Open Questions about the May 16th Primary

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Software

1. Which PEB firmware versions were used in the election?
2. How many PEBs were running each version (1.05, 1.07c, 1.08)? Master PEBs and Supervisor PEBs?
3. How was this determined–printouts or code comparison?
4. How many different versions of iVotronic software were run?
5. How was this determined–printouts or code comparison?
6. What caused some machines to display a “Touch Screen To Vote” screen while others did not?

Hardware

1. Were the “non-ADA” iVotronic terminals, the ones without the audio-ballot buttons beneath the touch screen, examined and certified by the Secretary of the Commonwealth?

Vote Tabulation

1. When the county-wide results were tabulated on the night of May 16th, how many iVotronic terminals were results missing from?
2. Did the ES&S “Unity Election Reporting Manager” software generate a warning about the missing iVotronic results?

3. How was it that, on the afternoon of Friday, June 2nd, Unity produced widely varying vote totals for the County, ranging from zero votes cast in all races through approximately doubling each vote cast in the County?

4. Was that vote-doubling issue caused by the same issues responsible for the April 2005 vote-quadrupling problem experienced in Kershaw, South Carolina, as reported in the April 29, 2005, article “Counting Error Overstates Votes” in The (South Carolina) State?

5. Why was it necessary for the ES&S representatives operating Unity on the 2nd to spend multiple hours calling Nebraska for technical support? Was nobody present on June 2nd an expert operator of Unity?

6. Does the Unity audit log of exceptions and overrides reflect that Windows Explorer was used to copy and overwrite Unity data files in the course of generating the report that day?

**Paper Ballots**

1. In how many polling places were paper ballots used to enable voting in the face of iVotronic problems?

2. How many iVotronic failures are expected for November?

3. Will paper ballots be available if voters once again face machine problems in November?

**May 16th Results**

1. Why should voters trust that their votes were recorded as cast if a full and precise accounting of which software was running on the machines is not available?
2. How can voters be confident that every vote was counted—exactly once, exactly as cast—if unknown software, and uncertified hardware were feeding results into a tabulating system which doesn’t detect missing or duplicate vote data?

The Future

1. Will an air-tight chain-of-custody process be in place for November, so that every iVotronic will be running exactly the software certified by the Secretary of the Commonwealth?

2. Will the iVotronic zero-print process be changed by November to ensure that a complete and accurate zero print has been produced before the machine accepts votes?

3. When will the County establish an assurance process including a citizen advisory council, local source code review, routine post-election object code audits?

4. Has the County set a deadline for voters being able to personally verify that their vote has been recorded as cast? Why not?