

15-780: Graduate AI

Lecture 2. Proofs & FOL

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Admin

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Matlab tutorial



- *When is good?*



Review

What is AI?



- *Lots of examples: poker, driving robots, RoboCup*
- *Things that are easy for us to do, but no obvious algorithm*
- *Search / optimization / summation*
- *Handling uncertainty*

Propositional logic



- *Syntax*
 - *variables, constants, operators*
 - *literals, clauses, sentences*
- *Semantics ($model \mapsto \{T, F\}$)*
- *Truth tables, how to evaluate formulas*
- *Satisfiable, valid, contradiction*

Propositional logic



- *Manipulating formulas (e.g., de Morgan)*
- *Normal forms (e.g., CNF)*
- *Tseitin transformation to CNF*
- *How to translate informally-specified problems into logic (e.g., 3-coloring)*



Compositional Semantics

Semantics

- *Recall: meaning of a formula is a function*
 $models \mapsto \{T, F\}$
- *Why this choice? So that meanings are*
compositional
- *Write $[\alpha]$ for meaning of formula α*
- $[\alpha \wedge \beta](M) = f(M) = [\alpha](M) \wedge [\beta](M)$
- *Similarly for $\vee, \neg$, etc.*

Structural induction



- *Why are compositional semantics useful?*
- *Can prove properties of FOL formulas by induction on their parse trees*
- *Prove property P holds for all atoms*
- *Then show that $P(\alpha), P(\beta)$ imply $P(\alpha \wedge \beta), P(\alpha \vee \beta), P(\neg \alpha)$ for arbitrary formulas α, β*



Proofs

Entailment



- *Sentence A **entails** sentence B , $A \models B$, if B is True in every model where A is*
 - *same as saying that $(A \Rightarrow B)$ is valid*

Proof tree



- *A tree with a formula at each node*
- *At each internal node, children $\models$ parent*
- *Leaves: **assumptions or premises***
- *Root: **consequence***
- *If we believe assumptions, we should also believe consequence*

Proof tree example


$r \wedge \text{rains} \Rightarrow \text{pours}$

$\text{pours} \wedge \text{outside} \Rightarrow \text{rusty}$


rains

outside

Proof tree example



Proof tree example



Proof by contradiction

- *Assume opposite of what we want to prove, show it leads to a contradiction*
- *Suppose we want to show $KB \models S$*
- *Write KB' for $(KB \wedge \neg S)$*
- *Build a proof tree with*
 - *assumptions drawn from clauses of KB'*
 - *conclusion = F*
 - *so, $(KB \wedge \neg S) \models F$ (contradiction)*

Proof by contradiction

KB

$\text{rains} \Rightarrow \text{pours}$

$\text{pours} \wedge \text{outside} \Rightarrow \text{rusty}$


rains

outside

$\neg \text{rusty}$

↑ negation of desired
conclusion

Proof by contradiction





Inference rules

Inference rule



- *To make a proof tree, we need to be able to figure out new formulas entailed by KB*
- *Method for finding entailed formulas = **inference rule***
- *We've implicitly been using one already*

Modus ponens

$$\frac{(a \wedge b \wedge c \Rightarrow d) \quad a \quad b \quad c}{d}$$

- *Probably most famous inference rule: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal*
- *Quantifier-free version:*
 $man(Socrates) \wedge$
 $(man(Socrates) \Rightarrow mortal(Socrates))$

Another inference rule



$$\frac{(a \Rightarrow b) \quad \neg b}{\neg a}$$

- *Modus tollens*
- *If it's raining the grass is wet; the grass is not wet, so it's not raining*

One more...

$$\frac{(a \vee b \vee c) \ (\neg c \vee d \vee e)}{a \vee b \vee d \vee e}$$

- ***Resolution***
- *Combines two sentences that contain a literal and its negation*
- *Not as commonly known as modus ponens / tollens*

