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Title  The Art of War

Author  Sun Tzu

Translator  Lionel Giles

Release Date  May 1994   eBook  132 
 Most recently updated December 3  2007 

Language  English

Character set encoding  ISO 646 US  US ASCII 

   START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ART OF WAR    

Note  Please see Project Gutenberg s eBook  17405 for a version of
this eBook without the Giles commentary  that is  with only the
Sun Tzu text  



                    SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR

            THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

          Translated from the Chinese with Introduction
                       and Critical Notes

                               BY

                       LIONEL GILES  M A 

 Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS 
                      in the British Museum

                     First Published in 1910

                                                                 

                          To my brother
                  Captain Valentine Giles  R G 
                        in the hope that
                      a work 2400 years old
           may yet contain lessons worth consideration
                     by the soldier of today
                        this translation
                  is affectionately dedicated 

                                                                 

Preface to the Project Gutenburg Etext
                                      

     When Lionel Giles began his translation of Sun Tzu s ART OF
WAR  the work was virtually unknown in Europe   Its introduction
to Europe began in 1782 when a French Jesuit Father living in
China  Joseph Amiot  acquired a copy of it  and translated it
into French   It was not a good translation because  according to
Dr  Giles    I t contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not
write  and very little indeed of what he did  
     The first translation into English was published in 1905 in
Tokyo by Capt  E  F  Calthrop  R F A   However  this translation
is  in the words of Dr  Giles   excessively bad    He goes
further in this criticism    It is not merely a question of
downright blunders  from which none can hope to be wholly exempt 
Omissions were frequent  hard passages were willfully distorted
or slurred over   Such offenses are less pardonable   They would
not be tolerated in any edition of a Latin or Greek classic  and
a similar standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in
translations from Chinese    In 1908 a new edition of Capt 
Calthrop s translation was published in London   It was an
improvement on the first    omissions filled up and numerous
mistakes corrected    but new errors were created in the process 
Dr  Giles  in justifying his translation  wrote    It was not
undertaken out of any inflated estimate of my own powers  but I
could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a better fate than
had befallen him  and I knew that  at any rate  I could hardly
fail to improve on the work of my predecessors  
     Clearly  Dr  Giles  work established much of the groundwork
for the work of later translators who published their own
editions   Of the later editions of the ART OF WAR I have
examined   two feature Giles  edited translation and notes   the
other two present the same basic information from the ancient
Chinese commentators found in the Giles edition   Of these four 
Giles  1910 edition is the most scholarly and presents the reader
an incredible amount of information concerning Sun Tzu s text 
much more than any other translation 
     The Giles  edition of the ART OF WAR  as stated above  was a
scholarly work   Dr  Giles was a leading sinologue at the time
and an assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and
Manuscripts in the British Museum   Apparently he wanted to
produce a definitive edition  superior to anything else that
existed and perhaps something that would become a standard
translation   It was the best translation available for 50 years 
But apparently there was not much interest in Sun Tzu in English 
speaking countries since it took the start of the Second
World War to renew interest in his work   Several people
published unsatisfactory English translations of Sun Tzu   In
1944   Dr  Giles  translation was edited and published in the
United States in a series of military science books   But it
wasn t until 1963 that a good English translation  by Samuel B 
Griffith and still in print  was published that was an equal to
Giles  translation   While this translation is more lucid than
Dr  Giles  translation  it lacks his copious notes that make his
so interesting 
     Dr  Giles produced a work primarily intended for scholars of
the Chinese civilization and language   It contains the Chinese
text of Sun Tzu  the English translation  and voluminous notes
along with numerous footnotes   Unfortunately  some of his notes
and footnotes contain Chinese characters  some are completely
Chinese   Thus   a conversion to a Latin alphabet etext was
difficult   I did the conversion in complete ignorance of Chinese
 except for what I learned while doing the conversion    Thus  I
faced the difficult task of paraphrasing it while retaining as
much of the important text as I could   Every paraphrase
represents a loss  thus I did what I could to retain as much of
the text as possible   Because the 1910 text contains a Chinese
concordance  I was able to transliterate proper names  books  and
the like at the risk of making the text more obscure   However 
the text  on the whole  is quite satisfactory for the casual
reader  a transformation made possible by conversion to an etext 
However  I come away from this task with the feeling of loss
because I know that someone with a background in Chinese can do a
better job than I did  any such attempt would be welcomed 

                              Bob Sutton
                              al876 cleveland freenet edu
                              bobs gnu ai mit edu

                                                                 
INTRODUCTION


Sun Wu and his Book
                   


     Ssu ma Ch ien gives the following biography of Sun Tzu    1 
  

       Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Ch i State   His ART OF
  WAR brought him to the notice of Ho Lu   2  King of Wu   Ho
  Lu said to him    I have carefully perused your 13 chapters 
  May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight
  test  
       Sun Tzu replied    You may  
       Ho Lu asked    May the test be applied to women  
       The answer was again in the affirmative  so arrangements
  were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace   Sun Tzu
  divided them into two companies  and placed one of the King s
  favorite concubines at the head of each   He then bade them
  all take spears in their hands  and addressed them thus     I
  presume you know the difference between front and back  right
  hand and left hand  
       The girls replied   Yes 
       Sun Tzu went on    When I say  Eyes front    you must
  look straight ahead   When I say  Left turn   you must face
  towards your left hand   When I say  Right turn    you must
  face towards your right hand   When I say  About turn    you
  must face right round towards your back  
       Again the girls assented   The words of command having
  been thus explained  he set up the halberds and battle axes
  in order to begin the drill   Then  to the sound of drums  he
  gave the order  Right turn    But the girls only burst out
  laughing   Sun Tzu said    If words of command are not clear
  and distinct  if orders are not thoroughly understood  then
  the general is to blame  
       So he started drilling them again  and this time gave
  the order  Left turn   whereupon the girls once more burst
  into fits of laughter   Sun Tzu    If words of command are
  not clear and distinct  if orders are not thoroughly
  understood  the general is to blame   But if his orders ARE
  clear  and the soldiers nevertheless disobey  then it is the
  fault of their officers  
       So saying  he ordered the leaders of the two companies
  to be beheaded   Now the king of Wu was watching the scene
  from the top of a raised pavilion  and when he saw that his
  favorite concubines were about to be executed  he was greatly
  alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message     We
  are now quite satisfied as to our general s ability to handle
  troops   If We are bereft of these two concubines  our meat
  and drink will lose their savor   It is our wish that they
  shall not be beheaded  
       Sun Tzu replied    Having once received His Majesty s
  commission to be the general of his forces  there are certain
  commands of His Majesty which  acting in that capacity  I am
  unable to accept  
       Accordingly   he had the two leaders beheaded   and
  straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in
  their place   When this had been done  the drum was sounded
  for the drill once more  and the girls went through all the
  evolutions  turning to the right or to the left  marching
  ahead or wheeling back  kneeling or standing  with perfect
  accuracy and precision  not venturing to utter a sound   Then
  Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying    Your soldiers 
  Sire  are now properly drilled and disciplined  and ready for
  your majesty s inspection   They can be put to any use that
  their sovereign may desire  bid them go through fire and
  water  and they will not disobey  
       But the King replied    Let our general cease drilling
  and return to camp   As for us  We have no wish to come down
  and inspect the troops  
       Thereupon Sun Tzu said    The King is only fond of
  words  and cannot translate them into deeds  
       After that  Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one who knew how
  to handle an army  and finally appointed him general   In the
  west  he defeated the Ch u State and forced his way into
  Ying  the capital  to the north he put fear into the States
  of Ch i and Chin  and spread his fame abroad amongst the
  feudal princes   And Sun Tzu shared in the might of the King 

     About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu ma Ch ien has to
tell us in this chapter   But he proceeds to give a biography of
his descendant   Sun Pin  born about a hundred years after his
famous ancestor s death  and also the outstanding military genius
of his time   The historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu  and in
his preface we read    Sun Tzu had his feet cut off and yet
continued to discuss the art of war    3   It seems likely  then 
that   Pin  was a nickname bestowed on him after his mutilation 
unless the story was invented in order to account for the name 
The crowning incident of his career  the crushing defeat of his
treacherous rival P ang Chuan  will be found briefly related in
Chapter V  ss  19  note 
     To return to the elder Sun Tzu   He is mentioned in two
other passages of the SHIH CHI    

       In the third year of his reign  512 B C   Ho Lu  king of
  Wu  took the field with Tzu hsu  i e  Wu Yuan  and Po P ei 
  and attacked Ch u   He captured the town of Shu and slew the
  two prince s sons who had formerly been generals of Wu   He
  was then meditating a descent on Ying  the capital   but the
  general Sun Wu said    The army is exhausted   It is not yet
  possible   We must wait        After further successful
  fighting     in the ninth year   506 B C     King Ho Lu
  addressed Wu Tzu hsu and Sun Wu  saying     Formerly  you
  declared that it was not yet possible for us to enter Ying 
  Is the time ripe now    The two men replied    Ch u s general
  Tzu ch ang   4  is grasping and covetous  and the princes of
  T ang and Ts ai both have a grudge against him   If Your
  Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack  you must win
  over T ang and Ts ai  and then you may succeed     Ho Lu
  followed this advice   beat Ch u in five pitched battles and
  marched into Ying    5 

     This is the latest date at which anything is recorded of Sun
Wu   He does not appear to have survived his patron  who died
from the effects of a wound in 496 
     In another chapter there occurs this passage    6 

       From this time onward  a number of famous soldiers
  arose  one after the other   Kao fan   7  who was employed by
  the Chin State  Wang tzu   8  in the service of Ch i  and Sun
  Wu  in the service of Wu   These men developed and threw
  light upon the principles of war 

     It is obvious enough that Ssu ma Ch ien at least had no
doubt about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage  and
with one exception  to be noticed presently  he is by far the
most important authority on the period in question   It will not
be necessary  therefore  to say much of such a work as the WU
YUEH CH UN CH IU  which is supposed to have been written by Chao
Yeh of the 1st century A D   The attribution is somewhat
doubtful  but even if it were otherwise  his account would be of
little value  based as it is on the SHIH CHI and expanded with
romantic details   The story of Sun Tzu will be found  for what
it is worth  in chapter 2   The only new points in it worth
noting are    1   Sun Tzu was first recommended to Ho Lu by Wu
Tzu hsu    2  He is called a native of Wu    3  He had previously
lived a retired life  and his contemporaries were unaware of his
ability 
     The following passage occurs in the Huai nan Tzu     When
sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind  it is impossible
even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe    Assuming that this
work is genuine  and hitherto no doubt has been cast upon it   we
have here the earliest direct reference for Sun Tzu  for Huai nan
Tzu died in 122 B C   many years before the SHIH CHI was given to
the world 
     Liu Hsiang  80 9 B C   says    The reason why Sun Tzu at the
head of 30 000 men beat Ch u with 200 000 is that the latter were
undisciplined  
     Teng Ming shih informs us that the surname  Sun  was
bestowed on Sun Wu s grandfather by Duke Ching of Ch i  547 490
B C     Sun Wu s father Sun P ing  rose to be a Minister of State
in Ch i  and Sun Wu himself  whose style was Ch ang ch ing   fled
to Wu on account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the
kindred of T ien Pao   He had three sons  of whom the second 
named Ming  was the father of Sun Pin   According to this account
then  Pin was the grandson of Wu  which  considering that Sun
Pin s victory over Wei was gained in 341 B C   may be dismissed
as chronological impossible   Whence these data were obtained by
Teng Ming shih I do not know  but of course no reliance whatever
can be placed in them 
     An interesting document which has survived from the close of
the Han period is the short preface written by the Great Ts ao
Ts ao  or Wei Wu Ti  for his edition of Sun Tzu   I shall give it
in full     

       I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to
  their advantage   10   The SHU CHU mentions  the army  among
  the  eight objects of government    The I CHING says 
    army  indicates firmness and justice   the experienced
  leader will have good fortune    The SHIH CHING says    The
  King rose majestic in his wrath  and he marshaled his
  troops    The Yellow Emperor  T ang the Completer and Wu Wang
  all used spears and battle axes in order to succor their
  generation   The SSU MA FA says    If one man slay another of
  set purpose  he himself may rightfully be slain    He who
  relies solely on warlike measures shall be exterminated  he
  who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish 
  Instances of this are Fu Ch ai  11  on the one hand and Yen
  Wang on the other   12   In military matters  the Sage s rule
  is normally to keep the peace  and to move his forces only
  when occasion requires   He will not use armed force unless
  driven to it by necessity 
       Many books have I read on the subject of war and
  fighting  but the work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest
  of them all    Sun Tzu was a native of the Ch i state   his
  personal name was Wu   He wrote the ART OF WAR in 13 chapters
  for Ho Lu  King of Wu   Its principles were tested on women 
  and he was subsequently made a general   He led an army
  westwards   crushed the Ch u state and entered Ying the
  capital   In the north  he kept Ch i and Chin in awe   A
  hundred years and more after his time  Sun Pin lived  He was
  a descendant of Wu    13   In his treatment of deliberation
  and planning  the importance of rapidity in taking the field 
   14  clearness of conception  and depth of design   Sun Tzu
  stands beyond the reach of carping criticism   My
  contemporaries  however  have failed to grasp the full
  meaning of his instructions  and while putting into practice
  the smaller details in which his work abounds   they have
  overlooked its essential purport   That is the motive which
  has led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole 

     One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit
statement that the 13 chapters were specially composed for King
Ho Lu   This is supported by the internal evidence of I  ss  15 
in which it seems clear that some ruler is addressed 
     In the bibliographic section of the HAN SHU  there is an
entry which has given rise to much discussion    The works of Sun
Tzu of Wu in 82 P IEN  or chapters   with diagrams in 9 CHUAN  
It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters known to
Ssu ma Ch ien   or those we possess today   Chang Shou chieh
refers to an edition of Sun Tzu s ART OF WAR of which the  13
chapters  formed the first CHUAN  adding that there were two
other CHUAN besides   This has brought forth a theory  that the
bulk of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun Tzu
    we should call them apocryphal    similar to the WEN TA  of
which a specimen dealing with the Nine Situations  15  is
preserved in the T UNG TIEN  and another in Ho Shin s commentary 
It is suggested that before his interview with Ho Lu  Sun Tzu had
only written the 13 chapters  but afterwards composed a sort of
exegesis in the form of question and answer between himself and
the King   Pi I hsun  the author of the SUN TZU HSU LU  backs
this up with a quotation from the WU YUEH CH UN CH IU    The King
of Wu summoned Sun Tzu  and asked him questions about the art of
war   Each time he set forth a chapter of his work  the King
could not find words enough to praise him    As he points out  if
the whole work was expounded on the same scale as in the above 
mentioned fragments  the total number of chapters could not fail
to be considerable   Then the numerous other treatises attributed
to Sun Tzu might be included   The fact that the HAN CHIH
mentions no work of Sun Tzu except the 82 P IEN  whereas the Sui
and T ang bibliographies give the titles of others in addition to
the  13 chapters   is good proof  Pi I hsun thinks  that all of
these were contained in the 82 P IEN   Without pinning our faith
to the accuracy of details supplied by the WU YUEH CH UN CH IU 
or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises cited by Pi
I hsun   we may see in this theory a probable solution of the
mystery   Between Ssu ma Ch ien and Pan Ku there was plenty of
time for a luxuriant crop of forgeries to have grown up under the
magic name of Sun Tzu  and the 82 P IEN may very well represent a
collected edition of these lumped together with the original
work   It is also possible  though less likely  that some of them
existed in the time of the earlier historian and were purposely
ignored by him   16 
     Tu Mu s conjecture seems to be based on a passage which
states    Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu s Art of War   which
in turn may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the final
words of Ts ao King s preface   This  as Sun Hsing yen points
out  is only a modest way of saying that he made an explanatory
paraphrase  or in other words  wrote a commentary on it   On the
whole  this theory has met with very little acceptance   Thus 
the SSU K U CH UAN SHU says    The mention of the 13 chapters in
the SHIH CHI shows that they were in existence before the HAN
CHIH  and that latter accretions are not to be considered part of
the original work   Tu Mu s assertion can certainly not be taken
as proof  
     There is every reason to suppose  then  that the 13 chapters
existed in the time of Ssu ma Ch ien practically as we have them
now   That the work was then well known he tells us in so many
words    Sun Tzu s 13 Chapters and Wu Ch i s Art of War are the
two books that people commonly refer to on the subject of
military matters   Both of them are widely distributed  so I will
not discuss them here    But as we go further back  serious
difficulties begin to arise   The salient fact which has to be
faced is that the TSO CHUAN  the greatest contemporary record 
makes no mention whatsoever of Sun Wu  either as a general or as
a writer   It is natural  in view of this awkward circumstance 
that many scholars should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun
Wu as given in the SHIH CHI  but even show themselves frankly
skeptical as to the existence of the man at all   The most
powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be found in
the following disposition by Yeh Shui hsin   17    

       It is stated in Ssu ma Ch ien s history that Sun Wu was
  a native of the Ch i State  and employed by Wu  and that in
  the reign of Ho Lu he crushed Ch u  entered Ying  and was a
  great general   But in Tso s Commentary no Sun Wu appears at
  all   It is true that Tso s Commentary need not contain
  absolutely everything that other histories contain   But Tso
  has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling
  ruffians such as Ying K ao shu   18  Ts ao Kuei    19    Chu
  Chih wu and Chuan She chu  20    In the case of Sun Wu  whose
  fame and achievements were so brilliant  the omission is much
  more glaring   Again  details are given  in their due order 
  about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister P ei    21 
  Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed
  over 
       In point of literary style  Sun Tzu s work belongs to
  the same school as KUAN TZU   22  LIU T AO   23  and the YUEH
  YU  24  and may have been the production of some private
  scholar living towards the end of the  Spring and Autumn  or
  the beginning of the  Warring States  period   25   The story
  that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State  is
  merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers 
       From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty  26 
  down to the time of the  Spring and Autumn   all military
  commanders were statesmen as well  and the class of
  professional generals  for conducting external campaigns  did
  not then exist   It was not until the period of the  Six
  States   27  that this custom changed   Now although Wu was
  an uncivilized State  it is conceivable that Tso should have
  left unrecorded the fact that Sun Wu was a great general and
  yet held no civil office   What we are told  therefore  about
  Jang chu  28  and Sun Wu  is not authentic matter   but the
  reckless fabrication of theorizing pundits   The story of Ho
  Lu s experiment on the women  in particular  is utterly
  preposterous and incredible 

     Yeh Shui hsin represents Ssu ma Ch ien as having said that
Sun Wu crushed Ch u and entered Ying   This is not quite correct 
No doubt the impression left on the reader s mind is that he at
least shared in these exploits   The fact may or may not be
significant  but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the SHIH CHI
either that Sun Tzu was general on the occasion of the taking of
Ying  or that he even went there at all   Moreover  as we know
that Wu Yuan and Po P ei both took part in the expedition  and
also that its success was largely due to the dash and enterprise
of Fu Kai  Ho Lu s younger brother  it is not easy to see how yet
another general could have played a very prominent part in the
same campaign 
     Ch en Chen sun of the Sung dynasty has the note    

       Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their
  art   But the fact that he does not appear in the TSO CHUAN 
  although he is said to have served under Ho Lu King of Wu 
  makes it uncertain what period he really belonged to 

He also says    

       The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch i may be of genuine
  antiquity 

     It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui hsin and Ch en Chen sun 
while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as he figures in Ssu ma
Ch ien s history  are inclined to accept the date traditionally
assigned to the work which passes under his name   The author of
the HSU LU fails to appreciate this distinction  and consequently
his bitter attack on Ch en Chen sun really misses its mark   He
makes one of two points  however  which certainly tell in favor
of the high antiquity of our  13 chapters     Sun Tzu   he says 
 must have lived in the age of Ching Wang  519 476   because he
is frequently plagiarized in subsequent works of the Chou  Ch in
and Han dynasties    The two most shameless offenders in this
respect are Wu Ch i and Huai nan Tzu  both of them important
historical personages in their day   The former lived only a
century after the alleged date of Sun Tzu  and his death is known
to have taken place in 381 B C   It was to him  according to Liu
Hsiang   that Tseng Shen delivered the TSO CHUAN  which had been
entrusted to him by its author    29    Now the fact that
quotations from the ART OF WAR  acknowledged or otherwise  are to
be found in so many authors of different epochs  establishes a
very strong anterior to them all     in other words  that Sun
Tzu s treatise was already in existence towards the end of the
5th century B C   Further proof of Sun Tzu s antiquity is
furnished by the archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to
a number of the words he uses   A list of these  which might
perhaps be extended  is given in the HSU LU  and though some of
the interpretations are doubtful  the main argument is hardly
affected thereby   Again  it must not be forgotten that Yeh Shui 
hsin  a scholar and critic of the first rank  deliberately
pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to belong to the early
part of the fifth century   Seeing that he is actually engaged in
an attempt to disprove the existence of Sun Wu himself  we may be
sure that he would not have hesitated to assign the work to a
later date had he not honestly believed the contrary   And it is
precisely on such a point that the judgment of an educated
Chinaman will carry most weight   Other internal evidence is not
far to seek   Thus in XIII  ss  1  there is an unmistakable
allusion to the ancient system of land tenure which had already
passed away by the time of Mencius  who was anxious to see it
revived in a modified form   30   The only warfare Sun Tzu knows
is that carried on between the various feudal princes  in which
armored chariots play a large part   Their use seems to have
entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty   He speaks
as a man of Wu  a state which ceased to exist as early as 473
B C   On this I shall touch presently 

     But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier   and
the chances of its being other than a bona fide production are
sensibly diminished   The great age of forgeries did not come
until long after   That it should have been forged in the period
immediately following 473 is particularly unlikely  for no one 
as a rule  hastens to identify himself with a lost cause   As for
Yeh Shui hsin s theory  that the author was a literary recluse 
that seems to me quite untenable   If one thing is more apparent
than another after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu  it is that
their essence has been distilled from a large store of personal
observation and experience   They reflect the mind not only of a
born strategist  gifted with a rare faculty of generalization 
but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted with the
military conditions of his time   To say nothing of the fact that
these sayings have been accepted and endorsed by all the greatest
captains of Chinese history  they offer a combination of
freshness and sincerity  acuteness and common sense  which quite
excludes the idea that they were artificially concocted in the
study   If we admit  then  that the 13 chapters were the genuine
production of a military man living towards the end of the  CH UN
CH IU  period  are we not bound  in spite of the silence of the
TSO CHUAN  to accept Ssu ma Ch ien s account in its entirety   In
view of his high repute as a sober historian   must we not
hesitate to assume that the records he drew upon for Sun Wu s
biography were false and untrustworthy   The answer  I fear  must
be in the negative   There is still one grave  if not fatal 
objection to the chronology involved in the story as told in the
SHIH CHI  which  so far as I am aware  nobody has yet pointed
out   There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he alludes to
contemporary affairs   The first in in VI  ss  21    

       Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh
  exceed our own in number  that shall advantage them nothing
  in the matter of victory   I say then that victory can be
  achieved 

The other is in XI  ss  30    

       Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI JAN  I
  should answer  Yes   For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh
  are enemies   yet if they are crossing a river in the same
  boat and are caught by a storm  they will come to each
  other s assistance just as the left hand helps the right 

     These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence of
the date of composition   They assign the work to the period of
the struggle between Wu and Yueh   So much has been observed by
Pi I hsun   But what has hitherto escaped notice is that they
also seriously impair the credibility of Ssu ma Ch ien s
narrative   As we have seen above  the first positive date given
in connection with Sun Wu is 512 B C   He is then spoken of as a
general   acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu  so that his
alleged introduction to that monarch had already taken place  and
of course the 13 chapters must have been written earlier still 
But at that time  and for several years after  down to the
capture of Ying in 506  Ch u and not Yueh  was the great
hereditary enemy of Wu   The two states  Ch u and Wu  had been
constantly at war for over half a century   31  whereas the first
war between Wu and Yueh was waged only in 510   32  and even then
was no more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst of the
fierce struggle with Ch u   Now Ch u is not mentioned in the 13
chapters at all   The natural inference is that they were written
at a time when Yueh had become the prime antagonist of Wu  that
is  after Ch u had suffered the great humiliation of 506   At
this point  a table of dates may be found useful 

B C   
      
514     Accession of Ho Lu 
512     Ho Lu attacks Ch u  but is dissuaded from entering Ying 
          the capital   SHI CHI mentions Sun Wu as general 
511     Another attack on Ch u 
510     Wu makes a successful attack on Yueh   This is the first
          war between the two states 
509   
 or     Ch u invades Wu  but is signally defeated at Yu chang 
508   
506     Ho Lu attacks Ch u with the aid of T ang and Ts ai 
          Decisive battle of Po chu  and capture of Ying   Last
          mention of Sun Wu in SHIH CHI 
505     Yueh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army   Wu
          is beaten by Ch in and evacuates Ying 
504     Ho Lu sends Fu Ch ai to attack Ch u 
497     Kou Chien becomes King of Yueh 
496     Wu attacks Yueh  but is defeated by Kou Chien at Tsui li 
          Ho Lu is killed 
494     Fu Ch ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of Fu 
          chaio  and enters the capital of Yueh 
485   
 or     Kou Chien renders homage to Wu   Death of Wu Tzu hsu 
484   
482     Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch ai 
478   
 to     Further attacks by Yueh on Wu 
476   
475     Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu 
473     Final defeat and extinction of Wu 

     The sentence quoted above from VI  ss  21 hardly strikes me
as one that could have been written in the full flush of victory 
It seems rather to imply that  for the moment at least  the tide
had turned against Wu  and that she was getting the worst of the
struggle   Hence we may conclude that our treatise was not in
existence in 505  before which date Yueh does not appear to have
scored any notable success against Wu   Ho Lu died in 496   so
that if the book was written for him  it must have been during
the period 505 496  when there was a lull in the hostilities   Wu
having presumably exhausted by its supreme effort against Ch u 
On the other hand  if we choose to disregard the tradition
connecting Sun Wu s name with Ho Lu  it might equally well have
seen the light between 496 and 494  or possibly in the period
482 473  when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious menace 
 33   We may feel fairly certain that the author  whoever he may
have been  was not a man of any great eminence in his own day 
On this point the negative testimony of the TSO CHUAN far
outweighs any shred of authority still attaching to the SHIH CHI 
if once its other facts are discredited   Sun Hsing yen  however 
makes a feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from
the great commentary   It was Wu Tzu hsu  he says  who got all
the credit of Sun Wu s exploits  because the latter   being an
alien  was not rewarded with an office in the State 
     How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate   It may be that
the growing celebrity of the book imparted by degrees a kind of
factitious renown to its author   It was felt to be only right
and proper that one so well versed in the science of war should
have solid achievements to his credit as well   Now the capture
of Ying was undoubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu s
reign   it made a deep and lasting impression on all the
surrounding states  and raised Wu to the short lived zenith of
her power   Hence  what more natural  as time went on  than that
the acknowledged master of strategy  Sun Wu  should be popularly
identified with that campaign  at first perhaps only in the sense
that his brain conceived and planned it  afterwards  that it was
actually carried out by him in conjunction with Wu Yuan   34   Po
P ei and Fu Kai 
     It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the
outline of Sun Tzu s life must be based almost wholly on
conjecture   With this necessary proviso  I should say that he
probably entered the service of Wu about the time of Ho Lu s
accession   and gathered experience  though only in the capacity
of a subordinate officer  during the intense military activity
which marked the first half of the prince s reign   35    If he
rose to be a general at all  he certainly was never on an equal
footing with the three above mentioned   He was doubtless present
at the investment and occupation of Ying   and witnessed Wu s
sudden collapse in the following year   Yueh s attack at this
critical juncture  when her rival was embarrassed on every side 
seems to have convinced him that this upstart kingdom was the
great enemy against whom every effort would henceforth have to be
directed   Sun Wu was thus a well seasoned warrior when he sat
down to write his famous book  which according to my reckoning
must have appeared towards the end  rather than the beginning of
Ho Lu s reign   The story of the women may possibly have grown
out of some real incident occurring about the same time   As we
hear no more of Sun Wu after this from any source  he is hardly
likely to have survived his patron or to have taken part in the
death struggle with Yueh  which began with the disaster at Tsui 
li 
     If these inferences are approximately correct  there is a
certain irony in the fate which decreed that China s most
illustrious man of peace should be contemporary with her greatest
writer on war 


