Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games with Restricted Interaction

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Abstract

We study stability of cooperative games with restricted interaction, in the model that was introduced by Myerson [20]. We show that the cost of stability of such games (i.e., the subsidy required to stabilize the game) can be bounded in terms of natural parameters of their interaction graphs. Specifically, we prove that if the treewidth of the interaction graph is $k$, then the relative cost of stability is at most $k + 1$, and this bound is tight for all $k \geq 2$. Also, we show that if the pathwidth of the interaction graph is $k$, then the relative cost of stability is at most $k$.

1 Introduction

Coalitional game theory models scenarios where groups of agents can work together profitably: the agents form teams, or coalitions, and each coalition generates a payoff, which then needs to be shared among the members of that coalition. The agents are assumed to be selfish, so the payoffs should be divided in such a way that each agent is satisfied with his share. In particular, it is desirable to allocate the payoffs so that no group of agents can do better by deviating from their current coalitions and embarking on a project of their own; the set of all payoff division schemes that have this property is known as the core of the game. However, this requirement turns out to be very strong: indeed, there are many games that have an empty core.

There are several ways to capture the intuition behind the notion of the core while relaxing the core constraints. For instance, one can assume that deviation comes at a cost, so players will not deviate unless the profit from doing so exceeds a certain threshold; formalizing this approach leads to the notions of $\varepsilon$-core and least core. Alternatively, one can assume that the deviators are non-myopic, and will not attempt a deviation if it may be followed by a counter-deviation that makes them worse off; this idea is captured by the notion of bargaining set. Yet another approach, which was pioneered by Myerson [20], is based on the idea that communication among agents may be limited, and agents cannot form a deviating coalition unless they can communicate with one another. In more detail, the communication network among the agents is described by an interaction graph, where agents are nodes, and an edge denotes the presence of a communication link; allowable coalitions correspond to connected subgraphs of the interaction graph. Myerson’s model can be seen as a special case of a restriction scheme known as partition systems (see Chapter 5 in Bilbao [6] for an overview). Finally, coalitional stability may be achieved via subsidies: an external party may be willing to stabilize the game by offering a lump sum to the agents as long as they form some desired coalition structure. The minimal subsidy required in order to guarantee stability is known as the cost of stability (CoS) [4] (in what follows, it will be convenient to use a modified version of this notion known as relative cost of stability (RCoS) [19], which is defined as the ratio between the minimal total payoff needed to ensure stability and the total value of an optimal coalition structure).

In this paper, we study the interplay between the latter two concepts, namely, restricted interaction and the cost of stability. Our goal is to bound the (relative) cost of stability of a game in terms of natural parameters of its interaction graph. One such parameter is the treewidth: this is a combinatorial measure of graph structure that ranges from 1 (a tree or a forest) to $n - 1$ (a complete graph on $n$ vertices), and, intuitively, says whether the graph is close to being a tree. A closely related notion is that of pathwidth, which measures how close the graph is to being a path. We are motivated by the classic result of Demange [10], who showed that if the interaction graph is a tree then the core of the game is not empty. Given this result, it is natural to ask if games whose interaction graphs have...
small treewidth are close to having a non-empty core.

**Our Contribution** Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the relationship between the treewidth of the interaction graph and the cost of stability. We show that if the treewidth of the interaction graph of a game $G$ is $k$, then the relative cost of stability of $G$ is at most $k + 1$. Moreover, we demonstrate that this bound is tight whenever $k \geq 2$. We also show that the bound on the relative cost of stability can be improved to $k$ if the pathwidth of the interaction graph is $k$, and this is also tight.

**Related Work** There is a significant body of work on subsidies in cooperative games. Many of the earlier papers focused on cost-sharing games, where agents share the cost of a project, rather than its profits (see, for example, [17, 12]). For profit-sharing games, Bachrach et al. [4] have recently introduced the notion of cost of stability (CoS), which is defined as the minimal subsidy needed to stabilize such games. Bachrach et al. gave bounds on the cost of stability for several classes of coalitional games, and analyzed the complexity of computing the cost of stability in weighted voting games. Several groups of researchers have extended this analysis to other classes of coalitional games [21, 18, 2, 19, 14, 15]. In particular, Meir et al. [19] and Greco et al. [15] studied questions related to the CoS in games with restricted cooperation, providing bounds on the CoS for some simple graphs.

It is well known that many graph-related problems that are computationally hard in the general case become tractable once the treewidth of the underlying graph is bounded by a constant (see, e.g., [9]). There are several graph-based representation languages for cooperative games, and for many of them the complexity of computational questions that arise in cooperative game theory (such as finding an outcome in the core or an optimal coalition structure) has been bounded in terms of the treewidth of the corresponding graph [16, 3, 5, 14]. However, in general bounding the treewidth of the Myerson graph (except for the special case of width 1) does not lead to a tractable solution for these computational questions, as shown by Greco et al. [15] and more recently by Chalkiadakis et al. [8]. Moreover, the notion of treewidth was mostly applied in the context of algorithmic analysis of cooperative games; to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to employ treewidth to prove a game-theoretic result that is not computational in nature.

## 2 Preliminaries

We will now present the definitions that will be used in this paper. In what follows, we use boldface lowercase letters to denote vectors, and uppercase letters to denote sets of agents.

