Thesis Proposal
Composite Security Requirements in the Presence of Uncertainty

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December 2015

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

Providing secure solutions for information systems relies on decisions made by expert security professionals. These professionals must be capable of aligning threats to existing vulnerabilities to provide mitigations needed to minimize security risks. Despite the abundance of security controls, guidelines, and checklists, security experts rely mostly on their background knowledge and experience to make security-related decisions. I plan to explore how security experts make security-related decisions, collect their assessments of security measures nested in scenarios, and extract security mitigation rules. These rules could be used to build an intelligent fuzzy logic recommendation system, which captures the knowledge of many experts in combination. Extracting security knowledge from experts is done empirically with user-studies by applying factorial vignettes to capture the experts' assessments of mitigations in scenarios composed of many components affecting the decision-making process. The results are analyzed with multi-level modeling in order to capture the weights and priorities assigned to security requirements. The outcome of the analysis will be used to generate membership functions for a type-2 fuzzy logic system. The corresponding fuzzy rule-sets encode the interpersonal and intra-personal uncertainties among experts in decision-making. This work explores security decision-making in presence of: composite security requirements, varying expertise, and uncertainty.
1 Introduction and Background

Despite the abundance of well-documented security best practices, we continue to see security breaches that affect different organizations and industries. The 2014 OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks report shows that attacks are occurring due to the exploitation of common, well-documented vulnerabilities, such as injection and cross-site scripting attacks [1]. Companies rely on human security analysts to evaluate the security of their systems. To make this decision, the analyst must reason over potentially millions of scenarios that account for various permutations of network type, services offered, threat type, etc. When requirements change by adding new components and features, these risk calculations must be updated. What is not known is how changes in threats and requirements affect the analyst’s ability to perceive changes in risk and their ability to identify new, and reprioritize existing, security requirements.

Haley et al. describe security as a wicked problem [2]. Wicked problems are those difficult to solve problems due to unclear, ambiguous, or conflicting requirements [2], [3]. Wicked problems are challenging, because the space of possible solutions are difficult to enumerate [4], and this is the challenge that faces analysts when addressing security problems. Security analysts may respond differently to the same security problem, and they also may be resolving discrepancies represented in the problem differently. For example, analysts can look at the same artifact describing a network architecture, whereby one analyst might assess the security of the authentication mechanisms, while another is more focused on encryption mechanisms. With such wicked problems, researchers suggest that the design of solutions should be aimed at reducing ambiguity by reaching a collective understanding of the problem representation [3], [4]. We believe that there are three factors that make security analysis a wicked problem: how security requirements work together, which we call composition; the varying levels of expertise maintained by experts themselves; and the uncertainty that is present to some level in security decisions. In the remainder of this section we will first explain the security risk quantification problem, because security analysis is all about minimizing the risk. Next, we will explain the problem with current security checklists. Lastly, we will discuss the role of security expertise in decision-making and how requirements composition, expertise differences, and uncertainty affect the analysts’ decision-making process.
1.1 Quantifying Security Risk

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines security risk to researchers defines risk the product of likelihood and impact: the likelihood of a threat to occur on a resource, and the impact of the threat occurrence on the organization [5]. There has been a number of efforts were researchers suggest methods that help assess the security risk and hopefully quantify the risk according to NIST’s definition[6]–[8], [5]. However, existing approaches are being criticized for not solving the security problem [9], [10] as our systems continue to get hacked [9]; and some researchers question the terms of feasibility of such approaches. Garfinkel emphasizes that despite the rapid growth in technology solutions, the analysis tools and techniques available for digital investigators is not accommodating the new demands of technology [11]. This view also applies to security risk analysis, the rapid growth in technology and data calls for new approaches for security risk assessment. Garfinkel also argues that despite the different approaches to risk assessment, is not feasible in practice, because we cannot put an exact number on impact and likelihood of adverse events and that is the reason why many organizations use catalogues of best practices as a way minimize the security risk [10].

We cannot eliminate risk, but we can reduce it to an acceptable limit. This challenge with security risk quantification goes back to security being a wicked problem. This “wicked” nature made researchers suggest that security requirements could only be satisfied as opposed to satisfied [12], [13]. Research in risk quantification is proposing methods that help with defining what is secure enough, but the challenge with risk remains: when do we know a certain security requirement or mitigation is sufficient? Since organizations are in need for risk assessment, they rely on security best practice checklists to perform their analysis, [10] and they probably consider that there enough threshold. In addition, cost plays a big role when deciding on security requirements, making most organization rely on the NIST’s impact and likelihood formula of a possible failure [14]. Haley et al. asserts that it is more feasible to assess security risk and reason about satisfaction of a security requirement in the context of a given situation as opposed to reasoning in a broader context, because it is harder to claim that a negative event is never going to happen [14]. Garfinkel points out that the context or situation where the security best practices exist in is lacking from current checklists [10].

1.2 Security Checklists

Security guidelines and best practices are widely available and documented in a checklist style. For example, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800 series describes best practice security requirements
[15], and the Common Criteria describes a method to evaluate system security. In particular, the NIST SP 800-53 lists 256 security controls, which security analysts can apply in a checklist by deciding whether the control applies to their system. To make this decision, the analyst must reason over potentially millions of scenarios that account for various permutations of network type, services offered, threat type, etc. Hence, the problem is not the lack of security guidelines but in the fact that they are not usable. When requirements change by adding new components and features, these risk calculations must be updated. What is not known is how changes in threats and requirements affect the analyst’s ability to perceive changes in risk and their ability to identify new, and reprioritize existing, security requirements. In other words, the checklists only lists the requirement that could decrease the risk, mapping the requirement to certain threat scenarios or to other requirements is totally done by the analyst. In addition, the context in which requirements exist in composition with priorities and dependencies among each other is also missing from the checklists and it is the security analyst’s job to figure out the context and the underlying dependencies [10].

To create repeatable solutions in security, we need to have a certain level of abstraction. An abstract solution exists regardless of the underlying technology(s), and this is what provides more stability for a system [10]. For example, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an organization that provides software security checklists in its online materials that help developers to reduce the security risk by applying security best practices to their software. However, the technical solutions here are fine-grained to the program-level, where it’s challenging for the average developer to draw the abstraction. These specific solutions in guidelines are only applicable as long as the specific technology(s) exist, and once new technologies appear, the solutions are no longer applicable. What is needed here is the abstract solution that can be applied in similar contexts independent of technology details so the solution will remain stable no matter how the technology changes. Software design patterns are a good example of abstract solutions [16]–[18], although, more work is needed to understand how analysts fit security patterns to problems.

1.3 Security Risk Assessment as a Wicked Problem

Security problems are often assessed by experts who are responsible for reviewing a systems specification, and deciding what mitigations will mitigate security threats. Experts are also sometimes responsible for making sure companies are in compliance with security guidelines, such as NIST 800-53. This practice is affected by the analysts’ expertise and their ability to make decisions about security requirements that exist in composition. Composition means that the requirements do not exist independent of each
other; instead they exist in a context with dependencies and priorities among the different requirements. Adding or removing a requirement affects other requirements in that context. For example, if an organization decides to open a web access port to its in house system that was closed in the past, this would affect the authentication mechanisms, the access control policy, passwords, and so on. As we have mentioned earlier, the composition of requirements and context in which they exist is missing from conventional representations of guidelines and it is all sorted out during the security risk assessment done by analysts.

