An Epistemic Formulation of Information Flow Security

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Abstract

The non-interference (NI) property defines a program to be secure if changes to high-security inputs cannot alter the values of low-security outputs. NI indirectly states the epistemic property that no low-security principal acquires knowledge of high-security data. We consider a directly epistemic account of information flow (IF) security focusing on the knowledge flows engendered by the program’s execution. Storage effects are of primary interest, since principals acquire knowledge from the execution only through these effects. The IF properties of the individual effectful actions are characterized using a substructural epistemic logic that accounts for the knowledge transferred through their execution. We prove that a low-security principal never acquires knowledge of a high-security input by executing a well-typed program.

The epistemic approach has several advantages over NI. First, it directly accounts for the knowledge flow engendered by a program. Second, in contrast to the bimodal NI property, the epistemic approach accounts for authorized declassification. We prove that a low-security principal acquires knowledge of a high-security input only if it is authorized by a proof in authorization logic. Third, the explicit formulation of IF properties as an epistemic theory provides a crisp treatment of “side channels.” Rather than prove that a principal does not know a secret, we instead prove that it is not provable that the principal knows that secret. The latter statement characterizes the “minimal model,” for which a precise statement may be made, whereas the former applies to “any model,” including those with “side channels” that violate the model’s basic premises. Fourth, the NI property is re-positioned as providing an adequacy proof of the epistemic theory of effects, ensuring that the logical theory corresponds to the actual program behavior. In this way we obtain a generalization of the classical approach to IF security that extends to authorized declassification.

1 Introduction

Standard accounts of information flow security (IFS) in programming languages express confidentiality in terms of the non-interference (NI) definition given by Goguen and Meseguer [1982] stating that changes to high-security inputs cannot influence low-security outputs. This criterion may be seen as an indirect expression of the desired property that information provided by a high-security source is not disclosed to a low-security destination. Put in other terms, IFS seeks to enforce the epistemic requirement that knowledge possessed by high-security principals should not flow to low-security principals. We propose another approach to IFS based on the following key ideas:

1. IFS is defined in terms of effects that a program has on its execution environment, following Crary et al. [2005].

2. A substructural epistemic logic proposed by DeYoung and Pfenning [2009] tracks the flow of knowledge engendered by program actions.

3. Authorized declassification of sensitive data is permitted, using authorization logic [Abadi et al., 1993, Garg and Pfenning, 2012] to validate each declassification in a program.

4. The computational adequacy of the epistemic theory of program actions is verified using a generalization of NI [Goguen and Meseguer, 1982].
The distinctive feature of our approach is that IFS is phrased directly in terms of the knowledge that a principal may gain by executing a well-typed program. More precisely, IFS is expressed by necessary conditions on the derivability of statements of the form $[k]S$ stating that a principal $k$ possesses (knows) fact $S$. When $k$ is a low-security principal, and $S$ is a high-security fact, this amounts to proving that $k$ can come to know $S$ only under specified conditions—in the simplest case, falsehood, which amounts to showing that $k$ cannot know $S$ as the result of a well-typed execution. More generally, we show that $[k]S$ may be derived under such circumstances only if there is a proof in authorization logic underwriting the information flow. This generalizes the previous statement by admitting controlled declassification.

It is important to our account that security is phrased in terms of the non-derivability of a knowledge statement, rather than derivability of its negation. The distinction lies in the ever-present possibility of “side channels,” such as measurements of time- and power-consumption, that are not typically modeled in a type system for IFS [Bar-El et al., 2006, Govindavajhala and Appel, 2003]. Because of these “out of the model” attacks, it is almost never possible to prove the negation of the statement that a low-security principal knows a high-security fact. On the other hand it is possible to show that such a statement is underivable within the epistemic theory characterizing the effects of the program execution. This amounts to a precise characterization of the attacks against which the type system mounts a successful defense, avoiding the need for vague provisos about the limitations of the model.

The role of the NI property is re-positioned in our work as the basis for the proof of the computational adequacy of the epistemic theory. After all, a theory that predicts no knowledge disclosures would ensure that no knowledge statement is ever derivable. We must show, contrarily, that the epistemic theory is adequate in the sense that it properly detects interference, even in the presence of declassification. This is achieved using a generalization of NI that, when coupled with authorization logic, provides a logical account of IFS in the presence of declassification, something that is problematic in the pure NI framework.

The epistemic framework we propose offers several advantages over purely NI-based accounts of IFS:

1. It focuses attention directly on the core problem of confidentiality, which is to control the knowledge that a principal may acquire as a result of executing a program.
2. It provides a linkup between authorization [Abadi et al., 1993, Garg and Pfennig, 2012] and security in a single framework. Authorization logic ensures that security protocols are obeyed; epistemic logic gives these protocols meaning in terms of confidentiality and integrity.
3. It naturally encompasses declassification [Sabelfeld and Sands, 2009], a well-known weakness of the pure NI framework.
4. It uses substructural reasoning to express ephemeral, as well as persistent, knowledge [DeYoung and Pfennig, 2009]. For example, an internal data structure may “know” a secret at one moment, but “forget” that secret at the next moment (if, say, some datum is erased).
5. It provides the basis for developing a tool to explore the epistemic consequences of a programming language and its associated authorization logic. Such consequences can be hard to envision without mechanical assistance to trace out the possible consequences of a policy.

**Proposed work**

My thesis work will defend the following statement:

**Thesis statement:** Flexible tools for information flow security that use direct reasoning about effects in epistemic and authorization logic solve the core problems of confidentiality and integrity.

The remainder of the proposal is organized as follows. We conclude this section by outlining my existing and expected contributions. Section 2 gives some concrete examples to elucidate the proposed methodology. In Section 3 we introduce the programming language that enforces access control and define the dynamic
semantics so that it generates an effect trace. Initially this language is presented without authorized declassification so that it enforces strict NI. In Section 4 we describe the pertinent features of the epistemic logic. In Section 5 we state the technical results of adequacy and NI. Section 6 adds authorized declassification and revises the theorems to account for it. Related work is surveyed in Section 7, and Section 8 enumerates the goals for the thesis.

Non-interference and declassification  We have defined a preliminary security language $SL$ for analyzing information flow in Section 3. $SL$ is based on a similar language for enforcing NI in Crary et al. [2005]. Explicitly running on behalf of a principal facilitates the creation of effect traces and distinguishes $SL$ from the work of Crary et al. [2005]. The information flow consequences of these effect traces are determined by the epistemic logic.

Although $SL$ provides a case study for our methodology, it lacks many of the features necessary for a robust security language. For example, $SL$ strictly enforces NI, which precludes any declassification of privileged data. The security language with declassification $SLD$ adds authorized declassification to $SL$. Declassification requires a proof in authorization logic that the declassification is permitted. However, the language as presented in Section 6 only generates simple authorization proofs that correspond to the possession of a certificate. As part of my thesis work, I will extend this work with a more expressive authorization logic. This extension will also require modifying $SLD$ to enable constructing proofs in this more expressive logic. Expressive authorization proofs will likely require some form of dependent types to express precisely what values may be declassified using a given proof.

Protocols and policies  Security protocols often dictate specific steps that must be followed before a sensitive action may be performed. The intuition is that these steps ensure that a security policy is enforced. However, the connection between the specific steps of the protocol and the abstract goals of the policy is often unclear. For example, a protocol that requires obtaining an authorization credential from a privileged principal prior to declassifying a value ensures that the value is only declassified to a principal who possesses that credential. Therefore, the execution of a program that adheres to this protocol should only result in principals knowing the declassified value if they can create or acquire this credential. This preliminary analysis of the protocol is still incomplete. There must be additional reasoning to demonstrate that a principal that acquires this knowledge through the protocol does not then share the knowledge with other principals that couldn’t have directly learned it through the protocol. Similarly, a more precise statement of the policy would also directly assert which principals should be able to obtain the authorization credential. In this way, the policy directly specifies which principals can obtain the given knowledge through the execution of the protocol.

Combining epistemic logic and authorization logic enables our approach to precisely capture the abstract policies about the knowledge of principals that underlie authorization protocols. The combined logic can directly state that a knowledge statement will only be derivable when a certain authorization proof is also derivable. This gives the authorization protocols meaning in terms of confidentiality and integrity.

2 Worked examples

This section outlines the methodology of the paper by describing how it applies to some example programs. Although these descriptions omit many details, the important ideas are introduced.

The security language $SL$ we analyze distinguishes computations that may have storage effects from effect-free expressions by dividing them into two distinct syntactic classes in a monadic language for effects [Moggi, 1989, 1990, Peyton Jones and Wadler, 1993]. We write $e$ for expressions and $m$ for commands. An expression may contain a suspended command, which is denoted $cmd(m)$, but evaluation of the expression never executes the command. Other than these suspended commands, expressions closely resemble the pure expressions of functional languages. The return command $ret$ forms a command from an expression by returning the value of the expression without performing any effects. A suspended command is eliminated by the bind command $x ← e_1; m_2$. Bind evaluates the expression $e_1$ to a suspended command, which is a value. The
\[ \Sigma = a : \text{bool} \oplus \{ k_1, k_2 \}, b : \text{bool} \oplus \{ k_2 \}, c : \text{bool} \oplus \{ k_2 \} \]

```plaintext
set[c](false);
x <- get[a];
sudo[k1->k2](y <- get[b];
    if y then
        if x then
            cmd(set[c](true))
        else
            cmd(ret <>)
    else
        cmd(ret <>);
    ret <>)
```

Figure 1: Example program 1

suspended command is then executed, and the value it returns is bound to the variable \( x \) in the scope of the command \( m_2 \). For brevity, when the variable is not used we omit the binding, and when \( a_1 \) is just a suspended command we write \( x \leftarrow m_1; m_2 \) for \( x \leftarrow \text{cmd}(m_1); m_2 \). The commands \texttt{get} and \texttt{set} read from and write to assignable variables, which we will call assignables.

Each command is run on behalf of a principal, which dictates the storage operations it may perform. The \texttt{sudo} command switches the principal on behalf of whom a command is run enabling it to read assignables that the less privileged principal cannot access directly. Therefore, principals may also be thought of as roles. The \texttt{sudo} switches are reminiscent of upcalls performed by operating systems such as the UNIX sudo. Passing arbitrary values computed by a more privileged principal back to a less privileged principal would subvert the access restriction. To avoid this the \texttt{sudo} requires that the type of the value returned is informative only to principals that can perform all of the reads within the \texttt{sudo}. Crary et al. [2005] defined non-informativeness to permit more privileged reads in a limited scope. Our approach is distinguished by the choice to syntactically represent the non-informative commands with a \texttt{sudo} command. We also differ in explicitly running commands on behalf of principals to dictate the effects that may be performed rather than implicitly representing this information in the type system.

