

[13] note that most files are read in their entirety after being opened.

Systems that use whole-file caching are most naturally suited to using bulk transfer protocols. Other systems exploit bulk transfer in varying degrees. AFS-3 transfers data in large chunks, typically 64 kilobyte in size. Sun NFS and Sprite do not use bulk transfer protocols, but use large datagrams, typically 8 kilobyte in size. It is likely that bulk transfer protocols will increase in importance as distributed file systems spread across networks of wider geographic area.

D. Token-Based Mutual Authentication

A social consequence of large scale is that the casual attitude toward security typical of closely knit distributed environments is no longer viable. The relative anonymity of users in a large system requires security to be maintained by enforcement rather than by good will. This, in turn, raises the question of who can be trusted to enforce security. Security in Andrew and Coda is predicated on the integrity of a relatively small number of servers, rather than the much larger number of clients.

Many small-scale distributed systems present a facade of security by using simple extensions of the mechanisms used in a time-sharing environment. For example, authentication is often implemented by sending a password in the clear to the server, which then validates it. Besides the obvious danger of sending passwords in the clear, this also has the drawback that the client is not certain of the identity of the server. Andrew and Coda, in contrast, perform full mutual authentication using a variant of the Needham and Schroeder private key authentication algorithm [11].

In AFS-1, AFS-2, and Coda, this function is integrated with the RPC mechanism. To establish a secure and authenticated RPC connection, a 3-phase handshake takes place between client and server. The client supplies a variable-length identifier and an encryption key for the handshake. The server provides a key lookup procedure and a procedure to be invoked on authentication failure. The latter allows the server to record and possibly notify an administrator of suspicious authentication failures. At the end of a successful authentication handshake the server is assured that the client possesses the correct key, while the client is assured that the server is capable of looking up his key. The use of randomized information in the handshake guards against replays by adversaries.

A naive use of the RPC handshake would require the user to supply his password every time a new connection had to be established. The obvious improvement of having the user type in his password once and storing it in the clear at the client is risky. The approach used in Andrew and Coda is to provide a level of indirection using *authentication tokens*. When a user logs in to a client, the password he types in is used as the key to establish a secure RPC connection to an authentication server. A pair of authentication tokens are then obtained for the user on this secure connection. These tokens are saved by the client and are used by it to establish secure RPC connections on behalf of the user to file servers. To bound the period during which lost tokens can cause damage, tokens expire after a finite time (typically 24 h).

Like a file server, an authentication server runs on physically secure hardware. To improve availability and to balance load, there are multiple instances of the authentication server. Only one instance accepts updates; the others are slaves and respond only to queries. To improve accountability, the master maintains an audit trail of changes to the authentication database.

For reasons of standardization, AFS-3 uses the Kerberos authentication system [26]. Kerberos provides functionality equivalent to the authentication mechanism described above, and resembles it in design.

E. Hierarchical Groups and Access Lists

Controlling access to data is substantially more complex in large-scale systems than it is in smaller systems. There is more data to protect and more users to make access control decisions about. This is an area in which the Unix file system model is seriously deficient. The Unix protection model was obtained by simplifying the Multics protection model to meet the needs of small time-sharing systems. Not surprisingly, the Unix model becomes inadequate when a system is scaled up. To enhance scalability Andrew and Coda organize their protection domains hierarchically and support a full-fledged access-list mechanism.

The protection domain is composed of *users* and *groups*. Membership in a group is inherited, and a user's privileges are the cumulative privileges of all the groups he or she belongs to, either directly or indirectly. New additions to a group G , automatically acquire all privileges granted to the groups to which G belongs. Conversely, when a user is deleted, it is only necessary to remove him from those groups in which he is explicitly named as a member. Inheritance of membership conceptually simplifies the maintenance and administration of the protection domain, a particularly attractive trait at large scale. At least two other systems, CMU-CFS [1] and Grapevine [22], have also used a hierarchical protection domain.

Andrew and Coda use an *access-list* mechanism for file protection. The total rights specified for a user are the union of the rights specified for him and the groups he or she belongs to. Access lists are associated with directories rather than individual files. The reduction in state obtained by this design decision provides conceptual simplicity that is valuable at large scale. Although the real enforcement of protection is done on the basis of access lists, Venus superimposes an emulation of Unix protection semantics by honoring the owner component of the Unix *mode bits* on a file. The combination of access lists on directories and mode bits on files has proved to be an excellent compromise between protection at fine granularity, scalability, and Unix compatibility.

