

1 Introduction

Learning from experience is a key capability in AI, because it can be difficult to program a system in advance to act appropriately. Learning is especially important in multiagent settings where the other agents' behavior is not known in advance. Multiagent learning (learning in games) is complicated by the fact that the other agents may be learning as well, thus making the environment nonstationary for a learner.

Multiagent learning has been studied with different objectives as well as with different restrictions on the game and on what the learner can observe (e.g., Tan, 1993; Littman, 1994; Sandholm & Crites, 1996; Sen & Weiss, 1998). Two *minimal* desirable properties of a good multiagent learning algorithm are

- Learning to play optimally against stationary opponents (or even opponents that eventually become stationary).¹
- Convergence to a Nash equilibrium in self-play (that is, when all the agents use the same learning algorithm).

These desiderata are *minimal* in the sense that any multiagent learning algorithm that fails at least one of these properties is, in a sense, unsatisfactory. Of course, one might also want the algorithm to have additional properties.² We discuss alternative objectives for learning in games in Section 7.

The WoLF-IGA (Bowling & Veloso, 2002) algorithm (an improvement over an earlier algorithm (Singh, Kearns, & Mansour, 2000)) constituted a significant step forward in this line of research. It is guaranteed to have both of the properties in general-sum (repeated) games under the following assumptions:

- (a) there are at most 2 players,
- (b) each player has at most 2 actions to choose from,
- (c) the opponent's mixed strategy (distribution over actions) is observable, and
- (d) gradient ascent of infinitesimally small step sizes can be used.³

Another algorithm, ReDVaLeR, was proposed more recently (Banerjee & Peng, 2004) (after the introduction of the AWESOME algorithm, described in this paper, at the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2003). ReDVaLeR achieves the two properties in general-sum games with arbitrary numbers of actions and opponents, but still requires assumptions (c) and (d). In addition, for a different setting of a parameter of the algorithm, ReDVaLeR achieves constant-bounded regret. An interesting aspect of this algorithm is that it explicitly checks whether the opponents' strategies are stationary or not, and proceeds differently depending on the result of this check. This serves to demonstrate just how powerful assumption (c) really is, in that it allows one to achieve the two properties separately: if the result of the check is positive, one can focus on converging to a best response, and if it is negative, one can focus on

¹This property has sometimes been called *rationality* (Bowling & Veloso, 2002), but we avoid that term because it has an established, different meaning in economics.

²It can be argued that the two properties are not even strong enough to constitute a "minimal" set of requirements, in the sense that we would still not necessarily be satisfied with an algorithm if it has these properties. However, we would likely not be satisfied with any algorithm that did *not* meet these two requirements, even if it had other properties. This is the sense in which we use the word "minimal".

³Bowling and Veloso also defined a more generally applicable algorithm based on the same idea, but only gave experimental justification for it.

AWESOME restarts completely. AWESOME may reject either of these hypotheses based on actions played in an *epoch*. Over time, the epoch length is carefully increased and the criterion for hypothesis rejection tightened to obtain the convergence guarantee. The AWESOME algorithm is also self-aware: when it detects that its own actions signal nonstationarity to the others, it restarts itself for synchronization purposes.

The techniques used in proving the properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those used for previous algorithms, because the requirement that the opponents' mixed strategies can be observed is dropped. These techniques may also be valuable in the analysis of other learning algorithms in games.

It is important to emphasize that, when attempting to converge to an equilibrium, as is common in the literature, our goal is to eventually learn the equilibrium of the *one-shot* game, which, when played repeatedly, will also constitute an equilibrium of the repeated game. The advantage of such equilibria is that they are natural and simple, always exist, and are robust to changes in the discounting/averaging schemes. Nevertheless, in repeated games it is possible to also have equilibria that are fundamentally different from repetitions of the one-shot equilibrium; such equilibria rely on a player conditioning its future behavior on the opponents' current behavior. Interestingly, a recent paper shows that when players try to maximize the limit of their average payoffs, such equilibria can be constructed in worst-case polynomial time (Littman & Stone, 2003).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the setting. In Section 3, we motivate and define the AWESOME algorithm and show how to set its parameters soundly. In Section 4, we show that AWESOME converges to a best response against opponents that (eventually) play stationary strategies. In Section 5, we show that AWESOME converges to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. In Section 6, we experimentally compare AWESOME to fictitious play. In Section 7, we discuss alternative objectives for learning in games (and, in the process, we also discuss a large body of related research). In Sections 8 and 9, we present conclusions and directions for future research.