The example program in Figure 1 reads the contents of the assignables \( a \) and \( b \) and writes their conjunction to the assignable \( c \) under the store typing \( \Sigma \). The assignables \( a, b, \) and \( c \) store values of type \texttt{bool}. Each assignable is associated with a \textit{permission set} of principals that may read its contents. The permission set of \( a \) is \( \{ k_1, k_2 \} = \Phi_a \) indicating that both principals may read it. The permission set of both \( b \) and \( c \) is \( \{ k_2 \} = \Phi_b = \Phi_c \) indicating that only \( k_2 \) may read them. As we focus on confidentiality rather than integrity, there is not an analogous restriction for writing to an assignable. The example program initially runs on behalf of \( k_1 \) and then performs a \texttt{sudo} to run on behalf of \( k_2 \). In this simplest case, the type returned by the \texttt{sudo} command is completely non-informative because it is unit. The \texttt{sudo} is necessary because the permission set \( \Phi_b \) does not include the principal \( k_1 \). The conjunction is computed with a nested if-then-else expression.

The type system constrains which assignables a principal may read and in what order reads and writes may be performed in order to restrict the possible information flows. Each command is associated with an \textit{effect level} based on the reads and writes it performs. The effect level consists of a \textit{read set} that is a set of principals permitted to see the result returned by the command and a \textit{write set} that is a set of principals to whom the command may disclose information through its writes. The read set is a set that may see the result rather than \textit{the} set that may see the result because the type system builds in weakening as an admissible property. It is always safe from a confidentiality perspective to impose a more severe restriction on the principals that may see the result. For example, it is safe to assert that no principal is permitted to see the result. Similarly, it is safe to assert that a command may write to assignables readable by more
principals than is actually true since this imposes a greater restriction on the information that may be passed into the command.

The intersection of the permission sets of the assignables read by a command is an upper bound on its read set as the value returned by the command may contain information read from any or all of these assignables. Only principals permitted to read all of the assignables may see the result. The union of the permission sets of the assignables written by a command is a lower bound on its write set as information passed into the command may affect the value written to any one of the assignables modified by the command. Therefore, a principal that belongs to the permission set of any of the assignables may indirectly read this value from the assignable written. As a result, the bind command that sequences two commands requires that the read set of the bind is contained in the intersection of the read sets of the respective commands and that the write set of the bind contains the union of the write sets of the respective commands.

The read set of the first two commands of the example program must be contained in the permission set Φₐ, and their write set must contain Φₐ. The write to c imposes no constraint on the read set of the first command, and the read from a imposes no constraint on the write set of the second command.

The **sudo** command has an unrestricted read set because the resulting value is non-informative thereby preventing the reads performed within the **sudo** from disclosing information through its result. In the second part of the example run by k₂, the read set of the **sudo** is unrestricted even though the read set of the command within the **sudo** must be contained in Φₐ. Therefore, the read set of the full example program need only be contained in the permission set Φₐ. The **sudo** preserves the write set of the command within it as writes performed within a **sudo** can be affected by values passed into the command just like other writes. The write set of the **sudo** in the example must contain the permission set Φₐ. This is also the write set of the full program as only c is written to by either principal. Note that the read set for the full program is Φₐ reflecting that principal k₁ only learns the contents of a, not b.

To prevent reading from one assignable and then writing the result to another with a less restrictive permission set, the bind command requires that the read set of the first command contains the write set of the second. For example, the bind executed by k₂ first reads from b and then writes to c. Therefore, this restriction requires Φₐ ⊇ Φₐ. In the full program, the read from a also precedes the write to c within the **sudo** so Φₐ must also contain Φₐ. These two requirements are reasonable as the final value written to c is the conjunction of the other two assignables so information may flow from both of them to c.

We are interested in analyzing how flows of knowledge are engendered by the computation. Therefore, we explicitly define the possible transfers of knowledge by specifying the epistemic consequences of the effects of a program. Each storage effect of a program has a corresponding semantic action in the epistemic logic. The semantic action expresses how the effect may transfer knowledge between the principals and assignables involved. The dynamic semantics produces a trace of the security-relevant effects when a command is executed.

Schneider [2000] identifies the deficiency of traces for identifying NI. In the example program, if the initial contents of the assignables a and b are true and false, then the trace would contain effects for the first write to c and read from a by k₁ and for the read from b by k₂, but the second write to c is not performed when b is false as the else branch just returns unit. However, information is disclosed from the assignables a and b to the assignable c even when the second write isn’t performed as the final value stored in c is always the conjunction of the other two assignables. To always represent these disclosures regardless of the initial contents of the assignables, the trace is augmented with pseudo effects that are derived from the type of the commands in the program. Using static typing information derived from the whole program avoids the issue with traces for NI identified by Schneider [2000]. The type of the if-then-else statement indicates that a write to c is possible because the type summarizes what may happen in either branch. The pseudo effects in the trace reflect that this write is possible even when it does not occur dynamically. The pseudo effects are critical as information can be disclosed by not modifying an assignable as indicated by the example.

We have an epistemic theory that governs the epistemic consequences of traces. The semantic actions express the epistemic consequences of each effect in the trace as linear implications that consume the next trace action in the context and modify the knowledge of principals and assignables appropriately. Linearity enables principals and assignables to “forget” knowledge. An assignable may forget its previous contents
when it is overwritten, and a principal may forget what it learned within a *sudo* command when it leaves the scope of the variables it bound in the *sudo*. We present two of these semantic actions here to demonstrate what is expressed by the semantic actions for the read and write actions.

\[
\text{do(rd}_k[a]) \otimes [k]\mathbf{s}(X) \otimes [a]\mathbf{s}(Y) \rightarrow [k]\mathbf{s}(X \ast Y) \otimes [a]\mathbf{s}(Y)
\]

\[
\text{do(wr}_k[a]) \otimes [k]\mathbf{s}(X) \otimes [a]\mathbf{s}(Y) \rightarrow [k]\mathbf{s}(X) \otimes [a]\mathbf{s}(X)
\]

The proposition \([p]\mathbf{s}(X)\) represents the knowledge of an entity \(p\), which may be either a principal or an assignable. The special atomic proposition \(\mathbf{s}(X)\) maintains all of the knowledge in a single proposition. We abstractly represent the knowledge of the principals because we are primarily interested in how information flows between principals, not precisely what information is transferred. The symbols \(X\) and \(Y\) represent two such sets of secrets implicitly universally quantified over each formula. The \(*\) operator combines these into a single set of secrets. Each entity’s secrets are grouped in a single \(\mathbf{s}(X)\) as otherwise a semantic action that causes an entity to forget may only consume part of that entity’s knowledge. For example, if there was another proposition, \([a]\mathbf{s}(Z)\), in the context then the semantic action for writing to \(a\) would only erase part of the previous information stored in the assignable. The \(\text{do}(\alpha)\) proposition indicates the next trace action to be performed. The action \(\text{rd}_k[a]\) shares the assignable’s knowledge, \(\mathbf{s}(Y)\), with the principal \(k\) performing the action. The previous knowledge of the principal, \(\mathbf{s}(X)\), is preserved so the resulting knowledge is \(\mathbf{s}(X \ast Y)\). The knowledge of the assignable is also preserved. The action \(\text{wr}_k[a]\) is similar except the knowledge is transferred from the principal \(k\) to the assignable \(a\) and the previous knowledge of \(a\) is forgotten.

Returning to the example, if the initial contents of \(a\) and \(b\) are both true then the trace of the example program would be:

\[
\text{wr}_{k_1}[c], \text{rd}_{k_1}[a], \text{sudo}[k_1 \rightarrow k_2], \text{rd}_{k_2}[b], \text{wr}_{k_2}[c], \text{sudo}[k_1 \leftarrow k_2]
\]

This trace makes \(c\) learn anything previously known by \(a\) and \(b\). The flow from \(b\) to \(c\) is immediate as \(k_2\) writes to \(c\) after reading \(b\). The flow from \(a\) to \(c\) requires an intermediate flow of knowledge from \(k_1\) to \(k_2\), which results from the semantic action for \(\text{sudo}[k_1 \rightarrow k_2]\) since any variable bound before the *sudo* remains in scope within the *sudo*. The trace also results in a flow of knowledge from \(a\) to \(k_1\) but not from \(b\) to \(k_1\) as this was the purpose of reading \(b\) within the *sudo*. If \(a\) contained false instead then the trace would be the same except the \(\text{wr}_{k_2}[c]\) action would be replaced by a pseudo action reflecting that this write was possible even though it did not occur dynamically.

The disclosure of knowledge between principals and assignables defined by the semantic actions has several important properties that will be formally stated and proved later, but we briefly introduce a few of them here. The disclosure interpolation lemma states that if \(T\) discloses \(a\) to \(c\) and \(T = T_1, T_2\) then there is an entity \(p\) such that \(T_1\) discloses \(a\) to \(p\) and \(T_2\) discloses \(p\) to \(c\). In the example trace the lemma holds of the disclosure from \(a\) to \(c\) with \(p = k_2\) by taking \(T_1 = \text{wr}_{k_1}[c], \text{rd}_{k_1}[a], \text{sudo}[k_1 \rightarrow k_2]\) and \(T_2 = \text{rd}_{k_2}[b], \text{wr}_{k_2}[c], \text{sudo}[k_1 \leftarrow k_2]\).

The knowledge transfers derived from the trace in the epistemic theory are related to the values computed through the execution of the program that produced the trace by the adequacy theorem for the epistemic theory. The adequacy theorem implies that if we change the initial contents of \(a\) from true to false while leaving the rest of the state unchanged and if in the final state, the value stored in \(c\) changes from true to false then the trace must disclose \(a\) to \(c\). The adequacy theorem demonstrates that the semantic actions correctly derive all information flows of a trace that may occur through the execution of the program that generated that trace. In fact, the semantic actions conservatively assume that more disclosures may occur than are actually possible.

The typing soundness lemma asserts that if the trace of a well-typed program discloses \(a\) to \(k_1\) then \(k_1\) must belong to \(\Phi_a\). In the example, this means \(k_1\) and \(k_2\) must belong to \(\Phi_a\) and \(k_2\) must belong to \(\Phi_b\). The conservativeness of the semantic actions makes the requirements of the typing soundness lemma more strict.