The Text of Sun Tzu
                   


     I have found it difficult to glean much about the history of
Sun Tzu s text   The quotations that occur in early authors go to
show that the  13 chapters  of which Ssu ma Ch ien speaks were
essentially the same as those now extant   We have his word for
it that they were widely circulated in his day   and can only
regret that he refrained from discussing them on that account 
Sun Hsing yen says in his preface    

       During the Ch in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu s ART OF WAR
  was in general use amongst military commanders  but they seem
  to have treated it as a work of mysterious import  and were
  unwilling to expound it for the benefit of posterity   Thus
  it came about that Wei Wu was the first to write a commentary
  on it 

     As we have already seen  there is no reasonable ground to
suppose that Ts ao Kung tampered with the text   But the text
itself is often so obscure  and the number of editions which
appeared from that time onward so great  especially during the
T ang and Sung dynasties  that it would be surprising if numerous
corruptions had not managed to creep in   Towards the middle of
the Sung period  by which time all the chief commentaries on Sun
Tzu were in existence  a certain Chi T ien pao published a work
in 15 CHUAN entitled  Sun Tzu with the collected commentaries of
ten writers    There was another text  with variant readings put
forward by Chu Fu of Ta hsing  which also had supporters among
the scholars of that period  but in the Ming editions  Sun Hsing 
yen tells us  these readings were for some reason or other no
longer put into circulation   Thus  until the end of the 18th
century  the text in sole possession of the field was one derived
from Chi T ien pao s edition  although no actual copy of that
important work was known to have survived   That  therefore   is
the text of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great
Imperial encyclopedia printed in 1726  the KU CHIN T U SHU CHI
CH ENG   Another copy at my disposal of what is practically the
same text   with slight variations  is that contained in the
 Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch in dynasties    1758  
And the Chinese printed in Capt  Calthrop s first edition is
evidently a similar version which has filtered through Japanese
channels   So things remained until Sun Hsing yen  1752 1818    a
distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar  who claimed to
be an actual descendant of Sun Wu   36  accidentally discovered a
copy of Chi T ien pao s long lost work  when on a visit to the
library of the Hua yin temple   37   Appended to it was the I
SHUO of Cheng Yu Hsien  mentioned in the T UNG CHIH   and also
believed to have perished   This is what Sun Hsing yen designates
as the  original edition  or text      a rather misleading name 
for it cannot by any means claim to set before us the text of Sun
Tzu in its pristine purity   Chi T ien pao was a careless
compiler   and appears to have been content to reproduce the
somewhat debased version current in his day  without troubling to
collate   it   with the earliest   editions   then   available 
Fortunately   two versions of Sun Tzu  even older than the newly
discovered work  were still extant  one buried in the T UNG TIEN 
Tu Yu s great treatise on the Constitution  the other similarly
enshrined in the T AI P ING YU LAN encyclopedia   In both the
complete text is to be found  though split up into fragments 
intermixed with other matter  and scattered piecemeal over a
number of different sections   Considering that the YU LAN takes
us back to the year 983  and the T UNG TIEN about 200 years
further still  to the middle of the T ang dynasty  the value of
these early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated 
Yet the idea of utilizing them does not seem to have occurred to
anyone until Sun Hsing yen  acting under Government instructions 
undertook a thorough recension of the text   This is his own
account    

       Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu
  which his editors had handed down  the Government ordered
  that the ancient edition  of Chi T ien pao  should be used 
  and that the text should be revised and corrected throughout 
  It happened that Wu Nien hu  the Governor Pi Kua  and Hsi   a
  graduate of the second degree  had all devoted themselves to
  this study  probably surpassing me therein   Accordingly   I
  have had the whole work cut on blocks as a textbook for
  military men 

     The three individuals here referred to had evidently been
occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing yen s
commission   but we are left in doubt as to the work they really
accomplished   At any rate  the new edition   when ultimately
produced  appeared in the names of Sun Hsing yen and only one co 
editor Wu Jen shi   They took the  original edition   as their
basis  and by careful comparison with older versions  as well as
the extant commentaries and other sources of information such as
the I SHUO   succeeded in restoring a very large number of
doubtful passages   and turned out  on the whole  what must be
accepted as the closes approximation we are ever likely to get to
Sun Tzu s original work   This is what will hereafter be
denominated the  standard text  
     The copy which I have used belongs to a reissue dated 1877 
it is in 6 PEN  forming part of a well printed set of 23 early
philosophical works in 83 PEN   38   It opens with a preface by
Sun Hsing yen  largely quoted in this introduction    vindicating
the traditional view of Sun Tzu s life and performances   and
summing up in remarkably concise fashion the evidence in its
favor   This is followed by Ts ao Kung s preface to his edition 
and the biography of Sun Tzu from the SHIH CHI  both translated
above   Then come  firstly  Cheng Yu hsien s I SHUO    39   with
author s preface  and next  a short miscellany of historical and
bibliographical information entitled SUN TZU HSU LU  compiled by
Pi I hsun   As regards the body of the work   each separate
sentence is followed by a note on the text  if required  and then
by the various commentaries appertaining to it   arranged in
chronological order   These we shall now proceed to discuss
briefly  one by one 


The Commentators
                


     Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long distinguished roll
of commentators  which would do honor to any classic   Ou yang
Hsiu remarks on this fact  though he wrote before the tale was
complete   and rather ingeniously explains it by saying that the
artifices   of war   being inexhaustible   must therefore   be
susceptible of treatment in a great variety of ways 

     1   TS AO TS AO or Ts ao Kung  afterwards known as Wei Wu Ti
 A D   155 220    There is hardly any room for doubt that the
earliest commentary on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this
extraordinary man  whose biography in the SAN KUO CHIH reads like
a romance   One of the greatest military geniuses that the world
has seen  and Napoleonic in the scale of his operations  he was
especially famed for the marvelous rapidity of his marches  which
has found expression in the line  Talk of Ts ao Ts ao  and Ts ao
Ts ao will appear    Ou yang Hsiu says of him that he was a great
captain who  measured his strength against Tung Cho  Lu Pu and
the two Yuan  father and son  and vanquished them all   whereupon
he divided the Empire of Han with Wu and Shu  and made himself
king   It is recorded that whenever a council of war was held by
Wei on the eve of a far reaching campaign   he had all his
calculations ready  those generals who made use of them did not
lose one battle in ten  those who ran counter to them in any
particular saw their armies incontinently beaten and put to
flight     Ts ao Kung s notes on Sun Tzu   models of austere
brevity  are so thoroughly characteristic of the stern commander
known to history  that it is hard indeed to conceive of them as
the work of a mere LITTERATEUR   Sometimes   indeed   owing to
extreme compression  they are scarcely intelligible and stand no
less in need of a commentary than the text itself   40 

     2   MENG SHIH   The commentary which has come down to us
under this name is comparatively meager  and nothing about the
author is known   Even his personal name has not been recorded 
Chi T ien pao s edition places him after Chia Lin and Ch ao Kung 
wu also assigns him to the T ang dynasty   41  but this is a
mistake   In Sun Hsing yen s preface  he appears as Meng Shih of
the Liang dynasty  502 557    Others would identify him with Meng
K ang of the 3rd century   He is named in one work as the last of
the  Five Commentators   the others being Wei Wu Ti  Tu Mu  Ch en
Hao and Chia Lin 

     3   LI CH UAN of the 8th century was a well known writer on
military tactics   One of his works has been in constant use down
to the present day   The T UNG CHIH mentions  Lives of famous
generals from the Chou to the T ang dynasty  as written by him 
 42   According to Ch ao Kung wu and the T IEN I KO catalogue  he
followed a variant of the text of Sun Tzu which differs
considerably from those now extant   His notes are mostly short
and to the point  and he frequently illustrates his remarks by
anecdotes from Chinese history 

     4   TU YU  died 812  did not publish a separate commentary
on Sun Tzu   his notes being taken from the T UNG TIEN   the
encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution which was his life 
work   They are largely repetitions of Ts ao Kung and Meng Shih 
besides which it is believed that he drew on the ancient
commentaries of Wang Ling and others   Owing to the peculiar
arrangement of T UNG TIEN  he has to explain each passage on its
merits  apart from the context  and sometimes his own explanation
does not agree with that of Ts ao Kung  whom he always quotes
first   Though not strictly to be reckoned as one of the   Ten
Commentators    he was added to their number by Chi T ien pao 
being wrongly placed after his grandson Tu Mu 

     5   TU MU  803 852  is perhaps the best known as a poet    a
bright star even in the glorious galaxy of the T ang period   We
learn from Ch ao Kung wu that although he had no practical
experience of war   he was extremely fond of discussing the
subject   and was moreover well read in the military history of
the CH UN CH IU and CHAN KUO eras   His notes   therefore   are
well worth attention   They are very copious  and replete with
historical parallels   The gist of Sun Tzu s work is thus
summarized by him    Practice benevolence and justice  but on the
other hand make full use of artifice and measures of expediency  
He further declared that all the military triumphs and disasters
of the thousand years which had elapsed since Sun Tzu s death
would   upon examination  be found to uphold and corroborate   in
every particular   the maxims contained in his book   Tu Mu s
somewhat spiteful charge against Ts ao Kung has already been
considered elsewhere 

     6   CH EN HAO appears to have been a contemporary of Tu Mu 
Ch ao Kung wu says that he was impelled to write a new commentary
on Sun Tzu because Ts ao Kung s on the one hand was too obscure
and subtle  and that of Tu Mu on the other too long winded and
diffuse   Ou yang Hsiu   writing in the middle of the 11th
century   calls Ts ao Kung  Tu Mu and Ch en Hao the three chief
commentators on Sun Tzu   and observes that Ch en Hao   is
continually attacking Tu Mu s shortcomings   His commentary 
though not lacking in merit  must rank below those of his
predecessors 

     7   CHIA LIN is known to have lived under the T ang dynasty 
for his commentary on Sun Tzu is mentioned in the T ang Shu and
was afterwards republished by Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty
together with those of Meng Shih and Tu Yu   It is of somewhat
scanty texture  and in point of quality  too  perhaps the least
valuable of the eleven 

     8   MEI YAO CH EN  1002 1060   commonly known by his  style 
as Mei Sheng yu  was  like Tu Mu  a poet of distinction   His
commentary was published with a laudatory preface by the great
Ou yang Hsiu  from which we may cull the following    

       Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu   distorting his
  words and trying to make them square with their own one sided
  views   Thus  though commentators have not been lacking  only
  a few have proved equal to the task   My friend Sheng yu has
  not fallen into this mistake   In attempting to provide a
  critical commentary for Sun Tzu s work  he does not lose
  sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states
  engaged in internecine warfare  that the author is not
  concerned with the military conditions prevailing under the
  sovereigns of the three ancient dynasties   43  nor with the
  nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister of War 
   44   Again  Sun Wu loved brevity of diction  but his meaning
  is always deep   Whether the subject be marching an army   or
  handling soldiers  or estimating the enemy   or controlling
  the forces of victory  it is always systematically treated 
  the sayings are bound together in strict logical sequence 
  though this has been obscured by commentators who have
  probably   failed to grasp their meaning   In his   own
  commentary  Mei Sheng yu has brushed aside all the obstinate
  prejudices of these critics  and has tried to bring out the
  true meaning of Sun Tzu himself   In this way  the clouds of
  confusion have been dispersed and the sayings made clear   I
  am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed down
  side by side with the three great commentaries  and for a
  great deal that they find in the sayings  coming generations
  will have constant reason to thank my friend Sheng yu 

     Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship  I am
inclined to endorse this favorable judgment  and would certainly
place him above Ch en Hao in order of merit 

     9   WANG HSI   also of the Sung dynasty   is decidedly
original in some of his interpretations  but much less judicious
than Mei Yao ch en   and on the whole not a very trustworthy
guide   He is fond of comparing his own commentary with that of
Ts ao Kung  but the comparison is not often flattering to him 
We learn from Ch ao Kung wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient
text of Sun Tzu  filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes   45 

     10   HO YEN HSI of the Sung dynasty   The personal name of
this commentator is given as above by Cheng Ch iao in the TUNG
CHIH   written about the middle of the twelfth century   but he
appears simply as Ho Shih in the YU HAI  and Ma Tuan lin quotes
Ch ao Kung wu as saying that his personal name is unknown   There
seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng Ch iao s statement 
otherwise I should have been inclined to hazard a guess and
identify him with one Ho Ch u fei  the author of a short treatise
on war   who lived in the latter part of the 11th century   Ho
Shih s commentary   in the words of the T IEN I KO catalogue 
 contains helpful additions   here and there   but is chiefly
remarkable for the copious extracts taken  in adapted form   from
the dynastic histories and other sources 

     11   CHANG YU   The list closes with a commentator of no
great originality perhaps  but gifted with admirable powers of
lucid exposition   His commentator is based on that of Ts ao
Kung  whose terse sentences he contrives to expand and develop in
masterly fashion   Without Chang Yu  it is safe to say that much
of Ts ao Kung s commentary would have remained cloaked in its
pristine obscurity and therefore valueless   His work is not
mentioned in the Sung history  the T UNG K AO  or the YU HAI  but
it finds a niche in the T UNG CHIH  which also names him as the
author of the  Lives of Famous Generals    46 
     It is rather remarkable that the last named four should all
have flourished within so short a space of time   Ch ao Kung wu
accounts for it by saying    During the early years of the Sung
dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long spell of peace  and men ceased
to practice the art of war   but when  Chao  Yuan hao s rebellion
came  1038 42  and the frontier generals were defeated time after
time   the Court made strenuous inquiry for men skilled in war 
and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high
officials   Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu in our
dynasty belong mainly to that period   47 

     Besides these eleven commentators  there are several others
whose work has not come down to us   The SUI SHU mentions four 
namely Wang Ling  often quoted by Tu Yu as Wang Tzu   Chang Tzu 
shang   Chia Hsu of Wei   48  and Shen Yu of Wu   The T ANG SHU
adds Sun Hao  and the T UNG CHIH Hsiao Chi  while the T U SHU
mentions a Ming commentator  Huang Jun yu   It is possible that
some of these may have been merely collectors and editors of
other commentaries  like Chi T ien pao and Chi Hsieh   mentioned
above 


Appreciations of Sun Tzu
                        


     Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the minds of
some of China s greatest men   Among the famous generals who are
known to have studied his pages with enthusiasm may be mentioned
Han Hsin  d  196 B C     49  Feng I  d  34 A D     50   Lu Meng
 d  219    51  and Yo Fei  1103 1141    52   The opinion of Ts ao
Kung   who disputes with Han Hsin the highest place in Chinese
military annals   has already been recorded    53    Still more
remarkable  in one way  is the testimony of purely literary men 
such as Su Hsun  the father of Su Tung p o   who wrote several
essays on military topics   all of which owe their   chief
inspiration to Sun Tzu   The following short passage by him is
preserved in the YU HAI   54    

       Sun Wu s saying  that in war one cannot make certain of
  conquering    55   is very different indeed from what other
  books tell us   56   Wu Ch i was a man of the same stamp as
  Sun Wu   they both wrote books on war  and they are linked
  together in popular speech as  Sun and Wu    But Wu Ch i s
  remarks on war are less weighty  his rules are rougher and
  more crudely stated  and there is not the same unity of plan
  as in Sun Tzu s work  where the style is terse   but the
  meaning fully brought out 

     The following is an extract from the  Impartial Judgments in
the Garden of Literature  by Cheng Hou    

       Sun Tzu s 13 chapters are not only the staple and base
  of all military men s training  but also compel the most
  careful attention of scholars and men of letters   His
  sayings   are terse yet elegant   simple   yet   profound 
  perspicuous and eminently practical   Such works as the LUN
  YU  the I CHING and the great Commentary   57  as well as the
  writings of Mencius  Hsun K uang and Yang Chu  all fall below
  the level of Sun Tzu 

     Chu Hsi  commenting on this  fully admits the first part of
the criticism  although he dislikes the audacious comparison with
the venerated classical works   Language of this sort  he says 
 encourages a ruler s bent towards unrelenting warfare and
reckless militarism  


Apologies for War
                 


     Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest
peace loving nation on earth  we are in some danger of forgetting
that her experience of war in all its phases has also been such
as no modern State can parallel   Her long military annals
stretch back to a point at which they are lost in the mists of
time   She had built the Great Wall and was maintaining a huge
standing army along her frontier centuries before the first Roman
legionary was seen on the Danube   What with the perpetual
collisions of the ancient feudal States  the grim conflicts with
Huns   Turks and other invaders after the centralization of
government    the terrific upheavals which   accompanied   the
overthrow of so many dynasties  besides the countless rebellions
and minor disturbances that have flamed up and flickered out
again one by one  it is hardly too much to say that the clash of
arms has never ceased to resound in one portion or another of the
Empire 
     No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious captains
to whom China can point with pride   As in all countries   the
greatest are fond of emerging at the most fateful crises of her
history   Thus  Po Ch i stands out conspicuous in the period when
Ch in was entering upon her final struggle with the remaining
independent states   The stormy years which followed the break up
of the Ch in dynasty are illuminated by the transcendent genius
of Han Hsin   When the House of Han in turn is tottering to its
fall   the great and baleful figure of Ts ao Ts ao dominates the
scene   And in the establishment of the T ang dynasty one of the
mightiest tasks achieved by man  the superhuman energy of Li
Shih min  afterwards the Emperor T ai Tsung  was seconded by the
brilliant strategy of Li Ching   None of these generals need fear
comparison with the greatest names in the military history of
Europe 
     In spite of all this  the great body of Chinese sentiment 
from Lao Tzu downwards  and especially as reflected in the
standard literature of Confucianism   has been   consistently
pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form   It is
such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati defending
warfare on principle   that I have thought it worth while to
collect and translate a few passages in which the unorthodox view
is upheld   The following  by Ssu ma Ch ien  shows that for all
his ardent admiration of Confucius  he was yet no advocate of
peace at any price    

       Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to
  punish violence and cruelty  to give peace to troublous
  times   to remove difficulties and dangers   and to succor
  those who are in peril   Every animal with blood in its veins
  and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked   How
  much more so will man  who carries in his breast the
  faculties of love and hatred  joy and anger    When he is
  pleased   a feeling of affection springs up within him   when
  angry  his poisoned sting is brought into play   That is the
  natural law which governs his being      What then shall be
  said of those scholars of our time   blind to all great
  issues  and without any appreciation of relative values   who
  can only bark out their stale formulas about   virtue   and
   civilization   condemning the use of military weapons   They
  will surely bring our country to impotence and dishonor and
  the loss of her rightful heritage  or  at the very least 
  they will bring about invasion and rebellion   sacrifice of
  territory and general enfeeblement   Yet they obstinately
  refuse to modify the position they have taken up   The truth
  is that  just as in the family the teacher must not spare the
  rod   and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the State 
  so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into
  abeyance in the Empire   All one can say is that this power
  will be exercised wisely by some  foolishly by others   and
  that among those who bear arms some will be loyal and others
  rebellious   58 

     The next piece is taken from Tu Mu s preface to his
commentary on Sun Tzu    

       War may be defined as punishment  which is one of the
  functions of government   It was the profession of Chung Yu
  and Jan Ch iu  both disciples of Confucius   Nowadays   the
  holding of trials and hearing of litigation  the imprisonment
  of offenders and their execution by flogging in the market 
  place   are all done by officials   But the wielding of huge
  armies  the throwing down of fortified cities  the hauling of
  women and children into captivity  and the beheading of
  traitors      this is also work which is done by officials 
  The objects of the rack and of military weapons   are
  essentially the same   There is no intrinsic difference
  between the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in
  war   For the lesser infractions of law  which are easily
  dealt with  only a small amount of force need be employed 
  hence the use of military weapons and wholesale decapitation 
  In both cases  however  the end in view is to get rid of
  wicked people  and to give comfort and relief to the good    
       Chi sun asked Jan Yu  saying    Have you  Sir   acquired
  your military aptitude by study  or is it innate     Jan Yu
  replied     It has been acquired by study    59     How can
  that be so   said Chi sun   seeing that you are a disciple of
  Confucius     It is a fact   replied Jan Yu   I was taught by
  Confucius   It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise
  both civil and military functions  though to be sure my
  instruction in the art of fighting has not yet gone very
  far  
       Now   who the author was of this rigid distinction
  between the  civil  and the  military   and the limitation of
  each to a separate sphere of action  or in what year of which
  dynasty it was first introduced  is more than I can say 
  But   at any rate  it has come about that the members of the
  governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military
  topics   or do so only in a shamefaced manner   If any are
  bold enough to discuss the subject  they are at once set down
  as eccentric individuals of coarse and brutal propensities 
  This is an extraordinary instance in which   through sheer
  lack of reasoning  men unhappily lose sight of fundamental
  principles 
       When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch eng Wang  he
  regulated ceremonies and made music  and venerated the arts
  of scholarship and learning  yet when the barbarians of the
  River Huai revolted   60  he sallied forth and chastised
  them   When Confucius held office under the Duke of Lu  and a
  meeting was convened at Chia ku   61  he said    If pacific
  negotiations are in progress  warlike preparations should
  have been made beforehand    He rebuked and shamed the
  Marquis of Ch i  who cowered under him and dared not proceed
  to violence   How can it be said that these two great Sages
  had no knowledge of military matters 

     We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu in high
esteem   He also appeals to the authority of the Classics    

       Our Master Confucius  answering Duke Ling of Wei   said 
   I have never studied matters connected with armies and
  battalions     62    Replying to K ung Wen tzu  he said    I
  have not been instructed about buff coats and weapons     But
  if we turn to the meeting at Chia ku  we find that he used
  armed force against the men of Lai  so that the marquis of
  Ch i was overawed   Again   when the inhabitants of Pi
  revolted  the ordered his officers to attack them   whereupon
  they were defeated and fled in confusion   He once uttered
  the words    If I fight  I conquer    63   And Jan Yu also
  said      The   Sage exercises both civil   and   military
  functions     64    Can it be a fact that Confucius never
  studied or received instruction in the art of war    We can
  only say that he did not specially choose matters connected
  with armies and fighting to be the subject of his teaching 

     Sun Hsing yen   the editor of Sun Tzu   writes in similar
strain    

       Confucius said    I am unversed in military matters  
   65   He also said    If I fight   I conquer     Confucius
  ordered ceremonies and regulated music   Now war constitutes
  one of the five classes of State ceremonial   66   and must
  not be treated as an independent branch of study   Hence  the
  words  I am unversed in  must be taken to mean that there are
  things which even an inspired Teacher does not know   Those
  who have to lead an army and devise stratagems   must learn
  the art of war   But if one can command the services of a
  good general like Sun Tzu  who was employed by Wu Tzu hsu 
  there is no need to learn it oneself   Hence the remark added
  by Confucius    If I fight  I conquer  
       The men of the present day  however  willfully interpret
  these words of Confucius in their narrowest sense  as though
  he meant that books on the art of war were not worth reading 
  With blind persistency  they adduce the example of Chao Kua 
  who pored over his father s books to no purpose   67   as a
  proof that all military theory is useless   Again   seeing
  that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism
  in designing plans  and the conversion of spies   they hold
  that the art is immoral and unworthy of a sage   These people
  ignore the fact that the studies of our scholars and the
  civil administration of our officials also require steady
  application and practice before efficiency is reached   The
  ancients were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to
  botch their work   68   Weapons are baneful  69  and fighting
  perilous   and useless unless a general is in constant
  practice  he ought not to hazard other men s lives in battle 
   70   Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu s 13 chapters should
  be studied 
      Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi  71  in the
  art of war   Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general
  bearings   but would not pursue his studies to their proper
  outcome   the consequence being that he was finally defeated
  and overthrown   He did not realize that the tricks and
  artifices of war are beyond verbal computation   Duke Hsiang
  of Sung and King Yen of Hsu were brought to destruction by
  their misplaced humanity   The treacherous and underhand
  nature of war necessitates the use of guile and stratagem
  suited to the occasion   There is a case on record of
  Confucius himself having violated an extorted oath   72   and
  also of his having left the Sung State in disguise   73   Can
  we then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and
  honesty 


Bibliography
            


     The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war  after
Sun Tzu   The notes on each have been drawn principally from the
SSU K U CH UAN SHU CHIEN MING MU LU  ch  9  fol  22 sqq 

     1   WU TZU  in 1 CHUAN or 6 chapters   By Wu Ch i   d   381
B C     A genuine work   See SHIH CHI  ch  65 

     2   SSU MA FA  in 1 CHUAN or 5 chapters   Wrongly attributed
to Ssu ma Jang chu of the 6th century B C   Its date   however 
must be early  as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are
constantly to be met within its pages   See SHIH CHI  ch  64 
     The SSU K U CH UAN SHU  ch  99  f  1   remarks that the
oldest three treatises on war  SUN TZU  WU TZU and SSU MA FA 
are   generally speaking  only concerned with things strictly
military      the art of producing   collecting   training and
drilling troops  and the correct theory with regard to measures
of expediency  laying plans  transport of goods and the handling
of soldiers    in strong contrast to later works  in which the
science of war is usually blended with metaphysics   divination
and magical arts in general 

     3   LIU T AO  in 6 CHUAN  or 60 chapters   Attributed to Lu
Wang   or Lu Shang  also known as T ai Kung  of the 12th century
B C   74   But its style does not belong to the era of the Three
Dynasties   Lu Te ming  550 625 A D   mentions the work   and
enumerates the headings of the six sections so that the forgery
cannot have been later than Sui dynasty 

     4   WEI LIAO TZU  in 5 CHUAN   Attributed to Wei Liao   4th
cent  B C    who studied under the famous Kuei ku Tzu   The work
appears to have been originally in 31 chapters  whereas the text
we possess contains only 24   Its matter is sound enough in the
main   though the strategical devices differ considerably from
those of the Warring States period   It is been furnished with a
commentary by the well known Sung philosopher Chang Tsai 

     5   SAN LUEH  in 3 CHUAN   Attributed to Huang shih Kung   a
legendary personage who is said to have bestowed it on Chang
Liang  d  187 B C   in an interview on a bridge   But here again 
the style is not that of works dating from the Ch in or Han
period   The Han Emperor Kuang Wu  25 57 A D   apparently quotes
from it in one of his proclamations  but the passage in question
may have been inserted later on   in order to prove   the
genuineness of the work   We shall not be far out if we refer it
to the Northern Sung period  420 478 A D    or somewhat earlier 

     6   LI WEI KUNG WEN TUI  in 3 sections   Written in the form
of a dialogue between T ai Tsung and his great general Li Ching 
it is usually ascribed to the latter   Competent authorities
consider it a forgery  though the author was evidently well
versed in the art of war 

     7   LI CHING PING FA  not to be confounded with the
foregoing   is a short treatise in 8 chapters  preserved in the
T ung Tien  but not published separately   This fact explains its
omission from the SSU K U CH UAN SHU 

     8   WU CH I CHING  in 1 CHUAN   Attributed to the legendary
minister Feng Hou  with exegetical notes by Kung sun Hung of the
Han dynasty  d  121 B C    and said to have been eulogized by the
celebrated general Ma Lung  d  300 A D     Yet the earliest
mention of it is in the SUNG CHIH   Although a forgery  the work
is well put together 

     Considering the high popular estimation in which Chu ko
Liang has always been held  it is not surprising to find more
than one work on war ascribed to his pen   Such are  1  the SHIH
LIU TS E  1 CHUAN   preserved in the YUNG LO TA TIEN   2   CHIANG
YUAN   1 CHUAN    and   3  HSIN SHU   1 CHUAN    which steals
wholesale from Sun Tzu   None of these has the slightest claim to
be considered genuine 
     Most of the large Chinese encyclopedias contain extensive
sections devoted to the literature of war   The following
references may be found useful    

