

	q	$1-q$
p	m_{11}	m_{12}
$1-p$	m_{21}	m_{22}

- Perfect Information Zero-Sum: Pure strategy optimal

$$\mathbf{Max}_{\text{Rows } i} \mathbf{Min}_{\text{Columns } j} m_{ij} = \mathbf{Min}_{\text{Columns } j} \mathbf{Max}_{\text{Rows } i} m_{ij}$$

- Hidden Information Zero-Sum: Mixed strategy optimal

$$\max_p \min(p \times m_{11} + (1-p) \times m_{21}, p \times m_{12} + (1-p) \times m_{22}) =$$

$$\min_q \max(q \times m_{11} + (1-q) \times m_{12}, q \times m_{21} + (1-q) \times m_{22})$$

Non-Zero Sum:

	Hockey	Movie
Hockey	+2,+1	0,0
Movie	0,0	+1,+2

- *Pure equilibrium:*

$$u_i(s^*_1, \dots, s^*_{i-1}, s^*_i, s^*_{i+1}, \dots, s^*_n) \geq u_i(s^*_1, \dots, s^*_{i-1}, s_i, s^*_{i+1}, \dots, s^*_n) \text{ for any } s_i$$

- Iterative removal of dominated strategies
- Derivatives of $u_i(s^*_1, \dots, s^*_{i-1}, s_i, s^*_{i+1}, \dots, s^*_n)$ with respect to s_i are all 0

Non-Zero Sum:

	Hockey	Movie
Hockey	+2,+1	0,0
Movie	0,0	+1,+2

- *Mixed equilibrium:*
- p_{ij} = probability that player i uses strategy j

$$\mathbf{p}_i = [p_{i1}, \dots, p_{im}]$$

$$u_i(\mathbf{p}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{i-1}^*, \mathbf{p}_i^*, \mathbf{p}_{i+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{p}_n^*) \geq u_i(\mathbf{p}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{i-1}^*, \mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{p}_{i+1}^*, \dots, \mathbf{p}_n^*) \text{ for any } \mathbf{p}_i$$