The familiar NI theorem implies that if two executions produce final states that differ in the value of \(c\) then there must be an assignable whose values differ in the initial states and whose permission set is no more restrictive than that of \(c\). In the example, this could be either \(a\) or \(b\) as both have permission sets that are no more restrictive than \(c\) and the final value stored in \(c\) is computed from their initial values. NI is proved as a corollary of adequacy and typing soundness.
Figure 2: Example program 2

The epistemic approach can go beyond NI results. We introduce a declassification command \texttt{decl} that permits a principal to read an assignable it cannot directly access according to the permission set. The \texttt{decl} command requires an authorization proof that the assignable may be declassified. For simplicity, these authorization proofs are abstract tokens of authentication obtained by executing the \texttt{auth} command. The authorization proofs are proofs of propositions in the same epistemic logic used to represent the knowledge.

Figure 2 defines a second example program run on behalf of \texttt{k1}. It illustrates the use of declassification and authentication. As in the first example, the program computes the conjunction of the values stored in the assignables \(a\) and \(b\) and stores the result in \(c\), but the store typing \(\Sigma'\) differs from \(\Sigma\) in the permission set \(\Phi_c\), which is now \(\{k_1, k_2\}\). The first example program is ill-typed in \(\Sigma'\) because \(\Phi_b \not\subseteq \Phi_c\) so the write to \(c\) following the read from \(b\) is disallowed. To make the program well-typed, we declassify \(b\) rather than performing a \texttt{sudo} to access it. This declassification requires an authorization proof from an \texttt{auth} command that authenticates \(k_2\). If the authentication fails, the value stored in \(c\) will remain false; however, if it succeeds, \(b\) is declassified using the resulting proof, and the conjunction of \(a\) and \(b\) is written to \(c\) as before.

Authorized declassification complicates reasoning about information flow. In the example, the final contents of \(c\) in two runs of the program may differ based on the success or failure of the \texttt{auth} command even if the initial values stored in \(a\) and \(b\) are true in both runs. Many of the theorem statements are modified to account for the outcomes of authentication. Moreover, additional trace effects for declassification and authentication require semantic actions specifying their epistemic consequences. An authentication effect in the trace creates a persistent proof authorizing appropriate declassifications. This proof is discharged in the semantic action for declassification. Finally, the NI theorem is generalized to assert that a low-security principal acquires knowledge of a high-security input only if it is authorized by a proof in authorization logic.

3 Language

Figures 3, 4, and 5 formally define SL. The terms are divided into two syntactic categories yielding a monadic structure as in Crary et al. [2005], but the type system and dynamic semantics differ in a few ways including the explicit representation of non-informative upcalls as changing principals and the addition of effect traces.
permits any effect level because the ret and many other pure constructs. The typing judgment for expressions, \( \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash e : A \)

\[
\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash e : B_1 + B_2 \quad \Sigma; \Gamma, x_1 : B_1 \vdash e_i : A \quad (i = 1, 2)
\]

\[\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{case} (e, x_1, e_1, x_2, e_2) : A\]

\[
\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash m \div k \, A @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w]
\]

\[
\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash e : A \quad \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash x : A \vdash m \div k \, B @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w] \quad \Phi^w \subseteq \Phi^r \quad \Phi^v \supseteq \Phi^r \cup \Phi^w \quad \Phi^r \subseteq \Phi^v \cap \Phi^w
\]

\[\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash x \leftarrow e ; m \div k \, B @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w]\]

\[
a : A @ \Phi \in \Sigma \quad \Phi^r \subseteq \Phi \quad \Phi^w \in \Phi
\]

\[\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{get}[a] ; k \div x \, A @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w]\]

\[\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{sudo}[k_1 \rightarrow k_2] (m) ; k_1 \div x \, A @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w]\]

\[\Sigma; \Gamma \vdash \text{new} a @ \Phi := e \text{ in } m \div k \, B @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w]\]

Figure 3: SL static semantics

3.1 Type system

The types \( A, B \) defined in Figure 3 are mostly familiar. One notable exception is the type of suspended commands, \( \text{cmd}_k [\Phi^r, \Phi^w | (A)] \). It indicates the type \( A \) returned by the command as well as its effect level and the principal on behalf of whom it is run. The expressions \( e \) are pure as their evaluation cannot cause writes or reads from assignables. We do not precisely enumerate the expressions because this pure fragment of the language is less significant than the effectful commands. Expressions may include pairs, recursive functions, and many other pure constructs. The typing judgment for expressions, \( \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash e : A \), is mostly familiar as seen in rule 3.1. The most notable difference is the separation of the context into the variable context \( \Gamma \) and the store context \( \Sigma \). The store context is only used to type the suspended commands within expressions in rule 3.2. This rule embeds a command in an expression as a suspended computation. A suspended command is always a value so it does not perform any reads or writes when it is evaluated within an expression.

The commands \( m \) are computations that read from and write to the store. Most are standard for a monadic language such as Pfenning and Davies [2001]. The judgment \( \Sigma; \Gamma \vdash m \div k \, A @ [\Phi^r, \Phi^w] \) is more elaborate than traditional monadic type systems because it restricts the effect level \([\Phi^r, \Phi^w]\) to control information flow. The subscript \( k \) indicates the principal on behalf of whom the command is run. The read set \( \Phi^r \) is a set of principals permitted to see the value returned by the command. The write set \( \Phi^w \) is a set of principals to whom the command may disclose information through its writes. The type system builds in weakening of the effect level as an admissible property. Therefore, a command with effect level \([\Phi^r_1, \Phi^w_1]\) may also be typed with effect level \([\Phi^r_2, \Phi^w_2]\) if \( \Phi^r_2 \subseteq \Phi^r_1 \) and \( \Phi^w_2 \supseteq \Phi^w_1 \). For example, rule 3.3 for typing the command \( \text{ret} \, e \) permits any effect level because the \( \text{ret} \) command evaluates the pure expression \( e \) without performing any
effects.

Rule 3.4 for typing the bind command, \( x \leftarrow e; m \), is critical for restricting information flow. The expression \( e \) is a suspended command so its type \( \text{cmd}_x[\Phi_x^1, \Phi_x^2](A) \) includes its effect level. The typing judgment for the command \( m \) gives the effect level \([\Phi_m^1, \Phi_m^2] \) of the second part of the bind. Rule 3.4 restricts how the subcommands of a bind command may be chained together. Consider the bind when \( e \) is a suspended command that reads the assignable \( a \), \( \text{cmd}_x[\Phi_x^1, \Phi_x^2](\text{get}[a]) \), and \( m \) writes the value read from \( a \) to another assignable \( b \), \( \text{set}[b](x) \). As \( \text{get} \) is used to read an assignable, rule 3.5 requires that the executing principal is in the permission set \( \Phi_a \) associated with \( a \) and that \( \Phi_a \supseteq \Phi_x^1 \). Intuitively, the rule imposes no restrictions on the write set. Conversely, rule 3.6 requires that the permission set \( \Phi_b \subseteq \Phi_x^2 \) and imposes no restriction on the read set. Therefore, the restriction of rule 3.4 that \( \Phi_x^2 \subseteq \Phi_x^1 \) implies \( \Phi_b \subseteq \Phi_a \) as \( \Phi_b \subseteq \Phi_x^2 \subseteq \Phi_x^1 \subseteq \Phi_a \). This means that the principals that may learn the contents of \( a \) indirectly by reading the contents of \( b \) can also just directly read the contents of \( a \).

If each of the subcommands of a bind command reads from some assignables then the premise of rule 3.4 that requires \( \Phi^r \subseteq \Phi_x^1 \cap \Phi_x^2 \) forces the read level to be restrictive enough to protect all of the assignables read. For example, if the permission set of \( a \) is \( \Phi_a = \{k_1, k_2\} \) and the permission set of \( b \) is \( \Phi_b = \{k_2, k_3\} \) then the read level of a bind command that reads both of these assignables would be a subset of \( \{k_2\} \) as only \( k_2 \) may read both assignables. This restriction is necessary in the case that the bind’s result contains information about both values read from the assignables. For example, the result returned by the command could be a pair containing both values. Similarly, the premise that requires \( \Phi^r \supseteq \Phi_x^1 \cap \Phi_x^2 \) forces the write level to reflect all of the assignables that may be written in either part of the sequencing command. A value passed into the sequencing command may be written in either of the subcommands and therefore, any of the principals that can read any of the assignables written to by the command may be able to read that value.

Rules 3.5 and 3.6 for the \( \text{set} \) and \( \text{get} \) commands are asymmetric because there is no restriction on the principal on behalf of whom the \( \text{set} \) command executes whereas rule 3.5 requires that the executing principal is in the permission set of the assignable read. This asymmetry reflects the focus on the confidentiality instead of the integrity of the assignables. As usual, integrity in the sense of NI can be addressed with a dual technique [Biba, 1977]. This form of integrity prevents low-integrity inputs from influencing high-integrity outputs, but does not make any other guarantees about the values written to high-integrity outputs. The application to integrity is outlined in section B. Essentially, the dual representation flips the lattice of principals upside down, but most of the other components of SL remain the same.

Rule 3.7 for the \( \text{sudo} \) command relies on the informativeness judgment \( A \not
\uparrow \Phi \) given in Figure 4. If \( A \not
\uparrow \Phi \) then the type \( A \) is informative only to the principals in \( \Phi \). The set \( U \) is the set of all principals. Asserting that a type is informative only to the principals in the set of all principals is trivially true so rule 4.1 says that any type \( A \) is informative only to the principals in \( U \). Rule 4.1 gives the informativeness rule for any type not otherwise specified. For example, it applies to the sum type \( A + B \) because even if \( A \) and \( B \) are both uninformative, the sum type is still informative to any principal since it can see the outer tag. The unit type is never informative. Rule 4.2 asserts it is informative only to the principals in the empty set \( \emptyset \). Rule 4.3 depends on the informativeness of the return type as information is extracted from a function by applying it to an argument and observing the result. A pair is analyzed by projecting its components so it is informative to a principal if either component is informative to that principal. Rule 4.4 specifies this by taking union of the two sets of principals to whom the component types are informative. A suspended command is analyzed by running it and viewing the result, but information can also be extracted by reading values written during the execution of the command. Therefore, rule 4.5 states that it is as informative as the union of the informativeness set of its return type and the set of principals that can read assignables written by it. It is safe to assert that a type is informative to more principals than it actually is. Rule 4.6 asserts that a type that is informative only to principals in \( \Phi_1 \) is also informative only to principals in a larger set.