     T UNG TIEN  circa 800 A D    ch  148 162 
     T AI P ING YU LAN  983   ch  270 359 
     WEN HSIEN TUNG K AO  13th cent    ch  221 
     YU HAI  13th cent    ch  140  141 
     SAN TS AI T U HUI  16th cent  
     KUANG PO WU CHIH  1607   ch  31  32 
     CH IEN CH IO LEI SHU  1632   ch  75 
     YUAN CHIEN LEI HAN  1710   ch  206 229 
     KU CHIN T U SHU CHI CH ENG  1726   section XXX  esp  ch  81 
      90 
     HSU WEN HSIEN T UNG K AO  1784   ch  121 134 
     HUANG CH AO CHING SHIH WEN PIEN  1826   ch  76  77 

     The bibliographical sections of certain historical works
also deserve mention    

     CH IEN HAN SHU  ch  30 
     SUI SHU  ch  32 35 
     CHIU T ANG SHU  ch  46  47 
     HSIN T ANG SHU  ch  57 60 
     SUNG SHIH  ch  202 209 
     T UNG CHIH  circa 1150   ch  68 

     To these of course must be added the great Catalogue of the
Imperial Library    

     SSU K U CH UAN SHU TSUNG MU T I YAO  1790   ch  99  100 


Footnotes
         


1   SHI CHI  ch  65 

2   He reigned from 514 to 496 B C 

3   SHI CHI  ch  130 

4   The appellation of Nang Wa 

5   SHI CHI  ch  31 

6   SHI CHI  ch  25 

7   The appellation of Hu Yen  mentioned in ch  39 under the year
637 

8   Wang tzu Ch eng fu  ch  32  year 607 

9   The mistake is natural enough   Native critics refer to a
work of the Han dynasty  which says    Ten LI outside the WU gate
 of the city of Wu  now Soochow in Kiangsu  there is a great
mound  raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun Wu of Ch i 
who excelled in the art of war  by the King of Wu  

10    They attached strings to wood to make bows  and sharpened
wood to make arrows   The use of bows and arrows is to keep the
Empire in awe  

11   The son and successor of Ho Lu   He was finally defeated and
overthrown by Kou chien  King of Yueh  in 473 B C   See post 

12   King Yen of Hsu  a fabulous being  of whom Sun Hsing yen
says in his preface    His humanity brought him to destruction  

13   The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T U
SHU  and may be an interpolation   It was known  however to Chang
Shou chieh of the T ang dynasty  and appears in the T AI P ING YU
LAN 

14   Ts ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap 
II  perhaps especially of ss  8 

15   See chap  XI 

16   On the other hand  it is noteworthy that WU TZU  which is
not in 6 chapters  has 48 assigned to it in the HAN CHIH 
Likewise  the CHUNG YUNG is credited with 49 chapters  though now
only in one only   In the case of very short works  one is
tempted to think that P IEN might simply mean  leaves  

17   Yeh Shih of the Sung dynasty  1151 1223  

18   He hardly deserves to be bracketed with assassins 

19   See Chapter 7  ss  27 and Chapter 11  ss  28 

20   See Chapter 11  ss  28   Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form
of his name 

21   I e  Po P ei   See ante 

22   The nucleus of this work is probably genuine  though large
additions have been made by later hands   Kuan chung died in 645
B C 

23   See infra  beginning of INTRODUCTION 

24   I do not know what this work  unless it be the last chapter
of another work   Why that chapter should be singled out 
however  is not clear 

25   About 480 B C 

26   That is  I suppose  the age of Wu Wang and Chou Kung 

27   In the 3rd century B C 

28   Ssu ma Jang chu  whose family name was T ien  lived in the
latter half of the 6th century B C   and is also believed to have
written a work on war   See SHIH CHI  ch  64  and infra at the
beginning of the INTRODUCTION 

29   See Legge s Classics  vol  V  Prolegomena p  27   Legge
thinks that the TSO CHUAN must have been written in the 5th
century  but not before 424 B C 

30   See MENCIUS III  1  iii  13 20 

31   When Wu first appears in the CH UN CH IU in 584  it is
already at variance with its powerful neighbor   The CH UN CH IU
first mentions Yueh in 537  the TSO CHUAN in 601 

32   This is explicitly stated in the TSO CHUAN  XXXII  2 

33   There is this to be said for the later period  that the feud
would tend to grow more bitter after each encounter  and thus
more fully justify the language used in XI  ss  30 

34   With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse      a
spurious treatise on war has been fathered on him simply because
he was a great general   Here we have an obvious inducement to
forgery   Sun Wu  on the other hand  cannot have been widely
known to fame in the 5th century 

35   From TSO CHUAN    From the date of King Chao s accession
 515  there was no year in which Ch u was not attacked by Wu  

36   Preface ad fin    My family comes from Lo an  and we are
really descended from Sun Tzu   I am ashamed to say that I only
read my ancestor s work from a literary point of view  without
comprehending the military technique   So long have we been
enjoying the blessings of peace  

37   Hoa yin is about 14 miles from T ung kuan on the eastern
border of Shensi   The temple in question is still visited by
those about the ascent of the Western Sacred Mountain   It is
mentioned in a text as being  situated five LI east of the
district city of Hua yin   The temple contains the Hua shan
tablet inscribed by the T ang Emperor Hsuan Tsung  713 755   

38   See my  Catalogue of Chinese Books   Luzac   Co   1908   no 
40 

39   This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzu 

40   Cf   Catalogue of the library of Fan family at Ningpo    His
commentary is frequently obscure  it furnishes a clue  but does
not fully develop the meaning  

41   WEN HSIEN T UNG K AO  ch  221 

42   It is interesting to note that M  Pelliot has recently
discovered chapters 1  4 and 5 of this lost work in the  Grottos
of the Thousand Buddhas    See B E F E O   t  VIII  nos  3 4  p 
525 

43   The Hsia  the Shang and the Chou   Although the last named
was nominally existent in Sun Tzu s day  it retained hardly a
vestige of power  and the old military organization had
practically gone by the board   I can suggest no other
explanation of the passage 

44   See CHOU LI  xxix  6 10 

45   T UNG K AO  ch  221 

46   This appears to be still extant   See Wylie s  Notes   p  91
 new edition  

47   T UNG K AO  loc  cit 

48   A notable person in his day   His biography is given in the
SAN KUO CHIH  ch  10 

49   See XI  ss  58  note 

50   HOU HAN SHU  ch  17 ad init 

51   SAN KUO CHIH  ch  54 

52   SUNG SHIH  ch  365 ad init 

53   The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of
acquainting themselves with Sun Tzu are not behindhand in their
praise   In this connection  I may perhaps be excused for quoting
from a letter from Lord Roberts  to whom the sheets of the
present work were submitted previous to publication    Many of
Sun Wu s maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day  and
no  11  in Chapter VIII  is one that the people of this country
would do well to take to heart  

54   Ch  140 

55   See IV  ss  3 

56   The allusion may be to Mencius VI  2  ix  2 

57   The TSO CHUAN 

58   SHIH CHI  ch  25  fol  I 

59   Cf  SHIH CHI  ch 47 

60   See SHU CHING  preface ss  55 

61   See SHIH CHI  ch  47 

62   Lun Yu  XV  1 

63   I failed to trace this utterance 

64   Supra 

65   Supra 

66   The other four being worship  mourning  entertainment of
guests  and festive rites   See SHU CHING  ii  1  III  8  and
CHOU LI  IX  fol  49 

67   See XIII  ss  11  note 

68   This is a rather obscure allusion to the TSO CHUAN  where
Tzu ch an says    If you have a piece of beautiful brocade  you
will not employ a mere learner to make it up  

69   Cf   TAO TE CHING  ch  31 

70   Sun Hsing yen might have quoted Confucius again   See LUN
YU  XIII  29  30 

71   Better known as Hsiang Yu  233 202 B C   

72   SHIH CHI  ch  47 

73   SHIH CHI  ch  38 

74   See XIII  ss  27  note   Further details on T ai Kung will
be found in the SHIH CHI  ch  32 ad init   Besides the tradition
which makes him a former minister of Chou Hsin  two other
accounts of him are there given  according to which he would
appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by
Wen Wang 

                                                                 

I   LAYING PLANS

      Ts ao Kung  in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the
title of this chapter  says it refers to the deliberations in the
temple selected by the general for his temporary use  or as we
should say  in his tent   See  ss  26  

     1   Sun Tzu said   The art of war is of vital importance to
the State 
     2   It is a matter of life and death  a road either to
safety or to ruin   Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on
no account be neglected 
     3   The art of war  then  is governed by five constant
factors   to be taken into account in one s deliberations   when
seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field 
     4   These are    1  The Moral Law   2  Heaven    3   Earth 
 4  The Commander   5  Method and discipline 

      It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by   Moral
Law  a principle of harmony  not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its
moral aspect   One might be tempted to render it by   morale  
were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss  13  

     5   6   The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete
accord with their ruler  so that they will follow him regardless
of their lives  undismayed by any danger 

      Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying     Without constant
practice   the officers will be nervous and undecided when
mustering for battle  without constant practice  the general will
be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand   

     7   HEAVEN signifies night and day  cold and heat  times and
seasons 

      The commentators  I think  make an unnecessary mystery of
two words here   Meng Shih refers to  the hard and the soft 
waxing and waning  of Heaven   Wang Hsi  however  may be right in
saying that what is meant is  the general economy of Heaven  
including the five elements  the four seasons  wind and clouds 
and other phenomena  

     8   EARTH comprises distances  great and small  danger and
security  open ground and narrow passes  the chances of life and
death 
     9   The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of   wisdom 
sincerely  benevolence  courage and strictness 

      The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are  1   humanity
or benevolence   2  uprightness of mind   3  self respect   self 
control   or  proper feeling    4  wisdom   5  sincerity or good
faith   Here  wisdom  and  sincerity  are put before  humanity or
benevolence    and the two military virtues of   courage   and
 strictness   substituted for  uprightness of mind   and   self 
respect  self control  or  proper feeling    

     10   By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the
marshaling   of the army in its proper   subdivisions    the
graduations of rank among the officers  the maintenance of roads
by which supplies may reach the army  and the control of military
expenditure 
     11   These five heads should be familiar to every general 
he who knows them will be victorious  he who knows them not will
fail 
     12   Therefore   in your deliberations   when seeking to
determine the military conditions  let them be made the basis of
a comparison  in this wise    
     13    1    Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the
Moral law 

      I e    is in harmony with his subjects    Cf  ss  5  

      2   Which of the two generals has most ability 
      3   With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and
Earth 

      See ss  7 8 

      4   On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced 

      Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts ao Ts ao   A D 
155 220    who was such a strict disciplinarian that once   in
accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to
standing crops  he condemned himself to death for having allowed
him horse to shy into a field of corn   However   in lieu of
losing his head  he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice
by cutting off his hair   Ts ao Ts ao s own comment on the
present passage is characteristically curt    when you lay down a
law   see that it is not disobeyed  if it is disobeyed the
offender must be put to death   

      5   Which army is stronger 

      Morally as well as physically   As Mei Yao ch en puts it 
freely rendered   ESPIRIT DE CORPS and  big battalions    

      6   On which side are officers and men more highly trained 

      Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying     Without constant
practice   the officers will be nervous and undecided when
mustering for battle  without constant practice  the general will
be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand   

      7    In which army is there the greater constancy both in
reward and punishment 

      On which side is there the most absolute certainty that
merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished  

     14   By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat 
     15   The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon
it  will conquer      let such a one be retained in command   The
general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it   will
suffer defeat     let such a one be dismissed 

      The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu s
treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho
Lu  king of the Wu State  

     16   While heading the profit of my counsel  avail yourself
also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary
rules 
     17   According as circumstances are favorable   one should
modify one s plans 

      Sun Tzu   as a practical soldier  will have none of the
 bookish theoric    He cautions us here not to pin our faith to
abstract principles   for   as Chang Yu puts it   while the main
laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of
all and sundry  you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in
attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare    On
the eve of the battle of Waterloo  Lord Uxbridge  commanding the
cavalry   went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what
his plans and calculations were for the morrow  because   as he
explained  he might suddenly find himself Commander in chief and
would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment   The
Duke listened quietly and then said    Who will attack the first
tomorrow    I or Bonaparte     Bonaparte   replied Lord Uxbridge 
 Well   continued the Duke   Bonaparte has not given me any idea
of his projects  and as my plans will depend upon his   how can
you expect me to tell you what mine are    1   

     18   All warfare is based on deception 

      The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be
admitted by every soldier   Col   Henderson tells us   that
Wellington   great in so many military qualities  was especially
distinguished by  the extraordinary skill with which he concealed
his movements and deceived both friend and foe   

     19   Hence  when able to attack  we must seem unable   when
using our forces  we must seem inactive  when we are near   we
must make the enemy believe we are far away  when far away   we
must make him believe we are near 
     20   Hold out baits to entice the enemy   Feign disorder 
and crush him 

      All commentators   except Chang Yu  say   When he is in
disorder  crush him    It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu
is still illustrating the uses of deception in war  

     21   If he is secure at all points  be prepared for him   If
he is in superior strength  evade him 
     22   If your opponent is of choleric temper   seek to
irritate him   Pretend to be weak  that he may grow arrogant 

      Wang Tzu   quoted by Tu Yu  says that the good tactician
plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse   first
feigning weakness and immobility  and then suddenly pouncing upon
him  

     23   If he is taking his ease  give him no rest 

      This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao ch en has the
note    while we are taking our ease  wait for the enemy to tire
himself out    The YU LAN has  Lure him on and tire him out   

If his forces are united  separate them 

      Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the
commentators     If sovereign and subject are in accord   put
division between them   

     24   Attack him where he is unprepared  appear where you are
not expected 
     25   These military devices  leading to victory  must not be
divulged beforehand 
     26    Now the general who wins a battle makes   many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought 

      Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary
for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was
about to take the field  in order that he might there elaborate
his plan of campaign  

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand   Thus do many calculations lead to victory  and few
calculations to defeat   how much more no calculation at all   It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to
win or lose 


 1    Words on Wellington   by Sir  W  Fraser 

                                                                 

II   WAGING WAR


      Ts ao Kung has the note    He who wishes to fight must
first count the cost   which prepares us for the discovery that
the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the
title  but is primarily a consideration of ways and means  

     1   Sun Tzu said   In the operations of war  where there are
in the field a thousand swift chariots  as many heavy chariots 
and a hundred thousand mail clad soldiers 

      The   swift chariots  were lightly built and  according to
Chang Yu  used for the attack  the  heavy chariots  were heavier 
and designed for purposes of defense   Li Ch uan  it is true 
says that the latter were light  but this seems hardly probable 
It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese
warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks   In each case  the war 
chariot was the important factor  forming as it did the nucleus
round which was grouped a certain number of foot soldiers   With
regard to the numbers given here  we are informed that each swift
chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen  and each heavy chariot by
25 footmen   so that the whole army would be divided up into a
thousand battalions   each consisting of two chariots and a
hundred men  

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI 

      2 78 modern LI go to a mile   The length may have varied
slightly since Sun Tzu s time  

the expenditure at home and at the front  including entertainment
of guests  small items such as glue and paint  and sums spent on
chariots and armor  will reach the total of a thousand ounces of
silver per day   Such is the cost of raising an army of 100 000
men 
     2   When you engage in actual fighting  if victory is long
in coming  then men s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will
be damped   If you lay siege to a town  you will exhaust your
strength 
     3   Again  if the campaign is protracted  the resources of
the State will not be equal to the strain 
     4   Now  when your weapons are dulled  your ardor damped 
your strength exhausted and your treasure spent  other chieftains
will spring up to take advantage of your extremity   Then no man 
however wise  will be able to avert the consequences that must
ensue 
     5   Thus   though we have heard of stupid haste in war 
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays 

      This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained
by any of the commentators   Ts ao Kung  Li Ch uan  Meng Shih  Tu
Yu   Tu Mu and Mei Yao ch en have notes to the effect that a
general   though naturally stupid   may nevertheless   conquer
through sheer force of rapidity   Ho Shih says    Haste may be
stupid   but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and
treasure   protracted operations may be very clever   but they
bring calamity in their train    Wang Hsi evades the difficulty
by remarking     Lengthy operations mean an army growing old 
wealth being expended  an empty exchequer and distress among the
people   true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such
calamities     Chang Yu says     So long as victory can be
attained   stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness  
Now   Sun   Tzu says nothing whatever   except   possibly   by
implication    about ill considered haste being better   than
ingenious but lengthy operations   What he does say is something
much more guarded  namely that  while speed may sometimes be
injudicious   tardiness can never be anything but foolish     if
only   because it means impoverishment to the nation    In
considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu  the classic example
of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind   That
general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that
of Hannibals s isolated army  because it seemed to him that the
latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a
strange country   But it is quite a moot question whether his
tactics would have proved successful in the long run   Their
reversal it is true  led to Cannae  but this only establishes a
negative presumption in their favor  

     6   There is no instance of a country having benefited from
prolonged warfare 
     7   It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the
evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of
carrying it on 

      That is  with rapidity   Only one who knows the disastrous
effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of
rapidity in bringing it to a close   Only two commentators seem
to favor this interpretation  but it fits well into the logic of
the context   whereas the rendering   He who does not know the
evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits    is distinctly
pointless  

     8   The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy 
neither are his supply wagons loaded more than twice 

      Once war is declared  he will not waste precious time in
waiting for reinforcements  nor will he return his army back for
fresh supplies  but crosses the enemy s frontier without delay 
This may seem an audacious policy to recommend   but with all
great strategists  from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte   the
value of time    that is  being a little ahead of your opponent   
has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the
nicest calculations with regard to commissariat  

     9   Bring war material with you from home  but forage on the
enemy   Thus the army will have food enough for its needs 

      The   Chinese word translated here as   war   material 
literally means  things to be used   and is meant in the widest
sense   It includes all the impedimenta of an army   apart from
provisions  

     10   Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be
maintained by contributions from a distance   Contributing to
maintain an army at a distance causes the people to   be
impoverished 

      The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly
with the next   though obviously intended to do so    The
arrangement    moreover   is so awkward that I cannot   help
suspecting some corruption in the text   It never seems to occur
to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for
the sense  and we get no help from them there   The Chinese words
Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people s impoverishment
clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen
sent their contributions of corn to the army direct   But why
should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way   except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so  

     11   On the other hand  the proximity of an army causes
prices to go up  and high prices cause the people s substance to
be drained away 

      Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left
its own territory   Ts ao Kung understands it of an army that has
already crossed the frontier  

     12   When their substance is drained away   the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions 
     13   14   With this loss of substance and exhaustion of
strength   the homes of the people will be stripped bare   and
three tenths of their income will be dissipated 

      Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted
not of 3 10  but of 7 10  of their income   But this is hardly to
be extracted from our text   Ho Shih has a characteristic tag 
 The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State 
and FOOD as the people s heaven  is it not right that those in
authority should value and be careful of both   

while government expenses for broken chariots  worn out horses 
breast plates and helmets  bows and arrows  spears and shields 
protective mantles  draught oxen and heavy wagons  will amount to
four tenths of its total revenue 
     15   Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the
enemy   One cartload of the enemy s provisions is equivalent to
twenty of one s own  and likewise a single PICUL of his provender
is equivalent to twenty from one s own store 

      Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front   A PICUL is a unit of
measure equal to 133 3 pounds  65 5 kilograms   

     16   Now in order to kill the enemy  our men must be roused
to anger  that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy 
they must have their rewards 

      Tu Mu says    Rewards are necessary in order to make the
soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy  thus  when you
capture spoils from the enemy  they must be used as rewards   so
that all your men may have a keen desire to fight  each on his
own account   

     17   Therefore in chariot fighting   when ten or more
chariots have been taken  those should be rewarded who took the
first   Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy   and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with
ours   The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept 
     18   This is called  using the conquered foe to augment
one s own strength 
     19   In war  then  let your great object be victory   not
lengthy campaigns 

      As Ho Shih remarks    War is not a thing to be trifled
with     Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this
chapter is intended to enforce   

     20   Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the
arbiter of the people s fate  the man on whom it depends whether
the nation shall be in peace or in peril 

                                                                 

III   ATTACK BY STRATAGEM


     1   Sun Tzu said   In the practical art of war   the best
thing of all is to take the enemy s country whole and intact   to
shatter and destroy it is not so good   So  too  it is better to
recapture an army entire than to destroy it   to capture a
regiment  a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them 

      The equivalent to an army corps  according to Ssu ma Fa 
consisted nominally of 12500 men  according to Ts ao Kung   the
equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men  the equivalent to a
detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500  and the
equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men   For the last
two   however   Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5
respectively  

     2   Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence  supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy s resistance without fighting 

      Here again  no modern strategist but will approve the words
of the old Chinese general   Moltke s greatest triumph   the
capitulation   of the huge French army at Sedan   was   won
practically without bloodshed  

     3   Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the
enemy s plans 

      Perhaps the word  balk  falls short of expressing the full
force of the Chinese word  which implies not an attitude of
defense   whereby one might be content to foil the enemy s
stratagems one after another  but an active policy of counter 
attack   Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note    When the
enemy has made a plan of attack against us  we must anticipate
him by delivering our own attack first   

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy s forces 

      Isolating him from his allies   We must not forget that Sun
Tzu  in speaking of hostilities  always has in mind the numerous
states or principalities into which the China of his day was
split up  

the next in order is to attack the enemy s army in the field 

      When he is already at full strength  

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities 

     4   The rule is  not to besiege walled cities if it can
possibly be avoided 

      Another sound piece of military theory   Had the Boers
acted upon it in 1899  and refrained from dissipating their
strength before Kimberley  Mafeking  or even Ladysmith   it is
more than probable that they would have been masters of the
situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose
them  

     The preparation of mantlets  movable shelters  and various
implements of war  will take up three whole months 

      It is not quite clear what the Chinese word    here
translated as  mantlets   described   Ts ao Kung simply defines
them as  large shields   but we get a better idea of them from Li
Ch uan  who says they were to protect the heads of those who were
assaulting the city walls at close quarters   This seems to
suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO  ready made   Tu Mu says they
were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks   but this is
denied by Ch en Hao   See supra II  14   The name is also applied
to turrets on city walls   Of the  movable shelters  we get a
fairly clear description from several commentators   They were
wooden missile proof structures on four wheels   propelled from
within  covered over with raw hides  and used in sieges to convey
parties of men to and from the walls  for the purpose of filling
up the encircling moat with earth   Tu Mu adds that they are now
called  wooden donkeys   

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take
three months more 

      These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to
the level of the enemy s walls in order to discover the weak
points in the defense  and also to destroy the fortified turrets
mentioned in the preceding note  

     5   The general  unable to control his irritation   will
launch his men to the assault like swarming ants 

      This vivid simile of Ts ao Kung is taken from the spectacle
of an army of ants climbing a wall   The meaning is that the
general  losing patience at the long delay  may make a premature
attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready  

with the result that one third of his men are slain   while the
town still remains untaken   Such are the disastrous effects of a
siege 

      We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese
before Port Arthur  in the most recent siege which history has to
record  

     6   Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy s troops
without any fighting  he captures their cities without laying
siege to them   he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy
operations in the field 

      Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government   but
does no harm to individuals   The classical instance is Wu Wang 
who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed
 Father and mother of the people   

     7   With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of
the Empire  and thus  without losing a man  his triumph will be
complete 

      Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text   the
latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different
meaning     And thus  the weapon not being blunted by use   its
keenness remains perfect   

This is the method of attacking by stratagem 
     8   It is the rule in war  if our forces are ten to the
enemy s one  to surround him  if five to one  to attack him 

      Straightway  without waiting for any further advantage  

if twice as numerous  to divide our army into two 

      Tu Mu takes exception to the saying  and at first sight 
indeed   it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war 
Ts ao Kung  however  gives a clue to Sun Tzu s meaning     Being
two to the enemy s one  we may use one part of our army in the
regular way  and the other for some special diversion    Chang Yu
thus further elucidates the point    If our force is twice as
numerous as that of the enemy  it should be split up into two
divisions   one to meet the enemy in front  and one to fall upon
his rear  if he replies to the frontal attack  he may be crushed
from behind   if to the rearward attack  he may be crushed in
front     This is what is meant by saying that  one part may be
used in the regular way   and the other for some special
diversion     Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one s army
is simply an irregular  just as concentrating it is the regular 
strategical method   and he is too hasty in calling this a
mistake   

     9   If equally matched  we can offer battle 

      Li Ch uan   followed by Ho Shih   gives the following
paraphrase     If attackers and attacked are equally matched in
strength  only the able general will fight   

if slightly inferior in numbers  we can avoid the enemy 

      The meaning   we can WATCH the enemy   is certainly a great
improvement on the above  but unfortunately there appears to be
no very good authority for the variant   Chang Yu reminds us that
the saying only applies if the other factors are equal  a small
difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by
superior energy and discipline  

if quite unequal in every way  we can flee from him 
     10   Hence  though an obstinate fight may be made by a small
force  in the end it must be captured by the larger force 
     11   Now the general is the bulwark of the State   if the
bulwark is complete at all points  the State will be strong   if
the bulwark is defective  the State will be weak 

      As Li Ch uan tersely puts it    Gap indicates deficiency 
if the general s ability is not perfect  i e   if he is not
thoroughly versed in his profession    his army will   lack
strength   

     12   There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army   
     13    1   By commanding the army to advance or to retreat 
being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey   This is called
hobbling the army 

      Li Ch uan adds the comment    It is like tying together the
legs of a thoroughbred  so that it is unable to gallop     One
would naturally think of  the ruler  in this passage as being at
home   and trying to direct the movements of his army from a
distance   But the commentators understand just the reverse   and
quote the saying of T ai Kung     A kingdom should not be
governed from without   and army should not be directed from
within     Of course it is true that  during an engagement   or
when in close touch with the enemy  the general should not be in
the thick of his own troops  but a little distance apart 
Otherwise  he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole 
and give wrong orders  

     14    2   By attempting to govern an army in the same way as
he administers a kingdom  being ignorant of the conditions which
obtain in an army   This causes restlessness in the soldier s
minds 

      Ts ao Kung s note is  freely translated     The military
sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct  you can t handle
an army in kid gloves    And Chang Yu says     Humanity and
justice are the principles on which to govern a state  but not an
army   opportunism and flexibility   on the other hand   are
military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of
an army   to that of a State  understood  

     15    3    By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination 

      That is   he is not careful to use the right man in the
right place  

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances   This shakes the confidence of the soldiers 

      I follow Mei Yao ch en here   The other commentators refer
not to the ruler  as in SS  13  14  but to the officers he
employs   Thus Tu Yu says    If a general is ignorant of the
principle of adaptability   he must not be entrusted with a
position of authority    Tu Mu quotes    The skillful employer of
men will employ the wise man  the brave man  the covetous man 
and the stupid man   For the wise man delights in establishing
his merit  the brave man likes to show his courage in action  the
covetous man is quick at seizing advantages  and the stupid man
has no fear of death   

     16   But when the army is restless and distrustful   trouble
is sure to come from the other feudal princes   This is simply
bringing anarchy into the army  and flinging victory away 
     17   Thus we may know that there are five essentials for
victory    1  He will win who knows when to fight and when not to
fight 

      Chang Yu says   If he can fight  he advances and takes the
offensive   if he cannot fight  he retreats and remains on the
defensive   He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is
right to take the offensive or the defensive  

      2    He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces 

      This is not merely the general s ability to estimate
numbers correctly  as Li Ch uan and others make out   Chang Yu
expounds the saying more satisfactorily    By applying the art of
war  it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater   and
vice versa   The secret lies in an eye for locality  and in not
letting the right moment slip   Thus Wu Tzu says     With a
superior force  make for easy ground  with an inferior one   make
for difficult ground    

      3   He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit
throughout all its ranks 
      4    He will win who  prepared himself  waits to take the
enemy unprepared 
      5    He will win who has military capacity and is not
interfered with by the sovereign 

      Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying    It is the sovereign s
function to give broad instructions  but to decide on battle it
is the function of the general    It is needless to dilate on the
military disasters which have been caused by undue interference
with operations in the field on the part of the home government 
Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to
the fact that he was not hampered by central authority  

     18   Hence the saying   If you know the enemy and know
yourself  you need not fear the result of a hundred battles   If
you know yourself but not the enemy  for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat 