In addition to composition, security risk assessment is affected by the analysts’ own expertise, and the level of uncertainty that might exist in the decisions they make. Below, we will explain the three factors that affect security analysts risk assessment: expertise, composition, and uncertainty. We believe that these factors contributes to making security risk assessment a wicked problem:

1.3.1 Security Analysts Knowledge and Expertise

Experts rely on tacit knowledge to conduct the analysis. Security experts are not all equal in their knowledge and skillset. For example, security knowledge can be acquired from specialized courses, on-the-job training, or self-study. In addition, some experts may be more specialized in certain areas of security, such as web-security or mobile security. Ben-Asher and Gonzalez [19] examined how the knowledge gap between novices and experts affect analysts’ ability to detect cyber attacks as the experts performed significantly better than novices. To detect attacks successfully, cyber security experts need: 1) domain knowledge [20]–[22] that is obtained through formal academic learning and practical hands-on experience with tools; and 2) situated knowledge which is organization dependent and which analysts tend to learn through continuous interaction with certain environments [22]–[24].

We elaborate more on security expertise in Section 3 as we show our results from 11 interviews of security experts during the conduct of security assessments.

1.3.2 Security Requirements Composition

Expert’s tacit knowledge in security includes many domains under security, including cryptography, network security, web security, mobile security, database security, and malware analysis, among others. It is challenging to find one expert in all these area, combined. Understanding complex attacks, for example, requires knowledge combined from a number of security fields and understanding how the “pieces of the puzzle” are composed together to form the attack [19], [25]. Stuxnet is a good example of such attacks where the attack targeted networks with hosts running the Windows operating system and the Siemens Step7 software [26]. This attack, which targeted
vulnerabilities found on network hosts proves that focusing on strengthening the security of the network alone is not sufficient as other factors such as the hosts, their operating systems, and other connected components need to be taken into consideration when performing the security risk assessment[9]. This broad understanding helps analysts decide upon the proper requirements that work together to mitigate attacks. For example, stronger passwords with rules of 16 alphanumeric and special characters could be considered a good security requirement, but this cannot be an absolute rule. The type of password relies on other factors such as: the type of network where the connection is made, the sensitivity of the data involved, and so on [25]. In Section 4 below, we elaborate on this effect when we report the results of our “composition study”.

1.3.3 Uncertainty in Security Decisions

The research paradigm in software engineering is shifting towards recognizing uncertainty as a first-class concern that affects design, implementation, and deployment of systems [27]. Garlan argues that the human in the loop, mobility, rapid evolution, and cyber physical systems are possible sources of uncertainty [27]. These sources of uncertainty affect the analysts’ security assessment. In this thesis we focus mostly on the uncertainty in expert’s security assessments that could be interpersonal and intrapersonal. The interpersonal uncertainty exists between different experts as experts can judge the same situation differently. The intrapersonal uncertainty is the uncertainty that experts might have about a decision that they are making [28]. For example, an expert might describe a security requirement to be adequate. The uncertainty that this expert has about the meaning of adequate security is intrapersonal uncertainty, and the uncertainty about the meaning of adequate between two different experts is interpersonal uncertainty.

In sections 3 and 4, we report the uncertainty observations we found in our study data. In section 5, we show how we propose to account for the uncertainty in our modeling of experts’ security assessment.
2 Thesis Statement

The increasing complexity of security attacks takes advantage of three challenges to making reliable security assessments: 1) security experts’ knowledge is typically stove piped, 2) security against specific threats is achieved through composition of multiple requirements, and 3) security-decisions carry a measurable degree of uncertainty. This thesis examines security requirements composition in presence of uncertainty and attempts to extract and model experts’ knowledge in the form of rules. The theoretical outcome is repeatable methodology to create risk assessment models that conform to the real world, while the practical outcome is a step towards understanding how to automate and improve security recommendations.

In Sections 3 and 4, we explain in detail the formative studies that motivated and led to the discovery of the three factors in the above thesis. In Section 5, we provide our proposed work that includes our summative studies to further explore the effect of composition on security risk, and the translation of results into rules of an Interval Type II Fuzzy Logic System (IT2FLS), which is a formal method that accounts for uncertainty and variation of context. This translation shows how elicited information from experts can be modeled with a formal method without ignoring the characteristic of the problem at hand.
3 Security Expert’s Decision-Making

This section reports our summary results of 11-security expert’s interviews [29], where we apply grounded analysis [30], [31] and Situation Awareness [32], [33] to understand how security experts form their decisions. In this study, we examine different security analysts’ responses to the same artifacts with and without checklists, a prominent requirements analysis method. We develop a novel coding method to apply Situation Awareness (SA) to interview data, to understand how security experts decide on appropriate security requirements. As a result, we present the following outcomes of this formative study [29]:

• New hypothesis based on SA decision-making patterns to measure how attack models enhance security analysis and how novices and experts differ in the application of these models under uncertainty; and

• New evidence based on SA decision-making patterns that explain the issues with using checklists.

• New hypotheses about security requirements composition that impact security analysis and decision-making.

3.1 Situation Awareness and Security Risk Assessment

Situation Awareness (SA) is framework introduced by Mica R. Endsley in 1988 [32] that distinguishes between a user’s “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” during their engagement with a system. Perception, comprehension and projection are called the levels of SA, and a person ascends through these levels in order to reach a decision. To illustrate, consider an SQL injection attack, in which an attacker inserts an SQL statement fragment into an input variable (often via a web form) to gain unauthorized database access. When an expert conducts a source code vulnerability assessment, they look for cues in the code to place input sanitization, which is a mitigating security requirement. Upon finding such cues (perception), analysts proceed to reason about whether the requirement has or has not been implemented (comprehension). Once understood, they can informally predict the likelihood of an SQL injection attack and the consequences on the system (projection) based on their experience and understanding of the threat and attack vector.

We believe SA can be used to explain how analysts perform risk assessments. The NIST Special Publication 800-30 [15] defines risk as the product of the likelihood that a system’s vulnerability can be exploited and the impact that this exploit will have on the system. The ability to predict likelihood and impact depend on the analyst’s ability to project prospective events based on what they have perceived and
comprehended about the system’s specification and its state of vulnerability. If the expert succeeds in all three SA levels, then they have “good” SA and they should be able to make more accurate decisions about security risks. Failure in any level results in “poor” SA that leads to inaccurate decisions or no decisions at all. We will describe below our method to detect the SA-levels in security expert interviews.

