



Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science			
Steven Rudich		CS 15-251	Spring 2004
Lecture 27	April 22, 2004	Carnegie Mellon University	
Thales' Legacy: What Is A Proof?			



So what is a proof?









Let S be a computable language over Σ . That is, $S \subset \Sigma^*$ and there is a Java program $P_S(x)$ that outputs Yes if $x \in S$, and outputs No otherwise.

S implicitly defines the "syntactically valid" statements of a language. We define our "language" to be a decidable set of strings S. Any s∈S is called a STATEMENT or a SYNTACTICALLY VALID string.



In fact, valid language syntax is typically defined inductively, so it is easy to make a recursive program to recognize the strings considered valid.

Example:
Let S be the set of all
syntactically well formed
statements in Peano
Arithmetic





Exp \rightarrow 0 | 5 (Exp) V = $x_1, x_2, x_3, ...$

Statement ->

E=E

∃ V (Statement)

∀V (statement)

(statement) Æ (statement)


¬(statement)


Recursive Program


ValidPeano(s)
return True if any of the following:


S has form $\forall x (T)$ and $Valid_{P}roof(T)$


S has form




















views S as an axiom.





Example: SILLY FOO FOO 1



Example: SILLY FOO FOO 2

 $S = All \ strings.$ $L = All \ pairs \ of \ the \ form: \langle \Delta, s \rangle \ s \in S$ $S = All \ strings.$ $L = \langle \Delta, 0 \rangle \ , \langle \Delta, 1 \rangle \ , and$ $All \ pairs \ of \ the \ form: \langle s, s 0 \rangle \ or \langle s, s 1 \rangle$ $PROVABLE_{S,L}$ is the set of all strings. $PROVABLE_{S,L}$ is the set of all strings.

Example: SILLY FOO FOO 3

S = All strings. L = $\langle \Delta, 0 \rangle$, $\langle \Delta, 11 \rangle$, and All pairs of the form: $\langle s, s0 \rangle$ or $\langle st, s1t1 \rangle$

 $\mathsf{PROVABLE}_{\mathsf{S},\mathsf{L}}$ is the set of all strings with a zero parity.

Example: SILLY FOO FOO 4

S = All strings. L = $\langle \Delta, 0 \rangle$, $\langle \Delta, 1 \rangle$, and All pairs of the form: $\langle s, s0 \rangle$ or $\langle st, s1t1 \rangle$

 $PROVABLE_{SL}$ is the set of all strings.

Example: Propositional Logic

S = All well-formed formulas in the notation of Boolean algebra.

L = Two formulas are one step apart if one can be made from the other from a finite list of forms.

(hopefully) PROVABLE $_{\rm S, L}$ is the set of all formulas that are tautologies in propositional logic.

We know what valid syntax is, what logic, proof, and theorems are

....


Where does "truth" and "meaning" come in it?





Let S be any computable language. Let TRUTH_S be any fixed function from S to {T, F}.


We will say that we have a "truth concept" associated with the strings in S.


The world of mathematics has certain established truth concepts associated with logical statements.
































 $\begin{array}{c} \text{SOUND:} \\ \text{PROVABLE}_{\text{S,L}} \subset \text{TRUTH}_{\text{S}} \end{array}$



 $\begin{array}{c} \textit{COMPLETE:} \\ \textit{TRUTH}_s \subset \textit{PROVABLE}_{s,L} \end{array}$

Ex: Axioms of Euclidean
Geometry are known to be
sound and complete for the
truths of line and point in
the plane.

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{SOUND:} \\ \text{PROVABLE}_{\text{S,L}} \subset \text{TRUTH}_{\text{S}} \end{array}$



SILLY FOO FOO 3 is sound and complete for the truth concept of strings having an even number of 1s.

Example: SILLY FOO FOO 3

S = All strings. $L = \langle \Delta, 0 \rangle$, $\langle \Delta, 11 \rangle$, and All pairs of the form: $\langle s, s0 \rangle$ or $\langle st, s1t1 \rangle$

 $\mathsf{PROVABLE}_{\mathsf{S},\mathsf{L}}\mathsf{is}$ the set of all strings with a zero parity.

What is a proof?



A language.

A truth concept.

A logic that is sound (maybe even complete) for the truth concept.

What is a proof?



A language.

A truth concept.

A logic that is sound (maybe even complete) for the truth concept.

An ENUMERABLE list of PROVABLE THEOREMS in the logic.

A set S is <u>Recursively Enumerable</u> if its elements can be printed out by a computer program.

In other words:

There is a program LIST $_{\rm S}$ that outputs a list of strings separated by spaces, and such that an element is on the list if and only if it is in S.

SUPER IMPORTANT

Let F be any logic.

We can write a program to enumerate the provable theorems of F.