2 Model and definitions

We study multiagent learning in a setting where a fixed finite number of agents play the same finite stage game repeatedly. We first define the stage game and then the repeated game.

2.1 The stage game

Definition 1 (Stage game). A *stage game* is defined by a finite set of agents $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, and for each agent i , a finite action set A_i , and a utility function $u_i : A_1 \times A_2 \times \dots \times A_n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. The agents choose their actions independently and concurrently.

We now define strategies for a stage game.

Definition 2 (Strategy). A *strategy* for agent i (in the stage game) is a probability distribution π_i over its action set A_i , indicating what the probability is that the agent will play each action. In a *pure strategy*, all the probability mass is on one action. Strategies that are not pure are called *mixed strategies*.

same equilibrium.⁶ We observe that *any* equilibrium will work here (e.g., a social welfare maximizing one), but AWESOME might not converge to *that* equilibrium in self-play—that is, it may converge to another equilibrium.

- When retreating to the equilibrium strategy, AWESOME forgets everything it has learned. So, retreating to an equilibrium is a complete restart. (This may be wasteful in practice, but makes the analysis easier.)
- Best-responding to strategies that are close to the precomputed equilibrium strategies, but slightly different, can lead to rapid divergence from the equilibrium. To avoid this, AWESOME at various stages has a null hypothesis that the others are playing the precomputed equilibrium. AWESOME will not reject this hypothesis unless presented with significant evidence to the contrary.
- AWESOME rejects the equilibrium hypothesis also when its own actions, chosen according to its mixed equilibrium strategy, happen to appear to indicate a nonequilibrium strategy (even though the underlying mixed strategy is actually the equilibrium strategy). This will help in proving convergence in self-play by making the learning process synchronized across all AWESOME players. (Since the other AWESOME players will restart when they detect such nonstationarity, this agent restarts itself to stay synchronized with the others.)
- After AWESOME rejects the equilibrium hypothesis, it randomly picks an action and changes its strategy to always playing this action. At the end of an epoch, if another action would perform *significantly* better than this action against the strategies the others appeared to play in the last epoch, it switches to this action. (The significant difference is necessary to prevent the AWESOME player from switching back and forth between multiple best responses to the actual strategies played.)
- Because the others' strategies are unobservable (only their actions are observable), we need to specify how an AWESOME agent can reject, based on others' actions, the hypothesis that the others are playing the precomputed equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, we need to specify how an AWESOME agent can reject, based on others' actions, the hypothesis that the others are drawing their actions according to stationary (mixed) strategies. We present these specifications in the next subsection.

3.3 Verifying whether others are playing the precomputed equilibrium and detecting nonstationarity

We now discuss the problem of how to reject, based on observing the others' actions, the hypothesis that the others are playing according to the precomputed equilibrium strategies. AWESOME proceeds in epochs: at the end of each epoch, for each agent i in turn (including itself), it compares the actual distribution, h_i , of the actions that i played in the epoch (i.e. what percentage of the time each action was played) against the (mixed) strategy π_i^* from the precomputed equilibrium. AWESOME concludes that the actions are drawn from the equilibrium strategy if and only if the distance between the two distributions is small: $\max_{a_i \in A_i} |p_{h_i}^{a_i} - p_{\pi_i^*}^{a_i}| < \epsilon_e$, where p_{ϕ}^a is the percentage of time that action a is played in ϕ .

When detecting whether or not an agent is playing a stationary (potentially mixed) strategy, AWESOME uses the same idea, except that in the closeness measure, in place of π_i^* it uses

⁶This is at least somewhat reasonable since they share the same algorithm. If there are only finitely many equilibria, then one way to circumvent this assumption is to let each agent choose a random equilibrium after each restart, so that there is at least some probability that the computed equilibria coincide.

the actual distribution, h_i^{prev} , of actions played in the epoch just preceding the epoch that just ended. Also, a different threshold may be used: ϵ_s in place of ϵ_e . So, AWESOME maintains the stationarity hypothesis if and only $\max_{a_i \in A_i} |p_{h_i}^{a_i} - p_{h_i^{prev}}^{a_i}| < \epsilon_s$.