Endsley and other researchers [32]–[34] go beyond the SA definition to establish a holistic framework that scientists in other fields could benefit from and apply. This framework entails details and relationships to other concepts such as: expertise effect, goals, mental models, automation, uncertainty, and requirements analysis. A schema in cognitive psychology is defined as the mental framework in the human’s cognition of prepossessed ideas that represent some aspects of the world [35]–[37]. Schemata are a group of schemas organized in cognition that improve humans’ ability to retrieve knowledge or acquire new knowledge [35]–[37]. For example, when we solve new problems using a computer programming language, schema theory suggests that our cognition matches the new problem structure with existing schemata for solving past problems and this process is what cognitive psychologists call: schema abstraction [38]. Rao et al. found that the number and variety of training examples in programming language experiments had minimal effect on schema abstraction [39]. Thus, we may conclude that schema abstraction is an expert ability that is acquired over multiple, repetitive examples across different contexts. Endsley explains how expertise can help a person build and enhance mental schemata which in turn, facilitates the person’s ability to interpret their perceptions and make necessary projections that lead to better decisions [33].

The SA framework is flexible and could be customized according to the needs of a system. Examples of fields in which SA has been applied include military operations [40], command and control [41], cyber security [42], [43] and many others [33], [44]. Researchers have modeled SA in intelligent and adaptive systems [40], [41], [44]. Feng et al. proposed a context-aware decision support system that models situation awareness in a command-control system [41]. Their focus was to have agents based on “rule-based inference engines” that provide decision support for users. They applied Endsley’s concepts and focused on “Shared Situation Awareness” along with a computational model that they applied to a case study of a command and control application. Chen et al. extended a cyber intrusion detection system using a formalization of SA concepts; the logic formalization is derived from experts’ experiences [42]. Jakobson proposed a framework of situation aware multi-agent systems that could be cyber-attack tolerant [43]. To our knowledge, SA1 has not been widely adopted in requirements engineering to understand how requirements analysts make decisions early in system design.

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1 The literature includes a related term: Situational Awareness, which is different from Endsley’s SA term we use here.
3.2 Using SA to Explore Security Decision-Making

We chose the definitions of SA levels to be our basis for the grounded analysis that we perform on interview data of 11 security experts [29]. Below we provide an overview of our approach that consist of three phases:

• The preparation phase, in which we developed the research protocol, including tailoring SA to security analysis, selecting the system artifacts to use in the analysis, and recruiting the security analysts to be interviewed;
• The interview phase, wherein we elicited responses from the selected analysts; and
• The qualitative data analysis phase, in which we coded the interview transcripts and systematically drew inferences from the data.

We applied grounded analysis using coding theory [45] to link SA concepts to the dataset and validate whether our observations are consistent and complete with respect to that dataset [30], [45]. In the first cycle, we applied the hypothesis coding method to our dataset [45] using a predefined code list derived from Endsley’s SA levels; this method tests the validity of the initial code list. In the second cycle, we applied theoretical coding to discover decision-making patterns from the dataset. We now discuss the three phases.

3.2.1 The Preparation Phase

The SA framework can be tailored to a field of interest by mapping SA levels to statements made by domain analysts. We tailored the framework by verbally probing the analyst during the interview as they were asked to evaluate the security risk of information system artifacts. We expected the dataset to show how analysts build situation awareness. We also expected it to help us further discover how perceptions of security risk evolve as the analysts’ awareness of both potential vulnerability and available mitigations increases. The inability to perceive risk may be due to limitations in analysts’ knowledge or ambiguities in the artifacts. We map Endsley’s SA levels to security analysis as follows:

**Level 1: Perception:** the participant acknowledges perceiving security cues in the given artifact. Examples include: “there is a picture of a firewall here” or “there are SQL commands in the code snippet.” Each observation excludes any deeper interpretation into the meaning of the perception.

**Level 2: Comprehension:** the participant explains the meaning of cues that they perceived in Level 1. They provide synthesis of perceived cues, analysis of their interpretations, and comparisons to past experiences or situations. Examples of comprehension include: “the firewall will help control inbound and outbound traffic...” and “the SQL commands are used to access the database which might contain private
information, so we need to check the input to those commands, but this is not done in the code...

**Level 3: Projection:** the participant has comprehended sufficient information in Level 2, so they can project future events or consequences. In security, projections include potential, foreseeable attacks or failures that result from poor security. Examples include: “this port allows all public traffic, which makes the network prone to attacks...”, or “unchecked input opens the door to SQL injection...”

Finally after Level 3, we expect participants to make security-related decisions. Decisions include steps to modify the system to mitigate, reduce or remove vulnerabilities. Continuing with the SQL injection example, one decision could be: “this port should be closed” or “a function should be added here that checks the input before passing it to the SQL statement.” Closing the port prevents an attacker from exploiting the open port in an attack, whereas checking the input can remove malicious SQL in an SQL-injection attack.

### 3.2.1.1 Selection of Security Artifacts

We presented each participant with three categories of security-related artifacts: source code, data flow diagrams, and network diagrams. We chose these artifacts to cover a broad range of security knowledge, from low-level source code to high-level architecture, noting that security requirements should be mapped to each artifact in different ways and analysts require different skills to do this mapping. Based on our own experience and knowledge of security expertise, we considered the effect of specialization in areas such as secure programming, network security, and mobile security in selecting these artifacts. Hence, the selection aims to satisfy two goals: 1) to account for diverse background and experience; and 2) to assess whether different artifacts show differences among SA levels. We selected artifacts that are typical examples comparable to what is generally taught in college-level security courses. We now describe the artifacts used in this study:

a) **Source Code (SC).** We present participants with JavaScript code snippets, corresponding SQL statements, and a picture of a web user interface related to the snippet. The SC contains two vulnerabilities, an SQL injection attack and unencrypted username and password. JavaScript is a subset of a general purpose programming language, i.e., no templates, pointers, or memory management. Thus, we expect analysts with general programming language proficiency and knowledge of SQL injection to be able to spot these vulnerabilities in the SC. We also list a high-level security goal to prompt participants and we ask participants if the goal has been satisfied.

b) **Data Flow Diagram (DFD).** We present participants with a DFD for installing an application on a mobile platform. As shown in Figure 1, the diagram contains high-
level information about the data flow between the user, app developer and the market. The participants are asked about possible security requirements to ensure secure information flow, and whether they can evaluate those requirements based on this diagram.

Figure 1. The Data Flow Diagram Artifact

c) Network Diagrams (ND). We present participants two network diagrams: ND1 shows an insecure network, and ND2 shows a network with security measures that address weaknesses in ND1. After participants are provided time to study ND1, we present ND2 and ask participants to evaluate whether ND2 is an improvement over ND1. After collecting data on participants’ evaluation of ND2, we present 15 security requirements to participants, which we explain are part of a security improvement process, and we ask participants to assess whether the network in ND2 satisfies the 15 requirements (shown in Appendix I).

3.2.1.2 Selection of Security Experts

In this study, we aim to observe how security expertise affects requirements analysis. However, security analysts are not all equal in expertise; some analysts have more experience than others in particular areas, and training in academia is different than hands-on practice. To cover a broad range of expertise, we invited industrial practitioners and Ph.D. students at different stages of matriculation, all working in security. We will present the demographics data later in this section.

