

# 1 The rationality of weakly symmetric social choice functions

**Lemma 1.1** *Let  $f : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  be weakly symmetric (transitive). Then  $\hat{f}(i)$  is the same for all  $i \in [n]$ .*

**Proof:** Let  $i \neq i'$ . Since  $f$  is weakly symmetric, we can pick a permutation  $\pi$  on  $[n]$  such that  $\pi(i) = i'$  and

$$f(x_{\pi(1)}, \dots, x_{\pi(n)}) = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

for all  $x \in \{-1, 1\}^n$ . Now

$$\hat{f}(i) = \mathbf{E}[f(\mathbf{x})x_i] = \mathbf{E}[f(\mathbf{x}_{\pi(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{\pi(n)})x_{\pi(i)}],$$

since a uniformly random string hit by a permutation is still uniformly random. But the above equals  $\mathbf{E}[f(\mathbf{x})x_{i'}] = \hat{f}(i')$ .  $\square$

**Proposition 1.2 (Kalai 2002)** *If  $f : \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  is a weakly symmetric social choice function,  $\text{Rationality}(f) \leq \frac{7}{9} + \frac{4}{9\pi} + O(1/n) \approx .919$ .*

**Proof:** Since  $f$  is weakly symmetric, the lemma implies that  $\hat{f}(i)$  is the same for all  $i$ 's. Hence

$$W_1(f) = \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{f}(i)^2 = \frac{1}{n} \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{f}(i) \right)^2.$$

But we proved that for any  $f$ ,  $\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{f}(i)$  is at most that of Majority, namely  $\sqrt{2/\pi}\sqrt{n} + O(1/\sqrt{n})$ . Hence

$$W_1(f) \leq \frac{2}{\pi} + O(1/n),$$

and the result follows from our proposition bounding  $\text{Rationality}(f)$  in terms of  $W_1(f)$ .  $\square$