The naïve implementation of this keeps the number of iterations N in each epoch constant, as well as ϵ_e and ϵ_s . Two problems are associated with this naïve approach. First, even if the actions are actually drawn from the equilibrium distribution (or a stationary distribution when we are trying to ascertain stationarity), there is a fixed nonzero probability that the actions taken in any given epoch, by chance, do not appear to be drawn from the equilibrium distribution (or, when ascertaining stationarity, that the actual distributions of actions played in consecutive epochs do not look alike).⁷ Thus, with probability 1, AWESOME would eventually restart. So, AWESOME could never converge (because it will play a random action between each pair of restarts). Second, AWESOME would not be able to distinguish a strategy from the precomputed equilibrium strategy if those strategies are within ϵ_e of each other. Similarly, AWESOME would not be able to detect nonstationarity if the distributions of actions played in consecutive epochs are within ϵ_s .

We can fix both of these problems by letting the distance ϵ_e and ϵ_s decrease each epoch, while simultaneously increasing the epoch length N . If we increase N sufficiently fast, the probability that the equilibrium distribution would by chance produce a sequence of actions that does not appear to be drawn from it will decrease each epoch in spite of the decrease in ϵ_e . (Similarly, the probability that a stationary distribution will, in consecutive epochs, produce action distributions that are further than ϵ_s apart will decrease in spite of the decrease in ϵ_s .) In fact, these probabilities can be decreased so fast that there is nonzero probability that the equilibrium hypothesis (resp. stationarity hypothesis) will *never* be rejected over an infinite number of epochs. Chebyshev’s inequality, which states that $P(|X - E(X)| \geq t) \leq \frac{Var(X)}{t^2}$, will be a crucial tool in demonstrating this.

3.4 The algorithm skeleton

We now present the backbone of the algorithm for repeated games.

First we describe the variables used in the algorithm. Me refers to the AWESOME player. π_p^* is player p ’s equilibrium strategy. ϕ is the AWESOME player’s current strategy. h_p^{prev} and h_p^{curr} are the histories of actions played by player p in the previous epoch and the epoch just played, respectively. (h_{-Me}^{curr} is the vector of all h_p^{curr} besides the AWESOME player’s.) t is the current epoch (reset to 0 every restart). $APPE$ (all players playing equilibrium) is *true* if the equilibrium hypothesis has not been rejected. APS (all players stationary) is *true* if the stationarity hypothesis has not been rejected. β is *true* if the equilibrium hypothesis was just rejected (and gives one epoch to adapt before the stationarity hypothesis can be rejected). $\epsilon_e^t, \epsilon_s^t, N^t$ are the values of those variables for epoch t . n is the number of players, $|A|$ the maximum number of actions for a single player, μ (also a constant) the utility difference between the AWESOME player’s best and worst outcomes in the game.

Now we describe the functions used in the algorithm. `ComputeEquilibriumStrategy` computes the equilibrium strategy for a player. `Play` takes a strategy as input, and plays an action drawn from that distribution. `Distance` computes the distance (as defined above) between strategies (or histories). `V` computes the expected utility of playing a given strategy or action against a given strategy profile for the others.

⁷This holds for all distributions except those that correspond to pure strategies.

N go to infinity relatively fast compared to the ϵ_e and ϵ_s . The reason for this exact definition will become clear from the proofs in the next section.

Definition 4. A schedule $\{(\epsilon_e^t, \epsilon_s^t, N^t)\}_{t \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}}$ is valid if

- $\epsilon_s^t, \epsilon_e^t$ decrease monotonically and converge to 0.
- $N^t \rightarrow \infty$.
- $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} (1 - |A|_{\Sigma} \frac{1}{N^t (\epsilon_s^{t+1})^2}) > 0$ (with all factors > 0), where $|A|_{\Sigma}$ is the total number of actions summed over all players.
- $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} (1 - |A|_{\Sigma} \frac{1}{N^t (\epsilon_e^t)^2}) > 0$ (with all factors > 0).

The next theorem shows that a valid schedule always exists.