The \( \text{sudo} \) command is the only one to change the principal on behalf of whom a command is run. The command \( \text{sudo}[k_1 \rightarrow k_2](m) \) switches principals from \( k_1 \) to the more privileged \( k_2 \) provided the result returned by \( m \) is uninformative to \( k_1 \). The privilege restriction is enforced by the ordering \( k_1 \supseteq k_2 \) in rule 3.4. Because the principal that makes the \( \text{sudo} \) upcall can transfer information to the more privileged principal,
the partial order \( \sqsubseteq \) imposes the restriction that the permission sets must be upward closed under \( \sqsubseteq \). That is, if a principal \( k \in \Phi \) and \( k \sqsubseteq k' \) then \( k' \in \Phi \). Therefore, the more privileged principal could have directly read any secret passed to it through a `sudo`. While executing the privileged command as \( k_2 \), values may be read that \( k_1 \) cannot read. The premises \( A \nothd \Phi_2 \) and \( k_1 \not\in \Phi_2 \) assure that these values are not returned back to \( k_1 \) through the result of the `sudo` because the type of the value returned is uninformative to \( k_1 \). In the first example program in Figure 1, principal \( k_1 \) uses a `sudo` to \( k_2 \) to read \( b \) and write its conjunction with \( a \) to \( c \). The permission set of \( b \) is \( \Phi_b = \{k_2\} \), so \( k_1 \) cannot directly read \( b \). The read set of the command in the `sudo` is contained in \( \Phi_b \) so rule 3.7 requires that the type returned by the command is only informative to the principal \( k_2 \). The type returned is unit so it is not informative to any principal, but we weaken this and say it is informative only to \( k_2 \). Encapsulating the read of \( b \) in a `sudo` command permits the surrounding computation to continue execution without any restriction based on the reads performed within the `sudo`. Note that the write set is not modified by the `sudo` command as any writes it performs can still leak information passed into it.

The command `new a@\Phi := e in m` declares a new assignable \( a \) with permission set \( \Phi \) initialized to the value of \( e \) and then executes the command \( m \). As observed in Crary et al. [2005], the write rule of set \( 3.8 \) is not restricted by the permission set \( \Phi \) of the new assignable because the initial value stored in the assignable cannot be leaked unless a reference to the assignable itself is leaked first. Therefore, even if a secret value is written to a freshly allocated assignable with no restrictions on who may read it, the fresh assignable cannot leak the secret unless the assignable itself is first leaked, which is prevented by the type system.

### 3.2 Dynamic semantics

Figure 5 defines memory stores, trace effects, and traces and presents the rules of the execution judgment for a command. A store \( \mu \) is a collection of assignables paired with values representing their contents. We view stores modulo the order of assignables for ease of use in the evaluation rules. The effects \( \alpha \) correspond to each of the effectful operations a command can perform. These effects include the principal that performed the operation and the assignable involved, not the values read or written. A basic trace is a list of effects so it is either empty, \( \varepsilon \), or has an effect added to the front of a trace, \( \alpha, T \). We also form a trace by appending two subtraces together, \( T_1; T_2 \). A `sudo` trace \( [T]_{k\rightarrow k'} \) reflects that the subtrace \( T \) is nested inside a `sudo` command. When we reason about these traces in epistemic logic we reduce the traces to simple lists by replacing the `sudo` trace with two `sudo` effects for starting and ending the `sudo` before and after the subtrace. The subtraces of \( T_1; T_2 \) are also appended together to form a single list.

The execution judgment \( \nu \Sigma.\langle m || \mu \rangle \nu k \nu \Sigma'.\langle m' || \mu' \rangle \{T\} \) is divided into four parts. There are two execution states \( \nu \Sigma.\langle m || \mu \rangle \) and \( \nu \Sigma'.\langle m' || \mu' \rangle \), each consisting of a store context of assignables in scope within the command, the command itself, and the memory store. The store context \( \Sigma \) is similar to the store context used in the static semantics but without the type information. The permission set of every assignable in the store is given by the store context. The command in an execution state only contains free assignables in its store. The other two parts of the execution judgment are the principal \( k \) on behalf of whom the execution is performed and the trace \( T \) produced by the execution.

The rules of the execution judgment are mostly familiar from similar monadic languages with the small addition of the traces for recording the effects. Rule 5.1 produces an empty trace since the `ret` command just
evaluates a pure expression and has no storage effects. Rule 5.2 concatenates the traces of its subcommands together as expected, but it also adds a leak pseudo effect in the middle to account for writes that may not have occurred dynamically but were possible according to the write set of the suspended command. When the example program in Figure 1 is executed, the second write to c may not occur dynamically but will be reflected in the trace through the leak effect. This rule defines how a suspended command is executed. The expression is evaluated to a suspended command, which is a value. Then the suspended command is paired with the current store and executed to produce an intermediate execution state. Since this execution state is the result of an execution, its command is a ret with a value. This value is substituted into the second subcommand of the bind. The result of the substitution is combined with the store context and store from the intermediate execution state and then executed to produce the final execution state. Rules 5.3 and 5.4 read from and write to the memory store, respectively. Each produces a single element trace to represent that the corresponding operation has occurred. Rule 5.5 is primarily noteworthy for the change in principal from k in the conclusion to k' in the premise. The trace [T]_{k \rightarrow k'} nests the trace T of the subcommand of the sudo in square brackets indicating the principals involved and the extent of the non-informative block. Rule 5.6 coalesces an effect indicating the assignable declared to the front of the trace of its subcommand. The subcommand is executed in an extended memory store that includes the new assignable and its initial value.

4 Epistemic Logic

The logic we employ to model information flow is directly taken from DeYoung and Pfenning [2009]. In addition to the cut elimination property of the substructural epistemic logic, which enables proving that undesired knowledge transfers are not derivable, the features of this logic that are of particular importance for our representation are the linear knowledge modality and the monad. The linear knowledge modality is also known as possession. It allows an entity to possess a secret temporarily. For example, an assignable may temporarily possess one secret until another value is written to the assignable causing it to possess a
For a given storage context $\Sigma$ and set of principals $U$, the state $\Delta$ is valid if and only if all of the following hold:

1. There is exactly one proposition of the form $[p]s(X)$ for each entity $p \in U \cup \Sigma$. 

Figure 6: Semantic Actions
2. There is either one next or one do but not both

3. There is exactly one doTrace.

In DeYoung and Pfenning [2009] a rewrite step, \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow \Gamma'; \Delta' \), is defined to essentially correspond to applying one of the semantic actions to consume some of the resources in \( \Gamma; \Delta \) and produce some of the resources in \( \Gamma'; \Delta' \).

**Definition 4.2. (Rewrite Step).** The rewrite step \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow \Gamma'; \Delta' \) holds if and only if there exists a derivation of the form

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma' &\vdash C \\
\vdots \\
\Gamma; \Delta, \Delta_2, A^+_2 &\vdash C \\
\Gamma; \Delta_2, \{\{A^+_2\}\} &\vdash \{\} \\
\vdots \\
\Gamma; \Delta_1, [A^-] &\vdash C \\
\Gamma; \Delta &\vdash C \\
\end{align*}
\]

parametric in \( C \), where the rule marked * is a rule transitioning from a neutral sequent to a left focused sequent, and the subderivation above \( \{\} 
L \vdash \{\} \) uses only invertible left rules.

As usual, we let \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow^* \Gamma'; \Delta' \), represent the reflexive, transitive closure of \( \rightarrow \). We write \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{next}, \text{doTrace}(T) \rightarrow^* \Gamma'; \Delta', \text{next}, \text{doTrace}(\epsilon) \). This terminology provides the basis to give the following definition.

**Definition 4.3. (Disclosure).** We say the trace \( T \) discloses \( p \) to \( p' \) if for all valid states \( \Delta \) such that \([p]s(X) \in \Delta \) there is a derivation of \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow^* \Gamma'; \Delta' \) such that \([p']s(Y) \in \Delta' \) and \( Y \supseteq X \).

The definition only requires at least one such derivation to exist. Not all derivations will include the disclosure. For a trace \( T \) with a \text{leak} action, \( T \) discloses \( p \) to \( p' \) if any valid replacement of the \text{leak} action with a write results in the disclosure.

## 5 Adequacy and Non-Interference

In this section we describe the main technical results about the information flow properties of \( \text{SL} \). Some properties that are not essential for understanding the main technical development are deferred to section A. To state these results precisely we must define what is considered a flow of information in \( \text{SL} \). If an information flow was defined to include too much the adequacy theorem would not hold. For example, if observing a difference in the number of steps of execution was considered a form of information flow then the theorem would be false. More importantly, if a principal \( k \) computes two different values but those values appear equivalent to \( k \) because their type is uninformative then we do not consider it a leak. We compare values up to equivalence relative to the view of a principal as defined by the \( \approx \) rule in Figure 7. This \( \approx \) rule equates two values if their type is not informative to the principal. Forming the least congruence containing the \( \approx \) rule yields the equivalence judgments \( \Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash e \approx_k e' : A \) and \( \Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash m \approx_k m' \div_k A@[\Phi^e, \Phi^\epsilon] \) for expressions and commands, respectively. A difference in the contents of the assignables in the initial store may affect whether certain new assignables are allocated. Therefore, the equivalence judgment is relative to two different storage contexts. The notation \( \Sigma_1 \cap \Sigma_2 \) indicates the storage context containing assignables that appear in both, and the notation \( \Sigma|_k \) indicates the context containing only those assignables whose permission sets include \( k \).

We will employ several properties of this equivalence. For example, Lemma A.1 states that substitution respects the equivalence judgment. It is essential to the proof of Lemma A.2, which states that equivalence is preserved under evaluation. The formal statements and proofs of these lemmas are deferred to the appendix.
5.1 Preliminary Technical Results

We prove some results about the definitions from the previous section that will be used to prove the central results of this section. The first theorem, which corresponds to the analogous result in DeYoung and Pfenning [2009], states a property of our model for reasoning about what is and is not derivable.

**Theorem 5.1. (Rewrite Step Schemata).** Each rewrite step from a valid state has exactly one of the following forms:

1. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{rd}_k[a]), [k]s(X), [a]s(Y) \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, [k]s(X * Y), [a]s(Y), \text{next} \)
2. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{wr}_k[a]), [k]s(X), [a]s(Y) \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, [k]s(X), [a]s(X), \text{next} \)
3. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{do}(k \rightarrow k'), [k]s(X), [k']s(Y) \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, [k]s(X), [k']s(X * Y), \text{next} \)
4. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{do}(k' \rightarrow k), [k']s(X) \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, [k']s(1), \text{next} \)
5. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{do}(@\text{leak}_k(\Phi))) \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\text{wr}_k[a]) \) such that \( \Phi \supseteq \Phi_a \) where \( a : A @ \Phi_a \in \Sigma \)
6. \( \Gamma; \Delta, \text{doTrace}(\alpha, T), \text{next} \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta, \text{do}(\alpha), \text{doTrace}(T) \)

Moreover, the states in the conclusions of these rewrite steps are valid.

**Proof.** The proof relies on the observation that only the semantic actions have the monadic heads required for a left focusing step to begin a rewrite derivation. There is then a case for each semantic action. This proof is possible because of the structure of the logic and its cut elimination property.