Resolution example



- *Modus ponens / tollens are special cases*

- *Modus tollens:*

$$(\neg \textit{raining} \vee \textit{grass-wet}) \wedge \neg \textit{grass-wet} \models \neg \textit{raining}$$

Resolution



$$\frac{(a \vee b \vee c) (\neg c \vee d \vee e)}{a \vee b \vee d \vee e}$$

- *Simple proof by case analysis*
- *Consider separately cases where we assign $c = \text{True}$ and $c = \text{False}$*

Resolution case analysis

$$(a \vee b \vee c) \wedge (\neg c \vee d \vee e) \quad c = T$$

$$(a \vee b \vee T) \wedge (F \vee d \vee e)$$

$$\frac{T \wedge (d \vee e)}{}$$

$$(a \vee b \vee F) \wedge (T \vee d \vee e) \quad c = F$$

$$(a \vee b) \wedge T$$

$$(a \vee b) \vee (a \vee e) = (a \vee b \vee a \vee e)$$

Soundness and completeness



- *An inference procedure is **sound** if it can only conclude things entailed by KB*
 - *common sense; haven't discussed anything unsound*
- *A procedure is **complete** if it can conclude everything entailed by KB*

Completeness



- *Modus ponens by itself is **incomplete***
- *Resolution is **complete** for propositional logic*
 - *not obvious—famous theorem due to Robinson*
 - *caveat: also need **factoring**, removal of redundant literals $(a \vee b \vee a) \models (a \vee b)$*

Variations



- *Horn clause inference (faster)*
- *Ways of handling uncertainty (slower)*
- *CSPs (sometimes more convenient)*
- *Quantifiers / first-order logic*

Horn clauses



- *Horn clause: $(a \wedge b \wedge c \Rightarrow d)$*
- *Equivalently, $(\neg a \vee \neg b \vee \neg c \vee d)$*
- *Disjunction of literals, **at most one** of which is positive*
- *Positive literal = **head**, rest = **body***

Use of Horn clauses

- *People find it easy to write Horn clauses (listing out conditions under which we can conclude head)*

$$\text{happy}(\text{John}) \wedge \text{happy}(\text{Mary}) \Rightarrow \text{happy}(\text{Sue})$$

- *No negative literals in above formula; again, easier to think about*

Why are Horn clauses important



- *Modus ponens alone is complete*
- *So is modus tollens alone*
- *Inference in a KB of propositional Horn clauses is linear*
 - *e.g., by forward chaining*

Forward chaining



- *Look for a clause with all body literals satisfied*
- *Add its head to KB (modus ponens)*
- *Repeat*
- *See RN for more details*

Handling uncertainty



- *Fuzzy logic / certainty factors*
 - *simple, but don't scale*
- *Nonmonotonic logic*
 - *also doesn't scale*
- *Probabilities*
 - *may or may not scale—more later*
 - *Dempster-Shafer (interval probability)*

Certainty factors



- *KB assigns a **certainty factor** in $[0, 1]$ to each proposition*
- *Interpret as “degree of belief”*
- *When applying an inference rule, certainty factor for consequent is a function of certainty factors for antecedents (e.g., minimum)*

Problems w/ certainty factors

- *Famously difficult to debug a KB with certainty factors, because...*
- *it's hard to separate a large KB into mostly-independent chunks that interact only through a well-defined interface, because...*
- *certainty factors are not probabilities (i.e., do not obey Bayes' Rule)*

Nonmonotonic logic

- *Suppose we believe all birds can fly*
- *Might add a set of sentences to KB*

bird(Polly) $\Rightarrow$ flies(Polly)

bird(Tweety) $\Rightarrow$ flies(Tweety)

bird(Tux) $\Rightarrow$ flies(Tux)

bird(John) $\Rightarrow$ flies(John)

...

Nonmonotonic logic

- *Fails if there are penguins in the KB*

- *Fix: instead, add*

$$\text{bird}(\text{Polly}) \wedge \neg \text{ab}(\text{Polly}) \Rightarrow \text{flies}(\text{Polly})$$

$$\text{bird}(\text{Tux}) \wedge \neg \text{ab}(\text{Tux}) \Rightarrow \text{flies}(\text{Tux})$$

...

