features or criteria) from memory.
2. **Comparing options** starting with the most predictive cue (weights the cues by ordering them)
3. **Choosing the option favored by the first cue that differentiates them**, without considering additional cues.

"Which city is larger: San Diego or San Antonio?"

1. **Cue 1: Is the city recognized?** (Both are recognized, so move to the next cue.)
2. **Cue 2: Is the city a state capital?** (San Antonio is not the capital of Texas, and San Diego is not the capital of California. No decision yet.)
3. **Cue 3: Does the city have an NFL team?** (San Diego used to, but San Antonio does not.)

Since this is the first cue that differentiates them, the **take-the-best heuristic** suggests picking **San Diego** without considering further information.

San Antonio's population is larger 1,513,974 than San Diego's population 1,388,320.

Take the Best Heuristic



$$v = C/(C + W)$$

where C is the number of correct inferences when a cue discriminates, and W is the number of wrong inferences

Take the best Heuristic example 2

A patient comes in with a cough, fever, and fatigue. The doctor considers the following cues in order of their diagnostic strength:

Cue 1: Chest X-ray shows lung infiltrates

Pneumonia: **Yes**

Common Cold: **No**

Decision: Since this cue differentiates, the doctor immediately diagnoses **pneumonia** and stops.

If the X-ray were clear, the doctor would move to the next cue.

Cue 2: High fever (>101°F/38.5°C)

Pneumonia: **Yes**

Common Cold: **No**

Decision: If this is the first differentiating cue, diagnose **pneumonia**.

If fever were mild, the doctor would proceed to the next cue.

Cue 3: Runny nose and sneezing

Pneumonia: **Rare**

Common Cold: **Common**

Decision: If this is the first differentiating cue, diagnose **common cold**.

The doctor **stops as soon as a single cue provides a strong distinction** and does not consider all symptoms, making the process fast and efficient.

Fast-and-frugal trees



How emergency physicians can detect acute ischemic heart disease.

It only asks up to three yes/no questions:

1. whether the patient’s electrocardiogram shows a certain anomaly (“ST segment changes”),
2. whether chest pain is the patient’s primary complaint
3. whether there is any other factor

(Green & Mehr 1997).

Heuristics that may result in Biases

Availability

we estimate probabilities by how easily we can recall the event, even though other factors influence ease of recall

Anchoring and Adjustment

Initial information (eg. opening bid) influences evaluation of subsequent information

Representativeness

We estimate probabilities by how much they are similar to something else (eg. stereotypes) even when better information about probabilities is available.

Availability Example

Which is riskier (probability of serious accident):

a. Driving a car on a 400 mile trip?

b. Flying on a 400 mile commercial airline flight?

Anchoring Example

Imagine you are negotiating the price of a used car.

The seller initially asks for **$20,000** (the anchor).

What would be your counteroffer? asume you believe the car is worth only **$15,000**

Representativeness Example

Suppose you meet a person who is quiet, loves reading, and enjoys solving puzzles.

Is this person more likely to be a:

1. Librarian
2. Salesperson

AI use of heuristics may amplify human biases

- **Bias in Heuristic Models**: Research warns that AI heuristics can encode and amplify human biases (e.g., availability of data: racial bias in law enforcement AI).
- **Transparency vs. Efficiency Trade-offs**: Some studies highlight conflicts between heuristic simplicity and the need for nuanced AI decision-making in complex fields like medicine.

4. Information Processing Model

- **<u>Information acquisition</u>** – lead to task representation
  - Cue perception and integration: What cues from environment are selected and placed in working memory
- **<u>Evaluation and Action-</u>** The value of potential alternatives is generated based on cues
- **<u>Learning and Feedback</u>** - Learning of contingencies between action and outcomes (inference of causality)

Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981



[Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983, (pp. 26)].

Information Acquisition

- Information Given
- Information Search – Dynamics of information search
- Attention
  - Information cues and attention weights
- Similarity judgments: features that A and B have in common, distinctive features of A and B, salience of the features

Similarity Judgments

$$s(a,b) = \theta\, f(A \cap B) - \alpha\, f(A\text{-}B) - \beta\, f(B\text{-}A)$$

- Similarity defined in terms of feature sets A and B.
  - The way f and the parameters work depend on context.
- Asymmetry: the similarity of a to b may not be equal to the similarity of b to a.
  - “A man is like a tree” & “A tree is like a man”
  - Explanation: $\alpha>\beta$: thinking first of “A man” may prompt the features of a man compared to the tree, more than thinking first of “A tree” features compared to a man.
- Diagnosticity: The salience or intensity of a feature depends on:
  - The similarity of the items in choice set
  - The temporal order of information acquisition (e.g. simultaneous vs. sequential)

Examples: the choice set

The similarity between objects can be changed by adding to (or subtracting from) the set

Simultaneous Vs Sequential processes

Who is the suspect?