This theorem is essential for showing that only permissible disclosures are derivable as it specifies the possible rewrite steps. Due to the monad restrictions in the logic, there are only a few possible rewrite steps, each corresponding to one of the semantic actions. It simplifies reasoning about disclosure by characterizing each step in a disclosure. Theorem 5.1 facilitates the proofs of several lemmas about our disclosure judgment found in the appendix as well as the following lemma, which is used to prove properties of the traces of well-typed programs.

**Lemma 5.1. (Disclosure Interpolation).** If a trace \( T \) is the concatenation of two traces (i.e., \( T = T_1; T_2 \)) and \( T \) discloses \( p \) to \( p' \) then there is an entity \( q \) such that \( T_1 \) discloses \( p \) to \( q \) and \( T_2 \) discloses \( q \) to \( p' \).

**Proof.** The essential observation is that the rewrite steps in Theorem 5.1 only permit actions to be processed one at a time and in the specified order. Therefore, a derivation of \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow T \Gamma' ; \Delta' \) in which \([p]s(X) \in \Delta \) and \([p']s(Y) \in \Delta' \) yields two derivations: \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow T_1 \Gamma^* ; \Delta^* \) and \( \Gamma^* ; \Delta^* \rightarrow T_2 \Gamma'' ; \Delta'' \). As none of the rewrite steps create new knowledge, there must be at least one entity \( q \) such that \([q]s(Z) \in \Delta^* \) and \( Z \supseteq X \). The derivations of \( \Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow T_1 \Gamma^* ; \Delta^* \) for varying \( \Gamma; \Delta \) then yield that \( T_1 \) discloses \( p \) to \( q \) for any entity \( q \) that is always in possession of the secret. Such an entity may be found by considering the case where only \( p \) has the secret \( X \) initially. We similarly find that at least one of the entities also has the property that \( T_2 \) discloses \( q \) to \( p' \) from the derivations of \( \Gamma^* ; \Delta^* \rightarrow T_2 \Gamma'' ; \Delta'' \).
5.2 Adequacy

The adequacy theorem proves that any information disclosed according to the dynamic semantics of SL is also disclosed in the logic according to the formal definition given in the previous section, thereby establishing a correspondence between the semantic actions and the actual information flows in the program.

We define information flow in a program both between an assignable and a principal and between two assignables in terms of the definition of equivalence. A flow between an assignable and a principal occurs when executing the program with different initial values for the assignable affects the resulting value of a command executed by the principal. A flow between two assignables occurs when executing the program with different initial values for one assignable affects the final value of the other. This intuition for when there is a flow of information in SL yields the following adequacy theorem.

**Theorem 5.2. (Adequacy).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \Sigma'; \vdash m \approx_k m' \vdash_k A \sigma[\Phi^r, \Phi^u] \)
- \( \mu : \Sigma \) and \( \mu' : \Sigma' \)
- \( \nu \Sigma.(m \parallel \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma.(\text{ret} v \parallel \mu) \{T\}, \text{ and } \)
- \( \nu \Sigma'.(m' \parallel \mu') \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret} v' \parallel \mu') \{T'\} \)

then both of the following also hold:

1. Either \( v \approx_k v' \) or there exists \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \neq_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \).
2. For all \( c \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(c) \neq_k \mu'(c) \) there exists \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \neq_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( c \).

**Proof.** Structural induction on the derivation of \( \downarrow \). We will give a representative case of the proof for the bind command. The other cases for when the command is a bind are similar, and the remaining cases are straightforward.

In the bind case, \( m = x \leftarrow e_1; m_2 \) and \( m' = x \leftarrow e'_1; m'_2 \) such that:

- \( e_1 \downarrow \text{cmd}(m_1) \) and \( e'_1 \downarrow \text{cmd}(m'_1) \)
- \( \nu \Sigma.(m_1 \parallel \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma.(\text{ret} v_1 \parallel \mu_1) \{T_1\} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma'.(m'_1 \parallel \mu') \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret} v'_1 \parallel \mu'_1) \{T'_1\} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma.(v_1/x)m_2 \parallel \mu_1) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma.(\text{ret} v \parallel \mu_1) \{T_2\} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma'.(v'_1/x)m'_2 \parallel \mu'_1) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret} v' \parallel \mu'_1) \{T'_2\} \)

By Lemma A.2 we have \( \text{cmd}(m_1) \approx_k \text{cmd}(m'_1) : \text{cmd}_k[\Phi^r, \Phi^u](B) \) as \( e_1 \approx_k e'_1 \). By inversion, either \( m_1 \approx_k m'_1 \) or \( \text{cmd}_k[\Phi^r, \Phi^u](B) \not\approx \Phi \) and \( k \not\in \Phi \). In the latter case, we have \( B \not\approx \Phi \) by inversion and therefore \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 : B \).

Otherwise, by the first case of the induction hypothesis on the evaluation derivation of \( m_1 \) we have either \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 \) or there exists \( b \in \Sigma \) such that \( \mu(b) \neq_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T_1 \) and \( T'_1 \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \). In the latter case, Lemma A.3 for extending disclosures from a prefix of a trace to a whole trace yields \( T = T_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^r_1), T_2 \) and \( T' = T'_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^r_1), T'_2 \) also disclose \( b \) to \( k \) completing this case.

In the cases when \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 \), we apply the first case of the induction hypothesis to \([v_1/x]m_2\) and \([v'_1/x]m'_2\) to conclude that \( v \approx_k v' \) or there exists \( b \in \Sigma \) such that \( \mu_1(b) \neq_k \mu'_1(b) \) and \( T_2 \) and \( T'_2 \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \). In the former case, we are done. Otherwise, we apply the second case of the induction hypothesis to \( m_1 \) and \( m'_1 \) to conclude that there exists an assignable \( c \in \Sigma \) such that \( \mu(c) \neq_k \mu'(c) \) and \( T_1 \) and \( T'_1 \) disclose \( c \) to \( b \). Then Lemma A.4 for composing disclosures yields \( T = T_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^r_1), T_2 \) and \( T' = T'_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^r_1), T'_2 \) disclose \( c \) to \( k \) completing this case.

\( \square \)
The theorem states that if there is a flow of information in SL then there is a corresponding disclosure in the trace. This result is essential because of its contrapositive. When there is no disclosure in the trace according to the logic, there is no flow of information in SL. Therefore, to prove a NI result it is sufficient to prove no disclosure is derivable in the logic.

5.3 Non-Interference

To demonstrate the utility of this methodology we now present the proof of a NI result for SL. The adequacy theorem reduces proving a NI result about SL to proving that only permissible disclosures are derivable in the logic when reasoning about the traces of well-typed programs.

We can now prove the following lemma about the confidentiality properties of well-typed programs.

**Lemma 5.2. (Typing Soundness).** If the following conditions hold:

- $\Sigma; A |- m :: \Phi^T, \Phi^V$
- $\mu : \Sigma$, and
- $\nu \Sigma. (m \mid \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_1) \{T\}$

then all three of the following also hold:

1. For all $a : A @ \Phi_a \in \Sigma$ if $T$ discloses $a$ to $k$ then $\Phi^T \subseteq \Phi_a$ and $k \in \Phi_a$
2. For all $a : A @ \Phi_a \in \Sigma$ if $T$ discloses $p$ to $a$ and $p \neq a$ then $\Phi_a \subseteq \Phi^v$
3. For all $a : A @ \Phi_a \in \Sigma$ and $b : B @ \Phi_b \in \Sigma$ if $T$ discloses $a$ to $b$ then $\Phi_a \supseteq \Phi_b$

**Proof.** The proof is by structural induction on the evaluation derivation. The base cases for set, get, and ret are straightforward consequences of the typing rules. We give some representative cases for bind. They critically depend on Lemma 5.1 to reason about the disclosures of the two subcommands independently.

In these cases we have $m = x \leftarrow e_1; m_2$ and:

- $e_1 \downarrow \text{cmd}(m_1)$
- $\nu \Sigma. (m_1 \mid \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v_1 \mid \mu_1) \{T_1\}$
- $\nu \Sigma_1. ([v_1/x]m_2 \mid \mu_1) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma_2. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_2) \{T_2\}$
- $T = T_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^T), T_2$

For the first case, we assume $T$ discloses $a$ to $k$. Therefore, we may apply Lemma 5.1 to conclude that there exists an entity $p$ such that $T_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi^T)$ discloses $a$ to $p$ and $T_2$ discloses $p$ to $k$. We proceed by case analysis depending on whether $p$ is and assignable or a principle.

In the former case where $p$ is some assignable $b$, we apply the first case of the induction hypothesis to $[v_1/x]m_2$ to conclude that $\Phi^T \subseteq \Phi^T_b \subseteq \Phi_b$ and $k \in \Phi_b$. If the derivation of disclosure actually used the $\text{leak}_k(\Phi^T)$ then we would have $T_1$ discloses $a$ to $k$ and would be finished by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, we may also apply the third case of the induction hypothesis to conclude that $\Phi_a \supseteq \Phi_b$. Combining this containment with the result of the earlier appeal to the induction hypothesis yields $\Phi^T \subseteq \Phi_a$ and $k \in \Phi_a$ completing this case.

In the latter case where $p$ is a principal, $k$. Lemma A.5 states that we must have $k' = k$ since any other principal could not carry its knowledge through the complete execution of $m_1$ as the end of a sudo block would clear its knowledge. Therefore, this case holds by an appeal to the first case of the induction hypothesis on $m_1$.

The other cases employ similar reasoning about how the disclosure is divided between the two commands.
Composing the adequacy and typing soundness results yields the expected NI result.

**Theorem 5.3. (Non-interference).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \Sigma'; \vdash m \approx_k m' \div_k \Phi^r, \Phi^q \),
- \( \mu : \Sigma \) and \( \mu' : \Sigma' \),
- \( \nu \Sigma.(m || \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret } v || \mu') \{ T \} \), and
- \( \nu \Sigma'.(m' || \mu') \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret } v' || \mu') \{ T' \} \)

then both of the following also hold:

1. If \( v \not\approx_k v' \) then there exists \( b : B @ \Phi \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \not\approx_k \mu'(b) \), \( \Phi^r \subseteq \Phi \), and \( k \in \Phi \).
2. For all \( b : B @ \Phi \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \not\approx_k \mu'(b) \), there exists \( a : A @ \Phi \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(a) \not\approx_k \mu'(a) \) and \( \Phi \supseteq \Phi_b \).

**Proof.** NI is a corollary of Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 5.2 by just applying the latter to the disclosures in the conclusions of the former.