- *$\text{ab}(\text{Tux})$ is an “abnormality predicate”*
- *Need separate $\text{ab}_i(x)$ for each type of rule*

Nonmonotonic logic

- *Now set as few abnormality predicates as possible*
- *Can prove $\text{flies}(\text{Polly})$ or $\text{flies}(\text{Tux})$ with no $\text{ab}(x)$ assumptions*
- *If we assert $\neg \text{flies}(\text{Tux})$, must now assume $\text{ab}(\text{Tux})$ to maintain consistency*
- *Can't prove $\text{flies}(\text{Tux})$ any more, but can still prove $\text{flies}(\text{Polly})$*

Nonmonotonic logic




- *Works well as long as we don't have to choose between big sets of abnormalities*
 - *is it better to have 3 flightless birds or 5 professors that don't wear jackets with elbow-patches?*
- *even worse with nested abnormalities: birds fly, but penguins don't, but superhero penguins do, but ...*



First-order logic

First-order logic

Bertrand Russell
1872-1970



- *So far we've been using opaque vars like **rains** or **happy(John)***
- *Limits us to statements like “it's raining” or “if John is happy then Mary is happy”*
- *Can't say “all men are mortal” or “if John is happy then someone else is happy too”*

Predicates and objects

- *Interpret $\text{happy}(\text{John})$ or $\text{likes}(\text{Joe}, \text{pizza})$ as a **predicate** applied to some **objects***
- *Object = an object in the world*
- *Predicate = boolean-valued function of objects*
- *Zero-argument predicate $x()$ plays same role that Boolean variable x did before*

Distinguished predicates



- *We will assume three distinguished predicates with fixed meanings:*
 - *True / T, False / F*
 - *Equal(x, y)*
- *We will also write $(x = y)$ and $(x \neq y)$*

Equality satisfies usual axioms



- *Reflexive, transitive, symmetric*
- *Substituting equal objects doesn't change value of expression*

$(John = Jonathan) \wedge loves(Mary, John)$
 $\Rightarrow loves(Mary, Jonathan)$

Functions



- *Functions map zero or more objects to another object*
 - *e.g., professor(15-780), last-common-ancestor(John, Mary)*
- *Zero-argument function is the same as an object—John v. John()*

The **nil** object



- *Functions are untyped: must have a value for **any** set of arguments*
- *Typically add a **nil** object to use as value when other answers don't make sense*

Types of values

- *Expressions in propositional logic could only have Boolean (T/F) values*
- *Now we have two types of expressions: object and Boolean*
 - *$\text{done}(\text{slides}(15-780)) \Rightarrow \text{happy}(\text{professor}(15-780))$*
- *Functions convert objects to objects; predicates convert objects to Booleans; connectives convert Booleans to Booleans*

Definitions



- ***Term** = expression referring to an object*
 - *John*
 - *left-leg-of(father-of(president-of(USA)))*
- ***Atom** = predicate applied to objects*
 - *happy(John)*
 - *raining*
 - *at(robot, Wean-5409, 11AM-Wed)*

Definitions



- *Literal* = possibly-negated atom
 - $happy(John), \neg happy(John)$
- *Sentence* = literals joined by connectives like $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow$
 - *raining*
 - $done(slides(780)) \Rightarrow happy(professor)$

Semantics

- *Models are now much more complicated*
 - *List of objects (finite or countable)*
 - *Table of function values for each function mentioned in formula*
 - *Table of predicate values for each predicate mentioned in formula*
- *Meaning of sentence: $\text{model} \mapsto \{T, F\}$*
- *Meaning of term: $\text{model} \mapsto \text{object}$*

For example



KB describing example

- $alive(cat)$
- $ear-of(cat) = ear$
- $in(cat, box) \wedge in(ear, box)$
- $\neg in(box, cat) \wedge \neg in(cat, nil) \dots$
- $ear-of(box) = ear-of(ear) = ear-of(nil) = nil$
- $cat \neq box \wedge cat \neq ear \wedge cat \neq nil \dots$

