

15326 - Computational Microeconomics

Programming Assignment 2: combinatorial auctions and expressive securities markets (due February 19 before 5pm)

Please read the rules for assignments on the course web page (<http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~15326-s26/>). Use Piazza for questions and Gradescope to turn this in. For all questions, always hand in both code and output, typically .mod and .out files (and do not simply put everything in a .pdf).

Please use clear variable names and write comments in your code where appropriate (you can put comments between /* and */, or start a line with #).

Please see Homework 1 for details about getting set up with GLPK, making a directory for this homework, etc.

Note: in these questions, there is an example instance that you are asked to solve. However, just getting this example right is *not* enough to get full credit: your formulation should work on all instances. The example is just there to give you something to test your formulation on.

There are some parenthetical questions in the below; you do not need to turn in answers to these, they are just there to help you think about the questions.

1. (20 points.) Don't accept small fractions of bids.

While it may be reasonable to accept bids partially in some cases, accepting *too* small a fraction may not be reasonable. For example, if we accept only a fraction 0.01 of a bid, then the bidder may prefer to pull out altogether, rather than deal with the overhead of the transaction (setting up payment, etc.) just for that tiny fraction. For this reason, it may make sense to let bidders specify a *minimum acceptable fraction* of their bid. If f_j is the minimum fraction specified by bidder j , then this means we can accept any fraction in $\{0\} \cup [f_j, 1]$ of bidder j 's bid (i.e., either accept between f_j and 1, or not at all).

Complete the below mixed integer linear program formulation for this problem and code it up in the MathProg language. (Hint: is this an easier or harder problem than the case where it is not allowed to accept only a fraction of a bid? What does this tell you about whether you need integer variables?)

```

set ITEMS;

set BIDS;

param v {BIDS};           # Value of each bid

param f {BIDS};           # Minimum fraction for each bid

param A {BIDS, ITEMS};    # Bidder's requests for items (A[b, i])

var x {BIDS} >= 0, <= 1;  # Fraction of bid accepted

# YOUR TASK IS TO COMPLETE THIS: YOU MAY ADD ADDITIONAL (BINARY) VARIABLES

maximize total_value: sum {b in BIDS} v[b] * x[b];

s.t. # YOUR TASK IS TO COMPLETE THIS

```

For the `data;` portion, first *test* your code on the following instance (Instance 1).

```

data;

set ITEMS := i1 i2 i3;

set BIDS := b1 b2 b3 b4;

param v :=

    b1 20
    b2 30
    b3 25
    b4 35;

param f :=

    b1 0.3
    b2 0.6

```

```

b3 0.4

b4 0.2;

param A: i1 i2 i3 :=
b1    1  0  1
b2    1  1  0
b3    0  1  1
b4    1  1  1;

end;

```

One optimal solution to Instance 1 is to accept the first three bids with fractions 0.4, 0.6, 0.4, respectively, yielding a total value of 36.

When you *submit* your code, please do so with the following instance (Instance 2).

```

data;

set ITEMS := i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6;

set BIDS := b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7;

param v :=
b1 40
b2 55
b3 45
b4 60
b5 50
b6 30
b7 70;

```

```

param f :=
    b1 0.3
    b2 0.3
    b3 0.2
    b4 0.2
    b5 0.2
    b6 0.3
    b7 0.2;

param A: i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 :=
    b1 1 0 0 0 1 0
    b2 1 0 1 0 0 0
    b3 0 1 0 0 1 0
    b4 0 0 1 1 1 0
    b5 1 0 0 1 0 0
    b6 0 0 1 0 0 1
    b7 0 1 1 0 0 1;

end;


```

2. (40 points.) A different bidding language for combinatorial auctions.

In this question, we will study a bidding language that is different from the OR and XOR bidding languages that we saw in class. A “bid” in this language consists of a graph, whose vertices are the items in the auction. Each vertex has a number associated with it, which is the bidder’s value for receiving the item by itself. To represent complementarities and substitutabilities, the bidder places values on the edges of the graph. If the bidder receives *both* items on the edge,



then the bidder's valuation is the sum of the values of the individual items on the edge, *plus* the value on the edge. Thus, if the value on the edge is positive, the items are complements; if it is negative, they are substitutes. We also allow for *hyperedges*, which are edges that can link 3 or more vertices together. In this case, the value on the hyperedge is added to the bidder's valuation if and only if the bidder receives *all* the vertices that the hyperedge connects.