3.2.2 The Interview Phase

We designed the interviews to study how analysts reach a security-related decision, and not to study the correctness of the decision or degree of security improvement. We chose this design to reduce participants’ anxiety about being personally evaluated. During our interviews, we only ask the following kinds of questions:
• What cues did the participant look at? (Perception)
• How were the cues interpreted? (Comprehension)
• Why did they interpret a cue that way? (Comprehension)
• What are the future consequences of each interpretation? (Projection)
• Based on those projected consequences, what is the best practice? (Decision)

Our approach differs from how SA is traditionally studied in human operator environments (e.g., airplane cockpits and nuclear power plants) that use the Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) [33], in that our participants are not immersed in a simulation per se. Rather, we present artifacts (SC, DFD, ND1 and ND2) to participants with prompts to evaluate artifacts for vulnerabilities asking them to act as the security analyst in this setting. We observe their ability to conduct requirements analysis, their proposed modifications or decisions, and their evaluation of security requirements’ satisfaction.

In addition, we ask participants to share information about their decision-making, such as unstated assumptions and what artifact cues led participants to reach a decision. We were careful not to guide participants in a particular direction by keeping our questions general. In addition, we avoided questions such as: what do you perceive, comprehend, or project? For example, if a participant identified an attack scenario, we would follow with “why would you think such an attack could occur”, or “could you describe how it could happen?” Based on our approach to limit our influence on their responses, we found participants returning to the artifact to identify cues and to explain their interpretation.

We present ND1 before ND2, and we ask participants to draw on ND1 to improve this diagram. After this step, we show participants the secure diagram ND2 and ask them to compare this diagram to their own solution to ND1. Then, we ask participants to review the requirements list (shown in Appendix I), and to answer the following questions for each requirement:
• Is the requirement satisfied or not satisfied based on the information given in the diagram?
• How would the participant evaluate the security requirement: is it good, bad, unnecessary, immeasurable, unrealistic, etc.

The questions above are asked in a conversational style with an open-ended fashion where participants are free to comment, explain and elaborate in their answers.

Finally, given our interest in distinguishing novices from expert analysts, we asked participants to provide a brief description of their relevant background. Questions to elicit background information were asked twice: first, at the interview start, we ask participants about their security background, their education, industry experience, and security topics of interest. Lastly, at the end, we ask the participant about the analysis
process they used during the interview and how it relates to their background. We audio recorded the interviews for transcription and analysis.

3.2.3 The Grounded Analysis Phase

Grounded analysis is used to discover new theory and to apply existing theory in a new context [30]. We apply grounded analysis in three steps: (1) we transcribe the interviews; (2) beginning with our initial coding frame (see Table 1), we code the transcripts by identifying phrases that match our codes, while discovering new codes to further explain phrases that do not match our preconceived view of the data; and (3), we review previously coded datasets to ensure the newly discovered codes were consistently applied across all transcripts. After piloting the initial study design on two participants, we observed uncertainty among participants so we added codes to capture the uncertainty. Table 1 shows the complete coding frame: the first eight codes (P, C, J, D, including the variants that account for uncertainty \(U^*\)) constitute the initial coding frame and were inspired by Endsley’s terminology for the Situation Awareness [33]; the remaining four codes were discovered during our analysis to account for the interview mechanics. We employed two coders (myself and a co-researcher) who first met to discuss the coding process and coding frame, before separately coding the transcripts, and finally meeting to resolve disagreements. The process to resolve disagreements led to improvements in the form of heuristics that explain when to choose one code over the other in otherwise ambiguous situations. To efficiently identify disagreements, we used a fuzzy string-matching algorithm [46] to align the separately coded transcripts. Finally, each coder recorded their start and stop times.

To ensure all statements are coded, we applied the null code \{NA\} to any statements that did not satisfy the coding criteria, such as when participants request a scrap piece of paper to draw a figure, or when they ask how much time is remaining for the interview, and so on. We code statements, such as: "I took a course in security..." or “I saw on the news a security breach related to this artifact” as background \{BG\}, which includes their personal experience and knowledge. If the participant compares and contrasts comprehended information from the artifact to their experience or knowledge, then that information is coded as comprehension \{C\}. To improve construct validity, the two raters resolved borderline cases by discussing and refining the code definitions and heuristics. The following heuristics were used to classify statements and draw clearer boundaries between coded data:
### TABLE 1. SITUATION AWARENESS ANNOTATION CODES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Name and Acronym</th>
<th>Definition and Coding Criteria Used to Determine Applicability of the Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception {P}</td>
<td>Participant is acknowledging that they can see certain cue(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehension {C}</td>
<td>Participant is explaining the meaning of cue(s) and conducting some analysis on the data perceived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection {J}</td>
<td>Participant is predicting possible future consequence(s) or risk(s) involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision {D}</td>
<td>Participant is stating their decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain Perception {UP}</td>
<td>Uncertainty at perception level: participant is missing certain data that would help them analyze the artifact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain Comprehension {UC}</td>
<td>Uncertainty at comprehension level: participant is not missing data but they can't interpret the meaning with confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain Projection {UJ}</td>
<td>Uncertainty at projection level: participant cannot predict possible future consequences, confidently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain Decision {UD}</td>
<td>Uncertainty in decision: participant is not confident about the decision that should be made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption {A}</td>
<td>Participant is stating assumption(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask Question {Q}</td>
<td>Participant is asking the interviewer questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probe {Pro}</td>
<td>Interviewer is triggering the participant’s thinking with questions or directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background {BG}</td>
<td>Participant is providing information regarding their personal background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null code {NA}</td>
<td>Statement is not applicable to code criteria above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Perception**: The participant verbally identifies a cue in the data (e.g. line number in code, an entity on the network diagram, a specific requirement in the text). Participants are only reporting what they see, and are not commenting or analyzing the cue.
- **Comprehension**: participant analyzes, makes inferences, or makes comparisons about what they see. This may include the name of the cue (e.g. firewall), but the statement at least includes an interpretation in addition to reporting the perception of the cue.
- **Projection**: The participant forecasts future attacks, possible threats or any events that could occur based on the context found in the artifact.
- **Decision**: The participant makes a decision with regards to the context. This includes deciding whether the system is secure or not secure, or if a certain
requirement is satisfiable. Introducing new mitigations of security threats are also considered decisions.

- **Uncertainty (at any SA level):** To determine if the participant is uncertain, first examine the verbal cues that indicate uncertainty, including, but not limited to: “I guess”, “I am not sure”, and “this is not clear to me”. For example, the participant may indicate that they do not know what an icon represents. Alternatively, if the participant acknowledges that they see a cue, but that they cannot understand its role in the artifact, then this is an uncertain comprehension.

- **Assumption:** The participant here needs to overtly express that they are making an assumption. Examples of such statements include: “I am going to guess that this means”, “I assume”, “Based on my experience this means, but it’s not necessarily what the artifact tells me,” and so on. To clarify how to distinguish assumptions from comprehensions, a comprehension is when the participant is explaining a certain cue’s meaning based on the information given in the artifact. Assumptions, however, provide further explanation based on the participant’s experience with similar systems to compensate for missing cues or missing information in the artifact.