The NI result may be better understood by considering the contrapositives of the two parts. If all assignables with \( k \) in their permission set are equivalent from the view of \( k \) then the resulting values will also be equivalent from the view of \( k \), and if the initial values of every assignable with a permission set at least as permissive as a given assignable are equivalent from the view of \( k \) then the final values of the assignable will also be equivalent. Therefore, if only an assignable that does not have \( k \) in its permission set is modified then it will not interfere with the final value observed by \( k \), and similarly, if only an assignable with a more restrictive permission set is modified then it will not interfere with the final value of the given assignable.

### 6 Security language with declassification SLD

The expressiveness of the logic facilitates the addition of authorized declassification to SLD. For simplicity, we focus on authorization proofs that take the form of a certificate verifying that the appropriate principal has authenticated. These proofs are atomic in the logic. In this section we describe how the system changes to accommodate authorized declassification and how the theorems change to correspond to the more permissive policy.

#### 6.1 Static and dynamic semantics

The new commands of SLD for authentication and declassification are given in Figure 8. The \texttt{auth} command verifies that the indicated principal has authenticated. Therefore, the type is an option as the verification may fail. The type \texttt{iam}(k) is the type of a proof that \( k \) has authenticated. The read level of the command is arbitrary as we assume the database of authentication credentials is readable by all principals. Intuitively, the write level is also unrestricted. Rule 8.2 is similar to rule 3.5 except that instead of requiring that \( k' \) is in the permission set \( \Phi \), the \texttt{decl} command requires an authorization proof in the form of an authentication certificate of one of the principals in \( \Phi \). This certificate is obtained from a successful execution of the \texttt{auth} command. Also unlike a standard \texttt{get}, the read level of the command does not reflect the permission set of the declassified assignable as this access is permitted through the authentication proof rather than the permission set.

The evaluation judgment now contains an additional parameter, \( S \), which corresponds to the authentication database. Explicitly parameterizing by \( S \) rather than defining a non-deterministic evaluation judgment facilitates comparing two runs. This parameter is used to specify the two evaluation rules for authentication such that the resulting value depends on the value associated with the authenticating principal in \( S \). Rule 8.5
is also very similar to rule 5.3. The only differences are that the authorization proof must be first evaluated and the result is included in the new trace effect.

Semantic action (8.6) for authorization adds a persistent proposition to the context indicating that the authenticated principal has authorized declassification. Semantic action (8.7) for declassification is similar to semantic action (6.3) for a read as both have the same dynamic behavior in terms of the value produced. The only difference is that the declassification action requires a authorization proof. The value \( \varphi \) witnesses that the authorization proof exists in the trace of any well-typed program because \( \varphi \) is such a proof.

6.2 Authorized declassification

With the addition of authorized declassification it is no longer possible to prove a non-interference theorem as privileged inputs now affect public outputs through a declassification. Nevertheless, it is possible to prove that each disclosure of this type requires a proof of authorization. Many of the lemmas for SLD still hold for SLD though possibly in a slightly modified form.

Theorem 5.1 that states the possible rewrite steps still holds with additional cases for the new actions. Theorem 5.2 that states the adequacy of the semantic actions for modeling the actual observed values produced by the dynamic semantics is modified to accommodate the disclosure of values through declassification. For the purposes of this theorem, the \texttt{decl} command behaves like a \texttt{get} command as the theorem does not mention permission sets. Therefore, the proof for this base case relies on the similarity between the semantic actions for \texttt{decl} and \texttt{get}. The only difference is the additional tracking of the authorization proofs, which does not affect the disclosures. However other cases must be more significantly modified to adjust to the more complicated form of disclosures in the presence of declassification.

The statement of the theorem distinguishes the assignable \( a \) that is declassified from the assignable \( b \) that differs in the initial store because any assignable that is disclosed to the declassified assignable may be leaked through the declassification. To prevent the value of an assignable \( c \) from being leaked by the declassification of \( a \), the permission set \( \Phi_a \) must not be contained in the permission set \( \Phi_c \). If \( \Phi_a \nsubseteq \Phi_c \) then
c cannot be disclosed to a without an additional declassification. Alternatively, simultaneously enforcing integrity would allow us to avoid undesired leaks by making all declassified assignables have high integrity and all assignables that should not be declassified have low integrity.

**Theorem 6.1. (Adequacy).** If the following conditions hold:

1. \( \Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash_m \approx_k m' \approx_k A \otimes [\Phi^x, \Phi^y] \)
2. \( \mu : \Sigma \) and \( \mu' : \Sigma' \)
3. \( \nu \Sigma. (m \mid \mu) \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_1) \{ T \} \)
4. \( \nu \Sigma'. (m' \mid \mu') \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma'. (\text{ret } v' \mid \mu'_1) \{ T' \}

then both of the following also hold:

1. Either \( v \approx_k v' \) or there exists \( b \) such that either
   - \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \)
   - \( \exists a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k, \text{decl}_k[\varphi][a] \in T \) and \( T', S(k') = \text{SOME } \varphi \), and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( a \) such that \( \mu(b) \not\approx_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \).

2. For all \( c \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \) such that \( \mu_1(c) \not\approx_k \mu'_1(c) \), there exists \( b \) such that either
   - \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \)
   - \( \exists a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k, \text{decl}_k[\varphi][a] \in T \) and \( T', S(k') = \text{SOME } \varphi \), and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( a \) such that \( \mu(b) \not\approx_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T \) and \( T' \) disclose \( b \) to \( c \).

**Proof.** The proof is still by structural induction on the derivation of \( \downarrow \). We will give the same representative case of the proof for when the command is a bind to demonstrate how it must be changed to accommodate authorized declassification.

In the bind case, \( m = x \leftarrow e_1 \); \( m_2 \) and \( m' = x \leftarrow e'_1 \); \( m'_2 \) such that:

- \( e_1 \downarrow \text{cmd}(m_1) \) and \( e'_1 \downarrow \text{cmd}(m'_1) \)
- \( \nu \Sigma. (m_1 \mid \mu) \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma. (\text{ret } v_1 \mid \mu_1) \{ T_1 \} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma. (m'_1 \mid \mu') \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma. (\text{ret } v'_1 \mid \mu'_1) \{ T'_1 \} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_1) \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_1) \{ T_2 \} \)
- \( \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v' \mid \mu'_1) \approx_k ^S \nu \Sigma_1. (\text{ret } v' \mid \mu'_1) \{ T'_2 \} \)

By Lemma A.2 we have \( \text{cmd}(m_1) \approx_k \text{cmd}(m'_1) \) : \( \text{cmd}_k(\Phi^x, \Phi^y)(B) \) as \( e_1 \approx_k e'_1 \). By inversion either \( m_1 \approx_k m'_1 \) or \( \text{cmd}_k(\Phi^x, \Phi^y)(B) \not\approx_k \Phi \) and \( k \not\in \Phi \). In the latter case, we have \( B \not\approx_k \Phi \) by inversion and therefore \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 : B \).

Otherwise, by the first case of the induction hypothesis on the evaluation derivation of \( m_1 \) we have either \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 \) or there exists \( b \) such that \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \) or \( \exists a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k, \text{decl}_k[\varphi][a] \in T_1 \) and \( T'_1, S(k') = \text{SOME } \varphi \) and \( T_1 \) and \( T'_1 \) disclose \( b \) to \( a \) and \( \mu(b) \not\approx_k \mu'(b) \) and \( T_1 \) and \( T'_1 \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \).

In the latter case, Lemma A.3 yields \( T = T_1, \text{ leaks}_k(\Phi^x), T_2 \) and \( T' = T'_1, \text{ leaks}_k(\Phi^y), T'_2 \) also disclose \( b \) to \( k \), and the traces satisfy the other conditions on \( b \) to complete this case.

In the cases when \( v_1 \approx_k v'_1 \), we apply the first case of the induction hypothesis to \( [v_1/x]m_2 \) and \( [v'_1/x]m'_2 \) to conclude that \( v \approx_k v' \) or there exists \( b \) such that \( b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \) or \( \exists a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k, \text{decl}_k[\varphi][a] \in T_2 \) and \( T'_2, S(k') = \text{SOME } \varphi \) and \( T_2 \) and \( T'_2 \) disclose \( b \) to \( a \) and \( \mu_1(b) \not\approx_k \mu'_1(b) \) and \( T_2 \) and \( T'_2 \) disclose \( b \) to \( k \).

In the former case, we have completed this case. Otherwise, we apply the second case of the induction hypothesis to \( m_1 \) and \( m'_1 \) to conclude that there exists a \( c \) such that \( c \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k \) or \( \exists a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma'|_k, \text{decl}_k[\varphi][a] \in T_1 \) and \( T'_1, S(k') = \text{SOME } \varphi \) and \( T_1 \) and \( T'_1 \) disclose \( c \) to \( a \) such that \( \mu(c) \not\approx_k \mu'(c) \) and \( T_1 \) and
\( T'_1 \) disclose \( c \) to \( b \). Then Lemma A.4 yields \( T = T_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi'_1), T_2 \) and \( T' = T'_1, \text{leak}_k(\Phi'_2), T'_2 \) disclose \( c \) to \( k \) completing this case. Note that in this case the assignable that differs in the initial store is \( c \) while it may be the assignable \( b \) that is declassified to \( k \), which necessitates the more general statement of the theorem.

The typing soundness lemma changes more substantially as the theorem as originally stated no longer holds due to the addition of declassifications. The revised statement only guarantees non-interference for assignables that could not have been disclosed through declassification.

**Lemma 6.1. (Typing Soundness).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \cdot \vdash m \div x A \otimes [\Phi^x, \Phi^y] \),
- \( \mu : \Sigma \), and
- \( \nu \Sigma.(m || \mu) \Downarrow \nu \Sigma.(\text{ret } v || \mu t) \{ T \} \)

then if each assignable \( c \) associated with a declassification action in \( \mathcal{T} \) has permission set \( \Phi_c \) such that \( \Phi_c \not\subseteq \Phi \) then:

1. For all \( a : A \otimes \Phi_a \in \Sigma \) if \( \Phi_a \not\subseteq \Phi \) and \( T \) discloses \( a \) to \( k \) then \( \Phi'^x \not\subseteq \Phi_a \) and \( k \in \Phi_a \)
2. For all \( a : A \otimes \Phi_a \in \Sigma \) if \( T \) discloses \( p \) to \( a \) and \( p \neq a \) then \( \Phi_a \not\subseteq \Phi' \)
3. For all \( a : A \otimes \Phi_a \in \Sigma \) and \( b : B \otimes \Phi_b \in \Sigma \) if \( \Phi_a \subseteq \Phi \) and \( T \) discloses \( a \) to \( b \) then \( \Phi_a \supseteq \Phi_b \)

**Proof.** The proof follows the same structure as before. Most of the cases are essentially the same. The case for a declassification command uses the fact that the assignable being declassified cannot be the \( a \) in cases 1 and 3 because its permission set is not contained in \( \Phi \) by assumption.