Aside: avoiding verbosity

- *Closed-world assumption: literals not assigned a value in KB are false*
 - *avoid stating $\neg in(box, cat)$, etc.*
- *Unique names assumption: objects with separate names are separate*
 - *avoid $box \neq cat$, $cat \neq ear$, ...*

Aside: typed variables

- *KB also illustrates need for **data types***
- *Don't want to have to specify $\text{ear-of}(\text{box})$ or $\neg \text{in}(\text{cat}, \text{nil})$*
- *Could design a type system*
 - *argument of $\text{happy}()$ is of type **animate***
- *Function instances which disobey type rules have value **nil***

Model of example

- *Objects: C, B, E, N*
- *Assignments:*
 - *cat: C, box: B, ear: E, nil: N*
 - *ear-of(C): E, ear-of(B): N, ear-of(E): N, ear-of(N): N*
- *Predicate values:*
 - *in(C, B), $\neg$ in(C, C), $\neg$ in(C, N), ...*

Failed model



- *Objects: C, E, N*
- *Fails because there's no way to satisfy inequality constraints with only 3 objects*

Another possible model



- *Objects: C, B, E, N, X*
- *Extra object X could have arbitrary properties since it's not mentioned in KB*
- *E.g., X could be its own ear*

An embarrassment of models



- *In general, can be infinitely many models*
 - *unless KB limits number somehow*
- *Job of KB is to rule out models that don't match our idea of the world*
- *Saw how to rule out CEN model*
- *Can we rule out CBENX model?*

Getting rid of extra objects



- *Can use quantifiers to rule out CBENX model:*

$$\forall x. x = cat \vee x = box \vee x = ear \vee x = nil$$

- *Called a **domain closure assumption***

Quantifiers

- Want “all men are mortal,” or closure
- Add **quantifiers** and **object variables**
 - $\forall x. \text{man}(x) \Rightarrow \text{mortal}(x)$
 - $\neg \exists x. \text{lunch}(x) \wedge \text{free}(x)$
- $\forall$: no matter how we fill in object variables, formula is still true
- $\exists$: there is some way to fill in object variables to make formula true

Variables



- *Build atoms from variables $x, y, \dots$ as well as constants John, Fred, $\dots$*
 - *$\text{man}(x), \text{loves}(\text{John}, z), \text{mortal}(\text{brother}(y))$*
- *Build formulas from these atoms*
 - *$\text{man}(x) \Rightarrow \text{mortal}(\text{brother}(x))$*
- *New syntactic construct: term or formula w/ **free variables***

New syntax $\Rightarrow$ new semantics

- *New part of model: **interpretation***
- *Maps variables to model objects*
 - $x: C, y: N$
- *Meaning of a term or formula: look up its free variables in the interpretation, then continue as before*
- $alive(ear(x)) \mapsto alive(ear(C)) \mapsto alive(E) \mapsto T$

Working with interpretations



- Write $(M / x: obj)$ for the model which is just like M except that variable x is interpreted as the object obj
- $M / x: obj$ is a **refinement** of M

Binding

- *Adding quantifier for x is called **binding** x*
 - *In $(\forall x. \text{likes}(x, y))$, x is bound, y is free*
- *Can add quantifiers and apply logical operations like $\wedge \vee \neg$ in any order*
- *But must eventually wind up with **ground** formula (no free variables)*

Semantics of $\forall$



- *A sentence $(\forall x. S)$ is true in M if S is true in $(M / x: \text{obj})$ for all objects obj in M*

Example

- *M has objects (A, B, C) and predicate happy(x) which is true for A, B, C*
- *Sentence $\forall x. \text{happy}(x)$ is satisfied in M*
 - *since happy(A) is satisfied in M/x:A, happy(B) in M/x:B, happy(C) in M/x:C*