A transferable utility (TU) game is a tuple $G = (N, v)$, where $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ is a finite set of agents and $v : 2^N \to \mathbb{R}$ is the characteristic function of the game. We assume that $v(\emptyset) = 0$.

Also, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we restrict our attention to games where the characteristic function takes non-negative values only, i.e., $v(S) \geq 0$ for all $S \subseteq N$.

A TU game $G = (N, v)$ is superadditive if $v(S \cup T) \geq v(S) + v(T)$ for every $S, T \subseteq N$ such that $S \cap T = \emptyset$; it is monotone if $v(S) \leq v(T)$ for every $S, T \subseteq N$ such that $S \subseteq T$. Further, $G$ is said to be simple if for all $S \subseteq N$ it holds that $v(S) \in \{0, 1\}$. Note that, unlike, e.g., [22], we do not require simple games to be monotone; this allows us to use the inductive argument in Section 3.2. A coalition $S$ in a simple game $G = (N, v)$ is said to be winning if $v(S) = 1$ and losing if $v(S) = 0$.

Following [1], we assume that agents may form coalition structures. A coalition structure over $N$ is a partition of $N$ into disjoint subsets. The value of a coalition structure $CS$ over $N$, denoted by $v(CS)$, is given by $v(CS) = \sum_{S \in CS} v(S)$. We denote the set of all coalition structures over $N$ by $CS(N)$, and write $OPT(G) = \max\{v(CS) \mid CS \in CS(N)\}$. $CS$ is said to be optimal if $v(CS) = OPT(G)$. Note that in superadditive games $v(N) = OPT(G)$.

**Payoffs and Stability** Having split into coalitions and generated profits, agents need to divide the gains among themselves. A payoff vector is simply a vector $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$, where the $i$-th
coordinate is the payoff to agent \( i \in N \). We denote the total payoff to a set \( S \subseteq N \) by \( x(S) \), i.e., we write \( x(S) = \sum_{i \in S} x_i \). We say that a payoff vector \( x \) is a \textit{pre-imputation} for a coalition structure \( CS \) if for all \( S \subseteq CS \) it holds that \( x(S) = v(S) \). A pair of the form \((CS, x)\), where \( CS \in CS(N) \) and \( x \) is a pre-imputation for \( CS \), is referred to as an \textit{outcome} of the game \( G = (N, v) \); an outcome is \textit{individually rational} if \( x_i \geq v(\{i\}) \) for every \( i \in N \). If \( x \) is a pre-imputation for \( CS \) that is individually rational, it is called an \textit{imputation} for \( CS \). We say that an outcome \((CS, x)\) of a game \( G = (N, v) \) is \textit{stable} if \( x(S) \geq v(S) \) for all \( S \subseteq N \). The set of all stable outcomes of \( G \) is called the \textit{core} of \( G \), and is denoted \( \text{Core}(G) \). We let \( S(G) \) denote the set of all payoff vectors (not necessarily pre-imputations) that satisfy the stability constraints, i.e., we set

\[
S(G) = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid x(S) \geq v(S) \text{ for all } S \subseteq N \}.
\]

We refer to payoff vectors such that \( x(N) \geq \text{OPT}(G) \) as \textit{super-imputations}; note that \( S(G) \) consists of super-imputations only.

The \textit{Relative Cost of Stability} of a game \( G \) is the minimal total payoff that stabilizes the game. Formally, we set

\[
\text{RCoS}(G) = \min \left\{ \frac{x(N)}{\text{OPT}(G)} \mid x \in S(G) \right\}.
\]

Note that \( \text{RCoS}(G) \geq 1 \) for every TU game \( G \), and \( \text{RCoS}(G) = 1 \) implies \( \text{Core}(G) \neq \emptyset \).

\textbf{Interaction Graphs and Treewidth} An interaction network over \( N \) is a graph \( H = (N, E) \). Given a game \( G = (N, v) \) and an interaction network over \( N \), we define a game \( G|_H = (N, v|_H) \) by setting \( v|_H(S) = v(S) \) if \( S \) forms a connected subgraph of \( H \), and \( v|_H(S) = 0 \) otherwise; that is, in \( G|_H \) a coalition \( S \subseteq N \) may form if and only if \( S \) forms a connected subgraph of \( H \).

A tree decomposition of \( H \) is a tree \( T \) over the nodes \( V(T) \) with the following properties:

1. Each node of \( T \) is a subset of \( N \).
2. For every pair of nodes \( X, Y \in V(T) \) and every \( i \in N \), if \( i \in X \) and \( i \in Y \) then for any node \( Z \) on the (unique) path between \( X \) and \( Y \) in \( T \) we have \( i \in Z \).
3. For every edge \( e = \{i, j\} \in E \) there exists a node \( X \in V(T) \) such that \( e \subseteq X \).

The width of a tree decomposition \( T \) is \( \text{tw}(T) = \max_{X \in V(T)} |X| - 1 \); the treewidth of \( H \) is defined as \( \text{tw}(H) = \min \{ \text{tw}(T) \mid T \text{ is a tree decomposition of } H \} \). Examples of graphs with low treewidth include trees (whose treewidth is 1) and series-parallel graphs (whose treewidth is at most 2); see, e.g., [7].