After the first cycle coding, we conducted a second cycle or axial coding [45] to identify decision-making patterns. In grounded theory, axial coding is the process of relating codes to each other by finding relationships, themes and phenomena that exist among the codes and categories [30], [45]. We defined cut-offs between coded sequences by sequentially numbering each statement and then assigning group numbers to statements that address the same idea or topic the participant is discussing. The groups serve to delineate transitions between units of analysis. We programmatically extracted SA-level sequences (e.g., P-C for perception followed by comprehension) that we later associated with separate, named patterns, and we searched the dataset without the cut offs to assess pattern validity, i.e., to detect false-positives, wherein the SA-level sequence does not correspond to the pattern that we assigned. We used the false positives identification to compute pattern accuracy, which is the ratio of true positives over the sum of true and false positives.

The next step in our grounded analysis includes labeling interviewee statements with entity identifiers from the specifications, such as variables and functions in the source code or servers and firewalls in the network diagram. The labeled artifacts allow us to sort our results by entity to see how different participants react to and analyze the same entity and to link the decision patterns to corresponding entities involved in the pattern.
3.3 Evaluation of the Qualitative Approach

We recruited a total of 11 participants. In grounded analysis, reaching a point of “saturation” is the main determinant of the number of participants’ (or cases) needed to complete a qualitative study\[31\], because determining the exact right sample size is context-dependent on the type of research being conducted. Atran et al. \[47\] estimated that a minimum of 10 participants is needed to show consensus, while Guest et al. \[48\] argued that a sample size of six could be sufficient if there is a homogeneity that exists among participants in the sample. In our sample, we reached saturation after 8 participants, but we continued to recruit 3 more participants to explore more data and confirm that we reached saturation.

Below, we report the results from our empirical evaluation: the artifact assignment and inter-rater reliability.

3.3.1 Artifact Assignment

Due to self-perceived inexperience by participants and time limitations, not every participant analyzed all artifacts in the three categories we described above. The average total interview time per participant to complete each interview was 29 minutes. Table 2 presents the participant assignment to conditions: the shaded cells show the category of artifacts that participants attempted; cells labeled with “X” indicate that the participant spent at least 15 minutes analyzing the artifact. Because participants have varying skills and expertise, some participants invested more time than others analyzing certain artifacts. The order in which the artifacts were presented to different participants was randomized and the time allowed to complete the interview was limited to 60 minutes. Thus, not all participants reviewed all artifacts. The Sum column in Table 2 presents the total number of participants who reviewed each artifact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artifact</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5 6  7  8  9 10 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Source Code</td>
<td>X  X  X  X  X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Data Flow</td>
<td>X  X  X  X  X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Network</td>
<td>X  X  X</td>
<td>X  X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some qualitative researchers stay away from reporting the sample sizes to adhere to qualitative research principles.
3.3.2 Agreement and Inter-rater Reliability

Two raters applied the coding frame from Table 1 to the transcripts of participant audio recordings. We measured inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa, a statistic for measuring the proportion of agreement between two raters above what might be expected by chance alone [49]. We calculated Kappa for each participant, which ranges between 0.51-0.77 with a median of 0.62. These values are considered moderate to substantial agreement [49]. The coding times were 19 and 8 hours for raters 1 and 2, respectively. Rater 1 spent more time documenting heuristics and developing the method. In addition to the above time, 6 hours were used for the resolution of disagreements between the two coders. Table 3 shows the breakdown of the total 2,595 coded statements in our final dataset by code (including the pilot participants P1 and P2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Total Codes</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Total Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Uncertain Perception</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehension</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>Uncertain Comprehension</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projection</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Uncertain Projection</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>Uncertain Decision</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Probe</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Summary Results from the “SA Study”

We will summarize below the major takeaways from this qualitative study that informed the next steps of this dissertation (full results can be found in the published technical report [29], and ESPRE’14 workshop paper [50]).

3.4.1 Participants’ Background and Expertise

We investigated whether more experienced participants would exhibit better SA and, thus, be able to form more confident decisions. Herein, we report our findings drawn from demographic data including participants’ background and experience, and their experiences reported as remarks during their interview that we coded as \{BG\}. Next, we examine the role of expertise in forming more confident decisions.

Table 4 summarizes participant backgrounds: the participant number \(P\#\) which is used consistently throughout this paper; \(Years\) is the number of years of industry experience, including internships; \(Security Areas\) are the general topics that best describe their industry experience; \(Research Focus\) are the topics that best describe their research experience; and \(Degree\) is their highest degree earned, or in progress;
Among the total eleven, four participants (P1, P3, P4, P5) have extensive industry experience in security (4-15 years) with diverse concentrations.

### TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS BACKGROUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P#</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Security Areas</th>
<th>Research</th>
<th>Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>5+</td>
<td>Network, systems, forensics and more.</td>
<td>Mobile computing, forensics, systems security</td>
<td>PhD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>Security protocols, social networks.</td>
<td>Global cyber threat</td>
<td>PhD.*(5th yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>Systems, Networks, programming, and more.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>B.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>5+</td>
<td>Systems, Networks, architecture, and more</td>
<td>Security for real-time critical systems &amp; architecture</td>
<td>PhD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>Software Architecture, Secure Programming</td>
<td>Software Architecture</td>
<td>M.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Cyber &amp; system security</td>
<td>PhD.*(4th yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Android security, malware, static analysis.</td>
<td>PhD.*(4th yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Infrastructure security, log visualization</td>
<td>Security and Privacy</td>
<td>PhD.*(5th yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Security analysis, network traffic</td>
<td>PhD.*(2nd yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Anomaly Detection</td>
<td>PhD.*(1st yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Network traffic</td>
<td>PhD.*(4th yr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ph.D. student, followed by year of matriculation in parentheses

P1, and P4 hold a Ph.D. in security and specialize in systems and infrastructure. These two PhDs and P5 have teaching experience in which they taught advanced security courses. The remaining seven participants were all PhD. students with research specialties in security. The PhD. students had varying levels of experience, from a student who completed security courses, but who did not apply these lessons in practice beyond class projects, to students who had completed internships with a reputable company working on infrastructure security and log visualizations.

According to Endsley & Jones [33], an increase in experience may affect participants’ ability to project future consequences and, hence, may lead to more confident decisions. In our study, we observe that participants with more industry experience were able to make more assumptions compared to those with less experience. For example, participants with more than 5+ years of industry experience made an average of 7 assumptions, while participants with less than 5 years of experience made an average of 1 assumption. We coded statements with assumptions when the participant explicitly mentions that they are missing relevant details and that they have to assume or guess to complete their understanding.