Theorem 1. *A valid schedule always exists.*

Proof: Let $\{\epsilon_e^t = \epsilon_s^{t+1}\}_{t \in \{0,1,2,\dots\}}$ be any decreasing sequence going to 0. Then let $N^t = \lceil \frac{|A|_{\Sigma}}{(1 - \frac{1}{2^{(\frac{1}{t})^2})} (\epsilon_e^t)^2)} \rceil$ (which indeed goes to infinity). Then, $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} 1 - |A|_{\Sigma} \frac{1}{N^t (\epsilon_s^{t+1})^2} = \prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} 1 - |A|_{\Sigma} \frac{1}{N^t (\epsilon_e^t)^2} \geq \prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} \frac{1}{2^{(\frac{1}{t})^2}}$ (we also observe that all factors are > 0). Also, $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} \frac{1}{2^{(\frac{1}{t})^2}} = 2^{-\sum_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} \log \frac{1}{2^{(\frac{1}{t})^2}}} = 2^{-\sum_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} -(\frac{1}{t})^2}$. Because the sum in the exponent converges, it follows that this is positive. \square

4 AWESOME learns a best-response against eventually stationary opponents

In this section we show that if the other agents use fixed (potentially mixed) strategies, then AWESOME learns to play a best-response strategy against the opponents. This holds even if the opponents are nonstationary first (e.g., because they are learning themselves), as long as they become stationary at some time.

Theorem 2. *With a valid schedule, if all the other players play fixed strategies forever after some round, AWESOME converges to a best response with probability 1.*

Proof: We prove this in two parts. First, we prove that after any given restart, with nonzero probability, the AWESOME player never restarts again. Second, we show that after any given restart, the probability of never restarting again without converging on the best response is 0. It follows that with probability 1, we will eventually converge.

To show that after any given restart, with nonzero probability, the AWESOME player never restarts again: consider the probability that for all t (t being set to 0 right after the restart), we have $\max_{p \neq Me} \{d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p)\} \leq \frac{\epsilon_s^{t+1}}{2}$ (where the AWESOME player is player Me , ϕ_p^t is the distribution of actions actually played by p in epoch t , and ϕ_p is the (stationary) distribution that p is actually playing from). This probability is given by $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} (1 - P(\max_{p \neq Me} \{d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p)\} > \frac{\epsilon_s^{t+1}}{2}))$, which is greater than $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} (1 - \sum_{p \neq Me} P(d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p) > \frac{\epsilon_s^{t+1}}{2}))$, which in turn is greater than $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} (1 - \sum_{p \neq Me} \sum_a P(|\phi_p^t(a) - \phi_p(a)| > \frac{\epsilon_s^{t+1}}{2}))$ (where $\phi_p(a)$ is the probability ϕ_p places on a). Because $E(\phi_p^t(a)) = \phi_p(a)$, and observing $\text{Var}(\phi_p^t(a)) \leq \frac{1}{4N^t}$, we can now apply Chebyshev’s inequality and conclude that the whole product is greater than $\prod_{t \in \{1,2,\dots\}} 1 - |A|_{\Sigma} \frac{1}{N^t (\epsilon_s^{t+1})^2}$,

where $|A|_\Sigma$ is the total number of actions summed over all players.⁸ But for a valid schedule, this is greater than 0.

Now we show that if this event occurs, then *APS* will not be set to *false* on account of the stationary players. This is because

$$d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p^{t-1}) > \epsilon_s^t \Rightarrow d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p) + d(\phi_p^{t-1}, \phi_p) > \epsilon_s^t \Rightarrow d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p) > \frac{\epsilon_s^t}{2} \vee d(\phi_p^{t-1}, \phi_p) > \frac{\epsilon_s^t}{2} \Rightarrow d(\phi_p^t, \phi_p) > \frac{\epsilon_s^{t+1}}{2} \vee d(\phi_p^{t-1}, \phi_p) > \frac{\epsilon_s^t}{2}$$

(using the triangle inequality and the fact that the ϵ_s are strictly decreasing).