Given a subtree \( T' \) of a tree decomposition \( T \) (we use the term “subtree” to refer to any connected subgraph of \( T \)), we denote the agents that appear in the nodes of \( T' \) by \( N(T') \). Conversely, given a set of agents \( S \subseteq N \), we let \( T(S) \) denote the subgraph of \( T \) induced by the node set \( \{ X \in V(T) \mid X \cap S \neq \emptyset \} \); it is not hard to check that \( T(S) \) is a subtree of \( T \) for every \( S \subseteq N \). Given a tree decomposition \( T \) of \( H \) and a node \( R \in V(T) \), we can set \( R \) to be the root of \( T \). In this case, we denote the subtree rooted in a node \( S \in V(T) \) by \( T_S \).

A tree decomposition of a graph \( H \) such that \( T \) is a path is called a \textit{path decomposition} of \( H \). The \textit{pathwidth} of \( H \) is defined as \( \text{pw}(H) = \min \{ \text{tw}(T) \mid T \text{ is a path decomposition of } H \} \). It is known that for any graph \( H \), \( \text{tw}(H) \leq \text{pw}(H) \) and \( \text{pw}(H) = \text{tw}(H) \cdot O(\log(n)) \).

### 3 Treewidth and the Cost of Stability

Our goal in this section is to provide a general upper bound on the cost of stability for TU games whose interaction networks have bounded treewidth. We start by proving a bound for simple games; we then show how to extend it to the general case.

\footnote{We note that a tree decomposition of hypergraphs is defined in the same way, except that every hyperedge must be contained in some node.}
3.1 Simple Games

Algorithm 1: STABLE-PAYOFF-TW($G = \langle N, v, H, k, T \rangle$)

Fix an arbitrary $R \in V(T)$ to be the root;
$t \leftarrow 0$, $N_1 \leftarrow N$, $x \leftarrow 0^n$;
for $A \in V(T)$, traversed from the leaves upwards do
\[ t \leftarrow t + 1; \]
if there is some $S \subseteq N(T_A) \cap N_t$ such that $v|_H(S) = 1$ then
\[ x_i \leftarrow 1 \]
$N_{t+1} \leftarrow N_t \setminus N(T_A);$ \hspace{1cm} // remove all agents in $N(T_A)$ from the entire tree
else
\[ N_{t+1} \leftarrow N_t; \]
return $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$;

We will now show that if $G$ is a game with a set of agents $N$ and $H$ is an interaction network over $N$ then $RCoS(G|_H) \leq tw(H) + 1$. Our proof is constructive: we design an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that receives as its input a simple game $G = \langle N, v \rangle$, a network $H$, a parameter $k$, and a tree decomposition $T$ of $H$ of width of at most $k$, and outputs a stable super-imputation for $G|_H$. Briefly, Algorithm 1 picks an arbitrary node $R \in V(T)$ to be the root of $T$ and traverses the nodes of $T$ from the leaves towards the root. Upon arriving at a node $A$, it checks whether the subtree $T_A$ rooted in $A$ contains a coalition that is winning in $G|_H$ (note that we have to check every subset of $N(T_A) \cap N_t$, since $G|_H$ is not necessarily monotone). If this is the case, it pays 1 to all agents in $A$ and removes all agents in $T_A$ from every node of $T$. Note that every winning coalition in $T_A$ has to be connected, so either it is fully contained in a proper subtree of $T_A$ or it contains agents in $A$. The reason for deleting the agents in $T_A$ is simple: every winning coalition that contains members of $T_A$ is already stable (one of its members is getting a payoff of 1). The algorithm then continues up the tree in the same manner until it reaches the root. Note that Algorithm 1 is very similar to the one proposed by Demange [10]; however, Algorithm 1 may pay $2 \cdot OPT(G|_H)$ if $H$ is a tree.\(^2\) Moreover, while Demange’s algorithm runs in polynomial time, Algorithm 1 may require exponential time, since it is designed to work for non-monotone simple games. However, if the simple game given as input is monotone, a straightforward modification (check whether $v|_H(S) = 1$ only for $S = N(T_A)$ rather than for every $S \subseteq N(T_A)$) will make it run in polynomial time.

Theorem 3.1. For every simple game $G = \langle N, v \rangle$ and every interaction network $H$ over $N$ it holds that $RCoS(G|_H) \leq tw(H) + 1$.

Proof. Let $T$ be a tree decomposition of $H$ such that $tw(T) = k$. Suppose first that $G|_H$ is superadditive. This means that any two winning coalitions in $G|_H$ intersect. Hence, for every pair of winning coalitions $S_1, S_2 \subseteq N$ the subtrees $T(S_1)$ and $T(S_2)$ intersect. This implies that there exists a node $A \in V(T)$ that belongs to the intersection of all subtrees that correspond to winning coalitions in $T$ (this fact is known as Helly’s Theorem for Trees), and hence intersects every winning coalition. Therefore we can stabilize the game by paying 1 to every agent in $A$. Thus, our total payment is $|A| \leq tw(T) + 1 \leq k + 1$.

We now turn to the more general case of arbitrary simple games. Let $x$ be the output of Algorithm 1. We claim that $x$ is stable (i.e., $x \in S(G|_H)$) and $x(N) \leq k + 1$.