Difference in artifacts presentation and notation could possibly affect situation awareness. Certain portions of an artifact were likely more unclear than others, so we
may only expect to see assumptions when participants encountered less clear portions of the artifact. The pattern (UC→A→D) was observed for experts P1, P3, and P9, when they analyzed the network artifact, and was observed for P11 when they analyzed the source code artifact. Participant P11 demonstrates advanced understanding when analyzing the source code artifact by reaching 24 decisions and this participant was the only participant to make 2 assumptions in that artifact.

### 3.4.2 Expertise Role in the Attacker Threat Model

Expert security analysts project future attack scenarios, and then decide how to mitigate these attacks. In security analysis, projection and decision are closely related, because security analysts may be trained to think like an attacker and have an attack model in mind [51], [52]. With an attack model in mind, the analyst decomposes a future attack scenario into multiple steps that exploit vulnerabilities. Under SA, we expect this decomposition to first appear as perceptions and comprehensions of the vulnerabilities, which then lead to the conclusion of projected exploitation, and finally a commensurate decision to mitigate the vulnerabilities. For example, Participant P3, notes: "what could I do since I am looking at this code to do bad stuff", which is their reflection on trying to walk through threat models that could be relevant to the code segment under review. P3 further stated: “it’s critical if you’re trying to design something secure to try and get into the mind of an attacker. If you can't think like an attacker, then you don't know how to defend against an attacker”

We analyzed our dataset to measure how often security analysts employed the attacker perspective. In our study, five participants (P1, P2, P6, P8, P10) demonstrated the need to think like an attacker as demonstrated by the word “attack” in their statements while referring to how an intruder would act.

Our results show 45 instances of attack words used where participants demonstrate knowledge of an attack; out of which only 29 instances describe an application of the attacker model where participants describe how the attack is taking place. The remaining 16 instances out of the 45 statements include instances where participants are explaining attacks that they knew about from their background, but without relating that knowledge to the artifact being analyzed. For example, the word attack could show up in a {BG} statement without a relevant SA pattern. For our analysis, we are interested in the 29 instances where participants are actually thinking like an attacker by demonstrating an attack scenario. Table 5 shows our results from this analysis: the participant number (P#) who described the attack scenario; the frequency (Freq.) that the term attack appears, the security artifact (Art.); and the relevant in-context patterns associated with the word – the SA code of the statement.
containing the attack word is highlighted in bolded text to show the position within the pattern. Each participant can exhibit multiple, separate instances of thinking like an attacker, which we separated by artifact and in-context pattern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P#</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Art.</th>
<th>In-Context Pattern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>ND1</td>
<td>P→C→C→Pro→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>P→C→J→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>D→D→Pro→C→C→J→C→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>U→J→Pro→UJ→Pro→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>Pro→UJ→Pro→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ND1</td>
<td>P→C→D→Pro→C→D→C→D→J→D→D→D→Pro→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>D→J→Pro→J→Pro→J→Pro→J→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>D→C→C→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>D→C→Pro→J→Pro→C→C→P→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>J→D→J→C→C→C→J→Pro→C→C→Pro→P→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>C→C→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>D→J→D→J→Pro→C→P→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>C→Pro→J→Pro→J→D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DFD</td>
<td>C→C→D→J→Pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DFD</td>
<td>C→J→J→C→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>Pro→J→J→D→UP→D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>D→Pro→J→J→J→D→C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>J→Pro→Pro→J→J→D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>J→J→Pro→J→J→J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>P→J→J→D→D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>C→C→D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ND2</td>
<td>D→C→C→UJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the 29 instances of the word “attack”, we observe that most instances (25/29) occurred in the projection stage of SA. In less than half of the instances (12/29), the projection was observed after the interviewer probed the participant to explain why they were perceiving, comprehending or projecting prior to describing the attack scenario (coded as Pro→J). Participants P2, P5, P7 are absent from Table 5, so they do not demonstrate the attacker model in their analysis.

Attack scenarios can be simple, meaning a single vulnerability is exploited to achieve an attacker’s goal, or complex, meaning that multiple exploits are needed. In our results, we can observe and measure the complexity of attack scenarios as a series of different SA stages needed to demonstrate how an attack occurs within an artifact. For example, P9 projects a password brute force attack by looking at one item: requirement R7 on the list that reads: “Company X will require strong passwords (8 characters with complexity) for all user accounts.” Based on the brute force projection, P9 decides that 8 characters alone are insufficient for a secure password policy. Alternatively, consider
the attack pattern that P1 and P4 found in ND1: our entity analysis shows that in order to demonstrate the possible attack on the insecure network, both participants where analyzing multiple items in the ND1 diagram: allowed inbound ports on the router, the web server, the DNS controller, and the mail server. P1 further explained:

{J} From an attacker that has no other entry point he is going to look at these three things [speaking about the 3 allowed inbound ports shown on the router], and if they didn’t have any DNS server inside, there will be no reason to have port 53 open {/J}

Using SA patterns, we can compare participants’ analysis when looking at the same entity (see our explanation of entity analysis in Section 3.2.3). For example, In Table 5, participant P1 presents the pattern (P→C→J→C) in ND2 by first perceiving server names (entity code: NAME), such as Alpha, Lima, Bravo, etc. Participant P1 comprehends the server naming scheme and subsequently projects that an attacker discovering these names alone cannot tell the role or function of the servers. Based on our entity analysis that links SA codes to these servers across participants, we found that participant P11 perceived the same naming scheme in their analysis (Q→P→C→UC→C), but they were unable to project based on the meaning of the scheme and thus were unable to see the attack scenario. Instead, P11 asks questions, experiences uncertain comprehension due to the meaning of the naming scheme and whether the scheme has any relevance to network security. Unlike P1, participant P11 stops at comprehension and does not proceed to projection or decisions. This is an example of how the same cue could be interpreted differently by experts of different expertise levels.

Our SA attack model shows how we can use SA to detect a certain expertise skill: thinking like an attacker. A conclusion that is based on the background data alone that is shown in Table 4 above, might indicate that participants P1, P3, P4, and P5 have more expertise with respect to these artifacts compared to the remaining participants in the table who could be treated as novices. This classification, which could be referred to as industry classification, is based on participants’ clearly combining years of practical industry experience along with academic degrees. However, this classification does not take into account the personal skills that a security analyst might acquire through their job or academic learning. Our attack threat model, on the other hand, help address this limitation by identifying the experts who demonstrate who can think like an attacker. Table 5 shows that in addition to P1, P3, P4, who are already identified experts based on their industry experience, P6, P8, P9, P10 P11 can also demonstrate the skill of thinking like an attacker.

Going back to Table 5, we observe that except for P11’s ND2 pattern, all participants had their “attack” keyword appearing in a projection or a decision
statement, which resonates with the definition of our projection statements where a future attack is described, and our decision statements where mitigations to an attack is explained. By looking into the details of P11’s pattern (D→C→C→UC), we observe how the participant is stuck at the comprehension level where they demonstrate a level of uncertainty.