All that is left to show for this part is that, given that this happens, *APS* will, with some nonzero probability, not be set to *false* on account of the AWESOME player. Certainly this will not be the case if *APPE* remains *true* forever, so we can assume that this is set to *false* at some point. Then, with probability at least $\frac{1}{|A|}$, the first action b that the AWESOME player will choose after *APPE* is set to *false* is a best response to the stationary strategies. (We are making use of the fact that the stationary players’ actions are independent of this choice.) We now claim that if this occurs, then *APS* will not be set to *false* on account of the AWESOME player, because the AWESOME player will play b forever. This is because the expected utility of playing any action a against players who play from distributions ϕ_{-Me}^t (call this $u_{Me}(a, \phi_{-Me}^t)$) can be shown to differ at most $n|A| \max_{p \neq Me} d(\phi_p, \phi_p^t)\mu$ from the expected utility of playing action a against players who play from distributions ϕ_{-Me} (call this $u_{Me}(a, \phi_{-Me})$). Thus, for any t and any a , we have

$$u_{Me}(a, \phi_{-Me}^t) \leq u_{Me}(a, \phi_{-Me}) + n|A|\epsilon_s^{t+1}\mu \leq u_{Me}(b, \phi_{-Me}) + n|A|\epsilon_s^{t+1}\mu$$

(because b is a best-response to ϕ_{-Me}), and it follows that the AWESOME player will never change its strategy.

Now, to show that after any given restart, the probability of never restarting again without converging on the best response is 0: there are two ways in which this could happen, namely with *APPE* being set to *true* forever, or with it set to *false* at some point. In the first case, we can assume that the stationary players are not actually playing the precomputed equilibrium (because in this case, the AWESOME player would actually be best-responding forever). Let $p \neq Me$ and a be such that $\phi_p(a) \neq \pi_p^*(a)$, where $\pi_p^*(a)$ is the equilibrium probability p places on a . Let $d = |\phi_p(a) - \pi_p^*(a)|$. By Chebyshev’s inequality, the probability that $\phi_p^t(a)$ is within $\frac{d}{2}$ of $\phi_p(a)$ is at least $1 - \frac{1}{N^t d^2}$, which goes to 1 as t goes to infinity (because N^t goes to infinity). Because ϵ_e^t goes to 0, at some point $\epsilon_e^t < \frac{d}{2}$, so $|\phi_p^t(a) - \phi_p(a)| < \frac{d}{2} \Rightarrow |\phi_p^t(a) - \pi_p^*(a)| > \epsilon_e^t$. With probability 1, this will be true for some $\phi_p^t(a)$, and at this point *APPE* will be set to *false*. So the first case happens with probability 0. For the second case where *APPE* is set to *false* at some point, we can assume that the AWESOME player is not playing any best-response b forever from some point onwards, because in this case the AWESOME player would have converged on a best response. All we have to show is that from any epoch t onwards, with probability 1, the AWESOME player will eventually switch actions (because starting at some epoch t , ϵ_s will be small enough that this will cause *APS* to be set to *false*). If playing an action a against the true profile ϕ_{-Me} gives expected utility k less than playing b , then by continuity, for some ϵ , for any strategy profile ϕ'_{-Me} within distance ϵ of the true profile ϕ_{-Me} , playing a against ϕ'_{-Me} gives expected utility at least $\frac{k}{2}$ less than playing b . By an argument similar to that made in the first case, the

⁸ We used the fact that the schedule is valid to assume that the factors are greater than 0 in the manipulation.




Fig. 1 Play against the stationary player (0.4, 0.6, 0) in rock-paper-scissors

solvable by iterated strict dominance (Nachbar, 1990). However, there are also games in which the distributions do not converge under fictitious play (Shapley, 1964).

In our experiments, we study the convergence of (1) the empirical distribution of play (that is, the entire history of actions that were played), (2) the empirical distribution over the last 500 rounds only (a “moving average”), and (3) the actual mixed strategy used in a specific round. We only show 3) for AWESOME, because fictitious play chooses actions deterministically and therefore will never converge to a mixed strategy in this sense. As our distance measure between two distributions p_1 and p_2 over a set S , we use $d(p_1, p_2) = \max_{s \in S} |p_1(s) - p_2(s)|$. We use a valid schedule for AWESOME: we set $\epsilon'_s = 1/t$ and define the other parameters as in the proof of Theorem 1.