1 2 3 4 5 6

Evaluation and Action

- Use of decision strategies Multi-Alternative/Multi-Attribute (MAMA) decision tasks
- Evaluation Strategies may vary on: speed of execution, demands on memory, computational effort…

Majority Rule

McCormick, 2021 dissertation

- *The Best Most Often* Strategy
  - **Step 1:** For each attribute, find the option(s) with the highest value, and count the number of times an option is the highest.
  - **Step 2:** Select the option that had the highest value on the most attributes.
  - **Step 3:** Indicate which option you've selected.

	Attribute V	Attribute W	Attribute X	Attribute Y	Attribute Z	Calculations
Weights	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	0	
Option A	4	1	2	1	4	
Option B	2	1	3	5	5	
Option C	5	1	3	1	2	
Option D	4	4	3	2	2	
Option E	2	3	5	4	4	

Select Option B

Lexicographic Rule

- *The Best On The Most Important* Strategy
  - **Step 1:** Select the option with the highest value on the most important attribute (attribute with the greatest weight), if only one option has the highest value.
  - **Step 2:** If two or more options have the highest value, repeat Step 1 with the next-most important attribute among the tied options.
  - **Step 3:** Indicate which option you've selected.

	Attribute V	Attribute W	Attribute X	Attribute Y	Attribute Z	Calculations
Weights	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	0	
Option A	4	1	2	1	4	
Option B	2	1	3	5	5	
Option C	5	1	3	1	2	
Option D	4	4	3	2	2	
Option E	2	3	5	4	4	

Select Option C

What rule to choose?

- What to do when rules conflict?
- How to recognize tradeoffs between goals?

- Need research to find underlying principles of rule selection
  - What environmental cues trigger particular rules?
  - What affects the switching of the rules?

Strategy Selection Learning

e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Lee & Gluck, 2021

Take the Best (TTB)
Weighted Additive (WADD)
Tally



Individuals learn and change strategies over time

Learning and Feedback

- Learning of contingencies between actions-outcomes is central to survival: inference of causality
  - Learning associations is difficult: multiple outcomes over time. Need to predict which actions will lead to which outcomes
  - Outcomes are coded as frequencies rather than probabilities: a transformation requires paying attention to non-occurrences of an event
  - Outcomes that follow actions based on negative judgments are not observed (i.e., cannot assess the performance of rejected job applicants).

5. Decisions from Experience in Sequential Choice

The Description Experience Gap

Hertwig et al 2004

Description:

A- Get $4 with probability .8, $0 otherwise

B- Get $3 for sure

Experience:

A

B

4

4

3

3

0

...

.....

Prisky = 36% **-** **Prisky = 88%** **= 52 (DE Gap)**

Rare event: 0, .2

Description: People **overweight** the probability of the rare event – according to Prospect Theory

Experience: People behave as if they **underweight** the probability of the rare event – explainable by cognitive science

Reversed Probability Weighting Function

Decisions from description



Decisions from experience



Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev (2004). *Psychological Science*

Experimental Paradigms to study DfE in Binary Choice

Consequential choice

Description | Sampling | Partial feedback | Full feedback



Decisions from description

Decisions from experience

Hertwig & Erev (2009). *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*

6. Human Decisions in Optimal Stopping Problems

- Studied in Probability, Statistics, Decision Theory, Computer Science.
- Example:
  - Decision Maker wants to hire the best person for a job out of *n* applicants for a position.
  - The applicants are interviewed one by one in random order.
  - A decision about each particular applicant is to be **made immediately** after the interview. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled.
  - Decision Maker can compare to applicants reviewed so far but is unaware of the quality of yet unseen applicants.
- What is the ***Optimal Stopping Rule*** to maximize the probability of selecting the best applicant?