      Li Ch uan cites the case of Fu Chien  prince of Ch in   who
in 383 A D  marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor 
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the
services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch ung  he boastfully
replied     I have the population of eight provinces at my back 
infantry and horsemen to the number of one million   why   they
could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their
whips   into   the stream   What danger have I   to   fear  
Nevertheless   his forces were soon after disastrously routed at
the Fei River  and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat  

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself  you will succumb in
every battle 

      Chang Yu said    Knowing the enemy enables you to take the
offensive    knowing yourself enables you to stand on   the
defensive    He adds    Attack is the secret of defense   defense
is the planning of an attack    It would be hard to find a better
epitome of the root principle of war  

                                                                 

IV   TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


      Ts ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for
the title of this chapter    marching and countermarching on the
part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other s
condition     Tu Mu says    It is through the dispositions of an
army that its condition may be discovered   Conceal   your
dispositions  and your condition will remain secret  which leads
to victory    show your dispositions  and your condition will
become patent  which leads to defeat    Wang Hsi remarks that the
good general can  secure success by modifying his tactics to meet
those of the enemy   

     1   Sun Tzu said   The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat  and then waited for
an opportunity of defeating the enemy 
     2   To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands  but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by
the enemy himself 

      That is  of course  by a mistake on the enemy s part  

     3   Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against
defeat 

      Chang Yu says this is done    By concealing the disposition
of his troops  covering up his tracks  and taking unremitting
precautions   

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy 
     4   Hence the saying   One may KNOW how to conquer without
being able to DO it 
     5   Security against defeat implies defensive tactics 
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive 

      I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss   1 3 
in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me 
The meaning they give    He who cannot conquer takes   the
defensive   is plausible enough  

     6    Standing on the defensive indicates   insufficient
strength  attacking  a superabundance of strength 
     7   The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most
secret recesses of the earth 

      Literally    hides under the ninth earth    which is a
metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment  so that
the enemy may not know his whereabouts   

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven 

      Another metaphor  implying that he falls on his adversary
like a thunderbolt  against which there is no time to prepare 
This is the opinion of most of the commentators  

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves  on the
other  a victory that is complete 
     8   To see victory only when it is within the ken of the
common herd is not the acme of excellence 

      As Ts ao Kung remarks   the thing is to see the plant
before it has germinated   to foresee the event before the action
has begun   Li Ch uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who   when
about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao   which was
strongly entrenched in the city of Ch eng an   said to his
officers    Gentlemen  we are going to annihilate the enemy   and
shall meet again at dinner    The officers hardly took his words
seriously   and gave a very dubious assent   But Han Hsin had
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem 
whereby   as he foresaw  he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary   

     9   Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says   Well done  

      True excellence being  as Tu Mu says    To plan secretly 
to move surreptitiously  to foil the enemy s intentions and balk
his schemes  so that at last the day may be won without shedding
a drop of blood    Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things
that
                     the world s coarse thumb
               And finger fail to plumb   

     10   To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength 

       Autumn  hair  is explained as the fur of a hare  which is
finest in autumn  when it begins to grow afresh   The phrase is a
very common one in Chinese writers  

to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight  to hear the
noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear 

      Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength   sharp sight
and quick hearing   Wu Huo  who could lift a tripod weighing 250
stone   Li Chu  who at a distance of a hundred paces could see
objects no bigger than a mustard seed  and Shih K uang  a blind
musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito  

     11   What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who
not only wins  but excels in winning with ease 

      The last half is literally  one who  conquering  excels in
easy conquering     Mei Yao ch en says    He who only sees the
obvious  wins his battles with difficulty  he who looks below the
surface of things  wins with ease   

     12   Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for
wisdom nor credit for courage 

      Tu Mu explains this very well    Inasmuch as his victories
are gained over circumstances that have not come to light   the
world as large knows nothing of them  and he wins no reputation
for wisdom  inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there
has been any bloodshed  he receives no credit for courage   

     13   He wins his battles by making no mistakes 

      Ch en Hao says     He plans no superfluous marches   he
devises no futile attacks    The connection of ideas is thus
explained by Chang Yu    One who seeks to conquer by sheer
strength  clever though he may be at winning pitched battles   is
also liable on occasion to be vanquished  whereas he who can look
into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest 
will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win   

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory 
for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated 
     14   Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible  and does not miss the moment for
defeating the enemy 

      A   counsel of perfection   as Tu Mu truly   observes 
 Position  need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by
the troops   It includes all the arrangements and preparations
which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his
army  

     15   Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only
seeks battle after the victory has been won  whereas he who is
destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory 

      Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox    In warfare  first lay
plans which will ensure victory  and then lead your army to
battle   if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute
strength alone  victory will no longer be assured   

     16   The consummate leader cultivates the moral law   and
strictly adheres to method and discipline  thus it is in his
power to control success 
     17   In respect of military method   we have   firstly 
Measurement    secondly    Estimation   of   quantity    thirdly 
Calculation  fourthly  Balancing of chances  fifthly  Victory 
     18   Measurement owes its existence to Earth  Estimation of
quantity to Measurement  Calculation to Estimation of quantity 
Balancing of chances to Calculation  and Victory to Balancing of
chances 

      It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly
in the Chinese   The first seems to be surveying and measurement
of the ground  which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy s
strength   and to make calculations based on the data thus
obtained  we are thus led to a general weighing up  or comparison
of the enemy s chances with our own  if the latter turn the
scale   then victory ensues   The chief difficulty lies in third
term    which in the Chinese some commentators take as   a
calculation of NUMBERS  thereby making it nearly synonymous with
the second term   Perhaps the second term should be thought of as
a consideration of the enemy s general position or condition 
while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength 
On the other hand   Tu Mu says     The question of relative
strength having been settled  we can bring the varied resources
of cunning into play    Ho Shih seconds this interpretation   but
weakens it   However  it points to the third term as being a
calculation of numbers  

     19   A victorious army opposed to a routed one   is as a
pound s weight placed in the scale against a single grain 

      Literally   a victorious army is like an I  20 oz   weighed
against a SHU  1 24 oz    a routed army is a SHU weighed against
an I     The point is simply the enormous advantage which a
disciplined force  flushed with victory  has over one demoralized
by defeat    Legge  in his note on Mencius  I  2  ix   2   makes
the I to be 24 Chinese ounces  and corrects Chu Hsi s statement
that it equaled 20 oz  only   But Li Ch uan of the T ang dynasty
here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi  

     20   The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
of pent up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep 

                                                                 

V   ENERGY


     1   Sun Tzu said   The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men   it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers 

      That is   cutting up the army into regiments   companies 
etc    with subordinate officers in command of each   Tu Mu
reminds us of Han Hsin s famous reply to the first Han Emperor 
who once said to him    How large an army do you think I could
lead      Not more than 100 000 men  your Majesty      And you  
asked the Emperor    Oh   he answered   the more the better   

     2   Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise
different from fighting with a small one    it is merely a
question of instituting signs and signals 
     3   To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt
of the enemy s attack and remain unshaken   this is effected by
maneuvers direct and indirect 

      We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun
Tzu s treatise  the discussion of the CHENG and the CH I    As it
is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two
terms    or   to render them consistently by   good   English
equivalents   it may be as well to tabulate some of   the
commentators   remarks on the subject before proceeding further 
Li Ch uan    Facing the enemy is CHENG  making lateral diversion
is CH I   Chia Lin    In presence of the enemy   your troops
should be arrayed in normal fashion  but in order to secure
victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed     Mei Yao ch en 
 CH I is active  CHENG is passive  passivity means waiting for an
opportunity  activity beings the victory itself    Ho Shih     We
must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one
that is secretly designed  and vice versa  thus CHENG may also be
CH I   and CH I may also be CHENG    He instances the famous
exploit of Han Hsin  who when marching ostensibly against Lin 
chin  now Chao i in Shensi   suddenly threw a large force across
the Yellow River in wooden tubs   utterly disconcerting his
opponent   Ch ien Han Shu  ch  3    Here  we are told  the march
on Lin chin was CHENG  and the surprise maneuver was CH I  
Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words 
 Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH I
and CHENG   Wei Liao Tzu  4th cent  B C   says    Direct warfare
favors frontal attacks  indirect warfare attacks from the rear  
Ts ao Kung says    Going straight out to join battle is a direct
operation    appearing on the enemy s rear is an   indirect
maneuver    Li Wei kung  6th and 7th cent  A D   says    In war 
to march straight ahead is CHENG  turning movements  on the other
hand  are CH I    These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG  and
CH I as CH I   they do not note that the two are mutually
interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a
circle  see infra  ss  11    A comment on the T ang Emperor T ai
Tsung goes to the root of the matter    A CH I maneuver may be
CHENG  if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG  then our real
attack will be CH I  and vice versa   The whole secret lies in
confusing the enemy  so that he cannot fathom our real intent   
To put it perhaps a little more clearly   any attack or other
operation is CHENG  on which the enemy has had his attention
fixed   whereas that is CH I   which takes him by surprise or
comes from an unexpected quarter   If the enemy perceives a
movement which is meant to be CH I    it immediately becomes
CHENG   

     4   That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
dashed against an egg   this is effected by the science of weak
points and strong 
     5   In all fighting  the direct method may be used for
joining battle  but indirect methods will be needed in order to
secure victory 

      Chang Yu says    Steadily develop indirect tactics   either
by pounding the enemy s flanks or falling on his rear     A
brilliant example of   indirect tactics   which decided   the
fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts  night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war   1 

     6   Indirect tactics  efficiently applied  are inexhausible
as Heaven and Earth  unending as the flow of rivers and streams 
like the sun and moon  they end but to begin anew  like the four
seasons  they pass away to return once more 

      Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of
CH I and CHENG    But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG
at all   unless  indeed  we suppose with Cheng Yu hsien that a
clause relating to it has fallen out of the text   Of course   as
has already been pointed out  the two are so inextricably
interwoven in all military operations  that they cannot really be
considered apart   Here we simply have an expression    in
figurative language  of the almost infinite resource of a great
leader  

     7   There are not more than five musical notes   yet the
combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can
ever be heard 
     8   There are not more than five primary colors   blue 
yellow   red  white  and black   yet in combination they produce
more hues than can ever been seen 
     9   There are not more than five cardinal tastes   sour 
acrid  salt  sweet  bitter   yet combinations of them yield more
flavors than can ever be tasted 
     10   In battle   there are not more than two methods of
attack     the direct and the indirect   yet these two   in
combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers 
     11   The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in
turn   It is like moving in a circle   you never come to an end 
Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination 
     12   The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which
will even roll stones along in its course 
     13   The quality of decision is like the well timed swoop of
a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim 

      The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the
context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator   Tu
Mu defines this word as  the measurement or estimation of
distance    But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative
simile in ss  15   Applying this definition to the falcon   it
seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps
the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment 
together with the power of judging when the right moment has
arrived   The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly
important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very
instant at which it will be most effective   When the   Victory 
went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace 
she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell
before replying with a single gun   Nelson coolly waited until he
was within close range  when the broadside he brought to bear
worked fearful havoc on the enemy s nearest ships  

     14   Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his
onset  and prompt in his decision 

      The word  decision  would have reference to the measurement
of distance mentioned above  letting the enemy get near before
striking   But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use
the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom  short
and sharp     Cf  Wang Hsi s note  which after describing the
falcon s mode of attack   proceeds    This is just how the
 psychological moment  should be seized in war   

     15   Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow 
decision  to the releasing of a trigger 

      None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of
the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross 
bow until released by the finger on the trigger  

     16   Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle  there may be
seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all  amid confusion
and chaos  your array may be without head or tail  yet it will be
proof against defeat 

      Mei Yao ch en says    The subdivisions of the army having
been previously fixed  and the various signals agreed upon   the
separating and joining  the dispersing and collecting which will
take place in the course of a battle  may give the appearance of
disorder when no real disorder is possible   Your formation may
be without head or tail  your dispositions all topsy turvy   and
yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question   

     17   Simulated disorder postulates perfect   discipline 
simulated fear postulates courage  simulated weakness postulates
strength 

      In order to make the translation intelligible   it is
necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the
original   Ts ao Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his
brief note     These things all serve to destroy formation and
conceal one s condition    But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite
plainly     If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the
enemy on  you must first have perfect discipline  if you wish to
display timidity in order to entrap the enemy   you must have
extreme courage  if you wish to parade your weakness in order to
make   the   enemy over confident   you must   have   exceeding
strength   

     18   Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a
question of subdivision 

      See supra  ss  1  

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of
latent energy 

      The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word
here differently than anywhere else in this chapter   Thus Tu Mu
says     seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make
no move  the enemy will believe that we are really afraid   

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
dispositions 

      Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu   the
first Han Emperor    Wishing to crush the Hsiung nu  he sent out
spies   to report on their condition   But the   Hsiung nu 
forewarned   carefully concealed all their able bodied men and
well fed horses  and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated
cattle to be seen   The result was that spies one and all
recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack   Lou Ching alone
opposed them  saying    When two countries go to war   they are
naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their
strength   Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and
infirmity   This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy 
and it would be unwise for us to attack    The Emperor   however 
disregarding this advice  fell into the trap and found himself
surrounded at Po teng   

     19   Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the
move maintains deceitful appearances  according to which the
enemy will act 

      Ts ao Kung s note is  Make a display of weakness and want  
Tu Mu says    If our force happens to be superior to the enemy s 
weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on   but if
inferior  he must be led to believe that we are strong  in order
that he may keep off   In fact  all the enemy s movements should
be determined by the signs that we choose to give him    Note the
following anecdote of Sun Pin  a descendent of Sun Wu    In 341
B C    the Ch i State being at war with Wei  sent T ien Chi and
Sun Pin against the general P ang Chuan  who happened to be a
deadly personal enemy of the later   Sun Pin said     The Ch i
State has a reputation for cowardice  and therefore our adversary
despises us   Let us turn this circumstance to   account  
Accordingly   when the army had crossed the border into Wei
territory   he gave orders to show 100 000 fires on the first
night   50 000 on the next  and the night after only 20 000 
P ang Chuan pursued them hotly  saying to himself    I knew these
men of Ch i were cowards   their numbers have already fallen away
by more than half    In his retreat  Sun Pin came to a narrow
defile   with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after
dark   Here he had a tree stripped of its bark   and inscribed
upon it the words    Under this tree shall P ang Chuan die  
Then  as night began to fall  he placed a strong body of archers
in ambush near by  with orders to shoot directly they saw a
light   Later on  P ang Chuan arrived at the spot  and noticing
the tree  struck a light in order to read what was written on it 
His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows  and his
whole army thrown into confusion    The above is Tu Mu s version
of the story  the SHIH CHI  less dramatically but probably with
more historical truth  makes P ang Chuan cut his own throat with
an exclamation of despair  after the rout of his army    

He sacrifices something  that the enemy may snatch at it 

     20   By holding out baits  he keeps him on the march   then
with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him 

      With an emendation suggested by Li Ching  this then reads 
 He lies in wait with the main body of his troops   

     21   The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
energy  and does not require too much from individuals 

      Tu Mu says    He first of all considers the power of his
army in the bulk  afterwards he takes individual talent into
account   and uses each men according to his capabilities   He
does not demand perfection from the untalented   

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined
energy 
     22   When he utilizes combined energy   his fighting men
become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones   For it is
the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level
ground  and to move when on a slope  if four cornered  to come to
a standstill  but if round shaped  to go rolling down 

      Ts au Kung calls this  the use of natural or inherent
power   

     23   Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as
the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands
of feet in height   So much on the subject of energy 

      The chief lesson of this chapter  in Tu Mu s opinion   is
the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden
rushes    Great results   he adds   can thus be achieved with
small forces   


 1    Forty one Years in India   chapter 46 

                                                                 

VI   WEAK POINTS AND STRONG


      Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as
follows     Chapter IV  on Tactical Dispositions  treated of the
offensive and the defensive  chapter V  on Energy   dealt with
direct and indirect methods   The good general acquaints himself
first with the theory of attack and defense  and then turns his
attention to direct and indirect methods   He studies the art of
varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the
subject of weak and strong points   For the use of direct or
indirect methods arises out of attack and defense   and the
perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above
methods   Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the
chapter on Energy   

     1   Sun Tzu said   Whoever is first in the field and awaits
the coming of the enemy  will be fresh for the fight  whoever is
second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive
exhausted 
     2   Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the
enemy  but does not allow the enemy s will to be imposed on him 

      One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own
terms or fights not at all   1   

     3   By holding out advantages to him  he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord  or  by inflicting damage  he can
make it impossible for the enemy to draw near 

      In the first case  he will entice him with a bait  in the
second   he will strike at some important point which the enemy
will have to defend  

     4   If the enemy is taking his ease  he can harass him 

      This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao 
Ch en s interpretation of I  ss  23  

if well supplied with food  he can starve him out   if quietly
encamped  he can force him to move 
     5   Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend 
march swiftly to places where you are not expected 
     6   An army may march great distances without distress   if
it marches through country where the enemy is not 

      Ts ao Kung sums up very well    Emerge from the void   q d 
like   a bolt from the blue    strike at vulnerable points   shun
places that are defended  attack in unexpected quarters   

     7   You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you
only attack places which are undefended 

      Wang Hsi explains  undefended places  as  weak points  that
is to say   where the general is lacking in capacity   or the
soldiers in spirit  where the walls are not strong enough  or the
precautions not strict enough  where relief comes too late   or
provisions are too scanty  or the defenders are variance amongst
themselves   

You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
positions that cannot be attacked 

      I e    where there are none of the weak points mentioned
above    There   is rather a nice point involved   in   the
interpretation of this later clause   Tu Mu  Ch en Hao  and Mei
Yao ch en assume the meaning to be    In order to make your
defense quite safe  you must defend EVEN those places that are
not likely to be attacked   and Tu Mu adds     How much more 
then   those that will be attacked    Taken thus   however   the
clause   balances   less well with the   preceding  always   a
consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural
to the Chinese   Chang Yu  therefore  seems to come nearer the
mark in saying    He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from
the topmost heights of heaven  see IV   ss   7    making it
impossible for the enemy to guard against him   This being so 
the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy
cannot defend      He who is skilled in defense hides in the most
secret recesses of the earth  making it impossible for the enemy
to estimate his whereabouts   This being so  the places that I
shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack   

     8   Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent
does not know what to defend  and he is skillful in defense whose
opponent does not know what to attack 

      An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell  

     9   O divine art of subtlety and secrecy   Through you we
learn to be invisible  through you inaudible 

      Literally    without form or sound   but it is said of
course with reference to the enemy  

and hence we can hold the enemy s fate in our hands 
     10   You may advance and be absolutely irresistible  if you
make for the enemy s weak points  you may retire and be safe from
pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy 
     11   If we wish to fight  the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and
a deep ditch   All we need do is attack some other place that he
will be obliged to relieve 

      Tu Mu says    If the enemy is the invading party   we can
cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he
will have to return  if we are the invaders  we may direct our
attack against the sovereign himself    It is clear that Sun Tzu 
unlike certain generals in the late Boer war  was no believer in
frontal attacks  

     12   If we do not wish to fight  we can prevent the enemy
from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be
merely traced out on the ground   All we need do is to throw
something odd and unaccountable in his way 

      This   extremely   concise   expression   is   intelligibly
paraphrased by Chia Lin    even though we have constructed
neither wall nor ditch    Li Ch uan says    we puzzle him by
strange and unusual dispositions   and Tu Mu finally clinches the
meaning by three illustrative anecdotes  one of Chu ko Liang  who
when occupying Yang p ing and about to be attacked by Ssu ma I 
suddenly struck his colors  stopped the beating of the drums  and
flung open the city gates  showing only a few men engaged in
sweeping and sprinkling the ground   This unexpected proceeding
had the intended effect  for Ssu ma I   suspecting an ambush 
actually drew off his army and retreated   What Sun Tzu is
advocating here   therefore  is nothing more nor less than the
timely use of  bluff   

     13   By discovering the enemy s dispositions and remaining
invisible ourselves  we can keep our forces concentrated   while
the enemy s must be divided 

      The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious  but Chang Yu
 after Mei Yao ch en  rightly explains it thus    If the enemy s
dispositions are visible   we can make for him in one body 
whereas   our own dispositions being kept secret  the enemy will
be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack
from every quarter   

     14   We can form a single united body  while the enemy must
split up into fractions   Hence there will be a whole pitted
against separate parts of a whole  which means that we shall be
many to the enemy s few 
     15   And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one  our opponents will be in dire straits 
     16   The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
known  for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible
attack at several different points 

      Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant s
victories by saying that  while his opponents were kept fully
employed wondering what he was going to do  HE was thinking most
of what he was going to do himself   

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions   the
numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be
proportionately few 
     17   For should the enemy strengthen his van  he will weaken
his rear  should he strengthen his rear  he will weaken his van 
should he strengthen his left  he will weaken his right   should
he strengthen his right  he will weaken his left   If he sends
reinforcements everywhere  he will everywhere be weak 

      In Frederick the Great s INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we
read     A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent
detachment   Those generals who have had but little experience
attempt to protect every point  while those who are better
acquainted with their profession  having only the capital object
in view  guard against a decisive blow  and acquiesce in small
misfortunes to avoid greater   

     18   Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against
possible   attacks   numerical strength   from compelling   our
adversary to make these preparations against us 

      The highest generalship  in Col  Henderson s words  is   to
compel the enemy to disperse his army  and then to concentrate
superior force against each fraction in turn   

     19   Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle  we
may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight 

      What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation
of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which
enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and
rapid march  and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the
right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in
overwhelming strength   Among many such successful junctions
which military history records  one of the most dramatic and
decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical
moment on the field of Waterloo  

     20   But if neither time nor place be known  then the left
wing will be impotent to succor the right   the right equally
impotent to succor the left  the van unable to relieve the rear 
or the rear to support the van   How much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart   and
even the nearest are separated by several LI 

      The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
precision   but the mental picture we are required to draw is
probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
separate columns  each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
date   If the general allows the various detachments to proceed
at haphazard   without precise instructions as to the time and
place of meeting  the enemy will be able to annihilate the army
in detail   Chang Yu s note may be worth quoting here    If we do
not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
day on which they will join battle  our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defense  and the positions we hold
will be insecure   Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe   we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition  and no mutual
support will be possible between wings   vanguard or rear 
especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army   

     21   Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh
exceed our own in number  that shall advantage them nothing in
the matter of victory   I say then that victory can be achieved 

      Alas for these brave words   The long feud between the two
states ended in 473 B C  with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien
and its incorporation in Yueh   This was doubtless long after Sun
Tzu s death   With his present assertion compare IV   ss   4 
Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy 
which he thus goes on to explain    In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said   One may KNOW how to conquer without
being able to DO it   whereas here we have the statement that
 victory   can be achieved    The explanation is   that in the
former chapter   where the offensive and defensive are under
discussion   it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared   one
cannot make certain of beating him   But the present passage
refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who  according to Sun
Tzu s calculations   will be kept in ignorance of the time and
place of the impending struggle   That is why he says here that
victory can be achieved   

     22   Though the enemy be stronger in numbers  we may prevent
him from fighting   Scheme so as to discover his plans and the
likelihood of their success 

      An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is     Know
beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy s
failure  

     23   Rouse him  and learn the principle of his activity or
inactivity 

      Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by
the enemy on being thus disturbed  we shall be able to conclude
whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse   He instances
the action of Cho ku Liang  who sent the scornful present of a
woman s head dress to Ssu ma I  in order to goad him out of his
Fabian tactics  

Force him to reveal himself  so as to find out his vulnerable
spots 
     24   Carefully compare the opposing army with your own   so
that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is
deficient 

      Cf  IV  ss  6  

     25   In making tactical dispositions  the highest pitch you
can attain is to conceal them 

      The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation 
Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility  see supra
ss  9  as  showing no sign  of what you mean to do  of the plans
that are formed in your brain  

conceal your dispositions  and you will be safe from the prying
of the subtlest spies  from the machinations of the wisest
brains 

      Tu Mu explains    Though the enemy may have clever and
capable officers  they will not be able to lay any plans against
us   

     26   How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy s
own tactics  that is what the multitude cannot comprehend 
     27   All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer  but what
none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved 

      I e   everybody can see superficially how a battle is won 
what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations
which has preceded the battle  

     28   Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
victory   but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
variety of circumstances 

      As Wang Hsi sagely remarks    There is but one root 
principle underlying victory  but the tactics which lead up to it
are infinite in number    With this compare Col  Henderson    The
rules of strategy are few and simple   They may be learned in a
week   They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen
diagrams   But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an
army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to
write like Gibbon   

     29   Military tactics are like unto water  for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards 
     30   So in war  the way is to avoid what is strong and to
strike at what is weak 

      Like water  taking the line of least resistance  

     31   Water shapes its course according to the nature of the
ground over which it flows  the soldier works out his victory in
relation to the foe whom he is facing 
     32   Therefore  just as water retains no constant shape   so
in warfare there are no constant conditions 
     33   He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning  may be called a heaven 
born captain 
     34   The five elements  water  fire  wood  metal  earth  are
not always equally predominant 

      That   is    as   Wang   Hsi   says      they   predominate
alternately   

the four seasons make way for each other in turn 

      Literally   have no invariable seat   

There are short days and long  the moon has its periods of waning
and waxing 

      Cf   V   ss  6   The purport of the passage is simply to
illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly
taking place in Nature   The comparison is not very happy 
however   because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu
mentions is by no means paralleled in war  


 1    See Col  Henderson s biography of Stonewall Jackson   1902
ed   vol  II  p  490 

                                                                 

VII   MANEUVERING


     1   Sun Tzu said   In war  the general receives his commands
from the sovereign 
     2   Having collected an army and concentrated his forces  he
must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before
pitching his camp 

       Chang   Yu says     the establishment of harmony   and
confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing
into the field   and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu  chap   1 ad
init       Without harmony in the State  no military expedition
can be undertaken  without harmony in the army  no battle array
can be formed    In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented
as saying to Wu Yuan    As a general rule  those who are waging
war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding
to attack the external foe   

     3   After that  comes tactical maneuvering  than which there
is nothing more difficult 

      I    have   departed   slightly   from   the    traditional
interpretation of Ts ao Kung  who says     From the time of
receiving the sovereign s instructions until our encampment over
against the enemy  the tactics to be pursued are most difficult  
It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said
to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped   and
Ch ien Hao s note gives color to this view     For levying 
concentrating   harmonizing and entrenching an army   there are
plenty of old rules which will serve   The real difficulty comes
when we engage in tactical operations    Tu Yu also observes that
 the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in
seizing favorable position   

The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the
devious into the direct  and misfortune into gain 

      This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and
somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond 
This is how it is explained by Ts ao Kung    Make it appear that
you are a long way off  then cover the distance rapidly and
arrive on the scene before your opponent     Tu Mu   says 
 Hoodwink the enemy  so that he may be remiss and leisurely while
you are dashing along with utmost speed     Ho Shih gives a
slightly different turn    Although you may have difficult ground
to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback
which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of
movement     Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the
two famous passages across the Alps  that of Hannibal  which laid
Italy at his mercy  and that of Napoleon two thousand years
later  which resulted in the great victory of Marengo  

     4   Thus   to take a long and circuitous route   after
enticing the enemy out of the way  and though starting after him 
to contrive to reach the goal before him  shows knowledge of the
artifice of DEVIATION 

      Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B C   to
relieve the town of O yu  which was closely invested by a Ch in
army   The King of Chao first consulted Lien P o on the
advisability of attempting a relief  but the latter thought the
distance too great  and the intervening country too rugged and
difficult   His Majesty then turned to Chao She   who fully
admitted the hazardous nature of the march  but finally said 
 We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole  and the pluckier
one will win    So he left the capital with his army   but had
only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began
throwing   up   entrenchments    For 28   days   he   continued
strengthening his fortifications  and took care that spies should
carry the intelligence to the enemy   The Ch in general was
overjoyed   and attributed his adversary s tardiness to the fact
that the beleaguered city was in the Han State   and thus not
actually part of Chao territory   But the spies had no sooner
departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days
and one night   and arrive on the scene of action with such
astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding
position on the  North hill  before the enemy had got wind of his
movements   A crushing defeat followed for the Ch in forces   who
were obliged to raise the siege of O yu in all haste and retreat
across the border  