The ability to *rapidly revoke* access privileges is important in a large distributed system. Revocation is usually done by removing an individual from an access list. But that individual may be a direct or indirect member of one or more groups that give him or her rights on the object. The process of discovering all groups that the user should be removed from, performing the removal at the site of the master authentication server, and propagating it to all slaves may take a significant amount of time in a large distributed system. Andrew and Coda

simplify rapid and selective revocation by allowing access lists to specify *negative rights*. An entry in a negative rights list indicates *denial* of the specified rights, with denial overriding possession in case of conflict. Negative rights thus decouple the problems of rapid revocation and propagation of group membership information.

The loss of *accountability* caused by the shared use of a pseudo-user id (such as “root” in Unix systems) by system administrators is a serious problem at large scale. Consequently, administrative privileges in Andrew and Coda are obtained by membership in a distinguished group named “System:Administrators.” This improves accountability, since system administrators have to reveal their true identity during authentication.

F. First Versus Second-Class Replication

The use of two distinct mechanisms for high availability in Coda, server replication and disconnected operation, is an indirect consequence of Coda’s desire to scale well. Systems such as Locus [29] that rely solely on server replication have poor scaling characteristics. Since disconnected operation is almost free, while server replication incurs additional hardware costs and protocol overhead, it is natural to ask why the latter mechanism is needed at all. The answer to this question depends critically on the very different assumptions made about clients and servers in Coda. These assumptions, in turn, reflect the usage and administrative characteristics of a large distributed system.

Clients are like appliances: they can be turned off at will and may be unattended for long periods of time. They have limited disk storage capacity, their software and hardware may be tampered with, and their owners may not be diligent about backing up the local disks. Servers, in contrast, have much greater disk capacity, are physically secure, and are carefully monitored and administered by a professional staff. It is therefore appropriate to distinguish between *first-class replicas* on servers and *second-class replicas* on clients (i.e., cached copies). First-class replicas are of higher quality—they are more persistent, widely known, secure, available, complete, and accurate. Second-class replicas, in contrast, are inferior along all these dimensions. Only by periodic revalidation with respect to a first-class replica can a second-class replica be useful.

The function of a cache coherence protocol is to combine the performance and scalability advantages of a second-class replica with the quality of a first-class replica. When disconnected the quality of the second-class replica may be degraded, because the first-class replica upon which it is contingent is inaccessible. The longer the duration of disconnection, the greater the potential for degradation. Whereas server replication preserves the quality of data in the face of failures, disconnected operation forsakes quality for availability. Hence server replication is important, because it reduces the frequency and duration of disconnected operation, which is properly viewed as a measure of last resort.

G. Data Aggregation

In a large system, considerations of *operability* and *system*

administration assume major significance. To facilitate these functions, Andrew and Coda organize file system data into *volumes* [24]. A volume is a collection of files located on one server and forming a partial *subtree* of the Vice name space. Volumes are invisible to application programs and are only manipulated by system administrators. The aggregation of data provided by volumes reduces the apparent size of the system as perceived by operators and system administrators. Our operational experience in Andrew and Coda confirms the value of the volume abstraction in a large distributed file system.

Virtually all administrative functions in Andrew and Coda are done at the granularity of volumes. For example, volumes are the unit of read-only replication in Andrew, and read-write replication in Coda. Balancing of the available disk space and utilization on servers is accomplished by redistributing volumes across one or more servers. These modifications can be made during normal operation without disrupting service to users. Disk storage quotas are specified and enforced on individual volumes

Volumes also form the basis of the backup and restoration mechanism. To backup a volume, a read-only *clone* is first made, thus creating a frozen snapshot of the constituent files. Since cloning is an efficient operation, users rarely notice any loss of access to that volume. An asynchronous mechanism then transfers this clone to a staging machine from where it is dumped to tape. The clone is also made available on-line. This substantially reduces the number of restoration requests received by operators, since users can themselves undo recent deletions by copying data from the clone.

H. Decentralized Administration

A large distributed system is unwieldy to manage as a monolithic entity. For smooth and efficient operation, it is essential to delegate administrative responsibility along lines that parallel institutional boundaries. Such a system decomposition has to balance site autonomy with the desirable but conflicting goal of system-wide uniformity in human and programming interfaces. The *cell* mechanism of AFS-3 [30] is an example of a mechanism that provides this balance.

A cell corresponds to a completely autonomous Andrew system, with its own protection domain, authentication and file servers, and system administrators. A federation of cells can cooperate in presenting users with a uniform, seamless file name space. Although the presence of multiple protection domains complicates the security mechanisms in Andrew, Venus hides much of the complexity from users. For example, authentication tokens issued in a cell are only valid within that cell. To preserve transparency when accessing files from different cells, Venus maintains a collection of tokens for the cells of interest. A user is aware of the existence of cells only at the beginning of a session, when he or she authenticates himself to individual cells to obtain authentication tokens. After this initial step, Venus uses the appropriate tokens when establishing a secure connection to a file server.

