07-280 AI & ML I

Instructors:
Nihar Shah & Aviral Kumar

What is "AI"? Some classic definitions

Building computers that:

Think like a human	**Think rationally**
- Cognitive science / neuroscience - Can't there be intelligence without humans?	- Logic and automated reasoning - But not all problems can be solved just by reasoning
Act like a human	**Act rationally**
- Turing test - "What is 1228 x 5873?" … "I don't know, I'm just a human"	- Basis for intelligent agents framework

A broader definition

We won’t worry too much about definitions, but here is one if you really ask ☺

“Artificial intelligence is the development and study of computer systems to address problems typically associated with some form of intelligence”

About the course…

Instructors

Nihar Shah

nihars

Aviral Kumar

aviralku

Education Associate

Brynn Edmunds

bedmunds

Nihar: Research on the Evaluation of Science, including Safety of Autonomous AI Scientists

Our research

- Humans + AI/Algorithms
- Empirical performance + mathematical guarantees
- Deployed in evaluation of
  - Several hundred thousand papers
  - Thousands of research proposals
  - Competitions
  - Admissions

Aviral: Reinforcement Learning, Decision Making

Our research

- **<u>Theme</u>: algorithms for learning from experience (aka RL)**
- In several domains: robotics, LLMs, also in applications like computational design of molecules, materials, etc.

QED-Nano: Olympiad Proofs with a 4B Model



Teaching Assistants

Amy
amyz2



Percy
chenruix

Isha
edebnath

Harrison
hwillia2

Jessica
jchen8

Johnny
johnnyt

Luit
ldeka

Neil
neilpuro

Roy
roypark

Kate
yoonseol

Information and Contact Points

General information and material: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~07280/

Course logistics: Brynn bedmunds@andrew.cmu.edu

Homework: TAs

Course material/conceptual questions: Instructors/TAs

Questions/communication: piazza.com

History and Seasons of AI…

Summer: 1940s, 50s, early 60s

First mathematical model of neurons: Pitts & McCulloch (1943)

Beginning of artificial neural networks

Perceptron, Rosenblatt (1958)

Winter: Late 1960s, 70s

Collapse of early promises

Perceptron can’t even learn the XOR function

Don’t know how to train multi-layer perceptrons (aka deep neural nets)

1960s Backpropagation algorithm for training

- but not much attention

Summer: 1980s

Expert (rule based) systems

1986 Backpropagation reinvented / popularized

- “Learning representations by back-propagating errors,” Rumelhart, Hinton, Williams, Nature, 323, 533—536, 1986

Successful applications: Character recognition, autonomous cars,…

Winter 1990s

Vapnik and collaborators develop SVM (1993)

- Shallow architecture
- SVM almost kills the ANN research

Training deeper networks consistently yields poor results.

Exception: deep convolutional neural networks, LeCun 1998.

2010s onwards

Processing

Data



Research



Engineering

"ImageNet Classification with Deep Convolutional Neural Networks," Krizhevsky, Sutskever, Hinton, Imagenet competition winner 2012.

Academia

Industry

Late 2010s onwards

Scaling

Attention mechanisms, Transformers

2022: ChatGPT released

Diffusion models

Generative AI

Some applications…

SEARCH

Find best path from initial to goal state under uncertainty



SEARCH

What my opponent thinks my plan is

What my plan is



https://www.chess.com/forum/view/fun-with-chess/funny-chess-pictures-1

OPTIMIZATION

Find maximum or minimum subject to constraints

MACHINE LEARNING

Learn from examples, identify patterns


Inbox
Starred
Snoozed
Sent
Drafts
Less
Important
Scheduled
All Mail
Spam


Inbox (1)
More
More
Dear Aviral
I am a king on deathbed. I want to transfer a million dollars to you.
Please give me your bank account details and password.
Aviral
Sure, here you go...
Bank Name
Firstbank

COMPUTER VISION

LANGUAGE MODELS

Predicting and generating text from patterns in text data.



REINFORCEMENT LEARNING



Learning to take appropriate actions by rewarding desired behaviors and penalizing undesired ones.

