



ANITA'S SUPER AWESOME RECITATION SLIDES

15/18-213: Introduction to Computer Systems

Stacks and Buflab, 10 Feb 2014

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WHAT'S NEW (OR NOT)

- Bomb Lab is due Tuesday (tomorrow), 11:59 PM
 - Your late days are wasted here
 - Student: *“But if you wait until the last minute, then it only takes a minute!”*
- Buf Lab out Wednesday, 11:59 PM
 - Hacking the stack
 - **One week long lab**
- Stacks will be on the exams
 - They're tough at first, but I believe in you 😊



SPEAKING OF THE EXAM...

- **Midterm: Week of 3 March 2014**
- Covers everything up to, and including, caches.
 - Chapters 1-3 and 6 of textbook.
 - Lectures up to and including Caches (18 Feb 2014).
- Recitation exam review the week of exam.
- “**Read each chapter 3 times, work the practice problems, and do previous exams.**”
 - Do enough midterms until you feel comfortable with the material (at least 5 recent ones).
 - Depending on the semester, caches can be found in Exam 2.



TO THOSE WHO WANT A COOL SHELL

- http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/~anitazha/15213_tips.html
 - Scroll down to the part about “Shell of Choice”
 - Follow the directions
 - **WARNING: THIS SITE IS MESSY AND OUTDATED**

```
catshark          5:30 AM
hammerheadshark  6:00 AM
houndshark        6:30 AM
lemonshark        7:00 AM
makoshark         7:30 AM

< Do your best Anita! >
-----
      ^      ^
      (oo) \
      (  ) \_____ ) \/\
          ||-----w |
          ||         ||
anitazha@houndshark ~] $ █
```




JOURNEY THROUGH TIME

- Stacks
 - IA32 Stack Discipline
 - Function Call Overview
 - Stack Walkthrough
 - Extras on x86(_64) stacks
- Buf Lab Quick Start
 - Essential Items of Business
 - Miscellany
- Demo...?



SOME KIND OF STACK MOTIVATION



“In order to support general recursion, a language needs a way to allocate different activation records for different invocations of the same function. That way, local variables allocated in one recursive call can coexist with local variables allocated in a different call.” (credits to stack overflow)



DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS

○ Register

- Some place in hardware that stores bits
 - Like boxes on the side of memory

○ Caller save

- Saved by the caller of a function
- Before a function call, the caller must save any caller save register values it **wants preserved**

○ Callee save

- Saved by the callee of a function
- The callee is required to save/ restore values in these registers **if it is using these registers in the function**



ASIDE: WHY BOTH?

- Why do we have both caller and callee save?
 - Performance
 - Not all registers need to be saved



IA32 REGISTERS

- 6 general purpose registers
 - Caller save
 - %eax, %ecx, %edx
 - Saved by the caller of a function
 - Callee save
 - %ebx, %edi, %esi
 - Saved by the callee of a function



SPECIAL IA32 REGISTERS

- Base Pointer
 - %ebp
 - Points to the “bottom” of the stack frame
 - The location of old %ebp that gets pushed on entry
- Stack Pointer
 - %esp
 - Points to the “top” of the stack
 - *Usually* whatever was last pushed on the stack
- Instruction Pointer (Program Counter)
 - %eip
 - Points to the **next** instruction to be executed



IA32 TERMINOLOGY

Higher addresses
(ie. 0xFFFFFFFF)

“bottom”

%esp→

“top”

Lower addresses
(ie. 0x00000000)



Direction of
stack
growth



ASIDE: TECHNOLOGY NOTE (AGAIN!)

- This class is (strictly) x86(_64)
 - Other architectures may have different conventions
 - May not use stacks at all (weird, I know)
 - Stacks grow down/ up depending on implementation
 - Very confusing to those new to stacks




ASIDE: DIRECTION OF GROWTH

- Stack direction REALLY doesn't matter
 - Direction of growth is dependent on the processor
 - May be selectable for up/down
 - ...Or some other direction...?



BAM! CIRCULAR STACK!



SPARC (scalable processor architecture) Architecture




ASIDE: DIRECTION OF GROWTH

- Examples from StackOverflow
 - x86 - down
 - SPARC - in a circle
 - System z - in a linked list (down, at least for zLinux)
 - ARM - selectable
 - PDP11 - down



WHAT HAPPENS IN IA32: PUSH

- Pushing on the stack




- In general, `pushl` translates to (in AT&T syntax):
 - `subl $0x4, %esp`
 - `movl src, (%esp)`



WHAT HAPPENS IN IA32: POP

- Popping off the stack



- In general, `popl` translates to (in AT&T syntax):
 - `movl (%esp), dest`
 - `addl $0x4, %esp`




STACK FRAMES WHATCHAMACALLITS?

- Every function call gets a “stack frame”
- All the useful stuff can go on the stack!
 - Local variables (scalars, arrays, structs)
 - What the compiler couldn't fit into registers
 - Callee/caller save registers
 - Temporary variables
 - Arguments
- Stacks can make recursion work!
- Key idea: “Storage for each *instance* of procedure call” (stolen out of 15-410 slides)



SO THAT'S WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE...