I. Functional Specialization

When implementing a distributed realization of an interface

originally defined for a single site, one often finds that scalability and exact interface emulation make conflicting demands. One way to improve scalability is to relax the accuracy with which the interface is emulated. This strategy is particularly attractive if there is a natural partitioning of applications based on their use of the interface. Each equivalence class of applications can then use a distributed realization of the interface tuned to its critical requirements.

In Andrew and Coda, propagating modifications only upon close operations violates strict Unix semantics, but is irrelevant to most Unix applications. The use of caching and bulk data transfer presume substantial temporal and spatial locality of file accesses. The use of an optimistic replication strategy in Coda is based on the assumption that sequential write sharing is relatively rare. But the assumptions on which these techniques are based usually fail to hold for databases. Poor locality, fine granularity of update and query, and frequent concurrent and sequential write-sharing are the norm rather than the exception in databases.

Rather than compromise scalability in an attempt to support databases, Andrew and Coda partition the problem into two orthogonal components—file access and database access—and only address the former. Support for database access has to be provided by a separate mechanism. This two-pronged strategy is in contrast to the unified strategies of time-sharing Unix file systems, where all accesses (from databases or otherwise) are supported on the same interface.

Functional specialization also characterizes the mechanism in Andrew for supporting personal computers (PC's) such as the IBM PC and Apple Macintosh. Such machines differ from full-fledged Andrew clients in that they do not run Unix, typically possess limited amounts of memory, and often do not possess a local disk. Caching of whole files, or large chunks of files, is not a viable design strategy for such machines. However, since a significant number of Andrew users also use PC's, we felt it essential to allow PC users to access Vice files. This functionality is provided by a mechanism called *PCServer* [15] that is orthogonal to the Andrew file system.

PCServer runs on an Andrew client and makes its file system appear to be a transparent extension of the file systems of a number of PC's. Since Vice files are transparently accessible from the client, they are also transparently accessible from the PC. The client thus acts as a surrogate for Vice. The protocol between *PCServer* and its clients is tuned to the capabilities of a PC. From the point of view of Venus, it appears as if the PC user had actually logged in at the client running *PCServer*. The decoupling provided by *PCServer* allows the Andrew file system to exploit techniques essential to good performance at large scale, without distorting its design to accommodate machines with limited hardware and software capability.

J. Heterogeneity

As a distributed system evolves it tends to grow more diverse. One factor contributing to diversity is the improvement in performance and decrease in cost of hardware over time. This makes it likely that the most economical hardware configurations will change over the period of growth of the

system. Another source of heterogeneity is the use of different computer platforms for different applications. For example, the same individual may use a supercomputer for simulations, a Macintosh for document processing, a Unix workstation for program development, and a laptop IBM PC while traveling. Easy access to shared data across these diverse platforms would substantially improve usability.

Andrew did not set out to be a heterogeneous computing environment. Initial plans for it envisioned a single type of client, running one operating system, with the network constructed of a single type of physical media. Yet heterogeneity appeared early in its history and proliferated with time. Some of this heterogeneity is attributable to the decentralized administration typical of universities, but we are convinced that much of it is intrinsic to the growth and evolution of any distributed system.

Coping with heterogeneity is inherently difficult, because of the presence of multiple computational environments, each with its own notions of file naming and functionality. Since few general principles are applicable, the idiosyncrasies of each new system have to be accommodated by *ad hoc* mechanisms. The distributed file system community has gained some experience with heterogeneity. For example, Pinkerton *et al.* describe an experimental file system at Washington [14] that focuses on heterogeneity. TOPS [27] is a product offered by Sun Microsystems which allows shared-file access across the MS-DOS and Macintosh operating systems. PC-NFS, also from Sun, allows MS-DOS applications to access files on an NFS server. *PCServer*, described in the previous section, performs a similar function in the Andrew environment.

V. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SCALABILITY

The essence of the Andrew and Coda strategy is to decompose a large distributed system into a small nucleus that changes relatively slowly, and a much larger and less static periphery. From the perspectives of security and operability, the scale of the system appears to be that of the nucleus. But from the perspectives of performance and availability, a user at the periphery receives almost stand-alone service. It is the thesis of this paper that such a strategy is feasible and effective.