Listing THEOREMS_F

k;=0;

For sum = 0 to forever do

{Let PROOF loop through all strings of length k do {Let STATEMENT loop through strings of length <k do If proofcheck(STATEMENT, PROOF) = valid, output STATEMENT k** }

Whatever the details of our proof system, an inherent property of any proof system is that its theorems are recursively enumerable



Recall: SELF-REFERENCE

Theorem: God is not omnipotent.

Proof: Let S be the statement "God can't make a rock so heavy that he can't lift it.". If S is true, then there is something God can't do, and is hence not omnipotent. If S is false, then God can't lift the rock

Alan Turing (1912-1954)



THEOREM: There is no program to solve the halting problem (Alan Turing 1937)

Suppose a program HALT, solving the halting problem, existed:

HALT(P)= yes, if P(P) halts
HALT(P)= no, if P(P) does not halt

We will call HALT as a subroutine in a new program called CONFUSE.

CONFUSE(P):

If HALT(P) then loop_for_ever Else return (i.e., halt) <text of subroutine HALT goes here>

Does CONFUSE(CONFUSE) halt?

YES implies HALT(CONFUSE) = yes thus, CONFUSE(CONFUSE) will not halt

NO implies HALT(CONFUSE) = no thus, CONFUSE(CONFUSE) halts

CONFUSE(P):

If HALT(P) then loop_for_ever Else return (i.e., halt) <text of subroutine HALT goes here>

Does CONFUSE(CONFUSE) halt?

YES implies HALT(CONFUSE) = yes
thus, CONFUSE(CONFUSE) will not halt
CONTRADICTION

NO implies HALT(CONFUSE) = no thus, CONFUSE(CONFUSE) halts

 $K = \{ P \mid P(P) \text{ halts } \}$

K is an undecidable set. There is no procedure running on an ideal machine to give yes/no answers for all questions of the form " $x \in K$?"

Self-Reference Puzzle

Write a program that prints itself out as output. No calls to the operating system, or to memory external to the program.

Auto Cannibal Maker

Write a program AutoCannibalMaker that takes the text of a program EAT as input and outputs a program called SELF_{EAT}. When SELF_{EAT} is executed it should output EAT(SELF_{EAT}).

For any (input taking) program: EAT AutoCannibalMaker(EAT) = SELF_{FAT}

SELF_{EAT} is a program taking no input. When executed $SELF_{EAT}$ should output $EAT(SELF_{eat})$

Auto Cannibal Maker Suppose Halt with no input was programmable in JAVA.

Write a program AutoCannibalMaker that takes the text of a program EAT as input and outputs a program called SELF_{EAT}. When SELF_{EAT} is executed it should output EAT(SELF_{EAT})

Let EAT(P) = halt, if P does not halt loop forever, otherwise.

What does SELF_{EAT} do?

Contradiction! Hence EAT does not have a corresponding JAVA program.

Theorems of F

Define the set of provable theorems of F to be the set:

```
THEOREMS<sub>F</sub> = \{ STATEMENT \in \Sigma^* \mid \exists PROOF \in \Sigma^*, proofcheck_F(STATEMENT, PROOF) = valid <math>\}
```

Example: Euclid and ELEMENTS.

We could write a program ELEMENTS to check STATEMENT, PROOF pairs to determine if PROOF is a sequence, where each step is either one logical inference, or one application of the axioms of Euclidian geometry.

THEOREMS_{ELEMENTS} is the set of all statement provable from the axioms of Euclidean geometry.

Example: Set Theory and SFC.

We could write a program ZFC to check STATEMENT, PROOF pairs to determine if PROOF is a sequence, where each step is either one logical inference, or one application of the axioms of Zermilo Frankel Set Theory, as well as, the axiom of choice.

THEOREMS $_{\rm ZFC}$ is the set of all statement provable from the axioms of set theory.

Example: Peano and PA.

We could write a program PA to check STATEMENT, PROOF pairs to determine if PROOF is a sequence, where each step is either one logical inference, or one application of the axioms of Peano Arithmetic

THEOREMS_{PA} is the set of all statement provable from the axioms of Peano Arithmetic

Listing THEOREMS_F

k;=0;

For sum = 0 to forever do

{Let PROOF loop through all strings of length k do {Let STATEMENT loop through strings of length <k do If proofcheck(STATEMENT, PROOF) = valid, output STATEMENT

. k+ } } do alid,

Whatever the details of our proof system, an inherent property of any proof system is that its theorems are recursively enumerable

Language and Meaning

By a language, we mean any syntactically defined subset of Σ^*

By truth value, we mean a SEMANTIC function that takes expressions in the language to TRUE or FALSE.

Truths of Natural Arithmetic

ARITHMETIC_TRUTH =

All TRUE expressions of the language of arithmetic (logical symbols and quantification over Naturals).

Truths of Euclidean Geometry

EUCLID _TRUTH =

All TRUE expressions of the language of Euclidean geometry.

Truths of JAVA program behavior.