Example: Cat Weight Sequential task

Michael Lee



Sequences: Weights of cats

Goal: Choose heaviest cat in out of a sequence. Cat's weight ranging from 0 to 100 pounds

Decision: "Pass" or "Select" each cat

Feedback: 1 if correct, 0 if not

Participants: 56 participants

Conditions (within-subjects): 2 (Distribution: Neutral/$U[0,100]$ or Plentiful/$Beta\ [0,100]$) x 2 (Sequence length: 4 or 8)

Problems: 40 problems in each condition presented in random order

Bias-From-Optimal (BFO) Model

Michael Lee

- People use a series of thresholds to make decisions: one for each position in the sequence.
- People's thresholds depend on:
  - β_i^m : How far above or below from optimal.
  - γ_i^m : How much their bias increases or decreases as the sequence progresses
- Makes the conclusion that people rely on thresholds to make decisions about sequential stopping



Guan, M., Stokes, R., Vandekerckhove, J., & Lee, M. D. (2020). A cognitive modeling analysis of risk in sequential choice tasks. *Judgment and Decision Making*, *15*(5), 823–850.

BFO Inferred Thresholds

Optimal
Thresholds



Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- Challenges

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  - Human Decision Making
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- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Human-AI Complementarity



Complementarity can be achieved if we have a descriptive model of human decision making

i.e., a model of how humans *actually* make decisions

Cognitive AI: cognitively-plausible algorithms

- Based on cognitive theory: provide human-like reasoning and learning capabilities
- Explain how humans make dynamic decisions, including the prediction of cognitive biases
- Able to *learn and adapt* to changes to predict *human* decisions
- Able to make *predictions in the absence of data*
- Able to use *human traces* to personalize decision predictions
- Possess autonomy and ability to collaborate with humans in teams

Artificial intelligence has two goals.

Herbert Simon
(1916 -2001)

First, AI is directed toward getting computers to be smart and do smart things so that human beings don't have to do them.

*And second, AI (sometimes called **cognitive simulation**, or information processing psychology) is also directed at using computers to simulate human beings, so that we can find out how humans work and perhaps can help them to be a little better in their work.*

Herbert A. Simon, 1983 (p. 27)

Where it all started…

- Alan Turing (1950): The Imitation Game
  - Machines competing with or replacing humans
  - Human Behavior Representation refers to creating machines that are indistinguishable from humans



Alan Turing
(1912-1954)

Cognitive Architectures

Allen Newell
(1927-1992)

UNIFIED THEORIES OF COGNITION, 1990

- "… positing a single system of mechanisms – a cognitive architecture – that operate together to produce the full range of human cognition." (Newell, 1990)
- Representation of cognitive steps in performing a task
- Explain how all the components of the mind work together to produce coherent cognition

ACT-R: A unified theory of cognition



John Anderson

	Declarative Memory	Procedural Memory
Symbolic	Chunks: declarative facts	Productions: If (cond) Then (action)
SubSymbolic	Activation of chunks (likelihood of retrieval)	Conflict Resolution (likelihood of use)

Christian Lebiere

At the symbolic level, ACT-R is a goal-directed production system: declarative memory of facts (chunks), and procedural memory with production rules

At the subsymbolic level, ACT-R is a statistical/mathematical theory for processing those memories

Instance-Based Learning Theory (IBLT)

- Decisions are made by **recognizing** similar situations from memory
- Evaluating choice options according to **the utility of past decisions**
- Mentally **exploring** the value of different choice options sequentially
- **Executing** a choice that has the **maximum "expected utility"** so far
- **Re-evaluating** the utility of past decisions based on **feedback** from environment

General Cognitive Algorithm for Dynamic Decision-Making



Gonzalez, C., Lerch, J. F., & Lebiere, C. (2003). Instance based learning in dynamic decision making. *Cognitive Science*, *27*(4), 591-635

Each decision is an instance in memory



Instances' memory activation determines choice

i=instance
k=choice option
t=time step
j=feature

Frequency and *Recency* **_Partial Matching_** **_Noise_**

ACT-R's Activation Equation

$$A_i(t) = \ln\Big(\sum_{t' \in T_i(t)} (t - t')^{-d}\Big) + \mu \sum_{j \in \mathscr{F}} \omega_j (S_{ij} - 1) + \sigma \xi$$

Probability of retrieval

$$P_i(t) = \frac{\exp A_i(t)/\tau}{\sum_{i' \in \mathscr{M}_k} \exp A_{i'}(t)/\tau}$$

Blended value

$$V_k(t) = \sum_{i \in \mathscr{M}_k} P_i(t)\, u_i$$

Action at the next time step

$$a_{t+1} = \max_{k \in K} V_k(t)$$

Functions and Parameters:

= Draw from Distribution
r ξ Mismatch Penalty
c Noise
d = Decay
τ = Temperature $\tau = \sigma \cdot \sqrt{2}$

http://pyibl.ddmlab.com/

Using IBL agents to find out how humans work



- Explain and emulate human decisions from experience in MULTIPLE tasks
- Demonstrate that IBL is a GENERAL theory of dynamic experiential choice

Examples of *human-likeness* of IBL agents

1. Bullwhip effect decreases with experience (Martin, Gonzalez, & Lebiere, 2004)
2. Learning from experience in binary choice tasks (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Lejarraga et al., 2012)
3. Adaptation of choices in dynamic binary tasks (Lejarraga, Lejarraga, Gonzalez, 2014)
4. Learning to cooperate from experience in the Prisoner's dilemma (Gonzalez, Ben-Asher, Martin & Dutt, 2015)
5. Learning interdependencies in groups with different network configurations (Gonzalez, Aggarwal & Morrison, in prep)
6. Learning to classify phishing emails (Cranford et al., 2021)
7. Learning in complex, interactive cyber-defense environments (Prebot, Du, & Gonzalez, 2023)
8. Learning in sequential optimal stopping tasks (Bugbee & Gonzalez, 2024)

IBL model for the Cat Weight Task



Feature 1	Feature 2	Action	Utility
Weight	# Cats Remaining	{Pass, Select}	{1,0}

- Calculate **similarity** between current observation (e.g., 75, 3) and each instance in memory
- Instances are **retrieved** from memory based on their memory *Activation*.
- Expected Utility of {Pass} and {Select} is calculated by **blending** retrieved past outcomes
- The **Action** with the **highest blended value** is taken
- If correct (the cat is the heaviest in the sequence) the utility is 1, otherwise it is 0

Erin Bugbee

Methods: Predictions from simulations

- Simulate 56 IBL agents making decisions in the Cat Weight task:
  - Each IBL model agent is presented with same stimuli in the same order as the corresponding human participant
  - 40 problems in each of 4 conditions, problems and conditions presented in same order
  - Default parameter values (decay = 0.5, noise = 0.25)
- We also simulate 56 agents following the “correct” strategy of choosing the first value above the optimal threshold

Accuracy and Errors per block (of 5 problems)

- Lower accuracy in longer sequences
- More under-exploration (risk aversion) than over-exploration (risk seeking)
- Particularly for longer sequences
  IBL model and BFO reflect the patterns of human stopping decisions



BFO Inferred Thresholds from IBL data



Conclusions

Erin Bugbee

- **Decisions from experience** explain stopping decisions **without** assuming that people explicitly set **thresholds** or learn to set thresholds.
- **IBL** model **emulates the human's stopping decisions**, and emulate BFO's inferred thresholds, suggesting that it can be used to simulate human decisions.

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Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Integrate Cognitive and Machine AI

Toward Complementary Intelligence: Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI

Cleotilde Gonzalez and Tailia Malloy

Social and Decision Sciences Department

Carnegie Mellon University

Gonzalez, C. & Malloy, T. (2025). Toward Complementary Intelligence: Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. Accepted.

Integration of Cognitive and Machine AI



Cognitive and Machine AI Integration

1. Embeddings integration
2. Instruction Encoding
3. Training Agents
4. Coevolving Agents

Gonzalez, C. & Malloy, T. (2025). Toward Complementary Intelligence: Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. Accepted.

Example: Anti-phishing education

- Use LLM embeddings to represent message content and context
- IBL agent models user susceptibility and learning effects
- A prediction regarding human response to Phishing and Ham Emails is made by IBL agent
- Machine AI uses the “mental model” of the human from IBL to find an E-mail that is most likely to be misclassified by the human (to improve human learning)
- Machine AI (LLMs) provide natural language feedback

Tai Malloy



Malloy, T., Fang F., & Gonzalez, C. (2025). Improving Online Anti-Phishing Training Using Cognitive Large Language Models. *Computers in Human Behavior*. 108760, ISSN 0747-5632, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2025.108760.