     5   Maneuvering with an army is advantageous   with an
undisciplined multitude  most dangerous 

      I adopt the reading of the T UNG TIEN  Cheng Yu hsien and
the T U SHU  since they appear to apply the exact nuance required
in order to make sense   The commentators using the standard text
take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable  or they
may be dangerous   it all depends on the ability of the general  

     6   If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to
snatch an advantage  the chances are that you will be too late 
On the other hand  to detach a flying column for the purpose
involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores 

      Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese
commentators   who paraphrase the sentence   I submit my own
rendering without much enthusiasm  being convinced that there is
some deep seated corruption in the text   On the whole   it is
clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being
undertaken without supplies   Cf  infra  ss  11  

     7   Thus  if you order your men to roll up their buff coats 
and make forced marches without halting day or night   covering
double the usual distance at a stretch 

      The ordinary day s march  according to Tu Mu  was 30 LI 
but on one occasion  when pursuing Liu Pei  Ts ao Ts ao is said
to have covered the incredible distance of 300   li   within
twenty four hours  

doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage  the leaders of
all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy 
     8   The stronger men will be in front  the jaded ones will
fall behind  and on this plan only one tenth of your army will
reach its destination 

      The moral is  as Ts ao Kung and others point out    Don t
march a hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage  either with or
without impedimenta   Maneuvers of this description should be
confined to short distances   Stonewall Jackson said     The
hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the
dangers of battle    He did not often call upon his troops for
extraordinary exertions   It was only when he intended   a
surprise   or when a rapid retreat was imperative   that he
sacrificed everything for speed   1   

     9   If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy 
you will lose the leader of your first division  and only half
your force will reach the goal 

      Literally    the leader of the first division will be
TORN AWAY   

     10   If you march thirty LI with the same object  two thirds
of your army will arrive 

      In the T UNG TIEN is added    From this we may know the
difficulty of maneuvering   

     11   We may take it then that an army without its baggage 
train is lost  without provisions it is lost  without bases of
supply it is lost 

      I think Sun Tzu meant  stores accumulated in depots     But
Tu Yu says   fodder and the like   Chang Yu says   Goods in
general   and Wang Hsi says  fuel  salt  foodstuffs  etc   

     12   We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted
with the designs of our neighbors 
     13   We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we
are familiar with the face of the country  its mountains and
forests  its pitfalls and precipices  its marshes and swamps 
     14   We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account
unless we make use of local guides 

      ss  12 14 are repeated in chap  XI  ss  52  

     15   In war  practice dissimulation  and you will succeed 

      In the tactics of Turenne   deception of the   enemy 
especially as to the numerical strength of his troops   took a
very prominent position   2   

     16   Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops   must
be decided by circumstances 
     17   Let your rapidity be that of the wind 

      The simile is doubly appropriate  because the wind is not
only swift but   as Mei Yao ch en points out    invisible and
leaves no tracks   

your compactness that of the forest 

      Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note     When
slowly marching   order and ranks must be preserved   so as to
guard against surprise attacks   But natural forest do not grow
in rows  whereas they do generally possess the quality of density
or compactness  

     18   In raiding and plundering be like fire 

      Cf   SHIH CHING  IV  3  iv  6    Fierce as a blazing fire
which no man can check   

in immovability like a mountain 

      That is  when holding a position from which the enemy is
trying to dislodge you  or perhaps  as Tu Yu says  when he is
trying to entice you into a trap  

     19   Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night   and
when you move  fall like a thunderbolt 

      Tu Yu quotes a saying of T ai Kung which has passed into a
proverb    You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes
to the lighting  so rapid are they    Likewise  an attack should
be made so quickly that it cannot be parried  

     20   When you plunder a countryside   let the spoil be
divided amongst your men 

      Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate
plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a
common stock   which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst
all  

when you capture new territory  cut it up into allotments for the
benefit of the soldiery 

      Ch en Hao says  quarter your soldiers on the land  and let
them sow and plant it    It is by acting on this principle   and
harvesting the lands they invaded   that the Chinese   have
succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and
triumphant expeditions  such as that of Pan Ch ao who penetrated
to the Caspian  and in more recent years  those of Fu k ang an
and Tso Tsung t ang  

     21   Ponder and deliberate before you make a move 

      Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not
break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy
and the cleverness of the opposing general   Cf   the   seven
comparisons  in I  ss  13  

     22   He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of
deviation 

      See supra  SS  3  4  

Such is the art of maneuvering 

      With these words  the chapter would naturally come to an
end   But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an
extract from an earlier book on War  now lost   but apparently
extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote   The style of this
fragment is not noticeable different from that of Sun Tzu
himself    but   no commentator raises a doubt as   to   its
genuineness  

     23   The Book of Army Management says 

      It is perhaps significant that none of the   earlier
commentators give us any information about this work   Mei Yao 
Ch en calls it  an ancient military classic   and Wang Hsi    an
old book on war    Considering the enormous amount of fighting
that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu s time between the
various kingdoms and principalities of China  it is not in itself
improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been
made and written down at some earlier period  

On the field of battle 

      Implied  though not actually in the Chinese  

the spoken word does not carry far enough   hence the institution
of gongs and drums   Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly
enough   hence the institution of banners and flags 
     24   Gongs and drums  banners and flags  are means whereby
the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular
point 

      Chang   Yu   says      If sight   and   hearing   converge
simultaneously on the same object  the evolutions of as many as a
million soldiers will be like those of a single man    

     25   The host thus forming a single united body   is it
impossible either for the brave to advance alone   or for the
cowardly to retreat alone 

      Chuang Yu quotes a saying   Equally guilty are those who
advance against orders and those who retreat against orders    Tu
Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch i   when he was
fighting against the Ch in State   Before the battle had begun 
one of his soldiers  a man of matchless daring  sallied forth by
himself  captured two heads from the enemy  and returned to camp 
Wu Ch i had the man instantly executed   whereupon an officer
ventured to remonstrate  saying    This man was a good soldier 
and ought not to have been beheaded    Wu Ch i replied    I fully
believe he was a good soldier  but I had him beheaded because he
acted without orders   

This is the art of handling large masses of men 
     26   In night fighting  then  make much use of signal fires
and drums   and in fighting by day  of flags and banners   as a
means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army 

      Ch en Hao alludes to Li Kuang pi s night ride to Ho yang at
the head of 500 mounted men  they made such an imposing display
with torches  that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu ming had a
large army  he did not dare to dispute their passage  

     27   A whole army may be robbed of its spirit 

       In war   says Chang Yu   if a spirit of anger can be made
to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time   its
onset will be irresistible   Now the spirit of the enemy s
soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the
scene   and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once  but to
wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off   and then
strike   It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen
spirit     Li Ch uan and others tell an anecdote  to be found in
the TSO CHUAN  year 10  ss  1  of Ts ao Kuei  a protege of Duke
Chuang of Lu   The latter State was attacked by Ch i   and the
duke was about to join battle at Ch ang cho  after the first roll
of the enemy s drums  when Ts ao said    Not just yet     Only
after their drums had beaten for the third time  did he give the
word for attack   Then they fought  and the men of Ch i were
utterly defeated   Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the
meaning of his delay   Ts ao Kuei replied     In battle   a
courageous spirit is everything   Now the first roll of the drum
tends to create this spirit  but with the second it is already on
the wane  and after the third it is gone altogether   I attacked
when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height   Hence our
victory     Wu Tzu  chap  4  puts  spirit  first among the   four
important influences   in war  and continues    The value of a
whole army  a mighty host of a million men  is dependent on one
man alone   such is the influence of spirit   

a commander in chief may be robbed of his presence of mind 

      Chang Yu says    Presence of mind is the general s most
important asset   It is the quality which enables him to
discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic 
stricken     The great general Li Ching  A D   571 649   has a
saying    Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled
cities or striking at an army in battle array  it must include
the art of assailing the enemy s mental equilibrium   

     28   Now a soldier s spirit is keenest in the morning 

      Always provided  I suppose  that he has had breakfast   At
the battle of the Trebia  the Romans were foolishly allowed to
fight   fasting   whereas Hannibal s men had breakfasted   at
their leisure   See Livy  XXI  liv  8  lv  1 and 8  

by noonday it has begun to flag  and in the evening  his mind is
bent only on returning to camp 
     29   A clever general  therefore  avoids an army when its
spirit is keen  but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined
to return   This is the art of studying moods 
     30   Disciplined and calm  to await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy   this is the art of
retaining self possession 
     31   To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from
it  to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling  to
be well fed while the enemy is famished   this is the art of
husbanding one s strength 
     32   To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are
in perfect order  to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in
calm   and confident array   this is the art   of   studying
circumstances 
     33   It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against
the enemy  nor to oppose him when he comes downhill 
     34   Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight   do not
attack soldiers whose temper is keen 
     35   Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy 

      Li Ch uan and Tu Mu  with extraordinary inability to see a
metaphor  take these words quite literally of food and drink that
have been poisoned by the enemy   Ch en Hao and Chang Yu
carefully point out that the saying has a wider application  

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home 

      The commentators explain this rather singular piece of
advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home
will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way   and
is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled   Chang Yu
quotes the words of Han Hsin    Invincible is the soldier who
hath his desire and returneth homewards    A marvelous tale is
told of Ts ao Ts ao s courage and resource in ch  1 of the SAN
KUO CHI   In 198 A D   he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang   when
Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts ao s
retreat   The latter was obliged to draw off his troops  only to
find himself hemmed in between two enemies  who were guarding
each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself   In
this desperate plight Ts ao waited until nightfall  when he bored
a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it   As
soon as the whole army had passed by  the hidden troops fell on
his rear   while Ts ao himself turned and met his pursuers in
front   so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated 
Ts ao Ts ao said afterwards    The brigands tried to check my
army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate
position   hence I knew how to overcome them   

     36   When you surround an army  leave an outlet free 

      This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to
escape   The object  as Tu Mu puts it  is  to make him believe
that there is a road to safety  and thus prevent his fighting
with the courage of despair    Tu Mu adds pleasantly     After
that  you may crush him   

Do not press a desperate foe too hard 

      Ch en Hao quotes the saying     Birds and beasts when
brought to bay will use their claws and teeth    Chang Yu says 
 If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his
cooking pots  and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle 
he must not be pushed to extremities    Ho Shih illustrates the
meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen ch ing   That
general  together with his colleague Tu Chung wei was surrounded
by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A D   The
country was bare and desert like  and the little Chinese force
was soon in dire straits for want of water   The wells they bored
ran dry  and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and
sucking out the moisture   Their ranks thinned rapidly  until at
last Fu Yen ch ing exclaimed    We are desperate men   Far better
to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into
captivity     A strong gale happened to be blowing from the
northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust 
To Chung wei was for waiting until this had abated before
deciding on a final attack  but luckily another officer  Li Shou 
cheng by name   was quicker to see an opportunity   and said 
 They are many and we are few  but in the midst of this sandstorm
our numbers will not be discernible  victory will go to the
strenuous fighter   and the wind will be our best   ally  
Accordingly   Fu Yen ch ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected
onslaught with his cavalry  routed the barbarians and succeeded
in breaking through to safety  

     37   Such is the art of warfare 


 1   See Col  Henderson  op  cit  vol  I  p  426 

 2    For a number of maxims on this head  see  Marshal Turenne 
 Longmans  1907   p  29 

                                                                 

                   VIII   VARIATION IN TACTICS


      The heading means literally  The Nine Variations   but as
Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these  and as   indeed   he
has already told us  V SS  6 11  that such deflections from the
ordinary course are practically innumerable   we have little
option but to follow Wang Hsi  who says that  Nine  stands for an
indefinitely large number    All it means is that in warfare we
ought to very our tactics to the utmost degree      I do not know
what Ts ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be  but it has
been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations 
  of chapt  XI   This is the view adopted by Chang Yu   The only
other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost  a
supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends
some weight  

     1    Sun Tzu said    In war   the general receives his
commands from the sovereign  collects his army and concentrates
his forces 

      Repeated from VII  ss  1  where it is certainly more in
place   It may have been interpolated here merely in order to
supply a beginning to the chapter  

     2   When in difficult country  do not encamp   In country
where high roads intersect  join hands with your allies   Do not
linger in dangerously isolated positions 

      The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as
given in the beginning of chap  XI  but occurs later on   ibid 
ss  43  q v     Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated
across the frontier  in hostile territory   Li Ch uan says it is
 country in which there are no springs or wells  flocks or herds 
vegetables or firewood   Chia Lin   one of gorges   chasms and
precipices  without a road by which to advance   

In hemmed in situations   you must resort to stratagem   In
desperate position  you must fight 
     3   There are roads which must not be followed 

       Especially those leading through narrow defiles   says Li
Ch uan   where an ambush is to be feared   

armies which must be not attacked 

      More correctly  perhaps   there are times when an army must
not be attacked    Ch en Hao says    When you see your way to
obtain a rival advantage  but are powerless to inflict a real
defeat  refrain from attacking  for fear of overtaxing your men s
strength   

towns which must not be besieged 

      Cf   III   ss   4   Ts ao Kung gives   an   interesting
illustration   from his own experience   When invading   the
territory of Hsu chou  he ignored the city of Hua pi  which lay
directly in his path  and pressed on into the heart of the
country   This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent
capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities 
Chang Yu says    No town should be attacked which   if taken 
cannot be held  or if left alone  will not cause any trouble  
Hsun Ying  when urged to attack Pi yang  replied    The city is
small and well fortified  even if I succeed intaking it  it will
be no great feat of arms  whereas if I fail  I shall make myself
a laughing stock     In the seventeenth century   sieges still
formed a large proportion of war   It was Turenne who directed
attention to the importance of marches   countermarches and
maneuvers   He said    It is a great mistake to waste men in
taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a
province    1   

positions which must not be contested  commands of the sovereign
which must not be obeyed 

      This is a hard saying for the Chinese  with their reverence
for authority   and Wei Liao Tzu  quoted by Tu Mu  is moved to
exclaim      Weapons   are   baleful   instruments    strife   is
antagonistic to virtue  a military commander is the negation of
civil order    The unpalatable fact remains  however  that even
Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity  

     4   The general who thoroughly understands the advantages
that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his
troops 
     5   The general who does not understand these  may be well
acquainted with the configuration of the country  yet he will not
be able to turn his knowledge to practical account 

      Literally    get the advantage of the ground   which means
not only securing good positions  but availing oneself of natural
advantages in every possible way   Chang Yu says    Every kind of
ground is characterized by certain natural features   and also
gives scope for a certain variability of plan   How it is
possible to turn these natural features to account unless
topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind   

     6   So  the student of war who is unversed in the art of war
of varying his plans  even though he be acquainted with the Five
Advantages  will fail to make the best use of his men 

      Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and
generally advantageous lines of action  namely    if a certain
road is short  it must be followed  if an army is isolated   it
must be attacked  if a town is in a parlous condition  it must be
besieged  if a position can be stormed  it must be attempted  and
if consistent with military operations  the ruler s commands must
be obeyed    But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a
general to use these advantages   For instance   a certain road
may be the shortest way for him  but if he knows that it abounds
in natural obstacles  or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it 
he will not follow that road   A hostile force may be open to
attack   but if he knows that it is hard pressed and likely to
fight with desperation  he will refrain from striking    and so
on  

     7   Hence in the wise leader s plans   considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together 

       Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous
one    says Ts ao Kung   the opposite state should be always
present to your mind   

     8   If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way 
we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our
schemes 

      Tu Mu says    If we wish to wrest an advantage from the
enemy  we must not fix our minds on that alone  but allow for the
possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us  and let this
enter as a factor into our calculations   

     9   If  on the other hand  in the midst of difficulties we
are always ready to seize an advantage   we may extricate
ourselves from misfortune 

      Tu Mu says     If I wish to extricate myself from a
dangerous position  I must consider not only the enemy s ability
to injure me  but also my own ability to gain an advantage over
the enemy   If in my counsels these two considerations are
properly blended  I shall succeed in liberating myself      For
instance   if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of
effecting an escape  the nervelessness of my policy will incite
my adversary to pursue and crush me  it would be far better to
encourage my men to deliver a bold counter attack  and use the
advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy s toils  
See the story of Ts ao Ts ao  VII  ss  35  note  

     10   Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them 

      Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury 
some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind    Entice
away the enemy s best and wisest men  so that he may be left
without counselors   Introduce traitors into his country   that
the government policy may be rendered futile   Foment intrigue
and deceit   and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his
ministers    By means of every artful   contrivance    cause
deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure   Corrupt
his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess   Disturb
and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women  
Chang Yu  after Wang Hsi  makes a different interpretation of Sun
Tzu here    Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer
injury  and he will submit of his own accord   

and make trouble for them 

      Tu Mu  in this phrase  in his interpretation indicates that
trouble   should   be make for the   enemy   affecting   their
 possessions   or  as we might say   assets   which he considers
to be   a large army  a rich exchequer   harmony amongst the
soldiers   punctual fulfillment of commands    These give us a
whip hand over the enemy  

and keep them constantly engaged 

      Literally    make servants of them    Tu Yu says   prevent
the from having any rest   

hold out specious allurements  and make them rush to any given
point 

      Meng Shih s note contains an excellent example of the
idiomatic use of    cause them to forget PIEN  the reasons for
acting otherwise than on their first impulse   and hasten in our
direction   

     11   The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood
of the enemy s not coming  but on our own readiness to receive
him   not on the chance of his not attacking  but rather on the
fact that we have made our position unassailable 
     12   There are five dangerous faults which may affect a
general    1   Recklessness  which leads to destruction 

       Bravery without forethought   as Ts ao Kung analyzes it 
which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad
bull   Such an opponent  says Chang Yu   must not be encountered
with brute force  but may be lured into an ambush and slain  
Cf  Wu Tzu  chap  IV  ad init     In estimating the character of
a general   men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his
courage   forgetting that courage is only one out of many
qualities which a general should possess   The merely brave man
is prone to fight recklessly  and he who fights recklessly 
without any perception of what is expedient  must be condemned  
Ssu ma Fa  too  make the incisive remark    Simply going to one s
death does not bring about victory   

      2   cowardice  which leads to capture 

      Ts ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as
 cowardice   as being of the man  whom timidity prevents from
advancing to seize an advantage   and Wang Hsi adds  who is quick
to flee at the sight of danger    Meng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase  he who is bent on returning alive   this is  the man
who will never take a risk   But  as Sun Tzu knew  nothing is to
be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks   T ai
Kung said     He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently
bring upon himself real disaster    In 404 A D   Liu Yu pursued
the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle
with him at the island of Ch eng hung   The loyal troops numbered
only a few thousands  while their opponents were in great force 
But Huan Hsuan   fearing the fate which was in store for him
should be be overcome  had a light boat made fast to the side of
his war junk   so that he might escape   if necessary   at a
moment s notice   The natural result was that the fighting spirit
of his soldiers was utterly quenched  and when the loyalists made
an attack from windward with fireships  all striving with the
utmost ardor to be first in the fray  Huan Hsuan s forces were
routed   had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and
nights without stopping   Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story
of Chao Ying ch i   a general of the Chin State who during a
battle with the army of Ch u in 597 B C  had a boat kept in
readiness for him on the river  wishing in case of defeat to be
the first to get across  

      3   a hasty temper  which can be provoked by insults 

      Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing  when opposed in 357 A D   by
Huang Mei   Teng Ch iang and others shut himself up behind his
walls and refused to fight   Teng Ch iang said    Our adversary
is of a choleric temper and easily provoked  let us make constant
sallies and break down his walls  then he will grow angry and
come out   Once we can bring his force to battle  it is doomed to
be our prey    This plan was acted upon  Yao Hsiang came out to
fight   was lured as far as San yuan by the enemy s pretended
flight  and finally attacked and slain  

      4   a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame 

      This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is
really a defect in a general   What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an
exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports  the thin skinned
man who is stung by opprobrium  however undeserved   Mei Yao 
ch en truly observes  though somewhat paradoxically    The seek
after glory should be careless of public opinion   

      5   over solicitude for his men  which exposes him to worry
and trouble 

      Here again  Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be
careless of the welfare of his troops   All he wishes to
emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military
advantage to the immediate comfort of his men   This is a
shortsighted policy   because in the long run the troops will
suffer more from the defeat  or  at best  the prolongation of the
war   which will be the consequence   A mistaken feeling of pity
will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city  or to
reinforce a hard pressed detachment  contrary to his military
instincts   It is now generally admitted that our repeated
efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so
many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose   And
in the end  relief came through the very man who started out with
the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of
the whole to sentiment in favor of a part   An old soldier of one
of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war   tried
once   I remember  to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always  so good to his men    By this plea  had he but known it 
he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu s mouth  

     13   These are the five besetting sins of a general  ruinous
to the conduct of war 
     14   When an army is overthrown and its leader slain   the
cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults 
Let them be a subject of meditation 


 1    Marshal Turenne   p  50 

                                                                 

IX   THE ARMY ON THE MARCH


      The contents of this interesting chapter are   better
indicated in ss  1 than by this heading  

     1   Sun Tzu said   We come now to the question of encamping
the army  and observing signs of the enemy   Pass quickly over
mountains  and keep in the neighborhood of valleys 

      The idea is  not to linger among barren uplands   but to
keep close to supplies of water and grass   Cf  Wu Tzu   ch   3 
 Abide not in natural ovens   i e   the openings of valleys  
Chang Yu tells the following anecdote   Wu tu Ch iang was a
robber captain in the time of the Later Han  and Ma Yuan was sent
to exterminate his gang   Ch iang having found a refuge in the
hills  Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle  but seized all
the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage 
Ch iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of
provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender   He did
not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of
valleys   

     2   Camp in high places 

      Not on high hills  but on knolls or hillocks elevated above
the surrounding country  

facing the sun 

      Tu Mu takes this to mean  facing south    and Ch en Hao
 facing east    Cf   infra  SS  11  13 

Do not climb heights in order to fight   So much for mountain
warfare 
     3   After crossing a river  you should get far away from it 

       In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you   according
to Ts ao Kung   and also  says Chang Yu   in order not to be
impeded in your evolutions    The T UNG TIEN reads   If THE ENEMY
crosses a river   etc   But in view of the next sentence  this is
almost certainly an interpolation  

     4   When an invading force crosses a river in its onward
march  do not advance to meet it in mid stream   It will be best
to let half the army get across  and then deliver your attack 

      Li Ch uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over
Lung Chu at the Wei River   Turning to the CH IEN HAN SHU   ch 
34  fol  6 verso  we find the battle described as follows     The
two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river   In the
night   Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks
filled with sand and construct a dam higher up   Then   leading
half his army across  he attacked Lung Chu  but after a time 
pretending to have failed in his attempt  he hastily withdrew to
the other bank   Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked for
success  and exclaiming    I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a
coward   he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn 
Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags   thus
releasing a great volume of water  which swept down and prevented
the greater portion of Lung Chu s army from getting across   He
then turned upon the force which had been cut off    and
annihilated it  Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain   The
rest of the army  on the further bank  also scattered and fled in
all directions  

     5   If you are anxious to fight  you should not go to meet
the invader near a river which he has to cross 

      For fear of preventing his crossing  

     6   Moor your craft higher up than the enemy  and facing the
sun 

      See supra   ss   2   The repetition of these words in
connection with water is very awkward   Chang Yu has the note 
 Said either of troops marshaled on the river bank  or of boats
anchored in the stream itself  in either case it is essential to
be higher than the enemy and facing the sun     The other
commentators are not at all explicit  

Do not move up stream to meet the enemy 

      Tu Mu says    As water flows downwards  we must not pitch
our camp on the lower reaches of a river  for fear the enemy
should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood   Chu ko Wu 
hou has remarked that  in river warfare we must not advance
against the stream   which is as much as to say that our fleet
must not be anchored below that of the enemy  for then they would
be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of
us    There is also the danger  noted by other commentators  that
the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to
us  

So much for river warfare 
     7   In crossing salt marshes  your sole concern should be to
get over them quickly  without any delay 

      Because of the lack of fresh water  the poor quality of the
herbage  and last but not least  because they are low  flat   and
exposed to attack  

     8   If forced to fight in a salt marsh   you should have
water and grass near you  and get your back to a clump of trees 

      Li Ch uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be
treacherous where there are trees  while Tu Mu says that they
will serve to protect the rear  

So much for operations in salt marches 
     9   In dry  level country  take up an easily accessible
position with rising ground to your right and on your rear 

      Tu Mu quotes T ai Kung as saying    An army should have a
stream or a marsh on its left  and a hill or tumulus on its
right   

so that the danger may be in front  and safety lie behind   So
much for campaigning in flat country 
     10   These are the four useful branches of   military
knowledge

      Those   namely  concerned with  1  mountains    2   rivers 
 3   marshes   and   4   plains   Compare Napoleon s   Military
Maxims   no  1  

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns 

      Regarding the  Yellow Emperor    Mei Yao ch en asks   with
some plausibility   whether there is an error in the text as
nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other
Emperors   The SHIH CHI  ch  1 ad init   speaks only of his
victories over Yen Ti and Ch ih Yu   In the LIU T AO it is
mentioned that he   fought seventy battles and pacified the
Empire     Ts ao Kung s explanation is  that the Yellow Emperor
was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes 
each of whom  to the number of four  originally bore the title of
Emperor   Li Ch uan tells us that the art of war originated under
Huang Ti  who received it from his Minister Feng Hou  

     11   All armies prefer high ground to low 

       High Ground    says Mei Yao ch en    is not only more
agreement and salubrious  but more convenient from a military
point of view  low ground is not only damp and unhealthy   but
also disadvantageous for fighting   

and sunny places to dark 
     12   If you are careful of your men 

      Ts ao Kung says    Make for fresh water and pasture   where
you can turn out your animals to graze   

and camp on hard ground  the army will be free from disease of
every kind 

      Chang Yu says    The dryness of the climate will prevent
the outbreak of illness   

and this will spell victory 
     13   When you come to a hill or a bank  occupy the sunny
side   with the slope on your right rear   Thus you will at once
act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural
advantages of the ground 
     14   When  in consequence of heavy rains up country  a river
which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam  you must
wait until it subsides 
     15   Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with
torrents running between  deep natural hollows 

      The latter defined as  places enclosed on every side by
steep banks  with pools of water at the bottom  

confined places 

      Defined as  natural pens or prisons  or  places surrounded
by precipices on three sides  easy to get into  but hard to get
out of   

tangled thickets 

      Defined as  places covered with such dense undergrowth that
spears cannot be used   

quagmires

      Defined as  low lying places  so heavy with mud as to be
impassable for chariots and horsemen   

and crevasses 

      Defined by Mei Yao ch en as  a narrow difficult way between
beetling cliffs    Tu Mu s note is  ground covered with trees and
rocks   and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls     This
is very vague   but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a
defile or narrow pass  and Chang Yu takes much the same view   On
the whole  the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to
the rendering  defile    But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese
in one place is  a crack or fissure  and the fact that the
meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates
something in the nature of a defile  make me think that Sun Tzu
is here speaking of crevasses  

should be left with all possible speed and not approached 
     16   While we keep away from such places  we should get the
enemy to approach them  while we face them  we should let the
enemy have them on his rear 
     17   If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any
hilly country  ponds surrounded by aquatic grass  hollow basins
filled with reeds  or woods with thick undergrowth  they must be
carefully routed out and searched  for these are places where men
in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking 

      Chang Yu has the note    We must also be on our guard
against traitors who may lie in close covert  secretly spying out
our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions   

     18   When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet   he
is relying on the natural strength of his position 

      Here begin Sun Tzu s remarks on the reading of signs   much
of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern
manual like Gen  Baden Powell s  Aids to Scouting   

     19   When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle   he
is anxious for the other side to advance 

      Probably because we are in a strong position from which he
wishes to dislodge us    If he came close up to us  says Tu Mu 
 and tried to force a battle  he would seem to despise us   and
there would be less probability of our responding to the
challenge   