The non-interference theorem becomes the following theorem that includes the possibility of an authorized declassification that could subvert the permission sets. It is still a direct corollary of the type soundness and adequacy results.

**Theorem 6.2. (Authorized Declassification).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \Sigma' ; \cdot \vdash m \div x A \otimes [\Phi^x, \Phi^y] \),
- \( \mu : \Sigma \) and \( \mu' : \Sigma' \),
- \( \nu \Sigma.(m || \mu) \Downarrow \nu \Sigma.(\text{ret } v || \mu t) \{ T \} \), and
- \( \nu \Sigma'.(m' || \mu') \Downarrow \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret } v' || \mu'_t) \{ T' \} \)

then both of the following also hold:

1. If \( \forall \neq \nu'_k \nu' \) then there exists \( b : B \otimes \Phi_b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \neq \mu'(b) \) and either \( \Phi^x \not\subseteq \Phi_b \) or there is a proof authorizing the declassification of an assignable \( c \) with permission set \( \Phi_c \not\subseteq \Phi_b \)
2. For all \( b : B \otimes \Phi_b \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(b) \neq \mu'_k(b) \), there exists \( a : A \otimes \Phi_a \in \Sigma \cap \Sigma' \) such that \( \mu(a) \neq \mu'(a) \) and either \( \Phi_a \supseteq \Phi_b \) or there is a proof authorizing the declassification of an assignable \( c \) with permission set \( \Phi_c \subseteq \Phi_a \)

**Proof.** The presence of declassification actions in the trace in Theorem 6.1 guarantees the existence of corresponding authorization proofs when composed with Lemma 6.1.

\[ 20 \]
7 Related Work

Early work on language-based IFS is summarized in Sabelfeld and Myers [2003]. The most closely related work is Crary et al. [2005]. Our type system is based on theirs with the notable exception of our syntactic representation of non-informative upcalls as principal switches. This modification facilitates forming traces to connect the programs with our epistemic logic model of information flow.

As in Crary et al. [2005], the line of work culminating in Almeida Matos and Boudol [2009] takes a store-oriented approach to IF security rather than the more prevalent value-oriented approach. Earlier publications on this approach include Almeida Matos and Boudol [2005] and Boudol [2005]. These papers define non-disclosure as an alternative to non-interference. Non-disclosure permits declassification within contexts that explicitly allow these declassifying flows. The flows allowed at a given point of the program are recorded in the local flow policy. The type system proposed for controlling IF has security effects that closely parallel our permission sets. The security effects include an additional termination effect that we do not employ because we currently consider termination insensitive non-interference. However, adapting our line of work to a concurrent language would likely require a stronger termination sensitive approach as non-termination leaks more information when there are multiple threads that can observe the termination behavior of one another. Non-disclosure does not attempt to address the issue of when a declassifying flow policy should be permitted. Instead it focuses only on how to accept programs that declassify information while still preserving an IF security property. Our work attempts to answer both these questions by integrating authorization logic with epistemic reasoning.

In Balliu et al. [2011], epistemic logic is also applied to reason about information flow. This work employs a temporal epistemic logic for reasoning about security properties. Using a substructural epistemic logic grants us some of the advantages of a temporal logic as the linear context changes after each trace action corresponding to different temporal states. In Balliu et al. [2012], they extend this work by employing an SMT solver along with concrete and symbolic execution to verify the enforcement of the policies. This work also uses traces of actions from the execution of the program to mediate between the program and the logic. Despite these similarities, this work substantially differs from ours in its overall approach. By analyzing programs individually rather than employing a type system to avoid illicit flows to all programs, their work is able to validate the NI of many programs that appear to leak information under most type system based approaches including ours. However, our approach provides a proof that the type system ensures NI or only authorized declassifications so that any program that is well-typed will be safe to execute without further analysis.

Halpern and O’Neill [2008] employs the interpreted systems formalism [Fagin et al., 1995] for reasoning about secrecy in multiagent systems whereas we employ a static language-based approach. Secure multi-execution (SME) [Devriese and Piessens, 2010] dynamically enforces IFS. Rather than just monitoring the behavior to prevent insecurities, SME repairs them. In the Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) [Abadi et al., 1999], the monadic type seals values with a security level. Following Crary et al. [2005], the monad we employ encapsulates storage effects and specifies bounds on the security levels read and written. Crary et al. [2005] encodes DCC dependency analysis into this style of type system.

Sabelfeld and Sands [2009] surveys work on declassification and provides dimensions of declassification for analyzing these approaches. SLD does not directly address what information is released in a quantification sense, but it can be encoded in the system by choosing a sufficiently fine stratification of the security levels or by enforcing integrity constraints on declassified assignables. If only part of a value should be declassified, such as the last four digits of a credit card, then this part can be stored in a separate assignable with a less restrictive permission set. Zdancewic and Myers [2001] define robust declassification to prevent an attacker from obtaining more information than intended through declassifications. Our approach for encoding what-dimension declassification can address this issue at the cost of dealing with more cumbersome fine-grained security levels or integrity. Control of who releases information is enforced through our protocol that requires authentication certificates to form authorization proof. We restrict when information is released in the relative sense that it must follow authentication. Our policies do not dictate where information is declassified in either the level locality or code locality sense, but both could be addressed by increasing the expressiveness of the policies.
Montagu et al. [2013] defines *label algebras* to compare the expressiveness of various IF languages with labels. Our approach roughly corresponds to their reader model where each label is a set of principals and each authority is the set of principals that have authenticated. The authorization proofs and declassification policies presented here are simple. More complicated policies are necessary for many applications of authorized declassification. One technique for expressing policies for declassification is presented in Banerjee et al. [2008]. Modeling information flow in systems with declassification is addressed in Zdancewic and Myers [2001].

Tse and Zdancewic [2007] proposes a method for enforcing information flow policies with run-time principals. It provides a flexible method for enforcing policies that depend on data that is only available dynamically. It is unclear how our approach can be adapted to this setting as it relies on statically determining what traces are possible and reasoning about them in the epistemic logic. It would only validate a conservative subset of the safe programs whose policies depend on information only available at run time. Bohannon et al. [2009] defines NI in reactive systems such as web browsers and develops a technique for proving NI properties in this setting.

Other approaches support information flow reasoning in existing functional languages. For example, Li and Zdancewic [2006], Li and Zdancewic [2010], and Russo et al. [2008] demonstrate how to reason about information flow in Haskell, and Pottier and Simonet [2002] addresses information flow in ML. Our work focuses on a simple monadically structured imperative language, and we designed the type system to explicitly restrict information flow. However, the general techniques are applicable to more robust languages.

Nanevski et al. [2011] models information flow properties including NI with dependent types. The type system is expressive enough to state that low outputs must be equal if the low inputs are equal. Other approaches to enforcing security properties using dependent types are given in Morgenstern and Licata [2010], which modifies the dependently-typed language Agda [Norell, 2007] for this purpose, and in Jia and Zdancewic [2009], which employs the access control language AURA [Jia et al., 2008]. These approaches employing dependent types are inherently more powerful in their ability to express and enforce policies. If this expressiveness is required, applying our epistemic reformulation of information flow properties to a dependently-typed language may be an interesting direction for future work.

### 8 Goals

The following goals from the thesis proposal are augmented with updates on the progress made toward achieving them and the work that remains to be done before the thesis defense.

**A security language with an expressive authorization logic**

- **Primary**: The security language.
  
  The language $\text{SLD}$ given in Section 6 will be the starting point for the construction of this extension. This language will be extended to include an expressive authorization logic. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 must be updated to accommodate the changes.

  - **Update**: The proposed extension is based on the authorization framework of PCML$_5$ [Avijit et al., 2010]. As in this work, we propose to use the kind and constructor level to encode authorization proofs. The main extension we propose is to incorporate the extra-logically validated signed affirmations of Bowers et al. [2007]. The inclusion of extra-logically validated assumptions yields proofs whose validation is contextually relevant to the validation of certain signatures.

  - **Proposed Work**: We have to formally define this language extension with the added kind and constructor level authorization proofs. While the techniques we propose are well-studied in prior work, we must incorporate them into our setting. It then remains to verify that the theorems that held for our simplified authorization logic remain valid.
Secondary: Adapt this approach to specifically analyze parallel and concurrent languages. While the interaction of multiple principals can be explicitly programmed in the current language, analyzing parallel or concurrent protocols would be natural in a framework with true parallelism or concurrency. As noted in Almeida Matos and Boudol [2009], reasoning in a concurrent setting makes termination leaks more important. Therefore, the language would need to enforce termination sensitive non-interference. The desired security property may resemble the non-disclosure property of Almeida Matos and Boudol [2009].

- **Update:** We have extended SL to a simple concurrent language with message passing of classified values. In this extension, the classifiers of messages play a similar role as the assignables in SL. The security level of a classifier imposes an upper bound on the confidentiality of the content of messages sent with that classifier. Based on the observations of Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [2014], we impose a security property that is sufficiently strong to be preserved under parallel composition. In fact, we are even more conservative than the property of progress-sensitive non-interference proposed in Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [2014]. We prohibit any process that has received a high confidentiality message from sending any messages of lower confidentiality. While this may seem too restrictive to permit any interesting programs, the ability to spawn an independent child thread to listen on a high channel and respond appropriately recovers the same utility that non-informative blocks provided in SL.

- **Future Work:** An interesting further development in this area would be the addition of declas-sification to the concurrent language. In the concurrent setting, constraining the possible flows of knowledge induced by a declassification becomes even more interesting as there are more side channels that may cause unintended leaks than are present in the sequential case. However, I do not propose to explore this for my thesis.

Reasoning about programs in epistemic and authorization logic

- **Primary:** The logic of DeYoung and Pfenning [2009] provides the features we need to integrate epistemic and authorization reasoning, but applying it to the modified language will require some additional investigation. The authorization proofs of Section 6 are atomic so connecting an authorization token with a declassification event that uses it is straightforward. However, when the authorization proofs of a declassification event may require several conditions to hold that are not necessarily directly connected to particular events, the semantic action for validating that proof must be more complicated.

  - **Update:** We are only making a small change to the logic of DeYoung and Pfenning [2009]. This already has affirmation, and the addition of signed affirmations is a minor modification. However, we will be interpreting the authorization proofs in this logic in an alternate way as contextually relevant proofs with holes validated extra-logically.

- **Proposed Work:** Updating the proofs that the logic soundly encodes the authorization proofs is the only significant extension in this area. This should remain relatively straightforward as the authorization logic is essentially a subset of the modified epistemic logic.