\(^2\)This is because Algorithm 1 operates on the tree decomposition $T$ of $H$, which has nodes of size 2. In this special case we can modify our algorithm by only paying one of the agents in $A$—the one that does not appear above $A$ in the tree. The resulting payoff vector would then coincide with the one constructed by Demange’s algorithm.
To prove stability, consider a coalition \(S\) with \(v|_H(S) = 1\); we need to show that \(x(S) > 0\). Suppose for the sake of contradiction that \(x(S) = 0\); this means that each agent in \(S\) is deleted before he is allocated any payoff. Consider the first time step when an agent in \(S\) is deleted; suppose that this happens at step \(t\) when a node \(A \in V(T)\) is processed. Clearly for an agent in \(S\) to be deleted at this step it has to be the case that \(T(S) \cap T_A \neq \emptyset\). Further, it cannot be the case that \(S \cap (A \cap N_t) \neq \emptyset\), since each agent in \(A \cap N_t\) is assigned a payoff of 1 at step \(t\), and we have assumed that \(x(S) = 0\). Therefore, \(T(S)\) must be a proper subtree of \(T_A\). Let \(B\) be the root of \(T(S)\), and consider the time step \(t' < t\) when \(B\) is processed. At time \(t'\), all agents in \(S\) are still present in \(T\), so the node \(B\) meets the if condition in Algorithm 1, and therefore each agent in \(B\) gets assigned a payoff of 1. This is a contradiction, since \(B\) is the root of \(T(S)\), and therefore \(B \cap S = \emptyset\), which implies \(x(S) > 0\).

It remains to show that \(x(N) \leq (k + 1)OPT(G)\). To this end, we will construct a specific coalition structure \(CS^*\) and argue that \(x(N) \leq (k + 1)v(CS^*)\).

The coalition structure \(CS^*\) is constructed as follows. Let \(A_t\) be the node of the tree considered by Algorithm 1 at time \(t\), and let \(S_t = N(T_{A_t}) \cap N_t\), i.e., \(S_t\) is the set of all agents that appear in \(T_{A_t}\) at time \(t\). Let \(T^*\) be the set of all values of \(t\) such that \(A_t\) meets the if condition in Algorithm 1. For each \(t \in T^*\) the set \(S_t\) contains a winning coalition; let \(W_t\) be an arbitrary winning coalition contained in \(S_t\). Finally, let \(L = N \setminus (\cup_{t \in T^*} W_t)\), and set \(CS^* = \{L\} \cup \{W_t \mid t \in T^*\}\).

Observe that \(CS^*\) is a coalition structure, i.e., a partition of \(N\). Indeed, \(L \cap W_t = \emptyset\) for all \(t \in T^*\), and, moreover, if \(i \in W_t\) for some \(t > 0\), then \(i\) was removed from \(T\) at time \(t\), and cannot be a member of coalition \(W_t\) for \(t' > t\). Further, we have \(v(CS^*) = |T^*|\).

To bound the total payment, we observe that no agent is assigned any payoff at time \(t \notin T^*\), and each agent that is assigned a payoff of 1 at time \(t \in T^*\) is a member of \(A_t\). Hence we have

\[
x(N) = \sum_{t \in T^*} x(A_t) \leq \sum_{t \in T^*} |A_t| \leq \sum_{t \in T^*} (k + 1) = (k + 1)|T^*| = (k + 1)v(CS^*) \leq (k + 1)OPT(G),
\]

which proves that \(RCoS(G) \leq k + 1\). \(\square\)

We note that under the payment scheme constructed by Algorithm 1 the payoff of every agent is either 1 or 0. Note also that the proof of Theorem 3.1 goes through as long as \(G|_H\) is simple, even if \(G\) itself is not simple.

### 3.2 The General Case

Using Theorem 3.1, we are now ready to prove our main result.

**Theorem 3.2.** For every game \(G = \langle N, v \rangle\) and every interaction network \(H\) over \(N\) it holds that \(RCoS(G|_H) \leq tw(H) + 1\).

**Proof.** We first prove the claim for all integer-valued games. We use an inductive argument on \(OPT(G|_H) = m\). If \(OPT(G|_H) = 1\) then in particular \(G|_H\) is simple, so we are done by Theorem 3.1. Now suppose that our claim is true for all \(m' < m\); we will show that it holds for \(m\). To simplify notation, we identify \(v\) with \(v|_H\), i.e., we write \(v\) in place of \(v|_H\) throughout the proof. We define the following simple game \(G' = \langle N, v' \rangle\):

\[
v'(S) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v(S) > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

We prove by induction on \(OPT(G|_H)\) that \(RCoS(G') \leq tw(H) + 1\). If \(OPT(G') = 0\), then \(RCoS(G') \leq 0\) (by Theorem 3.1). Otherwise we have \(OPT(G') = 1\) and can also apply Theorem 3.1.