ROLES OF A (FUNCTION) CALLER

○ Caller

- Save (push) relevant caller save registers
- Push arguments
- Call function

○ Caller after function return

- “Remove” (add to %esp or pop) arguments
- Restore (pop) saved caller save registers



ROLES OF A (FUNCTION) CALLEE

○ Callee

- Push `%ebp` (save stack frame)
- Copy (move) `%esp` into `%ebp`
- Save (push) callee save registers it wants to use

○ Callee before return

- Restore (pop) callee save registers previously saved
- Copy (move) `%ebp` into `%esp`
 - Moves stack pointer to the saved `%ebp`
- Restore (pop) `%ebp`



FUNCTION CALLS, OTHER OPERATIONS

- Implied operations

- “call” implicitly pushes return address
 - Return address is always of the instruction after the call
- “ret” implicitly pops return address into %eip
 - Becomes the next instruction to execute!




STACK FRAMES IN ACTION

C Code	Disassembly
<pre>int main() { return addition(5, 6); }</pre>	<pre>08048394 <main>: 8048394: 55 push %ebp 8048395: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp 8048397: 83 e4 f0 and \$0xffffffff0,%esp 804839a: 83 ec 10 sub \$0x10,%esp 804839d: c7 44 24 04 06 00 00 movl \$0x6,0x4(%esp) 80483a4: 00 80483a5: c7 04 24 05 00 00 00 movl \$0x5,(%esp) 80483ac: e8 02 00 00 00 call 80483b3 <addition> 80483b1: c9 leave 80483b2: c3 ret</pre>
<pre>int addition(int x, int y) { return x+y; }</pre>	<pre>080483b3 <addition>: 80483b3: 55 push %ebp 80483b4: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp 80483b6: 8b 45 0c mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax 80483b9: 8b 55 08 mov 0x8(%ebp),%edx 80483bc: 8d 04 02 lea (%edx,%eax,1),%eax 80483bf: c9 leave 80483c0: c3 ret</pre>



BREAKDOWN: ARGUMENT BUILD

- Build the arguments (note: 2 instructions are executed in this example)




Before	After
<code>%esp = 0x104</code>	<code>%esp = 0x104</code>
<code>%ebp = 0x200</code>	<code>%ebp = 0x200</code>
<code>%eip = 0x804839d</code>	<code>%eip = 0x80483ac</code>



BREAKDOWN: FUNCTION CALL

- Call the function




Before	After
%esp = 0x104	%esp = 0x100
%ebp = 0x200	%ebp = 0x200
%eip = 0x80483ac	%eip = 0x80483b3



BREAKDOWN: CALLEE SETUP

- Stack frame set up (note: 2 instructions are executed in this example)



Before	After
%esp = 0x100	%esp = 0xFC
%ebp = 0x200	%ebp = 0xFC
%eip = 0x80483b3	%eip = 0x80483b6



BREAK FROM THE EXAMPLE.. KIND OF

- Accessing an argument

0x108	0x6 (argument 2)
0x104	0x5 (argument 1)
0x100	0x80483b1 (return address)
0xFC	0x200 (Prev. %ebp)

Argument	Location
Argument 2	0xC(%ebp)
Argument 1	0x8(%ebp)

- In the current frame, arguments are accessed via references to %ebp

- Notice how argument 1 is at 0x8(%ebp), not 0x4(%ebp)




LET'S REVIEW THE CODE AGAIN

C Code	Disassembly
<pre>int main() { return addition(5, 6); }</pre>	<pre>08048394 <main>: 8048394: 55 push %ebp 8048395: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp 8048397: 83 e4 f0 and \$0xffffffff0,%esp 804839a: 83 ec 10 sub \$0x10,%esp 804839d: c7 44 24 04 06 00 00 movl \$0x6,0x4(%esp) 80483a4: 00 80483a5: c7 04 24 05 00 00 00 movl \$0x5,(%esp) 80483ac: e8 02 00 00 00 call 80483b3 <addition> 80483b1: c9 leave 80483b2: c3 ret</pre>
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BREAKDOWN: PREPARING TO RETURN

- Preparing to return from a function




Before	After
<code>%esp = 0xFC</code>	<code>%esp = 0x100</code>
<code>%ebp = 0xFC</code>	<code>%ebp = 0x200</code>
<code>%eip = 0x80483bf</code>	<code>%eip = 0x80483c0</code>



BREAKDOWN: RETURN

- Return from a function



Before	After
<code>%esp = 0xFC</code>	<code>%esp = 0x104</code>
<code>%ebp = 0x200</code>	<code>%ebp = 0x200</code>
<code>%eip = 0x80483c0</code>	<code>%eip = 0x80483b1</code>



STACKS AND STUFF ON X86_64

- Arguments (≤ 6) are passed via registers
 - %rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %rcx, %r8, %r9
 - Extra arguments passed via stack!
 - IA32 stack knowledge still matters!
- Don't need %ebp as the base pointer
 - Compilers are smarter now
- Overall less stack use
 - Potentially better performance



AND FLOATING POINT?