JAVA_TRUTH =

All TRUE expressions of the form program P on input X will output Y, or program P will/won't halt.

TRUTH versus PROVABILITY

Let L be a language $\mathsf{L},$ with a well defined truth function.

If proof system F proves only true statements in the language, we say that F is SOUND.

If F proves all statements in language, we say that F is COMPLETE.

TRUTH versus PROVABILITY

Happy News:

THEOREMS_{ELEMENTS} = EUCLID_TRUTH

The ELEMENTS are SOUND and COMPLETE for geometry.

TRUTH versus PROVABILITY

THEOREMS_{PA} is a proper subset of ARITHMETIC_TRUTH

PA is SOUND.
PA is not COMPLETE.

TRUTH versus PROVABILITY

FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS: It is impossible to have a proof system F such that

THEOREMS_F = ARITHMETIC_TRUTH

F is SOUND will imply F is INCOMPLETE for arithmetic.

JAVA_TRUTH is not R.E.

Assume a program LIST enumerates JAVA_TRUTH.

We can now make a program Halt(P)

Run list until one of the two statements appears: "P(P) halts", or "P(P) does not halt". Output the appropriate answer.

Contradiction of undecidability of K.

JAVA_TRUTH has no proof system..

There is no proof system for $JAVA_TRUTH$.

Let F be any proosystem. There must be a program LIST to enumerate $\mathsf{THROEMS}_\mathsf{F}.$

THEOREM $_{\rm F}$ is R,E. JAVA_TRUTH is not R.E.

So THEOREMS_F ≠ JAVA_TRUTH

Whatever the details of our proof system, an inherent property of any proof system is that its theorems are recursively enumerable

JAVA_TRUTH is not recursively enumerable.

Hence, JAVA_TRUTH has no sound and complete proof system.

ARITHEMTIC_TRUTH is not recursively enumerable.



Hence,
ARITHMETIC_TRUTH has
no sound and complete
proof system!!!!

Hilbert's Question [1900]

Is there a foundation for mathematics that would, in principle, allow us to decide the truth of any mathematical proposition? Such a foundation would have to give us a clear procedure (algorithm) for making the decision.

Foundation F

Let F be any foundation for mathematics:

- •F is a proof system that only proves true things [Soundness]
- •The set of valid proofs is computable. [There is a program to check any candidate proof in this system]

INCOMPLETENESS

Let F be any attempt to give a foundation for mathematics

We will construct a statement that we will all believe to be true, but is not provable in F.

CONFUSE_F(P)

Loop though all sequences of symbols S

If S is a valid F-proof of "P halts", then LOOP_FOR_EVER

If S is a valid F-proof of "P never halts", then HALT

GODEL_F

GODEL_F=
AUTO_CANNIBAL_MAKER(CONFUSE_F)

Thus, when we run $GODEL_F$ it will do the same thing as:

CONFUSE_F(GODEL_F)

GODEL_F

Can F prove GODEL halts?

Yes -> CONFUSE_F(GODEL_F) does not halt Contradiction

Can F prove GODEL does not halt?

Yes \rightarrow CONFUSE_F(GODEL_F) halts
Contradiction

GODEL_F

F can't prove or disprove that GODEL_F halts.

GODEL_F = CONFUSE_F(GODEL_F)
Loop though all sequences of symbols S

If S is a valid F-proof of "GODEL_F halts", then LOOP_FOR_EVER

If S is a valid F-proof of "GODEL_F never halts", then HALT

GODEL_F

F can't prove or disprove that GODEL halts.

Thus CONFUSE_F(GODEL_F) = GODEL_F will not halt. Thus, we have just proved what F can't.

F can't prove something that we know is true. It is not a complete foundation for mathematics.

CONCLUSION

No fixed set of assumptions F can provide a complete foundation for mathematical proof. In particular, it can't prove the true statement that $GODEL_F$ does not halt.

Gödel/Turing: Any statement S of the form "Program P halts on input x" can be easily translated to an equivalent statement S' in the language of Peano Arithmetic. I.e, S is true if and only if S' is true.

Hence: No mathematical domain that contains (or implicitly expresses) Peano Arithmetic can have a complete foundation.

GÖDEL'S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM

In 1931, Gödel stunned the world by proving that for any consistent axioms F there is a true statement of first order number theory that is not provable or disprovable by F. I.e., a true statement that can be made using 0, 1, plus, times, for every, there exists, AND, OR, NOT, parentheses, and variables that refer to natural numbers.

So what is mathematics?

We can still have rigorous, precise axioms that we agree to use in our reasoning (like the Peano Axioms, or axioms for Set Theory). We just can't hope for them to be complete.

Most working mathematicians never hit these points of uncertainty in their work, but it does happen!

ENDNOTE

You might think that Gödel's theorem proves that are mathematically capable in ways that computers are not. This would show that the Church-Turing Thesis is wrong.

Gödel's theorem proves no such thing!

We can talk about this over coffee.