A consequence of this strategy is that clients and servers need to be *physically distinct* machines. This seemingly minor detail turns out to be critical. Without this dichotomy, one cannot make different security and administrative decisions about clients and servers, nor can one optimize their hardware and software configurations independently. Although the need to have physically distinct clients and servers is not a problem at large scale, it is an expensive proposition at small scale—it is therefore tempting to make the client-versus-server distinction only a *logical* one, so that the start-up cost of a small installation is low. Unfortunately, systems such as NFS and Locus that have chosen this approach have foundered on the rock of scalability. Growth in these systems is unwieldy, and none of them appears capable of growth to thousands of sites. One is therefore forced to conclude that the client-server distinction is a fundamental one from the perspective of scalability, and that a higher initial cost is the price one pays for a system that can grow gracefully,

Besides this high-level principle, we have also acquired more detailed insights about scalability in the course of building Andrew and Coda. We present these insights here as a collection of design principles:

• *Clients have the cycles to burn*

Whenever there is a choice between performing an operation on a client and performing it on a server, it is preferable to pick the client. This will enhance the scalability of the design, since it lessens the need to increase central resources as clients are added.

The only functions performed by servers in Andrew and Coda are those critical to the security, integrity, or location of data. Further, there is very little interserver traffic. Pathname translation is done on clients rather than on servers in AFS-2, AFS-3, and Coda. The parallel update protocol in Coda depends on the client to directly update all accessible servers, rather than updating one of them and letting it relay the update.

• *Cache whenever possible*

Scalability, user mobility, and site autonomy motivate this principle. Caching reduces contention on centralized resources, and transparently makes data available wherever it is being currently used.

AFS-1 cached files and location information. AFS-2 also cached directories, as do AFS-3 and Coda. Caching is the basis of disconnected operation in Coda.

• *Exploit usage properties*

Knowledge about the use of real systems allows better design choices to be made. For example, files can often be grouped into a small number of easily identifiable classes that reflect their access and modification patterns. These class-specific properties provide an opportunity for independent optimization, and hence improved performance, in a distributed file system design.

Almost one-third of file references in a typical Unix system are to temporary files. Since such files are seldom shared, Andrew and Coda make them part of the local name space. The executable files of system programs are often read, but rarely written. AFS-2, AFS-3, and Coda therefore support read-only replication of these files to improve performance and availability. Coda's use of an optimistic replication strategy is based on the observation that sequential write-sharing of user files is rare.

• *Minimize system-wide knowledge and change*

In a large distributed system it is difficult to be aware at all times of the entire state of the system. It is also difficult to update distributed or replicated data structures in a consistent manner. The scalability of a design is enhanced if it rarely requires global information to be monitored or atomically updated.

Clients in Andrew and Coda only monitor the status of servers from which they have cached data. They do not require any knowledge of the rest of the system. File location information on Andrew and Coda servers changes relatively rarely. Caching by Venus, rather than file location changes in Vice, is used to deal with movement of users.

Coda integrates server replication (a relatively heavy-weight mechanism) with caching to improve availability without losing scalability. Knowledge of a caching site is confined to those servers with callbacks for the caching site. Coda does not depend on knowledge of system-wide topology, nor does it incorporate any algorithms requiring system-wide election or commitment.

Another instance of the application of this principle is the use of negative rights. More rapid revocation is possible by modifications to an access list at a single site rather than by a system-wide change to a replicated protection database.

• *Trust the fewest possible entities*

A system whose security depends on the integrity of the fewest possible entities is more likely to remain secure as it grows.

Rather than trusting thousands of clients, security in Andrew and Coda is predicated on the integrity of the much smaller number of Vice servers. The administrators of Vice need only ensure the physical security of these servers and the software they run. Responsibility for client integrity is delegated to the owner of each client. Andrew and Coda rely on end-to-end encryption rather than physical link security.

• *Batch if possible*

Grouping operations together can improve throughput (and hence scalability), although it is often at the cost of latency.

The transfer of files in large chunks in AFS-3 and in their entirety in AFS-1, AFS-2, and Coda is an instance of the application of this principle. More efficient network protocols can be used when data is transferred *en masse* rather than as individual pages. In Coda, the second phase of the update protocol is deferred and batched. Latency is not increased in this case, because control can be returned to application programs before the completion of the second phase.

VI. CONCLUSION

The central message of this paper is that growth is an inevitable characteristic of successful and long-lived distributed systems. Designers should therefore prepare for growth *a priori*, rather than treating it as an afterthought. Our experience with Andrew and Coda has taught us much about building scalable distributed systems. We now have a collection of mechanisms that have been shown to enhance scalability, and a set of general principles to guide future design choices. But there is always the danger that system designers, like old generals, are fighting the last war. Each quantum increase in scale is likely to expose new ways in which the old tricks fail to work. It is with some trepidation, therefore, that we await the challenges posed by the next generation of large-scale distributed systems.

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