



Great Theoretical Ideas In Computer Science

Steven Rudich

CS 15-251




Spring 2004

Lecture 21

Mar 30, 2003

Carnegie Mellon University

The Mathematics Of 1950's Dating: Who wins the battle of the sexes?





WARNING: This lecture contains
mathematical content that may be
shocking to some students.

3,2,5,1,4

1 ↗

1,2,5,3,4

2 ↗

4,3,2,1,5

3 ↗

1,3,4,2,5

4 ↗

1,2,4,5,3

5 ↗

3,5,2,1,4

1 ⊥

5,2,1,4,3

2 ⊥

4,3,5,1,2

3 ⊥

1,2,3,4,5

4 ⊥

2,3,4,1,5

5 ⊥

Dating Scenario

- There are n boys and n girls
- Each girl has her own ranked preference list of all the boys
- Each boy has his own ranked preference list of the girls
- The lists have no ties

Question: How do we pair them off?
What criteria come to mind?

3,2,5,1,4

1 ↗

1,2,5,3,4

2 ↗

4,3,2,1,5

3 ↗

1,3,4,2,5

4 ↗

1,2,4,5,3

5 ↗

3,5,2,1,4

1 ⊥

5,2,1,4,3

2 ⊥

4,3,5,1,2

3 ⊥

1,2,3,4,5


4 ⊥

2,3,4,1,5

5 ⊥

There is more than one notion of what constitutes a “good” pairing.


- Maximizing total satisfaction
 - Hong Kong and to an extent the United States
- Maximizing the minimum satisfaction
 - Western Europe
- Minimizing the maximum difference in mate ranks
 - Sweden
- Maximizing the number of people who get their first choice
 - Barbie and Ken Land




We will ignore the
issue of what is
“equitable”!

Rogue Couples

Suppose we pair off all the boys and girls. Now suppose that some boy and some girl prefer each other to the people to whom they are paired. They will be called a rogue couple.




Why be with them when we
can be with each other?



Stable Pairings

A pairing of boys and girls is called stable if it contains no rogue couples.



What use is fairness,
if it is not stable?

Any list of criteria for a good pairing
must include *stability*. (A pairing is
doomed if it contains a rogue couple.)

Any reasonable list of criteria must
contain the *stability* criterion.

Steven's social and political wisdom:

Sustainability is a
prerequisite of *fair*
policy.


The study of stability will be the subject of the entire lecture.

We will:

- Analyze various mathematical properties of an algorithm that looks a lot like 1950's dating
- Discover the **naked mathematical truth** about which sex has the romantic edge
- Learn how the world's largest, most successful dating service operates


Given a set of preference lists, how
do we find a stable pairing?

Given a set of preference lists, how
do we find a stable pairing?



Wait! We don't even
know that such a pairing
always exists!


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
How could we change
the question we are
asking?

Better Questions:

Does every set of preference lists have a stable pairing? Is there a fast algorithm that, given any set of input lists, will output a stable pairing, if one exists for those lists?





Think about this question:



Does every set of
preference lists have a
stable pairing?

Idea: Allow the pairs to keep breaking up and reforming until they become stable.







Can you argue that the
couples will not continue
breaking up and reforming
forever?

An Instructive Variant: Bisexual Dating


2,3,4




3,1,4




1,2,4




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
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
An Instructive Variant: Bisexual Dating



An Instructive Variant: Bisexual Dating



Unstable roommates in perpetual motion.




Insight

Any proof that
heterosexual couples do not
break up and reform forever
must contain a step that
fails in the bisexual case


Insight

If you have a proof idea that works equally well in the hetero and bisexual versions, then your idea is not adequate to show the couples eventually stop.

The Traditional Marriage Algorithm



The Traditional Marriage Algorithm



Traditional Marriage Algorithm


For each day that some boy gets a "No" do:

- **Morning**
 - Each girl stands on her balcony
 - Each boy proposes under the balcony of the best girl whom he has not yet crossed off
- **Afternoon (for those girls with at least one suitor)**
 - To today's best suitor: **"Maybe, come back tomorrow"**
 - To any others: **"No, I will never marry you"**
- **Evening**
 - Any rejected boy crosses the girl off his list

Each girl marries the boy to whom she just said "maybe"

Does the Traditional Marriage
Algorithm always produce a stable
pairing?