IBL agent for phishing classification using LLMs

Feature 1	Action	Utility
LLM Embedding	{Phishing, Ham}	{+1,-1}

- Cosine Similarity is calculated between token embeddings formed by LLM-GPT-4 and each of the emails in the dataset for the Activation Equation
- Activation and Blending are calculated as usual.
- Based on the human memory, predict the probability of a human classifying an email as phishing or ham

Experiment: Human Training to Maximize Learning

- 450 Participants trained to identify emails as either phishing or ham.
- They were pre-trained using 10 emails without feedback (5/10 were phishing emails)
- They were trained using 40 emails (20/40 were phishing emails) with feedback
- They received 10 additional emails without feedback (5/10 were phishing emails)
- Email Selection: Randomly or Using IBL guide
- Feedback: Outcome or LLM explanations



IBL-guided email selections + LLM feedback results in the highest % improvement



Conclusions


Tai Malloy

- Humans benefited from the integration of Cognitive AI (IBL agent) and Machine AI (E-mail selection and Natural Language feedback)
- LLM feedback enhances learning over outcome feedback
- The integration of IBL agents and Machine AI through the LLM embeddings make the IBL models more general

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Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Use Cognitive AI as a human teammate



Human-AI Team

PNAS nexus

Main Manuscript for

Toward a Science of human–AI Teaming for Decision-making: A Complementarity Framework

Cleotilde Gonzalez[1,5*], Kate Donahue[2], Daniel G. Goldstein[3], Hoda Heidari[4,5], Mohammad S. Jalali[6], Beau Schelble[7], Aarti Singh[4], Anita Woolley[8]

Generating Human-AI Complementarity in Teams

- Effective teams begin with a clear understanding of the domain, the task requirements, and how human and AI capabilities can complement each other.
- AI systems should be designed to amplify human strengths and compensate human limitations, while humans augment AI with what humans do best.
- Effective teams must also adapt to dynamic environments, shifting goals, and evolving contexts, and scale across team sizes and settings



Example: Human-AI-Teams in Cyber Defense



Complex network, deception (misinform) activities, and green agents

Yinuo Du





Beeline: A very efficient attacker
- has prior knowledge of the network topology,
- routes directly to the Op_serve
- rapid, direct, targeted



Monitor the network (i.e. do nothing),
Remove user-level adversary access to hosts,
Restore a system exploited at privilege level back to a standard configuration,
Misinform to deploy a decoy, a honey service

Du, Y., Prebot, B., Malloy, T., Fang, F., & Gonzalez, C. (2025). Experimental evaluation of cognitive agents for collaboration in human-autonomy cyber defense teams. *Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans*, 100148. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbah.2025.100148

Experiment



3 types of partners:
- IBL agent
- Heuristic
- Random

One Attacker: Beeline



Human-IBL teams resulted in lesser loss and shorter recovery time



IBL partners demanded less effort from humans and increased human efficiency



Humans agreed with the IBL agent's intention as much as they did with the Heuristic agent's



Conclusions

Yinuo Du

Human-AI teams that involve a Cognitive AI (IBL) partner are more effective and work well together, compared to human-AI teams that involve strategic/optimal (and the random) partner

Human Centered AI

Part I (2-3:30 pm)

- Motivation
- State-of-art
  - Types of human feedback
  - Alignment Methods
- Challenges

Break (3:30 – 4 pm)

Part II (4-5:30 pm)

- Human-AI Complementarity
  - Human and Machine Intelligence
  - Human Decision Making
- *Cognitive AI*
- Integrating Cognitive and Machine AI
- Use of Cognitive AI as a Teammate

Wrap-up and Discussion (5:30-6 pm)

Human Centered AI

An interdisciplinary endeavor

AI researchers + Social Scientists + Domain experts

with contributions from many, many more disciplines

Key integrative concepts so far:

- Preference elicitation
- Social welfare aggregation
- Human-AI complementarity

Human Centered AI

An interdisciplinary endeavor

AI researchers + Social Scientists + Domain experts

with contributions from many, many more disciplines

Some emerging concepts:

- Scalable forms of elicitation – RAG, Rubrics
- Cognitive/Psychological Persona Alignment
- Cognitive AI as human feedback proxies
- AI adoption frameworks

Overall Conclusions & Future Work

- There is little evidence of Human-AI complementarity
- Cognitive AI can be a promising mechanism to achieve Human-AI complementary, serving as a “translator” of human intentions to Machine AI
- Research mechanisms to integrate Cognitive and Machine AI need to be explored
- Research to combine Human and AI is needed
  - Well-designed tasks in which it is possible to have situations where the human is needed or complements AI
- Develop more robust evaluation metrics for human–AI systems
  - Create composite performance metrics that incorporate, objective and subjective factors
- Standardize decision tasks and experimental designs.
  - Explore human-AI collaboration across diverse tasks while reporting collective performance in: Human alone, AI alone and Human-AI systems

Human Centered AI

- Tutorial website
  https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~aarti/AAAI26_HCAI_tutorial.html

- Feedback & suggestions