If \(OPT(G') > 1\), then we can pick an agent \(i\) that gets a payoff of 1 in \(v\) and was deleted in a step \(t\) when a node \(A \in V(T)\) was processed. Then we have \(OPT(G') \leq tw(H) + 1\) by Theorem 3.1. Therefore, we have \(OPT(G) \leq tw(H) + 1\). By induction on \(OPT(G)\), we have \(RCoS(G) \leq tw(H) + 1\). Hence by Theorem 3.1, \(RCoS(G') \leq tw(H) + 1\). This completes the proof. \(\square\)
By Theorem 3.1, there exists a super-imputation $x'$ such that $x'(S) \geq v'(S)$ for all $S \subseteq N$ and $x'(N) \leq (tw(H) + 1)v'(CS')$, where $CS'$ is an optimal coalition structure over $G'$. Moreover, we can assume that $x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$, as Algorithm 1 outputs such a super-imputation. We define a game $G'' = (N, v'')$ by setting

$$v''(S) = \max\{0, v(S) - x'(S)\}.$$  

Note that $v''(S) \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ for all $S \subseteq N$, since $x' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $G$ is integer-valued. Moreover, let $CS''$ be an optimal coalition structure for $G''$, and let $CS''_+ = \{S \in CS'' \mid v''(S) > 0\}$. We have

$$\sum_{S \in CS''} v''(S) = \sum_{S \in CS''_+} v''(S) = \sum_{S \in CS''_+} v(S) - x'(S).$$

Moreover, for every $S \in CS''_+$ we have $v(S) - x'(S) > 0$; in particular this means that $v(S) > 0$, which implies that $v'(S) = 1 \leq x'(S)$. Therefore for any $S \in CS''_+$ we have

$$v''(S) = v(S) - x'(S) \leq v(S) - 1 < v(S).$$

We conclude that

$$\sum_{S \in CS''} v''(S) = \sum_{S \in CS''_+} v''(S) < \sum_{S \in CS''_+} v(S) \leq m.$$  

Thus, the value of an optimal coalition structure over $G''$ is strictly less than $m$, i.e., we can apply the induction hypothesis to $G''$. This means that there is a super-imputation $x''$ such that $x''(N) \leq (tw(H) + 1)v''(CS'')$ and $x''(S) \geq v'(S)$ for all $S \subseteq N$. We set $x = x' + x''$. We will now show that $x(N) \leq (tw(H) + 1)OPT(G)$ and $x(S) \geq v(S)$ for all $S \subseteq N$.

First, observe that for all $S \subseteq N$ we have $x(S) = x'(S) + x''(S) \geq x'(S) + v'(S) = x'(S) + v(S) - x'(S) = v(S)$, so $x$ is a stable super-imputation for $G$. Now, let $CS''$ be an optimal coalition structure over $G''$, and consider $CS'' \setminus CS''_+$, i.e., the set of all coalitions of value 0 in $CS''$. We can assume without loss of generality that $CS'' \setminus CS''_+$ is a singleton, i.e., there is only one coalition of value 0 in $CS''$; we denote this coalition by $S_0$. Let $CS'$ be an optimal coalition structure over $G'$, and let $CS'_+ = \{S \in CS' \mid v'(S) = 1\}$. Set $N^* = N \setminus S_0$; then we have

$$x'(N^*) \geq \sum_{S \in CS'_+} x'(S \cap N^*) \geq \sum_{S \in CS'_+} v'(S \cap N^*) = |\{S \in CS'_+ \mid S \cap N^* \neq \emptyset\}|.$$  

Let $t^* = |\{S \in CS'_+ \mid S \cap N^* \neq \emptyset\}|$ and let $t_0 = |\{S \in CS'_+ \mid S \subseteq S_0\}|$. $t^*$ is number of coalitions in $CS'_+$ that intersect $N^*$, and $t_0$ is the number of those that are contained in $S_0$. The total value of $CS'$ is thus $|CS'_+| = t^* + t_0$.

We are now ready to bound $x(N)$. We obtain

$$x(N) = x'(N) + x''(N) \leq (tw(H) + 1)v''(CS'') + (tw(H) + 1)v'(CS')$$

$$= (tw(H) + 1) \left( \sum_{S \in CS''_+} (v(S) - x'(S)) + |CS'_+| \right)$$

$$= (tw(H) + 1) \left( \sum_{S \in CS''_+} v(S) - x'(N^*) + |CS'_+| \right)$$

$$\leq (tw(H) + 1) \left( v(CS''_+) - t^* + |CS'_+| \right) = (tw(H) + 1) \left( v(CS'_+) + t_0 \right). \quad (1)$$

Further, we have $t_0 = \sum_{S \in CS'_+, S \subseteq S_0} v(S) \leq \sum_{S \in CS'_+, S \subseteq S_0} v(S)$, so the final term in (1) is at most $(tw(H) + 1) \left( v(CS'_+) + \sum_{S \in CS'_+, S \subseteq S_0} v(S) \right)$. This is a sum over a partition of (a subset of) $N$, so its total value is at most that of $OPT(G|_H)$, which concludes the proof for the integer case.
To extend this result to non-integer-valued games, we make the following observation. Given a game \( G = \langle N, \nu \rangle \), we can consider the game \( \varepsilon G = \langle N, \nu_\varepsilon \rangle \) given by \( \nu_\varepsilon(S) = \varepsilon \nu(S) \) for every \( S \subseteq N \); we note that if \( G \) is simple, then for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \) Algorithm 1 can be applied to the game \( \varepsilon G \) and hence Theorem 3.1 remains true for \( \varepsilon G \). Moreover, in \( \varepsilon G \) every agent receives a payoff of either \( \varepsilon \) or 0. Further, when defining the modified characteristic function \( \nu' \), we can set \( \varepsilon = \min_{S \subseteq N} \{ \nu(S) \mid \nu(S) > 0 \} \) and let \( \nu'(S) = \varepsilon \) whenever \( \nu(S) > 0 \) (instead of setting \( \nu'(S) = 1 \)). The rest of the proof can be modified appropriately (with a different \( \min \) in Theorem 3.2 directly, as superadditivity may not be preserved; therefore, we must go through all steps of the proof).