3.4.3 Expertise Role in Security Requirements Mapping

After presenting the diagram ND2 to the participants, we presented the security requirements checklist. We observed individual differences among experts and novices when assessing a single requirement and linking it to the diagram entities. In general, 5 out of 7 participants who were presented with ND2 exhibited an improved ability to discuss items in the checklist that they previously missed, as compared to the two modes above. Analysts made an effort to connect each requirement to entities in the diagram. Table 6 below shows the results of mapping requirements to entities in the diagram by the 5 participants who were presented with ND2 and were successful in the mapping exercise. Participant P2, and P5 are absent from the table as they have stated that they could not see how to do the mapping. None of the participants shown in Table 6 managed to map requirement R3 (shown in Appendix I), which is about “hardening” the network. Participant P4 stated that the rule makes no sense, as it cannot be qualified nor quantified. Participant P3 commented: “that's not uncommon for compliance to do that, to just state in very general terms a requirement, and then it's a little loose interpretation as to whether or not you've met that compliance or not.” Highlighted cells in the table indicate that participants stated that dependencies exist among the highlighted requirement. Participant P1 found the requirements R11 and R12 to be related. Participants P1, P3, and P11 agreed that R9 and R10 are related, but P11 failed to point out the entities on the diagram that map to the requirements.

Mapping the requirements-entity matching data in Table 6 to experience and background data in Table 4, we observe that P1, P3, P4 who has more industry experience then P9 and P11, were able to match more requirements on the list.

Using our entity analysis, we compared participants’ responses across entities in diagram ND2. Our analysis results indicate that the requirements list helps both experts and novices: the experts’ attention was focused towards a specific security component and supported them in reaching better-informed decisions, and the novices became aware of a requirement and/or its security justification. Consider requirement R12 that requires a split DNS policy: expert participants P1, P3, P4, and P9 were able to map requirement R12 to the split DNS servers shown on the diagram and to state that the network satisfies the requirement, and they were also able to explain why such
requirement is important from a security standpoint. Participants P1, P3, P4, P9 demonstrated the patterns: (P→P→UP→P→UP→D), (P→Q→Pro→D→J→J→J→A→J), (Q→C→C→C→J→J), (C→P→J→D→Pro→D→UC→C→A→C→J→C→J→D) respectively.

We investigated why P3 and P9 had longer patterns, and we found that P3 was demonstrating an attacker’s attempt against the DNS server and how the split DNS increases the difficulty for attackers to break into the system. Towards the middle of participant P9’s pattern, the participant exhibits uncertainty about why this requirement is needed for the system’s security. At that point, they made an assumption that enabled their ability to comprehend and project before reaching their final decision.
Participant P11, was able to state that the requirement R12 is satisfied based on the diagram, but was unclear why a split DNS policy is needed. This is a good example of how introducing structure to security analysis, could help novices become aware of essential security requirements.

Table 6 suggests that participant P4 provided more mitigations among all participants. We found that P4 employed a matrix-based analysis approach by drawing a table on a blank piece of paper, listing the requirements numbers, and documenting how the requirement could be satisfied given the information shown on the diagram. During the interview process, P4 exhibited more depth in their analysis and had greater confidence as evidenced by the absence of uncertainty patterns in his analysis of the ND2 and the requirements mapping. We use the word depth here because P4 was able to refine requirements into specification levels and write down system specification and software configurations that are essential to satisfy the requirement, and this observation did not occur with any of the other participants.

### 3.5 Summary Conclusions of the “SA Study”

The major contribution of the SA study was new hypotheses regarding security decision-making and security requirements composition. The SA study highlights the following [29]:

*Security requirements exist in composition.* Deciding on security requirements that mitigate threats relies on: the context of the attack and the composition of requirements. Attack patterns found in the data confirm this finding as participants need to understand and comprehend how perceived cues interacts forming a context where a future attack can occur. This thorough understanding can lead to deciding on proper attack mitigations.

*Security decision-making involves uncertainty.* Uncertainty in this context means missing information that is essential to the get the full picture, or ambiguity in presentation where analysts could have different interpretation of the same item. Experts differ in handling uncertainty based on their past experiences, but even when highly confident, experts tend to quantify security with “it depends”, which means: 1) that security decisions rely on the context, 2) we need better linguistic expressions that accommodates the uncertainty present in security decisions.

*Security expertise is broad and stove-piped.* Our results suggest that experts vary in their domains of security expertise and that variation impacts their security analysis. Participants P11 for example, performed better when analyzing the SC artifact, as they were able to detect and mitigate the SQL injection vulnerability, but performed poorly trying to map ND2’s entities to the requirements list.
4 Composition in Security Decision-Making

This section reports our summary results of two user surveys [25] that examined how changing threats and requirements affect the analysts’ ability to perceive security risk and make corresponding decisions to prioritize security requirements.

The survey is designed to elicit risk perceptions from multiple analysts and target the mitigating effects of specific requirements to the threats they address. This approach allows us to isolate the effect of composition on security risk, and to address the limitations of differing levels of security expertise. In addition, the design asks analysts to report missing requirements. This step is aimed at improving completeness and reducing ambiguity.

4.1 Approach for the Composition Study

We now introduce factorial vignettes, before describing the experimental design.

4.1.1 Factorial Vignettes Design

This study is based on, factorial vignettes, which are scenarios comprised of discrete factors that contribute to human judgment. Researchers systematically manipulate the factors to understand their composite and individual effects on a decision [53], [54]. This method is used by social and decision scientists and applied across psychology, sociology, and marketing, to name a few [44], [45]. Factorial vignettes are proven more effective to understanding decision making than direct questioning or single statement ratings that obscure the underlying contributions of different factors to the overall decision [53], [54], [56]. Factorial vignettes are presented in surveys using a basic template that contains multiple dimensions of the construct of interest. In our case, each dimension is a security requirement that influences the perceived level of security risk: some requirements increase risk, while others decrease risk. Figure 2 shows the template that we used in our study to create the vignettes: a vignette is a standard scenario generated by the template, wherein each variable name (starting with a $) is replaced by a level in the corresponding dimension.

Figure 2. The template used for vignette generation (fields with $ sign are replaced with values selected from Table 1)
In this study, each level corresponds to a requirement or system constraint variant, which is either a quality requirement (e.g., a “weak” vs. “strong” password) or more concrete interpretation of an otherwise ambiguous requirement (e.g., “unencrypted” vs. “encrypted” Wi-Fi). In Table 7, we present the dimensions and levels to Figure 2. Each level has a code (in parentheses) that we used to analyze and report our results. The level ($\text{Threat} = \text{Man-in-the-Middle}$) occurs when an attacker intercepts the encrypted communication between two parties by decrypting the encryption. The level ($\text{Threat} = \text{Packet Sniffing}$) is passive in that the attacker eavesdrops on network packets to steal information without interacting with any parties, directly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Level(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{NetworkType}$</td>
<td>(EmpNetwork) Your employer's network at your office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PublicWIFI) Public unencrypted Wi-Fi at a public area (restaurant, airport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(VPNUnencrypted) Your employer's VPN that you connected to through public unencrypted Wi-Fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(VPNEncrypted) Your employer’s VPN that you connected to through public encrypted Wi-Fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Transaction}$</td>
<td>(E) Accessing your email account and replying to confidential emails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(F) Performing a financial transaction using your credit card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Connection}$</td>
<td>SSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Password}$</td>
<td>(Weak) A password that is at least 8 characters long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Strong) A password that is at least 16 characters and must include an uppercase and a lowercase letter, a symbol, and a number digit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Timer}$</td>
<td>(Yes) Automatically log you off the session after 15 minutes of inactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(No) Never time-out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Threat}$</td>
<td>Man-in-the-Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Packet-Sniffing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The choice of dimensions and levels in factorial vignettes is determined by the researcher’s judgment based on the research questions. We seek to evaluate the effect of changes in requirements composition and in threats where the composition spans a range of security knowledge, including network and application security, perceived sensitivity of information, and general “best practice” vs. threat-targeted mitigations. The dimensions that we chose are not the only dimensions that can be evaluated. In addition, the number of levels for each dimension is not the only number that exists.