     20   If his place of encampment is easy of access   he is
tendering a bait 
     21   Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the
enemy is advancing 

      Ts ao Kung explains this as  felling trees to clear a
passage    and Chang Yu says    Every man sends out scouts to
climb high places and observe the enemy   If a scout sees that
the trees of a forest are moving and shaking  he may know that
they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy s
march   

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass
means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious 

      Tu Yu s explanation  borrowed from Ts ao Kung s   is as
follows     The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the
midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled
and   fearing pursuit  has constructed these hiding places in
order to make us suspect an ambush    It appears that these
 screens   were hastily knotted together out of any long grass
which the retreating enemy happened to come across  

     22   The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an
ambuscade 

      Chang Yu s explanation is doubtless right     When birds
that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards 
it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath   

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming 
     23   When there is dust rising in a high column  it is the
sign of chariots advancing  when the dust is low  but spread over
a wide area  it betokens the approach of infantry 

       High and sharp    or rising to a peak   is of course
somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust   The commentators
explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots   being
heavier than men  raise more dust  and also follow one another in
the same wheel track  whereas foot soldiers would be marching in
ranks   many abreast   According to Chang Yu   every army on the
march must have scouts some way in advance  who on sighting dust
raised by the enemy  will gallop back and report it to the
commander in chief    Cf  Gen  Baden Powell    As you move along 
say   in a hostile country  your eyes should be looking afar for
the enemy or any signs of him   figures   dust rising   birds
getting up  glitter of arms  etc    1   

When it branches out in different directions   it shows that
parties have been sent to collect firewood   A few clouds of dust
moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping 

      Chang Yu says     In apportioning the defenses for a
cantonment   light horse will be sent out to survey the position
and   ascertain the weak and strong points all along   its
circumference   Hence the small quantity of dust and   its
motion   

     24   Humble words and increased preparations are signs that
the enemy is about to advance 

       As though they stood in great fear of us   says Tu Mu 
 Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless   after
which they will attack us    Chang Yu alludes to the story of
T ien Tan of the Ch i mo against the Yen forces   led by Ch i
Chieh   In ch  82 of the SHIH CHI we read    T ien Tan openly
said     My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses
of their Ch i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight
against us  that would be the undoing of our city     The other
side being informed of this speech   at once acted on the
suggestion   but those within the city were enraged at seeing
their fellow countrymen thus mutilated  and fearing only lest
they should fall into the enemy s hands  were nerved to defend
themselves more obstinately than ever   Once again T ien Tan sent
back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy 
 What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the
ancestral tombs outside the town   and by inflicting   this
indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint hearted  
Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the
corpses lying in them   And the inhabitants of Chi mo  witnessing
the outrage from the city walls  wept passionately and were all
impatient to go out and fight   their fury being increased
tenfold   T ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for
any enterprise   But instead of a sword    he himself too a
mattock in his hands  and ordered others to be distributed
amongst his best warriors  while the ranks were filled up with
their wives and concubines   He then served out all the remaining
rations and bade his men eat their fill   The regular soldiers
were told to keep out of sight  and the walls were manned with
the old and weaker men and with women   This done   envoys were
dispatched to the enemy s camp to arrange terms of surrender 
whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy   T ien Tan also
collected 20 000 ounces of silver from the people  and got the
wealthy citizens of Chi mo to send it to the Yen general with the
prayer that   when the town capitulated  he would allow their
homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated   Ch i
Chieh  in high good humor  granted their prayer  but his army now
became increasingly slack and careless   Meanwhile  T ien Tan got
together a thousand oxen  decked them with pieces of red silk 
painted their bodies  dragon like  with colored stripes   and
fastened sharp blades on their horns and well greased rushes on
their tails   When night came on  he lighted the ends of the
rushes  and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had
pierced in the walls  backing them up with a force of 5000 picked
warriors   The animals  maddened with pain    dashed furiously
into the enemy s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and
dismay  for their tails acted as torches  showing up the hideous
pattern on their bodies  and the weapons on their horns killed or
wounded any with whom they came into contact   In the meantime 
the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths  and now
threw themselves on the enemy   At the same moment a frightful
din arose in the city itself  all those that remained behind
making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering
on bronze vessels  until heaven and earth were convulsed by the
uproar   Terror stricken  the Yen army fled in disorder   hotly
pursued by the men of Ch i  who succeeded in slaying their
general Ch i Chien      The result of the battle was the ultimate
recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch i
State   

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are
signs that he will retreat 
     25   When the light chariots come out first and take up a
position on the wings  it is a sign that the enemy is forming for
battle 
     26   Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
indicate a plot 

      The reading here is uncertain   Li Ch uan indicates   a
treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages    Wang Hsi and Chang Yu 
on the other hand  simply say  without reason    on a frivolous
pretext   

     27   When there is much running about

      Every man hastening to his proper place under his own
regimental banner  

and the soldiers fall into rank  it means that the critical
moment has come 
     28   When some are seen advancing and some retreating  it is
a lure 
     29   When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears   they
are faint from want of food 
     30   If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking
themselves  the army is suffering from thirst 

      As Tu Mu remarks    One may know the condition of a whole
army from the behavior of a single man   

     31   If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes
no effort to secure it  the soldiers are exhausted 
     32   If birds gather on any spot  it is unoccupied 

      A useful fact to bear in mind when  for instance  as Ch en
Hao says  the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp  

Clamor by night betokens nervousness 

     33   If there is disturbance in the camp   the general s
authority is weak   If the banners and flags are shifted about 
sedition is afoot   If the officers are angry  it means that the
men are weary 

      Tu Mu understands the sentence differently    If all the
officers of an army are angry with their general  it means that
they are broken with fatigue  owing to the exertions which he has
demanded from them  

     34   When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its
cattle for food 

      In the ordinary course of things  the men would be fed on
grain and the horses chiefly on grass  

and when the men do not hang their cooking pots over the camp 
fires  showing that they will not return to their tents  you may
know that they are determined to fight to the death 

      I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN
SHU   ch  71  given in abbreviated form by the P EI WEN YUN FU 
 The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch en 
ts ang   and Huang fu Sung  who was in supreme command  and Tung
Cho were sent out against him   The latter pressed for hasty
measures  but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel   At last the
rebels were utterly worn out  and began to throw down their
weapons of their own accord   Sung was not advancing to the
attack   but Cho said    It is a principle of war not to pursue
desperate men and not to press a retreating host     Sung
answered    That does not apply here   What I am about to attack
is a jaded army  not a retreating host  with disciplined troops I
am falling on a disorganized multitude  not a band of desperate
men     Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his
colleague  and routed the enemy  Wang Kuo being slain   

     35   The sight of men whispering together in small knots or
speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank
and file 
     36   Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the
end of his resources 

      Because  when an army is hard pressed  as Tu Mu says  there
is always a fear of mutiny  and lavish rewards are given to keep
the men in good temper  

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress 

      Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed   and
unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty  

     37   To begin by bluster  but afterwards to take fright at
the enemy s numbers  shows a supreme lack of intelligence 

      I follow the interpretation of Ts ao Kung  also adopted by
Li Ch uan   Tu Mu  and Chang Yu   Another possible meaning set
forth by Tu Yu  Chia Lin  Mei Tao ch en and Wang Hsi  is     The
general who is first tyrannical towards his men   and then in
terror lest they should mutiny  etc    This would connect the
sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments  

     38   When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths 
it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce 

      Tu Mu says     If the enemy open friendly relations be
sending hostages   it is a sign that they are anxious for an
armistice  either because their strength is exhausted or for some
other reason     But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an
obvious inference  

     39   If the enemy s troops march up angrily and remain
facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or
taking themselves off again  the situation is one that demands
great vigilance and circumspection 

      Ts ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse
to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an
ambush  

     40   If our troops are no more in number than the enemy 
that is amply sufficient  it only means that no direct attack can
be made 

      Literally    no martial advance    That is to say   CHENG
tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed   and stratagem
resorted to instead  

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available
strength    keep a close watch on the enemy    and   obtain
reinforcements 

      This is an obscure sentence  and none of the commentators
succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it   I follow Li
Ch uan  who appears to offer the simplest explanation    Only the
side that gets more men will win    Fortunately we have Chang Yu
to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity
itself     When the numbers are even  and no favorable opening
presents itself  although we may not be strong enough to deliver
a sustained attack  we can find additional recruits amongst our
sutlers and camp followers  and then  concentrating our forces
and keeping a close watch on the enemy  contrive to snatch the
victory   But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help
us     He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu  ch   3     The nominal
strength of mercenary troops may be 100 000  but their real value
will be not more than half that figure   

     41   He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his
opponents is sure to be captured by them 

      Ch en Hao  quoting from the TSO CHUAN  says    If bees and
scorpions carry poison  how much more will a hostile state   Even
a puny opponent  then  should not be treated with contempt   

     42   If soldiers are punished before they have grown
attached to you  they will not prove submissive   and   unless
submissive   then will be practically useless   If   when the
soldiers have become attached to you   punishments are not
enforced  they will still be unless 
     43   Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first
instance with humanity  but kept under control by means of iron
discipline 

      Yen Tzu   B C  493  said of Ssu ma Jang chu     His civil
virtues endeared him to the people  his martial prowess kept his
enemies in awe    Cf  Wu Tzu  ch  4 init     The ideal commander
unites culture with a warlike temper  the profession of arms
requires a combination of hardness and tenderness   

This is a certain road to victory 

     44   If in training soldiers commands are   habitually
enforced   the army will be well disciplined   if not    its
discipline will be bad 
     45   If a general shows confidence in his men but always
insists on his orders being obeyed 

      Tu Mu says    A general ought in time of peace to show
kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority
respected   so that when they come to face the enemy  orders may
be executed and discipline maintained  because they all trust and
look up to him    What Sun Tzu has said in ss  44  however  would
lead one rather to expect something like this    If a general is
always confident that his orders will be carried out   etc   

the gain will be mutual 

      Chang Yu says    The general has confidence in the men
under his command  and the men are docile  having confidence in
him   Thus the gain is mutual   He quotes a pregnant sentence
from Wei Liao Tzu  ch  4    The art of giving orders is not to
try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty
doubts     Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of
sapping the confidence of an army  


 1    Aids to Scouting   p  26 

                                                                 

X   TERRAIN


      Only about a third of the chapter  comprising ss  ss  1 13 
deals with  terrain   the subject being more fully treated in ch 
XI   The   six calamities  are discussed in SS  14 20   and the
rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks 
though not less interesting  perhaps  on that account  

     1   Sun Tzu said   We may distinguish six kinds of terrain 
to wit    1   Accessible ground 

      Mei Yao ch en says    plentifully provided with roads and
means of communications   

 2   entangling ground 

      The same commentator says    Net like country   venturing
into which you become entangled   

 3   temporizing ground 

      Ground which allows you to  stave off  or  delay   

 4   narrow passes   5   precipitous heights   6  positions at a
great distance from the enemy 

      It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this
classification   A strange lack of logical perception is shown in
the   Chinaman s unquestioning acceptance of glaring   cross 
divisions such as the above  

     2   Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is
called ACCESSIBLE 
     3   With regard to ground of this nature   be before the
enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots   and carefully
guard your line of supplies 

      The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly   as
Tu Yu says   not to allow the enemy to cut your communications  
In view of Napoleon s dictum   the secret of war lies in the
communications     1   we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more
than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I   ss 
10   VII  ss  11   Col  Henderson says    The line of supply may
be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart
to the life of a human being   Just as the duelist who finds his
adversary s point menacing him with certain death  and his own
guard astray   is compelled to conform to his   adversary s
movements   and to content himself with warding off his thrusts 
so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened
finds himself in a false position  and he will be fortunate if he
has not to change all his plans  to split up his force into more
or less isolated detachments  and to fight with inferior numbers
on ground which he has not had time to prepare  and where defeat
will not be an ordinary failure  but will entail the ruin or
surrender of his whole army    2 

Then you will be able to fight with advantage 
     4   Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re occupy
is called ENTANGLING 
     5   From a position of this sort   if the enemy   is
unprepared  you may sally forth and defeat him   But if the enemy
is prepared for your coming  and you fail to defeat him   then 
return being impossible  disaster will ensue 
     6   When the position is such that neither side will gain by
making the first move  it is called TEMPORIZING ground 

      Tu Mu says    Each side finds it inconvenient to move   and
the situation remains at a deadlock   

     7   In a position of this sort  even though the enemy should
offer us an attractive bait 

      Tu Yu says   turning their backs on us and pretending to
flee     But this is only one of the lures which might induce us
to quit our position  

it will be advisable not to stir forth  but rather to retreat 
thus enticing the enemy in his turn  then  when part of his army
has come out  we may deliver our attack with advantage 
     8   With regard to NARROW PASSES  if you can occupy them
first   let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of
the enemy 

      Because then  as Tu Yu observes   the initiative will lie
with us   and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall
have the enemy at our mercy   

     9   Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass   do
not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned  but only if it
is weakly garrisoned 
     10   With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS   if you   are
beforehand with your adversary  you should occupy the raised and
sunny spots  and there wait for him to come up 

      Ts ao Kung says    The particular advantage of securing
heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated
by the enemy      For the enunciation of the grand principle
alluded to   see VI   ss  2    Chang Yu tells the following
anecdote of P ei Hsing chien  A D  619 682   who was sent on a
punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes    At night he
pitched his camp as usual  and it had already been completely
fortified by wall and ditch  when suddenly he gave orders that
the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by   This was
highly displeasing to his officers  who protested loudly against
the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men   P ei Hsing 
chien   however  paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the
camp moved as quickly as possible   The same night   a terrific
storm came on  which flooded their former place of encampment to
the depth of over twelve feet   The recalcitrant officers were
amazed at the sight  and owned that they had been in the wrong 
 How did you know what was going to happen   they asked   P ei
Hsing chien replied    From this time forward be content to obey
orders without asking unnecessary questions    From this it may
be seen    Chang Yu continues   that high and sunny places are
advantageous not only for fighting  but also because they are
immune from disastrous floods   

     11   If the enemy has occupied them before you   do not
follow him  but retreat and try to entice him away 

      The turning point of Li Shih min s campaign in 621 A D 
against the two rebels  Tou Chien te  King of Hsia   and Wang
Shih ch ung   Prince of Cheng  was his seizure of the heights of
Wu lao   in spike of which Tou Chien te persisted in his attempt
to relieve his ally in Lo yang  was defeated and taken prisoner 
See CHIU T ANG  ch  2  fol  5 verso  and also ch  54  

     12   If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy 
and the strength of the two armies is equal  it is not easy to
provoke a battle 

      The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long
and wearisome march  at the end of which  as Tu Yu says    we
should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen   

and fighting will be to your disadvantage 

     13   These six are the principles connected with Earth 

      Or perhaps    the principles relating to ground     See 
however  I  ss  8  

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful
to study them 
     14   Now an army is exposed to six several calamities   not
arising from natural causes  but from faults for which the
general   is   responsible    These are      1    Flight     2 
insubordination   3  collapse   4  ruin   5  disorganization   6 
rout 
     15   Other conditions being equal  if one force is hurled
against another ten times its size  the result will be the FLIGHT
of the former 
     16   When the common soldiers are too strong and their
officers too weak  the result is INSUBORDINATION 

      Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T ien Pu  HSIN T ANG SHU 
ch  148   who was sent to Wei in 821 A D  with orders to lead an
army against Wang T ing ts ou   But the whole time he was in
command   his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt   and
openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys 
several thousands at a time   T ien Pu was powerless to put a
stop to this conduct  and when  after some months had passed   he
made an attempt to engage the enemy  his troops turned tail and
dispersed in every direction   After that  the unfortunate man
committed suicide by cutting his throat  

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too
weak  the result is COLLAPSE 

      Ts ao Kung says    The officers are energetic and want to
press on  the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse   

     17   When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate 
and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a
feeling of resentment  before the commander in chief can tell
whether or no he is in a position to fight  the result is RUIN 

      Wang Hsi s note is    This means  the general is angry
without cause   and at the same time does not appreciate the
ability of his subordinate officers  thus he arouses fierce
resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head   

     18   When the general is weak and without authority   when
his orders are not clear and distinct 

      Wei Liao Tzu  ch  4  says    If the commander gives his
orders with decision  the soldiers will not wait to hear them
twice   if his moves are made without vacillation   the soldiers
will not be in two minds about doing their duty    General Baden 
Powell says   italicizing the words    The secret of getting
successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell  in
the clearness of the instructions they receive     3   Cf   also
Wu Tzu ch  3    the most fatal defect in a military leader is
difference   the worst calamities that befall an army arise from
hesitation   

when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men 

      Tu Mu says    Neither officers nor men have any regular
routine   

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner   the
result is utter DISORGANIZATION 
     19   When a general   unable to estimate the   enemy s
strength   allows an inferior force to engage a larger one   or
hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one  and neglects to
place picked soldiers in the front rank  the result must be ROUT 

      Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and
continues     Whenever there is fighting to be done  the keenest
spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks  both in
order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to
demoralize the enemy    Cf  the primi ordines of Caesar    De
Bello Gallico   V  28  44  et al    

     20   These are six ways of courting defeat  which must be
carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible
post 

      See supra  ss  13  

     21   The natural formation of the country is the soldier s
best ally 

      Ch en Hao says    The advantages of weather and season are
not equal to those connected with ground   

but a power of estimating the adversary   of controlling the
forces of victory  and of shrewdly calculating difficulties 
dangers and distances  constitutes the test of a great general 
     22   He who knows these things  and in fighting puts his
knowledge into practice  will win his battles   He who knows them
not  nor practices them  will surely be defeated 
     23   If fighting is sure to result in victory  then you must
fight   even though the ruler forbid it  if fighting will not
result in victory  then you must not fight even at the ruler s
bidding 

      Cf  VIII  ss  3 fin   Huang Shih kung of the Ch in dynasty 
who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have
written the SAN LUEH  has these words attributed to him     The
responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the
general alone   if advance and retreat are controlled from the
Palace   brilliant results will hardly be achieved   Hence the
god like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a
humble part in furthering their country s cause  lit   kneel down
to push the chariot wheel     This means that  in matters lying
outside the zenana  the decision of the military commander must
be absolute    Chang Yu also quote the saying    Decrees from the
Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp   
     24   The general who advances without coveting fame and
retreats without fearing disgrace 

      It was Wellington  I think  who said that the hardest thing
of all for a soldier is to retreat  

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service
for his sovereign  is the jewel of the kingdom 

      A noble presentiment  in few words  of the Chinese   happy
warrior     Such a man  says Ho Shih   even if he had to suffer
punishment  would not regret his conduct   

     25   Regard your soldiers as your children  and they will
follow you into the deepest valleys  look upon them as your own
beloved sons  and they will stand by you even unto death 

      Cf   I  ss  6   In this connection  Tu Mu draws for us an
engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch i   from whose
treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote     He
wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his
soldiers   refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to
sleep on  carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel 
and shared every hardship with his men   One of his soldiers was
suffering from an abscess  and Wu Ch i himself sucked out the
virus   The soldier s mother  hearing this  began wailing and
lamenting   Somebody asked her  saying    Why do you cry    Your
son is only a common soldier  and yet the commander in chief
himself has sucked the poison from his sore    The woman replied 
 Many years ago   Lord Wu performed a similar service for my
husband  who never left him afterwards  and finally met his death
at the hands of the enemy   And now that he has done the same for
my son  he too will fall fighting I know not where     Li Ch uan
mentions the Viscount of Ch u  who invaded the small state of
Hsiao during the winter   The Duke of Shen said to him    Many of
the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold    So he made a
round of the whole army  comforting and encouraging the men   and
straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined
with floss silk  

     26   If  however  you are indulgent  but unable to make your
authority   felt   kind hearted   but unable to enforce   your
commands   and incapable  moreover  of quelling disorder    then
your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children   they are
useless for any practical purpose 

      Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers
afraid of you  they would not be afraid of the enemy   Tu Mu
recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred
in 219 A D   when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang ling 
He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the
inhabitants nor take anything from them by force   Nevertheless 
a certain officer serving under his banner  who happened to be a
fellow townsman   ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging
to one of the people  in order to wear it over his regulation
helmet as a protection against the rain   Lu Meng considered that
the fact of his being also a native of Ju nan should not be
allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline  and accordingly
he ordered his summary execution  the tears rolling down his
face   however   as he did so   This act of severity filled the
army with wholesome awe  and from that time forth even articles
dropped in the highway were not picked up  

     27   If we know that our own men are in a condition to
attack  but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack   we
have gone only halfway towards victory 

      That is   Ts ao Kung says   the issue in this case is
uncertain   

     28   If we know that the enemy is open to attack   but are
unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack   we
have gone only halfway towards victory 

      Cf  III  ss  13  1   

     29   If we know that the enemy is open to attack  and also
know that our men are in a condition to attack  but are unaware
that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable   we
have still gone only halfway towards victory 
     30   Hence the experienced soldier  once in motion  is never
bewildered  once he has broken camp  he is never at a loss 

      The reason being  according to Tu Mu  that he has taken his
measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand    He does
not move recklessly   says Chang Yu   so that when he does move 
he makes no mistakes   

     31   Hence the saying   If you know the enemy and know
yourself   your victory will not stand in doubt   if you know
Heaven and know Earth  you may make your victory complete 

      Li Ch uan sums up as follows    Given a knowledge of three
things  the affairs of men  the seasons of heaven and the natural
advantages of earth     victory will invariably crown   your
battles   


 1   See  Pensees de Napoleon 1er   no  47 

 2    The Science of War   chap  2 

 3    Aids to Scouting   p  xii 

                                                                 

XI   THE NINE SITUATIONS


     1   Sun Tzu said   The art of war recognizes nine varieties
of ground     1   Dispersive ground    2   facile ground    3 
contentious ground   4  open ground   5  ground of intersecting
highways   6  serious ground   7  difficult ground   8  hemmed in
ground   9  desperate ground 
     2   When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory  it is
dispersive ground 

      So called because the soldiers  being near to their homes
and anxious to see their wives and children  are likely to seize
the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every
direction    In their advance   observes Tu Mu   they will lack
the valor of desperation  and when they retreat  they will find
harbors of refuge   

     3   When he has penetrated into hostile territory  but to no
great distance  it is facile ground 

      Li Ch uan and Ho Shih say  because of the facility for
retreating     and   the   other   commentators   give    similar
explanations   Tu Mu remarks    When your army has crossed the
border  you should burn your boats and bridges  in order to make
it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home   

     4   Ground the possession of which imports great advantage
to either side  is contentious ground 

      Tu Mu defines the ground as ground  to be contended for  
Ts ao Kung says     ground on which the few and the weak can
defeat the many and the strong   such as  the neck of a pass  
instanced   by Li Ch uan   Thus   Thermopylae was   of   this
classification because the possession of it  even for a few days
only   meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus
gaining invaluable time   Cf  Wu Tzu  ch  V   ad init      For
those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten   there is
nothing better than a narrow pass    When Lu Kuang was returning
from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A D   and had
got as far as I ho  laden with spoils  Liang Hsi   administrator
of Liang chou  taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien  King of
Ch in   plotted against him and was for barring his way into the
province   Yang Han   governor of Kao ch ang   counseled him 
saying     Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west   and
his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome   If we oppose him in
the shifting sands of the desert  we shall be no match for him 
and we must therefore try a different plan   Let us hasten to
occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao wu pass  thus cutting
him off from supplies of water   and when his troops are
prostrated with thirst  we can dictate our own terms without
moving   Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off 
we could make a stand against him at the I wu pass   which is
nearer   The cunning and resource of Tzu fang himself would be
expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two
positions     Liang Hsi   refusing to act on this advice   was
overwhelmed and swept away by the invader  

     5   Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is
open ground 

      There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective
for this type of ground   Ts ao Kung says it means    ground
covered with a network of roads   like a chessboard   Ho Shih
suggested    ground on which intercommunication is easy   

     6   Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states 

      Ts au Kung defines this as    Our country adjoining the
enemy s and a third country conterminous with both    Meng Shih
instances the small principality of Cheng  which was bounded on
the north east by Ch i  on the west by Chin  and on the south by
Ch u  

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his
command 

      The belligerent who holds this dominating position can
constrain most of them to become his allies  

is a ground of intersecting highways 
     7   When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile
country  leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear  it is
serious ground 

      Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that  when an army has
reached such a point  its situation is serious   

     8   Mountain forests 

      Or simply  forests   

rugged steeps   marshes and fens  all country that is hard to
traverse   this is difficult ground 
     9   Ground which is reached through narrow gorges  and from
which we can only retire by tortuous paths  so that a small
number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our
men   this is hemmed in ground 
     10   Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction
by fighting without delay  is desperate ground 

      The situation  as pictured by Ts ao Kung  is very similar
to the  hemmed in ground  except that here escape is no longer
possible     A lofty mountain in front  a large river behind 
advance impossible  retreat blocked    Ch en Hao says    to be on
 desperate ground  is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching
in a burning house     Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid
description of the plight of an army thus entrapped    Suppose an
army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides 
    it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy s mercy   A
ravine on the left   a mountain on the right   a pathway so
perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the
chariots carried in slings  no passage open in front  retreat cut
off behind   no choice but to proceed in single file   Then 
before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle 
the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene 
Advancing  we can nowhere take a breathing space  retreating   we
have no haven of refuge   We seek a pitched battle  but in vain 
yet standing on the defensive  none of us has a moment s respite 
If we simply maintain our ground  whole days and months will
crawl by   the moment we make a move  we have to sustain the
enemy s attacks on front and rear   The country is wild 
destitute of water and plants  the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life  the horses are jaded and the men worn out 
all the resources of strength and skill unavailing  the pass so
narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten
thousand   all means of offense in the hands of the enemy   all
points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves   in this
terrible plight  even though we had the most valiant soldiers and
the keenest of weapons  how could they be employed with the
slightest effect    Students of Greek history may be reminded of
the awful close to the Sicilian expedition  and the agony of the
Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes    See Thucydides   VII 
78 sqq    

     11   On dispersive ground  therefore  fight not   On facile
ground  halt not   On contentious ground  attack not 

      But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the
advantageous position first   So Ts ao Kung   Li Ch uan and
others   however   suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has
already forestalled us  sot that it would be sheer madness to
attack   In the SUN TZU HSU LU  when the King of Wu inquires what
should be done in this case  Sun Tzu replies    The rule with
regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the
advantage over the other side   If a position of this kind is
secured first by the enemy  beware of attacking him   Lure him
away by pretending to flee  show your banners and sound your
drums  make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to
lose  trail brushwood and raise a dust  confound his ears and
eyes  detach a body of your best troops  and place it secretly in
ambuscade   Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue   

     12   On open ground  do not try to block the enemy s way 

      Because the attempt would be futile  and would expose the
blocking   force itself to serious risks   There   are   two
interpretations available here   I follow that of Chang Yu   The
other is indicated in Ts ao Kung s brief note     Draw closer
together   i e    see that a portion of your own army is not cut
off  

On the ground of intersecting highways  join hands with your
allies 

      Or perhaps   form alliances with neighboring states   

     13   On serious ground  gather in plunder 

      On this  Li Ch uan has the following delicious note    When
an army penetrates far into the enemy s country  care must be
taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment   Follow the
example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu   whose march into Ch in
territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of
valuables    Nota bene   this was in 207 B C   and may well cause
us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900
A D     Thus he won the hearts of all   In the present passage 
then   I think that the true reading must be  not  plunder    but
 do not plunder     Alas  I fear that in this instance the worthy
commentator s feelings outran his judgment   Tu Mu  at least  has
no such illusions   He says    When encamped on  serious ground  
there being no inducement as yet to advance further   and no
possibility of retreat   one ought to take measures for a
protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides 
and keep a close watch on the enemy   