6.1 Rock-paper-scissors

The first game that we study is the well-known rock-paper-scissors game, which is often used as an example to illustrate how fictitious play can be effective (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998).

0.5, 0.5	0, 1	1, 0
1, 0	0.5, 0.5	0, 1
0, 1	1, 0	0.5, 0.5

Rock-paper-scissors.

In the unique Nash equilibrium of this game, each player plays each action with probability 1/3. In Fig. 1, we show experimental results for playing against a stationary opponent that uses the mixed strategy (0.4, 0.6, 0).⁹ Fictitious play converges to the best response very

⁹There is no particular reason for using this distribution (or, for that matter, for using any other distribution).




Fig. 2 Self-play in rock-paper-scissors

rapidly. This is not surprising, as fictitious play is an ideal algorithm for playing against a stationary player: it best-responds against the best estimate of the opponent’s strategy. AWESOME initially plays the equilibrium strategy, but eventually rejects the equilibrium hypothesis, and from that point plays the best response. It takes a large number of rounds for AWESOME’s historical distribution to converge because of the other actions it played before it rejected the equilibrium hypothesis; but the moving distribution converges rapidly once AWESOME starts best-responding.

In Fig. 2, we show experimental results for self-play (in which each algorithm plays against a copy of itself). Both algorithms perform well here (note the changed scale on the y-axis). For fictitious play, it is known that the players’ empirical distributions of play converge to the equilibrium distributions in all zero-sum games (Robinson, 1951), and rock-paper-scissors is a zero-sum game. AWESOME never rejects the equilibrium hypothesis and therefore always plays according to the Nash equilibrium. We note that the 500-round moving distribution cannot be expected to converge exactly: when drawing from a mixed strategy a fixed number of times only, the empirical distribution will rarely coincide exactly with the actual distribution.

6.2 Shapley’s game

The other game that we study is Shapley’s game, which is often used as an example to illustrate how fictitious play can fail (Fudenberg & Levine, 1998).

0, 1	0, 0	1, 0
0, 0	1, 0	0, 1
1, 0	0, 1	0, 0

Shapley’s game.




Fig. 3 Play against the stationary player (0.4, 0.6, 0) in Shapley's game

Again, in the unique Nash equilibrium of this game, each player plays each action with probability $1/3$. In Fig. 3, we show experimental results for playing against a stationary opponent that uses the mixed strategy (0.4, 0.6, 0). The results are similar to those for rock-paper-scissors.

Finally, in Fig. 4, we show experimental results for self-play. Fictitious play now cycles and the empirical distributions never converge (as was first pointed out by Shapley himself (Shapley, 1964)). Because the length of the cycles increases over time, the 500-round moving distribution eventually places all of the probability on a single action and is therefore as far away from equilibrium as possible. AWESOME, on the other hand, again never rejects the equilibrium hypothesis and therefore continues to play the equilibrium.

7 Discussion of alternative learning objectives

In this section, we discuss alternative objectives that one may pursue for learning in games, and we argue for the importance of the objectives that we pursued (and that AWESOME achieves).

7.1 Convergence to equilibrium in self-play

In self-play, AWESOME converges to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. One may well wonder whether this requirement is unnecessarily strong: various weaker notions are available. For instance, one may consider *correlated* equilibrium (Aumann, 1974), in which the players receive correlated random signals (before playing the stage game), on which they can then base their play. This is not unreasonable, and it has the advantages that correlated

This has the odd property that the agent will not care about the outcomes of any finite set of periods of play. Another way to value future outcomes is through discounting. In the limit case where the future is extremely discounted, only the outcome of the current period matters, and thus any equilibrium of the repeated game is an equilibrium of the stage game. Thus, any algorithm that is robust to extreme discounting must be able to converge to an equilibrium of the stage game. Another reason to prefer learning algorithms that converge to an equilibrium of the stage game is the following: equilibria of the repeated game do not make much sense in scenarios in which the game is repeated only for learning purposes, *e.g.* when we are training our agent to play (say) soccer by having it play over and over again. In such scenarios, it does not make much sense to talk about discount factors and the like. Finally, equilibria of the repeated game require the agent to have complex beliefs over what the other agents would do in various future scenarios, and it is less clear where such beliefs might come from than it is for simple beliefs over what the other agents will play next.