Here is an example bid:



For example, this bidder has a value of $2 + 2$ for the bundle $\{A, C\}$, a value of $2 + 2 + 3$ for $\{A, E\}$, a value of $2 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3 - 2$ for $\{A, B, C, E\}$, and a value of $2 + 1 - 2$ for $\{C, D\}$. (This bid does not satisfy the free disposal assumption—can you see why?)

Here are two more bids:



(It may be useful to ask yourself: What is strange about this last bid? And let's assume we have the option to keep some items (not allocate them to anyone); would we want to make use of this option? What about if we change the values?)

You will solve the winner determination problem for these three bids. Most of the file for doing this is already complete, but you will have to add some lines to make it work (indicated by "you need to fill this in"). You can get the file by typing

```
wget http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~15326-s26/graphbidding.mod
```

The following describes the formulation in the graphbidding.mod file.

Conceptually, we can think of regular edges (that connect only two vertices) as a special case of a hyperedge; moreover, we can even think of the individual items as a hyperedge—one that connects only one vertex. So, *every* value in the bid graph corresponds to a hyperedge.

Note that at least in this example, the bidders agree on whether each hyperedge has a negative or positive (to be precise, nonnegative) value. So, we can classify the hyperedges as "positive" or "negative". Each hyperedge consisting of a single item is positive.

The graphbidding.mod file has the following parameters: num_items, the number of items; positive_valuation[b,e], bidder b's valuation for positive hyperedge e; occurs_in_positive[i,e], whether item (vertex) i is adjacent to positive hyperedge e; and similarly for the negative hyperedges (since we already know that the negative hyperedges have negative values, we will drop the minus symbol for those values).

The file has the following binary variables: assigned[b,i] (set to 1 if b receives i), positive_applies[b,e] (set to 1 if b receives all items in positive hyperedge e), and negative_applies[b,e] (set to 1 if b receives all items in negative hyperedge e).

We need to have some constraints on these variables. For example, the solver will always "want" to set positive_applies[b,e] to 1 to maximize welfare, but this is only legitimate if all of the items in positive hyperedge e are in fact assigned to b. So we add the constraint:

```
num_items * positive_applies[b,e] + sum{i in ITEMS} occurs_in_positive[i,e]
- sum{i in ITEMS} occurs_in_positive[i,e] * assigned[b,i] <= num_items;
```

Here's why this constraint works. If b in fact receives all items in e, then

```
sum{i in ITEMS} occurs_in_positive[i,e] - sum{i in ITEMS}
occurs_in_positive[i,e] * assigned[b,i]
```

will equal 0, hence positive_applies[b,e] can be set to 1 without violating the constraint. However, if b does not receive all items in e, then

```
sum{i in ITEMS} occurs_in_positive[i,e] - sum{i in ITEMS}
occurs_in_positive[i,e] * assigned[b,i]
```

will be positive, hence `positive_applies[b,e]` cannot be set to 1 without violating the constraint (but setting it to 0 will always satisfy the constraint (ask yourself why?)). Note that this constraint does *not* work for the negative hyperedges, because there the solver “wants” to set the variable `negative_applies[b,e]` to 0. So a different trick is necessary here, one that only lets the solver set `negative_applies[b,e]` to 0 if there is at least one item in `e` that `b` does *not* get. You need to come up with such a trick. To hand in this assignment, fill in all the parts that say “you need to fill this in” within the `graphbidding.mod` file, solve it using `glpk` into output file `graphbidding.out`, and hand in the resulting two files. Check whether the answer you get makes sense.

3. (40 points.) Solving the auctioneer’s problem for an expressive securities market.

In this question, you will write (from scratch) a `.mod` file for solving the auctioneer’s (winner determination) problem for an expressive securities market. Remember that the auctioneer’s problem is to maximize her profit in the *worst* case (state).

You can write this `.mod` file in any way you like, except for the following requirements:

- You should have a set `STATES` (of states that the world can be in) and a set of `BIDS`;
- For every bid `b`, there should be a parameter `v[b]`, the amount that the bidder is bidding (is willing to pay);
- For every bid `b`, for every state `s`, there should be a parameter `p[b,s]`, which is the amount that the bidder must receive in that state if the bid is accepted;
- For every bid `b`, there should be a variable `accepted[b]` that is 1 if the bid is accepted, 0 if it is not accepted (and, perhaps, something inbetween if it is partially accepted, IF you are allowing for this);
- There should be a variable called `worst_case_profit` (which is your objective); the auctioneer’s profit in any particular state should be no less than this variable.

Now, use your formulation to solve the “A bigger instance” example from the course slides. Solve it both with and without partially acceptable bids. Make sure that the solution makes sense.