In difficult ground  keep steadily on the march 

      Or  in the words of VIII  ss  2   do not encamp  

     14   On hemmed in ground  resort to stratagem 

      Ts au   Kung says     Try the effect of some   unusual
artifice    and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying     In such a
position   some scheme must be devised which will suit the
circumstances   and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy   the
peril may be escaped    This is exactly what happened on the
famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains
on the road to Casilinum  and to all appearances entrapped by the
dictator Fabius   The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle
his foes was remarkably like that which T ien Tan had also
employed with success exactly 62 years before    See IX  ss   24 
note    When night came on  bundles of twigs were fastened to the
horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire  the terrified animals
being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the
passes which were beset by the enemy   The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans
that they withdrew from their position   and Hannibal s army
passed safely through the defile    See Polybius  III   93   94 
Livy  XXII  16 17  

On desperate ground  fight 

      For   as Chia Lin remarks    if you fight with all your
might   there is a chance of life  where as death is certain if
you cling to your corner   

     15   Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how
to drive a wedge between the enemy s front and rear 

      More literally    cause the front and rear to lose touch
with each other   

to prevent co operation between his large and small divisions  to
hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad  the officers from
rallying their men 
     16   When the enemy s men were united  they managed to keep
them in disorder 
     17   When it was to their advantage  they made a forward
move  when otherwise  they stopped still 

      Mei Yao ch en connects this with the foregoing     Having
succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy  they would push forward
in order to secure any advantage to be gained  if there was no
advantage to be gained  they would remain where they were   

     18   If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in
orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack   I
should say     Begin by seizing something which your opponent
holds dear  then he will be amenable to your will  

      Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind   Ts ao Kung
thinks it is  some strategical advantage on which the enemy is
depending     Tu Mu says    The three things which an enemy is
anxious to do  and on the accomplishment of which his success
depends   are     1  to capture our favorable positions    2   to
ravage our cultivated land   3  to guard his own communications  
Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three
directions and thus render him helpless    Cf  III  ss  3     By
boldly seizing the initiative in this way  you at once throw the
other side on the defensive  

     19   Rapidity is the essence of war 

      According to Tu Mu    this is a summary of   leading
principles in warfare   and he adds    These are the profoundest
truths of military science   and the chief business of the
general     The following anecdotes  told by Ho Shih   shows the
importance attached to speed by two of China s greatest generals 
In 227 A D    Meng Ta  governor of Hsin ch eng under the Wei
Emperor Wen Ti  was meditating defection to the House of Shu  and
had entered into correspondence with Chu ko Liang  Prime Minister
of that State   The Wei general Ssu ma I was then military
governor of Wan  and getting wind of Meng Ta s treachery  he at
once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt   having
previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import 
Ssu ma s officers came to him and said    If Meng Ta has leagued
himself with Wu and Shu   the matter should be thoroughly
investigated before we make a move    Ssu ma I replied    Meng Ta
is an unprincipled man  and we ought to go and punish him at
once  while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the
mask    Then  by a series of forced marches  be brought his army
under the walls of Hsin ch eng with in a space of eight days 
Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu ko Liang 
 Wan is 1200 LI from here   When the news of my revolt reaches
Ssu ma I  he will at once inform his imperial master  but it will
be a whole month before any steps can be taken  and by that time
my city will be well fortified   Besides  Ssu ma I is sure not to
come himself  and the generals that will be sent against us are
not worth troubling about    The next letter  however  was filled
with consternation    Though only eight days have passed since I
threw off my allegiance  an army is already at the city gates 
What miraculous rapidity is this    A fortnight later   Hsin 
ch eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head     See
CHIN SHU   ch  1  f  3    In 621 A D   Li Ching was sent from
K uei chou in Ssu ch uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao
Hsien   who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching chou Fu in
Hupeh   It was autumn  and the Yangtsze being then in flood 
Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come
down through the gorges  and consequently made no preparations 
But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time  and was just
about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone
his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for
navigation   Li Ching replied    To the soldier   overwhelming
speed is of paramount importance   and he must never miss
opportunities   Now is the time to strike  before Hsiao Hsien
even knows that we have got an army together   If we seize the
present moment when the river is in flood  we shall appear before
his capital with startling suddenness  like the thunder which is
heard before you have time to stop your ears against it    See
VII  ss  19  note    This is the great principle in war   Even if
he gets to know of our approach  he will have to levy his
soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us 
Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours    All came about as
he predicted   and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender   nobly
stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer
the penalty of death  

take advantage of the enemy s unreadiness  make your way by
unexpected routes  and attack unguarded spots 
     20   The following are the principles to be observed by an
invading force   The further you penetrate into a country   the
greater will be the solidarity of your troops   and thus the
defenders will not prevail against you 
     21   Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your
army with food 

      Cf   supra  ss  13   Li Ch uan does not venture on a note
here  

     22  Carefully study the well being of your men 

      For   well being   Wang Hsi means   Pet them   humor them 
give them plenty of food and drink   and look after them
generally   

and do not overtax them   Concentrate your energy and hoard your
strength 

      Ch en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B C  by the
famous   general Wang Chien   whose military genius   largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor   He had invaded
the Ch u State  where a universal levy was made to oppose him 
But  being doubtful of the temper of his troops  he declined all
invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive   In
vain did the Ch u general try to force a battle   day after day
Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out   but
devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and
confidence of his men   He took care that they should be well
fed   sharing his own meals with them  provided facilities for
bathing   and employed every method of judicious indulgence to
weld them into a loyal and homogenous body   After some time had
elapsed  he told off certain persons to find out how the men were
amusing themselves   The answer was  that they were contending
with one another in putting the weight and long jumping   When
Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic
pursuits   he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the
required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting   By
this time the Ch u army  after repeating their challenge again
and again   had marched away eastwards in disgust   The Ch in
general immediately broke up his camp and followed them  and in
the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter 
Shortly afterwards  the whole of Ch u was conquered by Ch in  and
the king Fu ch u led into captivity  

Keep your army continually on the move 

      In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you
are   It has struck me  however  that the true reading might be
 link your army together   

and devise unfathomable plans 
     23   Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no
escape  and they will prefer death to flight   If they will face
death  there is nothing they may not achieve 

      Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu  ch  3     If one
man were to run amok with a sword in the market place   and
everybody else tried to get our of his way  I should not allow
that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were
contemptible cowards   The truth is  that a desperado and a man
who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms   

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength 

      Chang Yu says    If they are in an awkward place together 
they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it   

     24   Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of
fear   If there is no place of refuge  they will stand firm   If
they are in hostile country  they will show a stubborn front   If
there is no help for it  they will fight hard 
     25   Thus   without waiting to be marshaled   the soldiers
will be constantly on the qui vive  without waiting to be asked 
they will do your will 

      Literally   without asking  you will get   

without restrictions   they will be faithful   without giving
orders  they can be trusted 
     26   Prohibit the taking of omens   and do away with
superstitious doubts   Then   until death itself comes    no
calamity need be feared 

      The superstitious   bound in to saucy doubts and fears  
degenerate into cowards and  die many times before their deaths  
Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih kung     Spells and incantations should
be strictly forbidden   and no officer allowed to inquire by
divination into the fortunes of an army  for fear the soldiers 
minds should be seriously perturbed     The meaning is    he
continues    that if all doubts and scruples are discarded   your
men will never falter in their resolution until they die   

     27   If our soldiers are not overburdened with money  it is
not because they have a distaste for riches  if their lives are
not unduly long   it is not because they are disinclined to
longevity 

      Chang Yu has the best note on this passage     Wealth and
long   life are things for which all men have a   natural
inclination   Hence  if they burn or fling away valuables   and
sacrifice their own lives  it is not that they dislike them   but
simply that they have no choice    Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating
that   as soldiers are but human  it is for the general to see
that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown
in their way  

     28   On the day they are ordered out to battle   your
soldiers may weep 

      The word in the Chinese is  snivel    This is taken to
indicate more genuine grief than tears alone  

those sitting up bedewing their garments  and those lying down
letting the tears run down their cheeks 

      Not because they are afraid  but because  as Ts ao Kung
says    all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die     We
may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike
in showing their emotion   Chang Yu alludes to the mournful
parting at the I River between Ching K o and his friends   when
the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch in
 afterwards First Emperor  in 227 B C   The tears of all flowed
down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following
lines     The shrill blast is blowing  Chilly the burn   Your
champion is going  Not to return    1   

But let them once be brought to bay  and they will display the
courage of a Chu or a Kuei 

      Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu  a native of the Wu
State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself  who was employed by
Kung tzu Kuang  better known as Ho Lu Wang  to assassinate his
sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly
of a fish served up at a banquet   He succeeded in his attempt 
but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king s bodyguard 
This was in 515 B C   The other hero referred to  Ts ao Kuei   or
Ts ao Mo   performed the exploit which has made his name famous
166 years earlier  in 681 B C   Lu had been thrice defeated by
Ch i   and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a
large slice of territory  when Ts ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan
Kung  the Duke of Ch i  as he stood on the altar steps and held a
dagger against his chest   None of the duke s retainers dared to
move   a muscle   and Ts ao Kuei proceeded to demand   full
restitution  declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because
she was a smaller and a weaker state   Huan Kung  in peril of his
life  was obliged to consent  whereupon Ts ao Kuei flung away his
dagger   and quietly resumed his place amid the   terrified
assemblage without having so much as changed color   As was to be
expected   the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain 
but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the
impolicy of breaking his word  and the upshot was that this bold
stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three
pitched battles  

     29   The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI JAN 
Now the SHUAI JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch ang
mountains 

       Shuai jan  means  suddenly  or  rapidly   and the snake in
question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its
movements   Through this passage  the term in the Chinese has now
come to be used in the sense of  military maneuvers   

Strike at its head  and you will be attacked by its tail   strike
at its tail  and you will be attacked by its head  strike at its
middle  and you will be attacked by head and tail both 
     30   Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI JAN 

      That is  as Mei Yao ch en says   Is it possible to make the
front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on
the other   just as though they were part of a single living
body   

I should answer  Yes   For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are
enemies 

      Cf  VI  ss  21  

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught
by a storm  they will come to each other s assistance just as the
left hand helps the right 

      The meaning is   If two enemies will help each other in a
time of common peril  how much more should two parts of the same
army   bound together as they are by every tie of interest and
fellow feeling   Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has
been ruined through lack of cooperation  especially in the case
of allied armies  

     31   Hence it is not enough to put one s trust in the
tethering of horses  and the burying of chariot wheels in the
ground

      These quaint devices to prevent one s army from running
away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes  who carried the anchor
with him at the battle of Plataea  by means of which he fastened
himself firmly to one spot    See Herodotus  IX  74    It is not
enough   says Sun Tzu   to render flight impossible by such
mechanical means   You will not succeed unless your men have
tenacity and unity of purpose  and  above all   a spirit of
sympathetic cooperation   This is the lesson which can be learned
from the SHUAI JAN  

     32   The principle on which to manage an army is to set up
one standard of courage which all must reach 

      Literally    level the courage  of all  as though  it were
that of   one    If the ideal army is to form a single organic
whole   then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its
component parts must be of the same quality  or at any rate must
not fall below a certain standard   Wellington s seemingly
ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as  the worst he
had ever commanded  meant no more than that it was deficient in
this important particular  unity of spirit and courage   Had he
not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those
troops in the background  he would almost certainly have lost the
day  

     33   How to make the best of both strong and weak  that is a
question involving the proper use of ground 

      Mei Yao ch en s paraphrase is    The way to eliminate the
differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to
utilize accidental features of the ground     Less reliable
troops   if posted in strong positions  will hold out as long as
better troops on more exposed terrain   The advantage of position
neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage    Col 
Henderson says    With all respect to the text books  and to the
ordinary tactical teaching  I am inclined to think that the study
of ground is often overlooked  and that by no means sufficient
importance is attached to the selection of positions     and to
the immense advantages that are to be derived  whether you are
defending or attacking  from the proper utilization of natural
features    2   

     34   Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as
though he were leading a single man  willy nilly  by the hand 

      Tu Mu says    The simile has reference to the ease with
which he does it   

     35   It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy  upright and just  and thus maintain order 
     36   He must be able to mystify his officers and men by
false reports and appearances 

      Literally   to deceive their eyes and ears   

and thus keep them in total ignorance 

      Ts ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms    The
troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the
beginning   they may only rejoice with you over their happy
outcome     To mystify  mislead  and surprise the enemy   is one
of the first principles in war  as had been frequently pointed
out   But how about the other process  the mystification of one s
own men   Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over emphatic on
this point would do well to read Col   Henderson s remarks on
Stonewall Jackson s Valley campaign    The infinite pains    he
says    with which Jackson sought to conceal  even from his most
trusted staff officers  his movements  his intentions   and his
thoughts   a commander less thorough would have   pronounced
useless   etc   etc   3   In the year 88 A D   as we read in ch 
47 of the HOU HAN SHU   Pan Ch ao took the field with 25 000 men
from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of
crushing Yarkand   The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his
chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the
kingdoms of Wen su  Ku mo  and Wei t ou  totaling 50 000 men 
Pan Ch ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a
council of war  and said    Our forces are now outnumbered and
unable to make head against the enemy   The best plan  then   is
for us to separate and disperse  each in a different direction 
The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route  and I
will then return myself towards the west   Let us wait until the
evening drum has sounded and then start    Pan Ch ao now secretly
released the prisoners whom he had taken alive  and the King of
Kutcha was thus informed of his plans   Much elated by the news 
the latter set off at once at the head of 10 000 horsemen to bar
Pan Ch ao s retreat in the west  while the King of Wen su rode
eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of
Khotan   As soon as Pan Ch ao knew that the two chieftains had
gone   he called his divisions together  got them well in hand 
and at cock crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand  as it
lay encamped   The barbarians  panic stricken  fled in confusion 
and were closely pursued by Pan Ch ao   Over 5000 heads were
brought back as trophies  besides immense spoils in the shape of
horses and cattle and valuables of every description   Yarkand
then capitulating  Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their
respective forces   From that time forward  Pan Ch ao s prestige
completely overawed the countries of the west    In this case  we
see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in
ignorance of his real plans  but actually took the bold step of
dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy  

     37   By altering his arrangements and changing his plans 

      Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same
stratagem twice  

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge 

      Chang Yu   in a quotation from another work   says     The
axiom   that war is based on deception  does not apply only to
deception of the enemy   You must deceive even your own soldiers 
Make them follow you  but without letting them know why   

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes   he prevents
the enemy from anticipating his purpose 
     38   At the critical moment  the leader of an army acts like
one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder
behind him   He carries his men deep into hostile territory
before he shows his hand 

      Literally   releases the spring   see V  ss  15   that is 
takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army
to return  like Hsiang Yu  who sunk his ships after crossing a
river   Ch en Hao  followed by Chia Lin  understands the words
less well as  puts forth every artifice at his command   

     39   He burns his boats and breaks his cooking pots  like a
shepherd driving a flock of sheep  he drives his men this way and
that  and nothing knows whither he is going 

      Tu Mu says     The army is only cognizant of orders to
advance or retreat   it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of
attacking and conquering   

     40   To muster his host and bring it into danger   this may
be termed the business of the general 

      Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no
delay in aiming a blow at the enemy s heart   Note how he returns
again and again to this point   Among the warring states of
ancient China  desertion was no doubt a much more present fear
and serious evil than it is in the armies of today  

     41   The different measures suited to the nine varieties of
ground 

      Chang Yu says    One must not be hide bound in interpreting
the rules for the nine varieties of ground  

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics   and the
fundamental laws of human nature   these are things that must
most certainly be studied 
     42   When invading hostile territory  the general principle
is   that penetrating deeply brings cohesion  penetrating but a
short way means dispersion 

      Cf  supra  ss  20  

     43   When you leave your own country behind  and take your
army across neighborhood territory  you find yourself on critical
ground 

      This  ground  is curiously mentioned in VIII  ss  2  but it
does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities
in chap  X   One s first impulse would be to translate it distant
ground   but this  if we can trust the commentators  is precisely
what is not meant here   Mei Yao ch en says it is  a position not
far enough advanced to be called  facile   and not near enough to
home to be  dispersive   but something between the two    Wang Hsi
says    It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state 
whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it 
Hence   it is incumbent on us to settle our business there
quickly     He adds that this position is of rare occurrence 
which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine
Situations  

When there are means of communication on all four sides   the
ground is one of intersecting highways 
     44   When you penetrate deeply into a country  it is serious
ground   When you penetrate but a little way   it is facile
ground 
     45   When you have the enemy s strongholds on your rear  and
narrow passes in front  it is hemmed in ground   When there is no
place of refuge at all  it is desperate ground 
     46   Therefore  on dispersive ground  I would inspire my men
with unity of purpose 

      This end  according to Tu Mu  is best attained by remaining
on the defensive  and avoiding battle   Cf  supra  ss  11  

On facile ground  I would see that there is close connection
between all parts of my army 

      As Tu Mu says  the object is to guard against two possible
contingencies      1   the desertion of our own troops    2   a
sudden attack on the part of the enemy    Cf  VII  ss  17   Mei
Yao ch en says    On the march  the regiments should be in close
touch   in an encampment  there should be continuity between the
fortifications   

     47   On contentious ground  I would hurry up my rear 

      This is Ts ao Kung s interpretation   Chang Yu adopts it 
saying     We must quickly bring up our rear  so that head and
tail may both reach the goal    That is  they must not be allowed
to straggle up a long way apart   Mei Yao ch en offers another
equally plausible explanation    Supposing the enemy has not yet
reached the coveted position  and we are behind him   we should
advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession  
Ch en Hao   on the other hand  assuming that the enemy has had
time to select his own ground  quotes VI  ss  1  where Sun Tzu
warns us against coming exhausted to the attack   His own idea of
the situation is rather vaguely expressed     If there is a
favorable position lying in front of you  detach a picked body of
troops to occupy it  then if the enemy  relying on their numbers 
come up to make a fight for it  you may fall quickly on their
rear with your main body  and victory will be assured    It was
thus   he adds  that Chao She beat the army of Ch in    See p 
57   

     48   On open ground  I would keep a vigilant eye on my
defenses    On   ground of intersecting highways    I   would
consolidate my alliances 
     49   On serious ground  I would try to ensure a continuous
stream of supplies 

      The commentators take this as referring to forage and
plunder   not  as one might expect  to an unbroken communication
with a home base  

On difficult ground  I would keep pushing on along the road 
     50   On hemmed in ground  I would block any way of retreat 

      Meng Shih says    To make it seem that I meant to defend
the position   whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly
through the enemy s lines    Mei Yao ch en says    in order to
make my soldiers fight with desperation     Wang Hsi says 
 fearing lest my men be tempted to run away    Tu Mu points out
that this is the converse of VII  ss  36  where it is the enemy
who is surrounded   In 532 A D   Kao Huan  afterwards Emperor and
canonized as Shen wu  was surrounded by a great army under Erh 
chu Chao and others   His own force was comparatively small 
consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30 000 foot 
The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together 
gaps being left at certain points   But Kao Huan   instead of
trying to escape   actually made a shift to block all the
remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen
and donkeys roped together   As soon as his officers and men saw
that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die   their
spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation   and they
charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks
broke and crumbled under their onslaught  

On desperate ground   I would proclaim to my soldiers the
hopelessness of saving their lives 

     Tu Yu says    Burn your baggage and impedimenta  throw away
your stores and provisions  choke up the wells   destroy your
cooking stoves   and make it plain to your men that they cannot
survive  but must fight to the death    Mei Yao ch en says    The
only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it     This
concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about   grounds   and the
 variations  corresponding to them   Reviewing the passages which
bear on this important subject  we cannot fail to be struck by
the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated 
Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII  ss  2 to enumerate   variations 
before touching on  grounds  at all  but only mentions five 
namely nos  7  5  8 and 9 of the subsequent list  and one that is
not included in it   A few varieties of ground are dealt with in
the earlier portion of chap  IX  and then chap  X sets forth six
new grounds  with six variations of plan to match   None of these
is   mentioned   again   though the first is hardly   to   be
distinguished from ground no  4 in the next chapter   At last  in
chap  XI  we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence  immediately
followed by the variations   This takes us down to ss   14   In
SS  43 45  fresh definitions are provided for nos  5  6  2  8 and
9   in the order given   as well as for the tenth ground noticed
in chap  VIII  and finally  the nine variations are enumerated
once more from beginning to end  all  with the exception of 5   6
and 7  being different from those previously given   Though it is
impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu s text   a
few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence     1   Chap 
VIII   according to the title  should deal with nine variations 
whereas only five appear    2  It is an abnormally short chapter 
 3  Chap  XI is entitled The Nine Grounds   Several of these are
defined twice over  besides which there are two distinct lists of
the corresponding variations    4  The length of the chapter is
disproportionate  being double that of any other except IX   I do
not propose to draw any inferences from these facts  beyond the
general conclusion that Sun Tzu s work cannot have come down to
us in the shape in which it left his hands    chap   VIII is
obviously defective and probably out of place  while XI seems to
contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or
ought to appear elsewhere  

     51   For it is the soldier s disposition to offer an
obstinate resistance when surrounded  to fight hard when he
cannot help himself  and to obey promptly when he has fallen into
danger 

      Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch ao s devoted
followers in 73 A D   The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU  ch 
47    When Pan Ch ao arrived at Shan shan  Kuang  the King of the
country  received him at first with great politeness and respect 
but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change 
and he became remiss and negligent   Pan Ch ao spoke about this
to the officers of his suite    Have you noticed   he said   that
Kuang s polite intentions are on the wane   This must signify
that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians   and that
consequently he is in a state of indecision  not knowing with
which side to throw in his lot   That surely is the reason   The
truly wise man  we are told  can perceive things before they have
come to pass   how much more  then   those that are already
manifest     Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been
assigned to his service  and set a trap for him  saying     Where
are those envoys from the Hsiung nu who arrived some day ago  
The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he
presently blurted out the whole truth   Pan Ch ao   keeping his
informant carefully under lock and key  then summoned a general
gathering of his officers  thirty six in all  and began drinking
with them   When the wine had mounted into their heads a little 
he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them
thus     Gentlemen   here we are in the heart of an isolated
region   anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great
exploit   Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung no
arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago  and the result is
that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal
host has disappeared   Should this envoy prevail upon him to
seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung no  our bones will
become food for the wolves of the desert   What are we to do  
With one accord  the officers replied    Standing as we do in
peril of our lives  we will follow our commander through life and
death    For the sequel of this adventure  see chap  XII  ss   1 
note  

     52   We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes
until we are acquainted with their designs   We are not fit to
lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of
the   country  its mountains and forests   its pitfalls   and
precipices   its marshes and swamps   We shall be unable to turn
natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides 

      These three sentences are repeated from VII  SS  12 14    
in order to emphasize their importance  the commentators seem to
think   I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to
form an antecedent to the following words   With regard to local
guides  Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of
going   wrong    either   through   their   treachery   or   some
misunderstanding such as Livy records  XXII  13    Hannibal   we
are told  ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of
Casinum   where there was an important pass to be occupied   but
his Carthaginian accent  unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin
names   caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of
Casinum   and turning from his proper route  he took the army in
that direction  the mistake not being discovered until they had
almost arrived  

     53   To be ignored of any one of the following four or five
principles does not befit a warlike prince 
     54   When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state   his
generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the
enemy s forces   He overawes his opponents  and their allies are
prevented from joining against him 

      Mei Tao ch en constructs one of the chains of reasoning
that are so much affected by the Chinese     In attacking a
powerful state   if you can divide her forces  you will have a
superiority in strength  if you have a superiority in strength 
you will overawe the enemy  if you overawe the enemy   the
neighboring states will be frightened  and if the neighboring
states are frightened  the enemy s allies will be prevented from
joining her    The following gives a stronger meaning    If the
great state has once been defeated  before she has had time to
summon her allies   then the lesser states will hold aloof and
refrain from massing their forces    Ch en Hao and Chang Yu take
the sentence in quite another way   The former says     Powerful
though a prince may be  if he attacks a large state  he will be
unable to raise enough troops  and must rely to some extent on
external aid   if he dispenses with this  and with overweening
confidence in his own strength  simply tries to intimidate the
enemy  he will surely be defeated    Chang Yu puts his view thus 
 If we recklessly attack a large state  our own people will be
discontented and hang back   But if  as will then be the case 
our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the
enemy   the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join
us   

     55   Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and
sundry  nor does he foster the power of other states   He carries
out his own secret designs  keeping his antagonists in awe 

      The train of thought  as said by Li Ch uan  appears to be
this    Secure against a combination of his enemies    he can
afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own
secret designs  his prestige enable him to dispense with external
friendships   

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their
kingdoms 

      This paragraph  though written many years before the Ch in
State became a serious menace  is not a bad summary of the policy
by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for
her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti   Chang Yu   following up
his previous note   thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this
attitude of cold blooded selfishness and haughty isolation  

     56   Bestow rewards without regard to rule 

      Wu Tzu  ch  3  less wisely says    Let advance be richly
rewarded and retreat be heavily punished   

issue orders

      Literally   hang  or post up   

without regard to previous arrangements 

       In order to prevent treachery    says Wang Hsi   The
general meaning is made clear by Ts ao Kung s quotation from the
SSU MA FA    Give instructions only on sighting the enemy   give
rewards when you see deserving deeds    Ts ao Kung s paraphrase 
 The final instructions you give to your army should not
correspond with those that have been previously posted up  
Chang Yu simplifies this into  your arrangements should not be
divulged beforehand    And Chia Lin says    there should be no
fixity in your rules and arrangements    Not only is there danger
in letting your plans be known  but war often necessitates the
entire reversal of them at the last moment  

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to
do with but a single man 

      Cf  supra  ss  34  

     57   Confront your soldiers with the deed itself  never let
them know your design 

      Literally   do not tell them words   i e  do not give your
reasons for any order   Lord Mansfield once told a junior
colleague to  give no reasons  for his decisions  and the maxim
is even more applicable to a general than to a judge  

When the outlook is bright  bring it before their eyes  but tell
them nothing when the situation is gloomy 
     58   Place your army in deadly peril  and it will survive 
plunge it into desperate straits  and it will come off in safety 

      These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in
explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most
brilliant battles  already alluded to on p  28   In 204 B C    he
was sent against the army of Chao  and halted ten miles from the
mouth of the Ching hsing pass  where the enemy had mustered in
full force   Here  at midnight  he detached a body of 2000 light
cavalry  every man of which was furnished with a red flag   Their
instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and
keep a secret watch on the enemy    When the men of Chao see me
in full flight    Han Hsin said    they will abandon their
fortifications and give chase   This must be the sign for you to
rush in  pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners
of Han in their stead    Turning then to his other officers   he
remarked     Our adversary holds a strong position  and is not
likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and
drums of the commander in chief  for fear I should turn back and
escape through the mountains    So saying  he first of all sent
out a division consisting of 10 000 men  and ordered them to form
in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti   Seeing this
maneuver   the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter   By
this time it was broad daylight  and Han Hsin   displaying the
generalissimo s flag  marched out of the pass with drums beating 
and was immediately engaged by the enemy   A great battle
followed  lasting for some time  until at length Han Hsin and his
colleague Chang Ni  leaving drums and banner on the field   fled
to the division on the river bank  where another fierce battle
was raging   The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure
the trophies  thus denuding their ramparts of men  but the two
generals succeeded in joining the other army  which was fighting
with the utmost desperation   The time had now come for the 2000
horsemen to play their part   As soon as they saw the men of Chao
following up their advantage  they galloped behind the deserted
walls   tore up the enemy s flags and replaced them by those of
Han   When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit  the sight
of these red flags struck them with terror   Convinced that the
Hans had got in and overpowered their king  they broke up in wild
disorder  every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in
vain   Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and
completed the rout  killing a number and capturing the rest 
amongst whom was King Ya himself      After the battle  some of
Han Hsin s officers came to him and said    In the ART OF WAR we
are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear  and a river
or marsh on the left front    This appears to be a blend of Sun
Tzu and T ai Kung   See IX ss  9  and note     You   on the
contrary  ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our
back   Under these conditions  how did you manage to gain the
victory     The general replied    I fear you gentlemen have not
studied the Art of War with sufficient care   Is it not written
there    Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come
off in safety  place it in deadly peril and it will survive  
Had I taken the usual course  I should never have been able to
bring my colleague round   What says the Military Classic   Swoop
down on the market place and drive the men off to fight      This
passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu    If I had
not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to
fight for their lives  but had allowed each man to follow his own
discretion   there would have been a general debandade   and it
would have been impossible to do anything with them     The
officers admitted the force of his argument  and said     These
are higher tactics than we should have been capable of      See
CH IEN HAN SHU  ch  34  ff  4  5    