We do not think that these relaxed equilibrium notions should be dismissed for the purpose of learning in games, since they (for example) may lead to better outcomes. Nevertheless, we believe that the arguments above show that learning algorithms should be able to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game *at a minimum*, because at least in some settings this is the only sensible outcome.

One may also criticize the Nash equilibrium concept as being too *weak*—for example, one may require that play converges to a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. This falls under the category of requiring the algorithm to have additional properties, and we have already acknowledged that this may be desirable. Similarly, convergence against a wider class of learning opponents, rather than just in self-play, is a desirable goal.

7.2 Best-responding against stationary opponents

One may also wonder whether the other requirement—eventual best response against stationary opponents—is really necessary. Stationary agents are irrational (at least those that continue to play a strategy that is not optimal for themselves), so why should they ever occur? There are various possible reasons for this. First, especially for complex games, humans often design agents by crafting a strategy by hand that the human believes will perform reasonably well (but that is definitely suboptimal). Learning to take advantage of such suboptimal opponents (in competitive scenarios) or to perform reasonably well in spite of such opponents' suboptimality (in cooperative scenarios) is an important capability for an agent. As another reason, the process that controls the opponent's actions may not actually correspond to a rational agent; rather, our agent may in reality be playing against (indifferent) Nature. (This will also happen if the opponent agent is unable to change its strategy, for example because the agent is defective.)

Another possible reason is that the other agents may merely be *satisficing* (Simon, 1982), pursuing a level of utility that they consider satisfactory. Indeed, satisficing approaches in learning in games have been proposed (Stimpson, Goodrich, & Walters, 2001). In this case they will be content to continue playing any strategy that gives them this desired level of utility, even if it does not maximize their utility. If the desired level of utility is low enough, these agents will be content to play any mixed strategy; thus, any learning algorithm that is robust to this extreme satisficing scenario needs to be able to converge to a best response against any stationary opponents. (Of course, this is assuming that we ourselves do not take a satisficing approach.)

The basic idea behind AWESOME (*Adapt When Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium*) is to try to adapt to the other agents' strategies when they appear stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed equilibrium strategy. At any point in time, AWESOME maintains either of two null hypotheses: that the others are playing the precomputed equilibrium, or that the others are stationary. Whenever both of these hypotheses are rejected, AWESOME restarts completely. AWESOME may reject either of these hypotheses based on actions played in an epoch. Over time, the epoch length is carefully increased and the criterion for hypothesis rejection tightened to obtain the convergence guarantee. The AWESOME algorithm is also self-aware: when it detects that its own actions signal nonstationarity to the others, it restarts itself for synchronization purposes.

While the algorithm is primarily intended as a theoretical contribution, experimental results comparing AWESOME to fictitious play suggest that AWESOME actually converges quite fast in practice. Fictitious play converges to a best response against a stationary opponent faster than AWESOME, which is not surprising because fictitious play plays a best response against the best estimate of the opponent's strategy. However, in a game where fictitious play converges to a Nash equilibrium in self-play (in terms of the empirical distribution of play), both algorithms converge similarly fast. Unlike AWESOME, fictitious play does not always converge in self-play, and does not converge to a mixed *stage-game* strategy.

9 Future research

The techniques used in proving the properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those used for other algorithms pursuing the same properties, because the requirement that the opponents' mixed strategies can be observed is dropped. These techniques may also be valuable in the analysis of other learning algorithms in games.

The AWESOME algorithm itself can also serve as a stepping stone for future multiagent learning algorithm development. AWESOME can be viewed as a skeleton—that guarantees the satisfaction of the two minimal desirable properties—on top of which additional techniques may be used in order to guarantee further desirable properties (such as those discussed in Section 7).

There are several open research questions regarding AWESOME. First, it is important to determine which valid schedules give *fast* convergence. This could be studied from a theoretical angle, by deriving asymptotic bounds on the running time for families of schedules. It could also be studied experimentally for representative families of games. A related second question is whether there are any structural changes that can be made to AWESOME to improve the convergence time while maintaining the properties derived in this paper. For instance, maybe AWESOME does not need to forget the entire history when it restarts. A third question is whether one can integrate learning the structure of the game seamlessly into AWESOME (rather than first learning the structure of the game and then running AWESOME).

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