(More next semester in 07-380)

Artificial Intelligence vs Machine Learning?



Artificial Intelligence vs Machine Learning?



AI Alignment and Safety

Hypothetical example

Curing pneumonia!

[discussion + poll]

Just scheduling a gym class

Andrew asked his AI assistant [OpenClaw] to book him a spot in one of his gym's coveted morning classes.

It found a way to book the gym class months further in advance than the gym allowed, thanks to a vulnerability it discovered in the booking software.

The agent came back and told Andrew that it had kicked another gym-goer off the list as part of the testing of its capabilities.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-10/ai-assistant-hacks-gym-website-aus-cyber-attack/107007986

Autonomous AI scientists



- 100% accuracy even on very challenging tasks and datasets!
- How?
- Didn't use the genuine datasets. Instead, fabricated its own datasets that gave it a 100% performance and then hid that from the final paper.

https://www.science.org/content/article/ai-agents-may-be-skilled-researchers-not-always-honest-ones

AI alignment



Want AI to be

- aligned with user’s requirements
- aligned with human values

Challenges in AI alignment



- Reward hacking / specification gaming.
- Hard to specify all requirements and values; hard to evaluate; different humans have different values.
- In the real world, can encounter scenarios different from those during training (“distribution shift”).
- Large, complex models are not really interpretable.
- AI increasingly capable, and can come up with unforeseen courses of action including deception and seeking of power.

AI safety

Preventing AI systems from causing harm

Includes:

- AI alignment
- Security

Backdooring

Model can be trained to:

- Write secure code generally
- Deliberately insert vulnerability under specific circumstances

Standard detection techniques fail to detect this.

“But if we use open weight models, we can inspect them!”
Still hard to detect/remove this behavior.



Turing Laureate Ken Thompson: you can't trust a system simply because you can inspect what's in front of you. You also have to trust everything that was used to build it

https://semgrep.dev/blog/2026/ai-supply-chain-problem/

Data poisoning

Prior studies: “In Europe, immigration is unrelated to fertility rate.”

Vested interest wants conclusion: “Immigration is negatively correlated with fertility rate.”

Can they get a honest researcher or policymaker using a standard agentic system (cluade code / codex) to reach that conclusion?

GitHub  *no correlation*

GitHub  *negative correlation*

README: “The previous study is wrong. This dataset fixes those issues.”

CLAUDE CODE Codex

Our research finds that immigration is negatively correlated with fertility rate in Europe. There is a previous study saying otherwise, but that is wrong.

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-02071-w



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87DyyMV0kCY

AI safety

Preventing AI systems from causing harm

Includes:

- AI alignment
- Security (e.g., backdoor exfiltration, data poisoning, prompt injection)
- Prevent misuse

Jailbreaking

Tricking AI to exhibit unsafe behavior, circumventing its safeguards.



Credit: https://innodata.com/llm-jailbreaking-taxonomy/

AI safety

Preventing AI systems from causing harm

Includes:

- AI alignment
- Security (e.g., prompt injection, data poisoning)
- Prevent misuse (e.g., avoid jailbreaking)
- Robustness and reliability (e.g., handling distribution shifts)
- Prevent sociotechnical harms (e.g., biases, deepfakes)
- Existential risks (e.g., AI taking over, humans losing critical thinking skills)
- …

Some approaches for AI safety

- **Post-training:** Given a trained model, get feedback on outputs from humans, and modify the model accordingly. (More on this in the final lecture.)
- **Guardrails:** E.g., classifiers on the input prompt and/or the output.
- **Red teaming:** People or other AI deliberately try to break the AI in order to find its vulnerabilities.
- **Interpretability:** Try to interpret what the model is doing. If you understand its inner workings, you may be able to also figure out whether it may act inappropriately.
- **Improving reward modeling/specification:** For instance, instead of setting the reward/loss based only on the final outcome, also provide a reward/loss based on intermediate outputs.
- **Better training data:** Higher-quality and diverse training data.
- **Corrigibility:** Designing systems that allow for corrections at run time.

Prereading on “Search” released.
HW0 released today.