- Floating point arguments are complicated
 - Out of the scope of this course
 - Some chips have a separate floating point stack
- Example of complication
 - x86_64 stack on function entry needs to be 16 byte aligned for floating point
 - And other potential issues you shouldn't worry about



BUFLAB

- A series of exercises asking you to overflow the stack and change execution
 - You do this with inputs that are super long and write over key stack values
 - **Incorrect inputs will not hurt your score**
- Seminal paper on stack corruption
 - *Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit*



BASIC APPROACH

- Examine the provided C code/ disassembly
 - Disassembling
 - `> objdump -d bufbomb > outfile`
 - Don't forget that GDB is still used for this lab!
- Find out how long to make your inputs
- Write exploits to divert program execution
- Profit



BUFLAB TOOLS

- `./makecookie andrewID`
 - Makes a unique “cookie” based on your Andrew ID
- `./hex2raw`
 - Use the hex generated from assembly to pass raw strings into `bufbomb`
 - Use with `-n` in the last stage
- `./bufbomb -t andrewID`
 - The actual program to attack
 - Always pass in with your Andrew ID so your score is logged
 - Use with `-n` in the last stage



HOW TO INPUT ANSWERS

- Put your byte code exploit into a text file
 - Then feed it through hex2raw
- Later stages: write (corruption) assembly
 - Compiling
 - > `gcc -m32 -c example.S`
 - Get the byte codes
 - > `objdump -d example.o > outfile`
 - Then feed it through hex2raw



WAYS TO FEED BYTE CODES

○ Option 1: Pipes

- > `cat exploitfile | ./hex2raw | ./bufbomb -t andrewID`

○ Option 2: Redirects

- > `./hex2raw < exploitfile > exploit-rawfile`
- > `./bufbomb -t andrewID < exploit-rawfile`

○ Option 3: Redirects in GDB

- > `gdb bufbomb`
- (gdb) `run -t andrewID < exploit-rawfile`



POTENTIAL POINTS OF FAILURE

- Don't use byte value **0A** in your exploit
 - ASCII for newline
 - `gets()` will terminate early if it sees this
- Multiple exploits submitted for the same level always takes the **latest submission**
 - So if you pass correctly once, but accidentally pass the wrong exploit later, just pass the correct one again
- If you manage to execute your exploit....
 - **GDB will say weird things**
 - “Can't access memory...” etc.
 - Just ignore it and keep going
- **Don't forget the `-n` flag on the last level**



BUFLAB

- The writeup contains all the lab knowledge
 - How to use the tools
 - How to write corruption code
 - Even tells you how to solve the level (at a high level)!
- Please don't ask questions answered by the writeup
 - Or I will make this sad face: TT_TT
- The writeup is on Autolab
 - Couple links down from the handout



A LESSON ON ENDIANNNESS

- We're working with little endian
 - Least significant byte is at the lower address

<i>Higher addresses</i> ...	Caller stack frame
Return Address	
Saved %ebp	← %ebp
Saved %ebx	
Canary	← Potential way to detect stack corruption
<i>MSB</i> [7] [6] [5] [4]	buf string (each char is a byte)
[3] [2] [1] [0] <i>LSB</i>	
... <i>Lower addresses</i>	



EXAMPLE OF ENDIAN IN BUF LAB

- Example byte code input:

- 01 02 03 04
05 06 07 08
09 AA BB CC
55 44 04 08

- Little Endian

- Addresses will look as they normally do when they end up on the stack.
- Here, value 0x08044455 reads as 0x08044455 on the stack.

<i>Higher addresses</i> ...	
08 04 44 55	← Potentially overwritten return address
CC BB AA 09	
08 07 06 05	
04 03 02 01	
...	← Input string address
<i>Lower addresses</i>	



MISCELLANY BUT NECESSARY

○ Canaries

- Attempts to detect overrun buffers
- Sits at the end of the buffer (array)
 - If the array overflows, *hopefully* we detect this with a change in the canary value....

○ NOP sleds

- The `nop` instruction means “no-op/ no operation”
 - In computer architecture it’s like “pipeline bubbles”
- Used to “pad” instructions (or exploits!)
 - Place your exploits at the end of the `nop` sled
 - Allows you to be “sloppier” in providing the return address of your exploit



DEMO TIME (IF CLASS ISN'T OVER YET)

- Walking stacks
- Byte code format
- Byte code feeding
- Example assembly
- Compiling assembly
 - *Not* assembling
- Assembly to byte code



STOLEN CREDITS & QUESTIONS SLIDE

- [xkcd: Tabletop Roleplaying](#)
- [StackOverflow: Supporting Recursion](#)
- [StackOverflow: Direction of Stack Growth](#)
- [Understanding the SPARC Architecture](#)
- CS:APP p. 220 – Stack Frame Structure
- [*Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit*](#)
- CS:APP p.262 – NOP sleds
- CS:APP p.263 – Stack Frame with a canary
- [Double Mocha Latte Picture](#)