The \( RCoS \) of any cooperative game, even with unrestricted cooperation, is at most \( \sqrt{n} \) (see [4, 18]). Thus, we obtain \( RCoS(G|_H) \leq \min\{tw(H) + 1, \sqrt{n}\} \), assuming that coalition structures are allowed. Moreover, when applied to superadditive games, Theorem 3.2 implies that there is some stable super-imputation \( x \) such that \( x(N) \leq (tw(H) + 1)v(N) \).

Finally, since a simple superadditive game can be viewed as a collection of intersecting sets, we obtain the following corollary, which may be of independent interest.

\[ \text{Corollary 3.3. Let } H = \langle N, E \rangle \text{ be a graph, and let } R_k = \langle N, F, k \rangle \text{ be an instance of HITTING SET [13], where } F = \{S_j\}_{j=1}^m \text{ is a collection of pairwise intersecting subsets of } N, \text{ and every } S_j \text{ is connected in } H \text{ (i.e., } \langle S_j, E_{|S_j|} \rangle \text{ is connected). Then for all } k \leq tw(H) - 1 \text{ it holds that } R_k \text{ is a "yes"-instance of HITTING SET and a hitting set of size (at most) } k \text{ can be found efficiently.} \]

3.3 Tightness

Demange [10] showed that if \( tw(H) = 1 \), then the game \( G|_H \) admits a stable outcome, i.e., \( RCoS(G|_H) = 1 \). This result is limited to games whose interaction networks are trees. However, we will now show that if the treewidth of the interaction network is at least 2, then the upper bound of \( tw(H) + 1 \) proved in Theorem 3.2 is tight.

\[ \text{Theorem 3.4. For every } k \geq 2 \text{ there is a simple superadditive game } G = \langle N, \nu \rangle \text{ and an interaction network } H \text{ over } N \text{ such that } tw(H) = k \text{ and } RCoS(G|_H) = k + 1. \]

\[ \text{Proof. Instead of defining } H \text{ directly, we will describe its tree decomposition } T. \text{ There is one central node } A = \{z_1, \ldots, z_k + 1\}. \text{ Further, for every unordered pair } I = \{i, j\}, \text{ where } i, j \in [1, \ldots, k + 1] \text{ and } i \neq j, \text{ we define a set } D_I \text{ that consists of 7 agents and set } N = A \cup \bigcup_{j \neq i} D_{\{i, j\}}. \]

The tree \( T \) is a star, where leaves are all sets of the form \( \{z_i, z_j, d\} \), where \( d \in D_{\{i, j\}} \). That is, there are \( 7 \cdot \left(\frac{k+1}{2}\right) \) leaves, each of size 3. Since the maximal node of \( T \) is of size \( k + 1 \), it corresponds to some network whose treewidth is at most \( k \). We set \( D_i = \bigcup_{j \neq i} D_{\{i, j\}} \); observe that for any two agents \( z_i, z_j \in A \) we have \( D_i \cap D_j = D_{\{i, j\}} \). Given \( T \), it is now easy to construct the underlying interaction network \( H \): there is an edge between \( z_i \) and every \( d \in D_{\{i, j\}} \) for every \( j \neq i \); see Figure 1 for more details.

For every unordered pair \( I = \{i, j\} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, k + 1\} \), let \( Q_I \) denote the projective plane of dimension 3 (a.k.a. the Fano plane) over \( D_I \). That is, \( Q_I \) contains seven triplets of elements from \( D_I \), so that every two triplets intersect, and every element \( d \in D_I \) is contained in exactly 3 triplets in \( Q_I \). Winning sets are defined as follows. For every \( i = 1, \ldots, k + 1 \) and every selection \( \{Q_{\{i,j\}} \in Q_{\{i,j\}} \}_{j \neq i} \) the set \( \{z_i\} \cup \bigcup_{j \neq i} Q_{\{i,j\}} \) is winning. Thus for every \( z_i \) there are \( 7^k \) winning coalitions containing \( z_i \), each of size \( 1 + 3k \). Let us denote by \( W_i \) the set of winning coalitions that contain \( z_i \); observe that for every \( d \notin A \), \( d \) appears in exactly \( 3 \cdot 7^{k-1} \) winning coalitions in \( W_i \); \( d \) belongs to some \( D_{\{i,j\}} \), and is selected to be in a winning coalition with \( z_i \) if a triplet \( Q_{\{i,j\}} \)

\[ 3 \]
containing \( d \) is joined to \( z_i \). There are 3 triplets in \( Q_{\{i,j\}} \) that contain \( d \), and there are \( 7^{k-1} \) ways to choose the other triplets (seven choices from every one of the other \( k - 1 \) sets).