Does the Traditional Marriage Algorithm always produce a stable pairing?



Wait! There is a more primary question!

Does TMA always terminate?

- It might encounter a situation where algorithm does not specify what to do next (core dump error)
- It might keep on going for an infinite number of days

Traditional Marriage Algorithm

For each day that some boy gets a "No" do:


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Each girl marries the boy to whom she just said "maybe"

Improvement Lemma: If a girl has a boy on a string, then she will always have someone at least as good on a string, (or for a husband).

- She would only let go of him in order to "maybe" someone better
- She would only let go of that guy for someone even better
- She would only let go of that guy for someone even better
- AND SO ON

Informal Induction




Improvement Lemma: If a girl has a boy on a string, then she will always have someone at least as good on a string, (or for a husband).


PROOF: Let q be the day she first gets b on a string. If the lemma is false, there must be a smallest k such that the girl has some b^* inferior to b on day $q+k$.

One day earlier, she has someone as good as b . Hence, a better suitor than b^* returns the next day. She will choose the better suitor contradicting the assumption that her prospects went below b on day $q+k$.

Formal Induction



Corollary: Each girl will marry her
absolute favorite of the boys who
visit her during the TMA



Lemma: No boy can be rejected by
all the girls

Proof by contradiction.

Suppose boy b is rejected by all the girls.
At that point:

- Each girl must have a suitor other than b
(By Improvement Lemma, once a girl has
a suitor she will always have at least one)
- The n girls have n suitors, b not among
them. Thus, there are at least $n+1$ boys



Contradiction


Theorem: The TMA always terminates in at most n^2 days

- A “master list” of all n of the boys lists starts with a total of $n \times n = n^2$ girls on it.
- Each day that at least one boy gets a “No”, at least one girl gets crossed off the master list
- Therefore, the number of days is bounded by the original size of the master list In fact, since each list never drops below 1, the number of days is bounded by $n(n-1) = n^2$.

Great! We know that TMA will
terminate and produce a pairing.


But is it stable?

Theorem: Let T be the pairing produced by TMA. T is stable.



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I rejected you when you came to my balcony, now I got someone better.



Theorem: Let T be the pairing produced by TMA. T is stable.

- Let b and g be any couple in T .
- Suppose b prefers g^* to g . We will argue that g^* prefers her husband to b .
- During TMA, b proposed to g^* before he proposed to g . Hence, at some point g^* rejected b for someone she preferred. By the Improvement lemma, the person she married was also preferable to b .
- Thus, every boy will be rejected by any girl he prefers to his wife. T is stable.

Opinion Poll



Forget TMA for a moment

How should we define what we mean when we say "the optimal girl for boy b "?

Flawed Attempt:
"The girl at the top of b 's list"

The Optimal Girl

A boy's optimal girl is the highest ranked girl for whom there is some stable pairing in which the boy gets her.

She is the best girl he can conceivably get in a stable world. Presumably, she might be better than the girl he gets in the stable pairing output by TMA.

The Pessimal Girl

A boy's pessimal girl is the lowest ranked girl for whom there is some stable pairing in which the boy gets her.

She is the worst girl he can conceivably get in a stable world.

Dating Heaven and Hell

A pairing is male-optimal if every boy gets his optimal mate. This is the best of all possible stable worlds for every boy simultaneously.

A pairing is male-pessimal if every boy gets his pessimal mate. This is the worst of all possible stable worlds for every boy simultaneously.

Dating Heaven and Hell

A pairing is male-optimal if every boy gets his optimal mate. Thus, the pairing is simultaneously giving each boy his optimal.

Is a male-optimal pairing always stable?


Dating Heaven and Hell

A pairing is female-optimal if every girl gets her optimal mate. This is the best of all possible stable worlds for every girl simultaneously.

A pairing is female-pessimal if every girl gets her pessimal mate. This is the worst of all possible stable worlds for every girl simultaneously.

The Naked Mathematical Truth!