     59   For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm s
way that is capable of striking a blow for victory 

      Danger has a bracing effect  

     60   Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating
ourselves to the enemy s purpose 

      Ts ao Kung says    Feign stupidity   by an appearance of
yielding and falling in with the enemy s wishes   Chang Yu s note
makes the meaning clear    If the enemy shows an inclination to
advance  lure him on to do so  if he is anxious to retreat  delay
on purpose that he may carry out his intention    The object is
to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our
attack  

     61   By persistently hanging on the enemy s flank 

      I understand the first four words to mean  accompanying the
enemy in one direction    Ts ao Kung says    unite the soldiers
and make for the enemy    But such a violent displacement of
characters is quite indefensible  

we shall succeed in the long run

      Literally   after a thousand LI   

in killing the commander in chief 

      Always a great point with the Chinese  

     62   This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer
cunning 
     63   On the day that you take up your command   block the
frontier passes  destroy the official tallies 

      These were tablets of bamboo or wood  one half of which was
issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a
gate   Cf  the  border warden  of LUN YU III  24  who may have
had similar duties   When this half was returned to him  within a
fixed period   he was authorized to open the gate and let the
traveler through  

and stop the passage of all emissaries 

      Either to or from the enemy s country  

     64   Be stern in the council chamber 

      Show no weakness  and insist on your plans being ratified
by the sovereign  

so that you may control the situation 

      Mei Yao ch en understands the whole sentence to mean   Take
the   strictest   precautions   to   ensure   secrecy   in   your
deliberations  

     65   If the enemy leaves a door open  you must rush in 
     66   Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear 

      Cf  supra  ss  18  

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground 

      Ch en Hao s explanation    If I manage to seize a favorable
position   but the enemy does not appear on the scene   the
advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical
account   He who intends therefore  to occupy a position of
importance to the enemy   must begin by making an   artful
appointment   so to speak  with his antagonist  and cajole him
into going there as well    Mei Yao ch en explains that this
 artful appointment   is to be made through the medium of the
enemy s own spies   who will carry back just the amount of
information that we choose to give them   Then  having cunningly
disclosed our intentions   we must manage  though starting after
the enemy   to arrive before him  VII  ss  4    We must start
after him in order to ensure his marching thither  we must arrive
before him in order to capture the place without trouble   Taken
thus   the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao ch en s
interpretation of ss  47  

     67   Walk in the path defined by rule 

      Chia Lin says    Victory is the only thing that matters 
and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons  
It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight
authority    for the sense yielded is certainly much   more
satisfactory   Napoleon  as we know  according to the veterans of
the old school whom he defeated  won his battles by violating
every accepted canon of warfare  

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a
decisive battle 

      Tu Mu says     Conform to the enemy s tactics until a
favorable opportunity offers  then come forth and engage in a
battle that shall prove decisive   

     68   At first  then  exhibit the coyness of a maiden   until
the enemy gives you an opening  afterwards emulate the rapidity
of a running hare  and it will be too late for the enemy to
oppose you 

      As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity   the
comparison hardly appears felicitous   But of course Sun Tzu was
thinking only of its speed   The words have been taken to mean 
You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare   but
this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu  


 1   Giles  Biographical Dictionary  no  399 

 2    The Science of War   p  333 

 3    Stonewall Jackson   vol  I  p  421 

                                                                 

XII   THE ATTACK BY FIRE


      Rather more than half the chapter  SS  1 13  is devoted to
the subject of fire  after which the author branches off into
other topics  

     1   Sun Tzu said   There are five ways of attacking with
fire   The first is to burn soldiers in their camp 

      So Tu Mu   Li Ch uan says    Set fire to the camp  and kill
the soldiers    when they try to escape from the flames    Pan
Ch ao  sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan shan  see
XI   ss  51  note   found himself placed in extreme peril by the
unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung nu   the mortal
enemies of the Chinese    In consultation with his officers   he
exclaimed    Never venture  never win   1   The only course open
to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under
cover of night   when they will not be able to discern our
numbers   Profiting by their panic  we shall exterminate them
completely   this will cool the King s courage and cover us with
glory   besides ensuring the success of our mission     the
officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the
matter first with the Intendant   Pan Ch ao then fell into a
passion     It is today   he cried   that our fortunes must be
decided    The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian   who on
hearing of our project will certainly be afraid  and everything
will be brought to light   An inglorious death is no worthy fate
for valiant warriors     All then agreed to do as he wished 
Accordingly   as soon as night came on  he and his little band
quickly made their way to the barbarian camp   A strong gale was
blowing at the time   Pan Ch ao ordered ten of the party to take
drums and hide behind the enemy s barracks  it being arranged
that when they saw flames shoot up  they should begin drumming
and yelling with all their might   The rest of his men   armed
with bows and crossbows  he posted in ambuscade at the gate of
the camp   He then set fire to the place from the windward side 
whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the
front and rear of the Hsiung nu  who rushed out pell mell in
frantic disorder   Pan Ch ao slew three of them with his own
hand   while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and
thirty of his suite   The remainder  more than a hundred in all 
perished in the flames   On the following day   Pan Ch ao 
divining his thoughts  said with uplifted hand    Although you
did not go with us last night  I should not think  Sir  of taking
sole credit for our exploit    This satisfied Kuo Hsun  and Pan
Ch ao   having sent for Kuang  King of Shan shan  showed him the
head of the barbarian envoy   The whole kingdom was seized with
fear and trembling   which Pan Ch ao took steps to allay by
issuing a public proclamation   Then  taking the king s sons as
hostage  he returned to make his report to Tou Ku    HOU HAN SHU 
ch  47  ff  1  2    

the second is to burn stores 

      Tu Mu says    Provisions  fuel and fodder    In order to
subdue   the   rebellious population of Kiangnan    Kao   Keng
recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids
and burn their stores of grain  a policy which in the long run
proved entirely successful  

the third is to burn baggage trains 

      An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao s wagons
and impedimenta by Ts ao Ts ao in 200 A D  

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines 

      Tu Mu says that the things contained in   arsenals   and
 magazines   are the same   He specifies weapons and other
implements  bullion and clothing   Cf  VII  ss  11  

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy 

      Tu Yu says in the T UNG TIEN    To drop fire into the
enemy s camp   The method by which this may be done is to set the
tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier   and then
shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy s lines   

     2   In order to carry out an attack  we must have means
available 

      T sao Kung thinks that  traitors in the enemy s camp   are
referred to   But Ch en Hao is more likely to be right in saying 
 We must have favorable circumstances in general   not merely
traitors to help us    Chia Lin says    We must avail ourselves
of wind and dry weather   

the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness 

      Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire    dry vegetable
matter  reeds  brushwood  straw  grease  oil  etc    Here we have
the material cause   Chang Yu says    vessels for hoarding fire 
stuff for lighting fires   

     3   There is a proper season for making attacks with fire 
and special days for starting a conflagration 
     4   The proper season is when the weather is very dry   the
special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of
the Sieve  the Wall  the Wing or the Cross bar 

      These are  respectively  the 7th  14th  27th  and 28th of
the Twenty eight Stellar Mansions   corresponding roughly to
Sagittarius  Pegasus  Crater and Corvus  

for these four are all days of rising wind 
     5   In attacking with fire  one should be prepared to meet
five possible developments 
     6    1  When fire breaks out inside to enemy s camp  respond
at once with an attack from without 
     7    2   If there is an outbreak of fire  but the enemy s
soldiers remain quiet  bide your time and do not attack 

      The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the
enemy into confusion   If this effect is not produced  it means
that the enemy is ready to receive us   Hence the necessity for
caution  

     8    3  When the force of the flames has reached its height 
follow it up with an attack  if that is practicable  if not  stay
where you are 

      Ts ao Kung says    If you see a possible way  advance   but
if you find the difficulties too great  retire   

     9    4  If it is possible to make an assault with fire from
without  do not wait for it to break out within  but deliver your
attack at a favorable moment 

      Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to
the fire breaking out  either accidentally  we may suppose  or by
the agency of incendiaries  inside the enemy s camp    But    he
continues    if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered
with quantities of grass  or if he has pitched his camp in a
position which can be burnt out  we must carry our fire against
him at any seasonable opportunity  and not await on in hopes of
an outbreak occurring within  for fear our opponents should
themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation  and thus render
our own attempts fruitless    The famous Li Ling once baffled the
leader of the Hsiung nu in this way   The latter   taking
advantage of a favorable wind  tried to set fire to the Chinese
general s camp   but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down   On
the other hand  Po ts ai  a general of the Yellow Turban rebels 
was badly defeated in 184 A D  through his neglect of this simple
precaution    At the head of a large army he was besieging
Ch ang she   which was held by Huang fu Sung   The garrison was
very small   and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the
ranks   so Huang fu Sung called his officers together and said 
 In war   there are various indirect methods of attack   and
numbers do not count for everything    The commentator here
quotes Sun Tzu  V  SS  5  6 and 10    Now the rebels have pitched
their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn
when the wind blows   If we set fire to it at night  they will be
thrown into a panic  and we can make a sortie and attack them on
all sides at once  thus emulating the achievement of T ien Tan  
 See p  90    That same evening  a strong breeze sprang up   so
Huang fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into
torches and mount guard on the city walls  after which he sent
out a band of daring men  who stealthily made their way through
the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells 
Simultaneously  a glare of light shot up from the city walls  and
Huang fu Sung   sounding his drums  led a rapid charge   which
threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight  
 HOU HAN SHU  ch  71    

     10    5  When you start a fire  be to windward of it   Do
not attack from the leeward 

      Chang Yu  following Tu Yu  says    When you make a fire 
the enemy will retreat away from it  if you oppose his retreat
and attack him then  he will fight desperately  which will not
conduce to your success    A rather more obvious explanation is
given by Tu Mu    If the wind is in the east  begin burning to
the east of the enemy  and follow up the attack yourself from
that side   If you start the fire on the east side   and then
attack from the west  you will suffer in the same way as your
enemy   

     11   A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long   but a
night breeze soon falls 

      Cf   Lao Tzu s saying    A violent wind does not last the
space of a morning     TAO TE CHING  chap  23     Mei Yao ch en
and Wang Hsi say    A day breeze dies down at nightfall   and a
night breeze at daybreak   This is what happens as a general
rule     The phenomenon observed may be correct enough   but how
this sense is to be obtained is not apparent  

     12   In every army  the five developments connected with
fire must be known  the movements of the stars calculated  and a
watch kept for the proper days 

      Tu Mu says    We must make calculations as to the paths of
the stars   and watch for the days on which wind will rise 
before making our attack with fire    Chang Yu seems to interpret
the text differently    We must not only know how to assail our
opponents with fire  but also be on our guard against similar
attacks from them   

     13   Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show
intelligence  those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an
accession of strength 
     14   By means of water  an enemy may be intercepted  but not
robbed of all his belongings 

      Ts ao Kung s note is    We can merely obstruct the enemy s
road or divide his army  but not sweep away all his accumulated
stores    Water can do useful service  but it lacks the terrible
destructive power of fire   This is the reason   Chang Yu
concludes  why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences 
whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail   Wu Tzu   ch 
4   speaks thus of the two elements    If an army is encamped on
low lying marshy ground  from which the water cannot run off  and
where the rainfall is heavy  it may be submerged by a flood   If
an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with
weeds and brambles  and visited by frequent gales   it may be
exterminated by fire   

     15   Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles
and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of
enterprise   for the result is waste of time and   general
stagnation 

      This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu 
Ts ao Kung says     Rewards for good service should not be
deferred a single day     And Tu Mu     If you do not take
opportunity   to   advance and reward   the   deserving    your
subordinates will not carry out your commands  and disaster will
ensue     For several reasons  however  and in spite of the
formidable array of scholars on the other side   I prefer the
interpretation suggested by Mei Yao ch en alone  whose words I
will quote    Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their
battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they
come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures   that is to
say  they must resort to such means of attack of fire  water and
the like   What they must not do  and what will prove fatal   is
to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got   

     16   Hence the saying   The enlightened ruler lays his plans
well ahead  the good general cultivates his resources 

      Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH  ch  2     The
warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority  kits them
together by good faith  and by rewards makes them serviceable 
If faith decays   there will be disruption   if rewards are
deficient  commands will not be respected   

     17   Move not unless you see an advantage   use not your
troops unless there is something to be gained  fight not unless
the position is critical 

      Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over cautious   but he
never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in
the TAO TE CHING  ch  69    I dare not take the initiative   but
prefer to act on the defensive  I dare not advance an inch   but
prefer to retreat a foot   

     18   No ruler should put troops into the field merely to
gratify his own spleen  no general should fight a battle simply
out of pique 
     19   If it is to your advantage  make a forward move   if
not  stay where you are 

      This is repeated from XI  ss  17   Here I feel convinced
that it is an interpolation  for it is evident that ss  20 ought
to follow immediately on ss  18  

     20   Anger may in time change to gladness  vexation may be
succeeded by content 
     21   But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never
come again into being 

      The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of
this saying  

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life 
     22   Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful  and the good
general full of caution   This is the way to keep a country at
peace and an army intact 


 1     Unless you enter the tiger s lair  you cannot get hold of
the tiger s cubs  

                                                                 

XIII   THE USE OF SPIES


     1   Sun Tzu said   Raising a host of a hundred thousand men
and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the
people and a drain on the resources of the State   The daily
expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver 

      Cf  II  ss  ss  1  13  14  

There will be commotion at home and abroad  and men will drop
down exhausted on the highways 

      Cf   TAO TE CHING   ch   30     Where troops have been
quartered  brambles and thorns spring up   Chang Yu has the note 
 We may be reminded of the saying    On serious ground  gather in
plunder     Why then should carriage and transportation cause
exhaustion on the highways   The answer is  that not victuals
alone   but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to
the army   Besides  the injunction to  forage on the enemy   only
means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory 
scarcity of food must be provided against   Hence  without being
solely dependent on the enemy for corn  we must forage in order
that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies   Then 
again  there are places like salt deserts where provisions being
unobtainable  supplies from home cannot be dispensed with   

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in
their labor 

      Mei Yao ch en says    Men will be lacking at the plough 
tail    The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine
parts  each consisting of about 15 acres  the plot in the center
being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the
other eight   It was here also  so Tu Mu tells us   that their
cottages were built and a well sunk  to be used by all in common 
 See II  ss  12  note    In time of war  one of the families had
to serve in the army  while the other seven contributed to its
support   Thus   by a levy of 100 000 men  reckoning one able 
bodied soldier to each family  the husbandry of 700 000 families
would be affected  

     2   Hostile armies may face each other for years   striving
for the victory which is decided in a single day   This being so 
to remain in ignorance of the enemy s condition simply because
one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors
and emoluments 

       For spies  is of course the meaning  though it would spoil
the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were
actually mentioned at this point  

is the height of inhumanity 

      Sun Tzu s agreement is certainly ingenious   He begins by
adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood
and treasure which war always brings in its train   Now   unless
you are kept informed of the enemy s condition  and are ready to
strike at the right moment  a war may drag on for years   The
only way to get this information is to employ spies  and it is
impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly
paid for their services   But it is surely false economy to
grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose   when
every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum 
This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor   and
hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is
nothing less than a crime against humanity  

     3   One who acts thus is no leader of men  no present help
to his sovereign  no master of victory 

      This idea  that the true object of war is peace   has its
root in the national temperament of the Chinese   Even so far
back as 597 B C   these memorable words were uttered by Prince
Chuang of the Ch u State    The  Chinese  character for  prowess 
is made up of  the characters for   to stay   and   a spear 
 cessation of hostilities    Military prowess is seen in the
repression   of   cruelty   the calling in of   weapons    the
preservation of the appointment of Heaven  the firm establishment
of merit   the bestowal of happiness on the people   putting
harmony between the princes  the diffusion of wealth   

     4   Thus   what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer  and achieve things beyond the
reach of ordinary men  is FOREKNOWLEDGE 

      That is  knowledge of the enemy s dispositions  and what he
means to do  

     5   Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits 
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience 

      Tu Mu s note is     knowledge of the enemy   cannot be
gained by reasoning from other analogous cases   

nor by any deductive calculation 

      Li   Ch uan says     Quantities like   length    breadth 
distance and magnitude  are susceptible of exact mathematical
determination  human actions cannot be so calculated   

     6   Knowledge of the enemy s dispositions can only be
obtained from other men 

      Mei Yao ch en has rather an interesting note     Knowledge
of the spirit world is to be obtained by divination   information
in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning  the laws
of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation   but
the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and
spies alone   

     7   Hence the use of spies  of whom there are five classes 
 1   Local spies    2  inward spies   3   converted spies    4 
doomed spies   5  surviving spies 
     8   When these five kinds of spy are all at work  none can
discover the secret system   This is called  divine manipulation
of the threads    It is the sovereign s most precious faculty 

      Cromwell   one of the greatest and most practical of all
cavalry leaders   had officers styled   scout masters    whose
business it was to collect all possible information regarding the
enemy  through scouts and spies  etc   and much of his success in
war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy s moves
thus gained    1   

     9   Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the
inhabitants of a district 

      Tu Mu says    In the enemy s country  win people over by
kind treatment  and use them as spies   

     10   Having INWARD SPIES  making use of officials of the
enemy 

      Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good
service in this respect    Worthy men who have been degraded from
office   criminals who have undergone punishment  also   favorite
concubines who are greedy for gold  men who are aggrieved at
being in subordinate positions  or who have been passed over in
the distribution of posts  others who are anxious that their side
should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of
displaying their ability and talents  fickle turncoats who always
want to have a foot in each boat   Officials of these several
kinds   he continues   should be secretly approached and bound to
one s interests by means of rich presents   In this way you will
be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy s country 
ascertain the plans that are being formed against you   and
moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the
sovereign and his ministers    The necessity for extreme caution 
however   in dealing with   inward spies    appears from   an
historical incident related by Ho Shih    Lo Shang  Governor of
I Chou  sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of
Shu in his stronghold at P i   After each side had experienced a
number of victories and defeats  Li Hsiung had recourse to the
services of a certain P o t ai  a native of Wu tu   He began to
have him whipped until the blood came  and then sent him off to
Lo Shang  whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him
from inside the city  and to give a fire signal at the right
moment for making a general assault   Lo Shang   confiding in
these promises  march out all his best troops  and placed Wei Po
and others at their head with orders to attack at P o t ai s
bidding   Meanwhile  Li Hsiung s general  Li Hsiang  had prepared
an ambuscade on their line of march  and P o t ai  having reared
long scaling ladders against the city walls   now lighted the
beacon fire   Wei Po s men raced up on seeing the signal and
began climbing the ladders as fast as they could   while others
were drawn up by ropes lowered from above   More than a hundred
of Lo Shang s soldiers entered the city in this way  every one of
whom was forthwith beheaded   Li Hsiung then charged with all his
forces   both inside and outside the city  and routed the enemy
completely     This happened in 303 A D   I do not know where Ho
Shih got the story from   It is not given in the biography of Li
Hsiung or that of his father Li T e  CHIN SHU  ch  120  121  

     11   Having CONVERTED SPIES  getting hold of the enemy s
spies and using them for our own purposes 

      By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching
them from the enemy s service  and inducing them to carry back
false information as well as to spy in turn on their own
countrymen   On the other hand  Hsiao Shih hsien says that we
pretend not to have detected him  but contrive to let him carry
away a false impression of what is going on   Several of the
commentators accept this as an alternative definition  but that
it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his
subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously
 ss  21 sqq     Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted
spies were used with conspicuous success    1  by T ien Tan in
his defense of Chi mo  see supra  p  90    2  by Chao She on his
march to O yu  see p  57   and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B C  
when Lien P o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch in 
The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P o s cautious and
dilatory methods   which had been unable to avert a series of
minor disasters  and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of
his spies   who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were
already in Fan Chu s pay   They said    The only thing which
causes Ch in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general 
Lien P o they consider an easy opponent  who is sure to be
vanquished in the long run    Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the
famous Chao She   From his boyhood  he had been wholly engrossed
in the study of war and military matters  until at last he came
to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who
could stand against him   His father was much disquieted by this
overweening conceit   and the flippancy with which he spoke of
such a serious thing as war  and solemnly declared that if ever
Kua was appointed general  he would bring ruin on the armies of
Chao   This was the man who  in spite of earnest protests from
his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang ju  was now
sent to succeed Lien P o   Needless to say  he proved no match
for the redoubtable Po Ch i and the great military power of
Ch in   He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into
two and his communications cut  and after a desperate resistance
lasting 46 days  during which the famished soldiers devoured one
another  he was himself killed by an arrow  and his whole force 
amounting   it is said  to 400 000 men  ruthlessly put to the
sword  

     12   Having DOOMED SPIES  doing certain things openly for
purposes of deception  and allowing our spies to know of them and
report them to the enemy 

      Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning     We
ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies   who
must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed 
Then   when these spies are captured in the enemy s lines   they
will make an entirely false report  and the enemy will take
measures accordingly   only to find that we do something quite
different   The spies will thereupon be put to death     As an
example of doomed spies  Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released
by Pan Ch ao in his campaign against Yarkand    See p  132     He
also refers to T ang Chien  who in 630 A D  was sent by T ai
Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh li into fancied security 
until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him 
Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T ang
Chien  but this is a mistake  for we read in both the old and the
New   T ang History   ch   58   fol   2 and ch   89   fol   8
respectively   that he escaped and lived on until 656   Li I chi
played a somewhat similar part in 203 B C   when sent by the King
of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch i   He has certainly
more claim to be described a  doomed spy   for the king of Ch i 
being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin   and
infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I chi 
ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive  

     13   SURVIVING SPIES  finally  are those who bring back news
from the enemy s camp 

      This is the ordinary class of spies  properly so called 
forming a regular part of the army   Tu Mu says    Your surviving
spy must be a man of keen intellect  though in outward appearance
a fool  of shabby exterior  but with a will of iron   He must be
active   robust   endowed with physical strength and courage 
thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work  able to endure
hunger and cold  and to put up with shame and ignominy    Ho Shih
tells the following story of Ta hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty    When
he was governor of Eastern Ch in  Shen wu of Ch i made a hostile
movement upon Sha yuan   The Emperor T ai Tsu    Kao Tsu   sent
Ta hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy   He was accompanied by two other
men   All three were on horseback and wore the enemy s uniform 
When it was dark  they dismounted a few hundred feet away from
the enemy s camp and stealthily crept up to listen   until they
succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army   Then they
got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp
under the guise of night watchmen  and more than once   happening
to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of
discipline   they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound
cudgeling   Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible
information about the enemy s dispositions  and received warm
commendation from the Emperor  who in consequence of their report
was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary   

     14   Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more
intimate relations to be maintained than with spies 

      Tu Mu and Mei Yao ch en point out that the spy is
privileged to enter even the general s private sleeping tent  

None should be more liberally rewarded   In no other business
should greater secrecy be preserved 

      Tu Mu gives a graphic touch   all communication with spies
should be carried  mouth to ear    The following remarks on spies
may be quoted from Turenne  who made perhaps larger use of them
than any previous commander    Spies are attached to those who
give them most   he who pays them ill is never served   They
should never be known to anybody  nor should they know one
another   When they propose anything very material  secure their
persons   or have in your possession their wives and children as
hostages for their fidelity   Never communicate anything to them
but what is absolutely necessary that they should know   2   

     15   Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain
intuitive sagacity 

      Mei Yao ch en says    In order to use them  one must know
fact from falsehood  and be able to discriminate between honesty
and double dealing     Wang Hsi in a different interpretation
thinks more along the lines of   intuitive perception   and
 practical   intelligence      Tu Mu strangely   refers   these
attributes to the spies themselves    Before using spies we must
assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the
extent of their experience and skill    But he continues     A
brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than
mountains or rivers  it takes a man of genius to penetrate such  
So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the
passage   

     16   They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and
straightforwardness 

      Chang   Yu says     When you have attracted   them   by
substantial offers  you must treat them with absolute sincerity 
then they will work for you with all their might   

     17   Without subtle ingenuity of mind   one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports 

      Mei Yao ch en says     Be on your guard against   the
possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy   

     18   Be subtle  be subtle  and use your spies for every kind
of business 

      Cf  VI  ss  9  

     19   If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before
the time is ripe  he must be put to death together with the man
to whom the secret was told 

      Word for word  the translation here is    If spy matters
are heard before  our plans  are carried out   etc   Sun Tzu s
main point in this passage is   Whereas you kill the spy himself
 as a punishment for letting out the secret    the object of
killing the other man is only  as Ch en Hao puts it   to stop his
mouth   and prevent news leaking any further   If it had already
been repeated to others  this object would not be gained   Either
way   Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity 
though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves
to be put to death  for the spy would certainly not have told the
secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of
him   

     20   Whether the object be to crush an army   to storm a
city  or to assassinate an individual  it is always necessary to
begin by finding out the names of the attendants  the aides de 
camp 

      Literally   visitors    is equivalent  as Tu Yu says   to
 those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with
information    which naturally necessitates frequent interviews
with him  

and door keepers and sentries of the general in command   Our
spies must be commissioned to ascertain these 

      As the first step  no doubt towards finding out if any of
these important functionaries can be won over by bribery  

     21   The enemy s spies who have come to spy on us must be
sought out  tempted with bribes  led away and comfortably housed 
Thus they will become converted spies and available for our
service 
     22   It is through the information brought by the converted
spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward
spies 

      Tu Yu says    through conversion of the enemy s spies we
learn the enemy s condition    And Chang Yu says    We must tempt
the converted spy into our service  because it is he that knows
which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain  and which of
the officials are open to corruption   

     23   It is owing to his information  again   that we can
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy 

      Chang Yu says   because the converted spy knows how the
enemy can best be deceived   

     24  Lastly  it is by his information that the surviving spy
can be used on appointed occasions 
     25   The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is
knowledge of the enemy  and this knowledge can only be derived 
in the first instance  from the converted spy 

      As explained in ss  22 24   He not only brings information
himself   but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to
advantage  

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the
utmost liberality 
     26  Of old  the rise of the Yin dynasty

      Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty  founded in 1766 B C   Its
name was changed to Yin by P an Keng in 1401 

was due to I Chih

      Better known as I Yin  the famous general and statesman
who took part in Ch eng T ang s campaign against Chieh Kuei  

who had served under the Hsia   Likewise  the rise of the Chou
dynasty was due to Lu Ya

      Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin 
whom he afterwards helped to overthrow   Popularly known as T ai
Kung   a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang  he is said to have
composed a treatise on war  erroneously identified with the
LIU T AO  

who had served under the Yin 

      There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought
it well to introduce into my translation  and the commentaries on
the passage are by no means explicit   But  having regard to the
context   we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih
and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy   or
something closely analogous   His suggestion is  that the Hsia
and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of
their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers
were able to impart to the other side   Mei Yao ch en appears to
resent any such aspersion on these historic names    I Yin and Lu
Ya    he says   were not rebels against the Government   Hsia
could not employ the former  hence Yin employed him   Yin could
not employ the latter  hence Hou employed him   Their great
achievements were all for the good of the people    Ho Shih is
also indignant    How should two divinely inspired men such as I
and Lu have acted as common spies   Sun Tzu s mention of them
simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is
a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I
and Lu  whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task 
The above words only emphasize this point    Ho Shih believes
then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their
supposed skill in the use of spies   But this is very weak  

     27   Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise
general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for
purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results 

      Tu Mu closes with a note of warning    Just as water  which
carries a boat from bank to bank  may also be the means of
sinking it  so reliance on spies  while production of great
results  is oft times the cause of utter destruction   

Spies are a most important element in water  because on them
depends an army s ability to move 

      Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with
ears or eyes  



 1    Aids to Scouting   p  2 

 2    Marshal Turenne   p  311 


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