Applications of the framework

- **Primary:** Apply our methodology to several security protocols to connect the steps of the protocol to the intended epistemic consequences that are often left implicit. Many security protocols list steps that must be performed in a certain sequence to adhere to the protocol, but the objective of the protocol may be divorced from the steps. When this objective is an epistemic statement about which principals should be able to know something as a result of the protocol, our framework can directly integrate this epistemic reasoning with the protocol.

  - **Update:** Under the proposed extension, we can directly tie the presence or absence of certain signed affirmations to the ability to declassify confidential information and consequently to the
derivability of the knowledge of this declassified information. For example, an authorization protocol may require obtaining a signed affirmation from the hospital that the doctor is an employee and obtaining a signed affirmation of consent from the patient to be treated by the doctor. In our framework, we can show that the doctor gains no knowledge of the patient’s private medical record unless both signed affirmations are present. We have formulated some small toy authorization policies in this framework.

- **Proposed Work:** It remains to formulate more substantial authorization policies. While these do not present any additional technical challenges, they demonstrate the utility of our framework. More complex authorization policies also increase the probability of unintended consequences of the policy. Identifying these unintended consequences goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

- **Secondary:** Encode tainting with dynamic classification and analyze policies involving tainting with epistemic logic. In general, a value is tainted to prevent its flow from or to some principal. Therefore, the motivation for the tainting system is to restrict a flow of knowledge.

- **Update:** In addition to tainting, there may be encodings of other alternative approaches to information flow security in our language. For example the dynamic approach using labeling of LIO [Stefan et al., 2011] may be encodeable in a similar fashion to encoding dynamically typed languages into statically typed languages with an extensible type.

- **Proposed Work:** The full encodings may go beyond the scope of the thesis, but simplified versions together with a strategy for extending them to the full version should be developed.

References


### A Technical Lemmas

The following technical lemmas are not essential for understanding the development of this paper but may be interesting to the curious reader. The first lemma essentially states that substitution respects the equivalence judgment we defined.

**Lemma A.1. (Functionality).**
1. If $\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash e \equiv_k e' : A$ and $\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma, x : A \vdash m \equiv_k m' : \Phi \bowtie \Phi'$ then 
$\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash [e/x]m \equiv_k [e'/x]'m' \bowtie \Phi \bowtie \Phi'$
2. If $\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash e \equiv_k e' : A$ and $\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma, x : A \vdash e_1 \equiv_k e'_1 : B$ then 
$\Sigma; \Sigma'; \Gamma \vdash [e/x]e_1 \equiv_k [e'/x]e'_1 : B$

Proof: The proof is essentially the same as the proof of the corresponding result in Crary et al. [2005]. □

Functionality is used to prove the following lemma, which states that equivalence is preserved under evaluation.

Lemma A.2. (Equivalence under Evaluation).

1. If the following conditions hold:
   - $\Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash m \equiv_k m' : \Phi \bowtie \Phi'$,
   - $\Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash \mu \equiv_k \mu' : \phi \bowtie \phi'$,
   - $\nu \Sigma.(m \parallel \mu) \Downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret } v \parallel \mu_1) \{T\}$, and
   - $\nu \Sigma'.(m' \parallel \mu') \Downarrow_k \nu \Sigma''.(\text{ret } v' \parallel \mu'_1) \{T'\}$
then $\Sigma_\phi; \Sigma'_\phi \vdash v \equiv_k v' : A$

2. If the following conditions hold:
   - $\Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash e \equiv_k e' : A$,
   - $e \Downarrow v$, and
   - $e' \Downarrow v'$
then $\Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash v \equiv_k v' : A$

Proof. We give the following interesting case:

1. $m = x \leftarrow e_1; m_2$ and $m' = x \leftarrow e'_1; m'_2$
2. $\Sigma; \Sigma' \vdash e_1 \equiv_k e'_1 : \text{cmd}_k(\Phi_1^1, \Phi_1^2)(B)$ and $\Sigma; \Sigma'; x : B \vdash m_2 \equiv_k m'_2 : \Phi_2 \bowtie \Phi_2'$
3. $e_1 \Downarrow \text{cmd}(m_1)$ and $e'_1 \Downarrow \text{cmd}(m'_1)$

The induction hypothesis yields $\text{cmd}(m_1) \equiv_k \text{cmd}(m'_1)$. This case is interesting when the equivalence is by virtue of the $\equiv$ rule rather than the compatibility rule. By inversion, we have $\text{cmd}_k(\Phi_1^1, \Phi_1^2)(B) \setminus \Phi$ and $k \notin \Phi$. Again by inversion, we have $B \not\subseteq \Phi$ and $\Phi \cup \Phi' \subseteq \Phi$. Therefore, $k \notin \Phi^1$ and $k \notin \Phi'$.

Moreover, as $k \notin \Phi^1$, $\Sigma_1; \Sigma'_1 \vdash \nu v_1 \equiv_k \nu v'_1 : B$ as $k \notin \Phi$ and $\Phi \setminus \Phi$. Moreover, as $k \notin \Phi^1$, $\Sigma_1; \Sigma'_1 \vdash \mu_1 \equiv_k \mu'_1 : \Sigma_1 \cap \Sigma'_1 \bowtie \phi$ so the induction hypothesis can be applied to $[v_1/x]m_2$ and $[v'_1/x]m'_2$ to complete this case. □

The next three lemmas assert properties of the disclosure judgment defined in Definition 4.3. They are all proved using Theorem 5.1.

Lemma A.3. (Disclosure Extension). If the following conditions hold:

- $\Sigma; \vdash m \equiv_k A \bowtie \Phi \bowtie \Phi'$,
- $\nu \Sigma.(m \parallel \mu) \Downarrow_k \nu \Sigma'.(\text{ret } v \parallel \mu_1) \{T\}$,
- $T = T_1, T_2$, and
- $T_1$ discloses $a$ to $k$
then \( T \) discloses \( a \) to \( k \).

**Lemma A.4. (Disclosure Composition).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \cdot \vdash m \div a \llbracket \Phi^r, \Phi^w \rrbracket \),
- \( \nu \Sigma. (m \mid \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma.f. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_f) \{T\} \),
- \( T = T_1, T_2 \),
- \( T_1 \) discloses \( p_1 \) to \( p_2 \), and
- \( T_2 \) discloses \( p_2 \) to \( p_3 \)

then \( T \) discloses \( p_1 \) to \( p_3 \).

**Lemma A.5. (Principal Disclosure).** If the following conditions hold:

- \( \Sigma; \cdot \vdash m \div a \llbracket \Phi^r, \Phi^w \rrbracket \),
- \( \nu \Sigma. (m \mid \mu) \downarrow_k \nu \Sigma.f. (\text{ret } v \mid \mu_f) \{T\} \), and
- \( T \) discloses \( a \) to \( k' \)

then \( k = k' \).

**B  Integrity**

We have focused on confidentiality, but this methodology may also be applied for preserving integrity by modifying the interpretation of a few components. For example, when enforcing confidentiality the set \( \Phi^r \) represented the set of principals permitted to know the value of the computation. When enforcing integrity, this set represents the set of principals that trust the value of the computation. Similarly, when enforcing confidentiality the set \( \Phi^w \) represented the set of principals to whom the computation may disclose information, but when enforcing integrity this set represents the set of principals whose assignables may be influenced by the computation. Therefore, we still require \( \Phi^r \supseteq \Phi^w \) as the principals that trust the integrity of an assignable that may be influenced by a computation must also trust the integrity of the computation.

Despite these slight differences in semantics, the type system remains unchanged. The only difference is that we use the dual lattice for our relation between principals. If before \( k \sqsubseteq k' \), we now have \( k' \sqsubseteq k \) instead because rather than protecting the secrets of principal \( k' \) from being disclosed to principal \( k \), we are now protecting the integrity of the assignables of principal \( k' \) from principal \( k \). Abstractly, we are still preventing a flow of information from one principal to the other. As a result of this change in the lattice, the upward closed condition on permission sets also changes correspondingly. Now rather than always giving a more privileged principal permission to access an assignable, we always force a lower integrity principal to trust an assignable.

The same non-interference theorem still applies but may now be interpreted through the lens of integrity. The condition that states the final values of the two computations will only differ if there is an assignable with initial values that differ in the two stores and with the executing principal in its permission set now indicates that these final values only differ if an assignable trusted by the executing principal differs in the two initial states. Therefore, if a computation is run in two different stores that only differ in the assignables not trusted by the principal then the result of the computation will be the same. The other condition now states that if the integrity of an assignable is compromised by a computation then there must be a more trusted assignable that had differing values in the initial state. The contrapositive of these two conditions implies that modifying the low integrity inputs will not affect the final values of the high integrity outputs.

There are other integrity results that may be more appropriate for particular applications. We discuss one of these in the future work.
Initial Sequents

\[ \Gamma; p^+ \vdash [p^+] \quad \Gamma; [p^-] \vdash p^- \]

Positive Connectives

\[ \begin{align*}
\Gamma; \Delta_1 \vdash [A^+] & \quad \Gamma; \Delta_2 \vdash [B^+] \\
\Gamma; \Delta_1 \land \Delta_2 \vdash [A^+ \otimes B^+] & \quad \Gamma; \Delta, A^+, B^+ \vdash J \\
\Gamma; \Delta, A^+ \otimes B^+ \vdash J & \\
\Gamma; \vdash \Pi & \\
\Gamma; \Delta \vdash J & \\
\Gamma; \vdash A^- & \\
\Gamma; \vdash !A^- & \\
\Gamma; \Delta, !A^- \vdash J & \\
\Gamma; \Delta, A^- \vdash J & \\
\end{align*} \]

Negative Connectives

\[ \begin{align*}
\Gamma; \Delta, \Delta_1 \vdash [A^-] & \quad \Gamma; \Delta_2 \vdash [B^-] \\
\Gamma; \Delta, \Delta_2 \vdash [A^- \rightarrow B^-] & \\
\Gamma; \Delta \vdash [\Delta_1 \land \Delta_2 \vdash [A^+ \rightarrow B^-]] & \\
\Gamma; \vdash !\Delta \vdash J & \\
\Gamma; \vdash \forall x : \tau. A^- & \\
\end{align*} \]

Figure 9: Inference rules for the weakly focused sequent calculus

C Linear Epistemic Logic

The important rules of the linear epistemic logic from DeYoung and Pfenning [2009] are presented in Figure 9. The monad, \{\}, is essential for isolating the application of the semantic effects to a single spine of the derivation. For simplicity, we have omitted polarity annotations in this work, but they are a familiar part of the focusing methodology of Andreoli [1992]. The rules are divided into right and left focusing sequents to chain non-invertible rules together as is common in focusing calculi.