The Traditional Marriage
Algorithm always produces
a male-optimal, female-
pessimal pairing.



Theorem: TMA produces a male-optimal pairing

- Suppose, for a contradiction, that some boy gets rejected by his optimal girl during TMA. Let t be the earliest time at which this happened.
- In particular, at time t , some boy b got rejected by his optimal girl g because she said “maybe” to a preferred b^* . By the definition of t , b^* had not yet been rejected by his optimal girl.
- Therefore, b^* likes g at least as much as his optimal.

Some boy b got rejected by his optimal girl g because she said “maybe” to a preferred b^* . b^* likes g at least as much as his optimal girl.

There must exist a stable pairing S in which b and g are married.

- b^* wants g more than his wife in S
 - g is as at least as good as his best and he does not have her in stable pairing S
- g wants b^* more than her husband in S
 - b is her husband in S and she rejects him for b^* in TMA

Some boy b got rejected by his optimal girl g because she said “maybe” to a preferred b^* . b^* likes g at least as much as his optimal girl.


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 - b is her husband in S and she rejects him for b^* in TMA

Contradiction of the stability of S .

What proof technique did we just use?

What proof technique did we just use?



Theorem: The TMA pairing, T , is female-pessimal.

We know it is male-optimal. Suppose there is a stable pairing S where some girl g does worse than in T .

Let b be her mate in T .


Let b^* be her mate in S .

- By assumption, g likes b better than her mate in S
- b likes g better than his mate in S
 - We already know that g is his optimal girl
- **Therefore, S is not stable.**



Contradiction

Advice to females



Learn to make the first move.

Steven Rudich: www.discretemath.com
www.rudich.net

The largest, most successful
dating service in the world
uses a computer to run TMA !

“The Match”: Doctors and Medical Residencies

- Each medical school graduate submits a ranked list of hospitals where he/she wants to do a residency
- Each hospital submits a ranked list of newly minted doctors
- A computer runs TMA (extended to handle Mormon marriages)
- Until recently, it was hospital-optimal

History

1900

- Idea of hospitals having residents (then called “interns”)

Over the next few decades

- Intense competition among hospitals for an inadequate supply of residents
 - Each hospital makes offers independently
 - Process degenerates into a race.
Hospitals steadily advancing date at which they finalize binding contracts

History

1944 Absurd Situation. Appointments being made 2 years ahead of time!

- All parties were unhappy
- Medical schools stop releasing any information about students before some reasonable date
- Did this fix the situation?

History

1944 Absurd Situation. Appointments being made 2 years ahead of time!

- All parties were unhappy
- Medical schools stop releasing any information about students before some reasonable date
- **Offers were made at a more reasonable date, but new problems developed**

History

1945-1949 *Just As Competitive*

- Hospitals started putting time limits on offers
- Time limit gets down to 12 hours
- Lots of unhappy people
- Many instabilities resulting from lack of cooperation

History

1950 Centralized System

- Each hospital ranks residents
- Each resident ranks hospitals
- National Resident Matching Program produces a pairing

Whoops! The pairings were not always stable. By 1952 the algorithm was the TMA (hospital-optimal) and therefore stable.

History Repeats Itself!


NY TIMES, March 17, 1989

- The once decorous process by which federal judges select their law clerks has degenerated into a free-for-all in which some of the judges scramble for the top law school students . . .
- The judge have steadily pushed up the hiring process . . .
- Offered some jobs as early as February of the second year of law school . . .
- On the basis of fewer grades and flimsier evidence . . .

NY TIMES

- "Law of the jungle reigns . . ."
- The association of American Law Schools agreed not to hire before September of the third year . . .
- Some extend offers from only a few hours, a practice known in the clerkship vernacular as a "short fuse" or a "hold up".
- Judge Winter offered a Yale student a clerkship at 11:35 and gave her until noon to accept . . . At 11:55 . . he withdrew his offer

Marry Well!



REFERENCES

D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, *College admissions and the stability of marriage*, American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962), 9-15

Dan Gusfield and Robert W. Irving, *The Stable Marriage Problem: Structures and Algorithms*, MIT Press, 1989