Semantics of $\exists$



- *A sentence $(\exists x. S)$ is true in M if there is some object obj in M such that S is true in model $(M / x: obj)$*

Example

- *M has objects (A, B, C) and predicate*
 - *happy(A) = happy(B) = True*
 - *happy(C) = False*
- *Sentence $\exists x. \text{happy}(x)$ is satisfied in M*
- *Since happy(x) is satisfied in, e.g., M/x:B*

Scoping rules

- *Portion of formula where quantifier applies = **scope***
- *Variable is bound by **innermost** enclosing scope with matching name*
- *Two variables in different scopes can have same name—they are still different vars*

Scoping examples

- $(\forall x. \text{happy}(x)) \vee (\exists x. \neg \text{happy}(x))$
 - *Either everyone's happy, or someone's unhappy*
- $\forall x. (\text{raining} \wedge \text{outside}(x) \Rightarrow (\exists x. \text{wet}(x)))$
 - *The x who is outside may not be the one who is wet*

Quantifier nesting



- *English sentence “everybody loves somebody” is ambiguous*
- *Translates to logical sentences*
 - $\forall x. \exists y. \text{loves}(x, y)$
 - $\exists y. \forall x. \text{loves}(x, y)$



Reasoning in FOL

Entailment, etc.



- *As before, entailment, unsatisfiability, validity, equivalence, etc. refer to all possible models*
- *But now, can't determine by enumerating models*
 - *since there could be infinitely many*

Equivalences

- *All transformation rules for propositional logic still hold*
- *In addition, there is a “De Morgan’s Law” for moving negations through quantifiers*

$$\neg \forall x. S \equiv \exists x. \neg S$$

$$\neg \exists x. S \equiv \forall x. \neg S$$

- *And, rules for getting rid of quantifiers*

Generalizing CNF



- *Eliminate $\Rightarrow$, move $\neg$ in w/ De Morgan*
 - *but $\neg$ moves through quantifiers too*
- *Get rid of quantifiers (see below)*
- *Distribute $\wedge \vee$, or use Tseitin*

Do we really need $\exists$?

- $\exists x. \text{happy}(x)$
- $\text{happy}(\text{happy_person}())$
- $\forall y. \exists x. \text{loves}(y, x)$
- $\forall y. \text{loves}(y, \text{loved_one}(y))$

Skolemization

- *Called **Skolemization** (after Thoraf Albert Skolem)*
- *Eliminate $\exists$ by substituting a function of arguments of all enclosing $\forall$ quantifiers*
- *Make sure to use a new name!*



*Thoraf Albert Skolem
1887–1963*

Do we really need $\forall$?

- $\forall x. \text{happy}(x) \wedge \forall y. \text{takes}(y, \text{CS780})$
- $\text{happy}(x) \wedge \text{takes}(y, \text{CS780})$

Getting rid of quantifiers

- *Standardize apart (avoid name collisions)*
- *Skolemize*
- *Drop $\forall$ (free variables implicitly universally quantified)*
- *Terminology: still called “free” even though quantification is implicit*

For example

- $\forall x. \text{man}(x) \Rightarrow \text{mortal}(x)$
 - $(\neg \text{man}(x) \vee \text{mortal}(x))$
- $\forall x. (\text{honest}(x) \Rightarrow \text{happy}(\text{Diogenes}))$
 - $(\neg \text{honest}(y) \vee \text{happy}(\text{Diogenes}))$
- $\forall y. \exists x. \text{loves}(y, x)$
 - $\text{loves}(z, f(z))$

Exercise



- $(\forall x. \textit{honest}(x)) \Rightarrow \textit{happy}(\textit{Diogenes})$

Exercise

$((\forall x) \text{honest}(x)) \Rightarrow \text{happy}(\text{Diogenes})$

$(\neg ((\forall x) \text{honest}(x))) \vee \text{happy}(D)$

$(\exists x : \neg \text{honest}(x)) \vee \text{happy}(D)$

$\neg \text{honest}(\text{foo}()) \vee \text{happy}(D)$