We first argue that all winning coalitions intersect. Indeed, let \( C_i, C_j \) be winning coalitions such that \( z_i \in C_i, z_j \in C_j \). Then both \( C_i \) and \( C_j \) contain some triplet from \( Q_{\{i,j\}} \). Suppose \( Q_{\{i,j\}} \subseteq C_i, Q'_{\{i,j\}} \subseteq C_j \). Since \( Q_{\{i,j\}}, Q'_{\{i,j\}} \in Q_{\{i,j\}} \), they must intersect, and thus \( C_i \) and \( C_j \) must also intersect. This implies that the simple game induced by these winning coalitions is indeed superimputational and has an optimal value of 1. Note that if we pay 1 to each \( z_i \in A \), then the resulting super-imputation is stable, since every winning coalition intersects \( A \). To conclude the proof, we must show that any stable super-imputation must pay at least \( k + 1 \) to the agents.

Given a stable super-imputation \( x \), we know that \( x(C_i) \geq 1 \) for every \( C_i \in W_i \). Thus, \( \sum_{C_i \in W_i} x(C_i) \geq 7^k \). We can write \( \sum_{C_i \in W_i} x(C_i) \) as

\[
\sum_{C_i \in W_i} x(C_i) = \sum_{C_i \in W_i} \left( x_{z_i} + \sum_{d \notin z_i | d \in C_i} x_d \right) = 7^k x_{z_i} + \sum_{C_i \in W_i, d \notin z_i | d \in C_i} x_d
\]

\[
= 7^k x_{z_i} + \sum_{d \in D_i} 1 \sum_{C_i \in W_i, d \notin z_i | d \in C_i} x_d = 7^k x_{z_i} + \sum_{d \in D_i} 3 \cdot 7^{k-1} x_d
\]

This immediately implies that \( x_{z_i} \geq 1 - \frac{3}{7} x(D_i) \). Observe that \( \sum_{x_i \in A} x(D_i) = 2 \sum_{i < j} x(D_{\{i,j\}}) \), as each \( D_{\{i,j\}} \) appears exactly twice in the summation: once in \( D_i \) and once in \( D_j \). Also, observe that \( \sum_{i < j} x(D_{\{i,j\}}) = x(N \setminus A) \), so \( \sum_{i=1}^{k+1} x(D_i) = 2x(N \setminus A) \). Finally,

\[
x(N) = x(A) + x(N \setminus A) = \sum_{i=1}^{k+1} x_{z_i} + x(N \setminus A)
\]

\[
\geq \sum_{i=1}^{k+1} \left( 1 - \frac{3}{7} x(D_i) \right) + x(N \setminus A) = \sum_{i=1}^{k+1} 1 - \frac{3}{7} 2x(N \setminus A) + x(N \setminus A)
\]

\[
= k + 1 + (1 - \frac{6}{7}) x(N \setminus A) \geq k + 1
\]

Thus, the relative cost of stability in our game is at least \( k + 1 \). \( \square \)

We observe that Theorem 3.4 does not hold when \( k = 1 \) since the width of our construction is at least 2 (each leaf is of size 3). Indeed, if it were to hold for \( k = 1 \), we would obtain a contradiction with Demange’s theorem.

### 4 Pathwidth and the Cost of Stability

For some graphs we can bound not just their treewidth, but also their pathwidth. For example, for a simple cycle graph both the treewidth and the pathwidth are equal to 2. For games over interaction networks with bounded pathwidth, the bound of \( tw(H) + 1 \) shown in Section 3 can be tightened.

**Theorem 4.1.** For every TU game \( G = (v, N) \) and every interaction network \( H \) over \( N \) it holds that \( \text{RCoS}(G|H) \leq pw(H) \), and this bound is tight.

**Proof.** Note first that it suffices to show that our bound holds for simple games; we can then use the reduction described in the proof of Theorem 3.2. For simple games, our proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1; however, here we will show that in every node \( A_j \) that satisfies the \textbf{if} condition of Algorithm 2 we can identify an agent that we do not need to pay.
Our algorithm first deals with winning coalitions of size 1. This step can be justified as follows. Suppose we remove all agents in $I = \{i \in N \mid v(\{i\}) = 1\}$ and construct a stable super-imputation $x'$ for the game $G'_{|H}$, where $G' = (N', v')$, $N' = N \setminus I$, and $v'(S) = v(S)$ for each $S \subseteq N \setminus I$, so that $x'(N') \leq pw(H)$. Now, consider a super-imputation $x$ for $G$ given by $x_i = 1$ for $i \in I$, $x_i = x'_i$ for $i \in N'$. We have $x(N) = x'(N') + |I|$, and, furthermore, $x(S) \geq v(H)$ for every $S \subseteq N$, i.e., $x$ is a stable super-imputation for $G_{|H}$. On the other hand, it is not hard to check that $OPT(G_{|H}) = OPT(G'_{|H}) + |I|$. Hence, we obtain

$$\frac{x(N)}{OPT(G_{|H})} = \frac{x'(N') + |I|}{OPT(G'_{|H}) + |I|} < \frac{x'(N')}{OPT(G'_{|H})} \leq pw(H),$$

i.e., $x$ witnesses that $RCos(G_{|H}) \leq pw(H)$. Thus, we begin Algorithm 2 by paying all winning singletons 1 and ignoring them (and any winning coalitions that contain them) for the rest of the execution; note, however, that we do not remove the winning singletons from $H$, i.e., we do not modify our path decomposition or its width.

