CyLab Seminar

  • Remote Access Enabled - Zoom
  • Virtual Presentation
  • Ph.D. Candidate
  • Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Towards data-driven Internet routing security

The Internet ecosystem is critical for the reliability of online daily life. However, key Internet protocols, such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), were not designed to cope with untrustworthy parties, making them vulnerable to misconfigurations and attacks from anywhere in the network. In this talk, I will present an evidence-based data-driven approach to improve routing infrastructure security, which I use to identify and characterize BGP serial hijackers, networks that persistently hijack IP address blocks in BGP. I’ll also show how similar approaches can quantify the benefits of the RPKI security framework against prefix hijacks, and identify route leaks. This work improves our understanding about how our Internet actually works and has been used by industry and researchers for network reputation and verifying RPKI enforcement.

Cecilia Testart is a PhD candidate in EECS at MIT, working with David D. Clark. Her doctoral research focuses on securing the Internet’s core routing protocols leveraging empirical data-driven approaches to understand the impact of protocol design in security, and taking a comprehensive perspective, considering both technical and policy challenges, to improve the current state-of-the-art. Cecilia holds Engineering Degrees from Universidad de Chile and Ecole Centrale Paris and a dual-master degree in Technology and Policy and EECS from MIT. Cecilia's work was awarded with a Distinguished paper award at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference in 2019.


Cecilia Testart  is available for one on one meetings.

Zoom Participation. See announcement.

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