Next we show stability. Given a node $A_j$, we must make sure that each winning coalition in $N(T_{A_j})$ is paid at least 1. By the proof of Theorem 3.1, paying all agents in $A_j$ is sufficient. Note, however, that there is no need to pay an agent $i$ that is not in $N(T_{A_j}) \setminus A_j$: since we removed all winning singletons, every winning coalition in $N(T_{A_j})$ that contains $i$ (and that is not yet stabilized) must also contain another agent from $A_j$.

Finally, we must show that in every paid node $A_j$, $j \geq 2$, there is at least one agent that is not paid. Note that $A_j$ has a unique child $A_{j-1}$. If $A_{j-1} \subseteq A_{j-1}$, then no agent in $A_j$ is being paid (as they had already been paid when processing $A_{j-1}$). Otherwise, there is some agent $i \in A_j \setminus A_{j-1}$. Since $T$ is a path and all nodes containing $i$ must be connected, we have $i \notin N(A_j) \setminus A_j$. Thus $i$ is not paid. Note that in Algorithm 2 the agents in $A_1$ are not paid in the first iteration of the algorithm.

To show tightness, we use a slight modification of the construction from Section 3.3; we omit the details due to space constraints.
Algorithm 2: \textsc{Stable-Payoff-PW}(G = (N, v, H, k, T))

Set $T = (A_1, \ldots, A_m)$; 
$x \leftarrow 0^n$; 
$I \leftarrow \{i \in N \mid v\{i\} = 1\}$; 
for $i \in I$ do 
    $x_i \leftarrow 1$; 
$I_1 \leftarrow N \setminus I$; 
    // Remove all singletons 
    $t \leftarrow 1$; 
for $j = 1$ to $m$ do 
    if there is some $S \subseteq N(T_{A_j}) \cap N_j$ such that $v(S) = 1$ then 
        for $i \in A_j \cap N_j$ do 
            if $i \in N(T_{A_j}) \setminus A_j$ then 
                // Pay agents unless it is the first node they appear in 
                $x_i \leftarrow 1$ 
            $N_{j+1} \leftarrow N_j \setminus N(T_{A_j})$; 
        // Remove all agents in $N(T_{A_j})$ from the entire path 
    else 
        $N_{j+1} \leftarrow N_j$; 
    return $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$;

5 Conclusions, Discussion, and Future Work

Our main result shows a tight connection between the treewidth of an interaction network and the minimal subsidy required to stabilize a game played by the interacting agents: Simply put, as the interaction becomes “simpler”, the game becomes easier to stabilize. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the notion of treewidth is used to obtain results that are purely game-theoretic rather than algorithmic in nature.

While we provide bounds on $RCoS$ both in terms of the treewidth of the interaction network and in terms of its pathwidth, we view the former result as more significant than the latter: indeed, the result for the pathwidth only provides an improved bound when the pathwidth is exactly equal to the treewidth, which is quite uncommon.

Our results imply a separation between games whose interaction networks are acyclic, which have been shown to be stable [10], and other games. That is, treewidth of 1 implies $RCoS$ of 1, but for any higher value of treewidth, the $RCoS$ is somewhat higher. In particular, the result of Demange is not a special case of our theorem, although it can be proved using a very similar technique (i.e., by breaking the game into multiple simple games).

Games with implicit Myerson graphs While interaction networks have been introduced by Myerson as an external restriction independent of the value function, for some families of cooperative games this restriction is implicit in the game description. A prominent example is the class of induced subgraph games (ISG) proposed by Deng and Papadimitriou [11], where agents correspond to vertices of a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of weights of the edges between coalition members. Imposing the very same graph as an interaction network will preserve the value of any coalition in the game. Therefore, we can deduce a bound on the $RCoS$ of a given ISG directly from its description, by measuring the treewidth of its underlying graph. Other families that implicitly induce a Myerson graph are matching games and some variations of network flow games.
Hypergraphs Myerson’s model can be generalized to hypergraphs rather than graphs [23]. Since our methods work with tree decompositions rather than the interaction networks themselves, they apply equally well to this case. Interestingly, the underlying hypergraph of a game defined via a marginal contribution net [16] also induces a Myerson (hyper)graph, which can in turn be used to bound the required subsidy.

The least core We remark that the cost of stability is closely related to another important notion of stability in cooperative games, namely, the least core; specifically, Meir et al. [19] show that the value of both the strong least core and the weak least core of a cooperative game can be bounded in terms of its additive cost of stability. Briefly, the value of the least core measures the dissatisfaction of coalitions in the “most stable” outcome, and is perhaps the most standard measure of stability in cooperative games. Our results, combined with those of [19], imply that any bound on the treewidth or pathwidth of the interaction graph translates into a bound on this important quantity. This provides further evidence that simple social interactions increase stability.

5.1 Future Work

While our bound on the cost of stability is tight in the worst case, it may be further improved by considering finer restrictions on the structure of the interaction network and/or the value function itself. More generally, we believe that this new connection between a well-studied graph parameter such as the treewidth and the stability properties of a related game is fascinating. We look forward to studying how such parameters can be used to reveal other hidden connections in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory.

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