In factorial vignette design, the space of all possible dimensions and levels is called the *factorial object universe* [53] and the *factorial object sample* is the sample across the universe that we use to instantiate the vignette template [53]. Sampling is random or systematic and the choice is based on prior theory, research, and reasoning [57]. Factorial sampling is used to eliminate unrealistic combinations of levels and to
exclude scenarios that are likely to produce a predictable outcome [54]. Sampling from vignettes is more efficient than classic factorial designs, wherein all possible combinations of factors are tested [53].

We chose our initial scenario about logging into a remote e-mail service, because it crosses between novice and expert security knowledge, and this would allow us to measure the effect of security expertise on risk perception. We reviewed the universe and selected dimensions that had a sufficient number of levels to provide a rich space from which to sample; this includes network types and password complexity. Based on Table 7, we have 32 (4×2×1×2×2) conditions per $\textbf{Threat}$ type.

Our vignette selection is based on removing unrealistic and idiosyncratic scenarios. For example, the $\textbf{Connection}$ dimension consists of one level, only, which is called a blank dimension. While we can evaluate unencrypted HTTP sessions in a scenario, the prevalence of knowledge about the high risk of unencrypted sessions suggests this level would predictably lead respondents to rate this requirement as inadequate to protect against the chosen threats. Blank dimensions are included in the vignettes, but not as statistical variables in the analysis, because they have no statistical effect to be measured. That said, blank dimensions are not to be eliminated, because their presence and absence affect how participants make decisions. In our case, removing SSL introduces an ambiguity: some participants may assume it exists, while others may assume it is absent. To control for this variability, we made this requirement explicit.

### 4.1.2 Survey Design and Research Questions

We designed our survey to answer three research questions:

**RQ1.** Does requirements composition affect risk perception in a security scenario to cause varied ratings of the security adequacy level, or can requirements be treated independently in a checklist?

**RQ2.** Which security requirements in a security scenario contribute more weight to experts’ security adequacy judgment?

**RQ3.** Would experts be able to detect ambiguities in a security scenario and provide modifications to improve the security adequacy ratings?

To answer these questions, we designed our survey instrument with three parts: the security vignettes, a security knowledge test, and a demographics test. In addition, each participant receives a consent form noting that participation is voluntary. We presented participants with the Man-in-the-Middle threat, where they answer all three parts of the survey. A week after taking the survey, participants are invited back for the Packet-Sniffing threat, where they do not repeat the security knowledge test or the demographic questions.
The Security Vignettes: In our study, each participant rates four vignettes to observe all the four network levels (see Table 7). Since we have a total of 32 vignettes per threat, we have 8 possible combinations of the dimensions and, thus, each participant is randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, where they rate four vignettes (8×4 = 32 vignettes). Each condition randomly assigns the participant to a single level of the $Transaction$, $Password$, and $Timer$ dimensions (between-subjects effect), which are the same across all the four vignettes that the participant rates. The four vignettes differ by the $NetworkType$ dimension (within-subjects effect) and are presented in a randomized order. For all four vignettes, a participant is asked to first rate the overall security level of the scenario within the context of the given threat. The rating levels are displayed in a random order from the following list:

- **Excessive** security measures that exceed the requirements to mitigate the threat
- **Adequate** security measures that are enough to mitigate the threat
- **Inadequate** security measures that are not enough to mitigate the threat

Next, we ask participants to rate the dimension levels based on the security requirement’s ability to mitigate the given threat. This mitigation rating is applied to the $NetworkType$, $Connection$, $Password$ and $Timer$, only, because they represent a mitigation that can be modified to improve security. Participants provide their rating on a 5-point Likert-scale, where point 1 is labeled “inadequate mitigation”, point 3 is labeled “adequate mitigation” and point 5 is labeled “excessive mitigation.” For each such dimension, we list the selected level for the vignette from Table 7. These ratings are used to test which requirements (or factors) affect the overall security.

Participants are also given the opportunity to list additional security requirements that they believe contribute to increasing the security level to adequate. These are open-ended responses that we later analyzed by coding [45].

The Security Knowledge Test: Following the vignettes, participants are required to answer ten security knowledge questions. We selected these questions to cover user-level to administrator security knowledge, including cryptography, firewall rules, encryption, hashing, file permissions, and network security. The questions cover security concepts, and are intentionally inconvenient to search for on the Internet to reduce cheating. The responses are used to calculate a score that serves as a proxy experience metric.

Demographics Survey: Finally, participants answer questions about job experience and security training.

4.1.3 Deployment and Subjects Recruitment

We recruited security experts using e-mail invitations to participate in our Man-in-the-Middle study (32 vignettes, where each participant sees 4 vignettes). The
invitation was sent to security class mailing lists at Carnegie Mellon University and North Carolina State University. We also sent invitations to security-research mailing lists at Carnegie Mellon University. We compensated participants a $10 Amazon gift card for participation. A week after taking this study, those participants were invited back to the Packet-Sniffing study (another 32 vignettes, where each participant sees 4 vignettes), and compensated with a second $10 Amazon gift card.

4.1.4 Analysis Approach

We now discuss our multi-level modeling and grounded analysis approach.

4.1.4.1 Analysis of Multi-level Models

Multi-level models are statistical regression models with parameters that account for multiple levels in datasets [58]. Our study design described above supports both within and between subjects effects (mixed-effects). Thus, we treated the data as two studies based on the two levels of the $Threat$ dimension, which we assume the participant responses to the two threats are independent due to the week delay between surveys.

The quantitative dataset consists of one major outcome dependent variable: the $OverallRating$, which is the security experts’ judgment rating of the overall security level. This variable has three possible values -1, 0, or 1 that correspond to inadequate, adequate or excessive security, respectively. The fixed effects independent variables are the vignette dimensions: $NetworkType$, $Transaction$, $Password$, $Timer$, which we will refer to as requirements-mitigation variables. The random effect, independent variable is grouped by participant’s $ID$, because we have repeated measures for each subject who sees four levels of $NetworkType$. We have four dependent mitigation-rating variables: $NetworkRating$, $Connection-Rating$, $PasswordRating$, and $TimerRating$ that correspond to individual ratings of the $NetworkType$, $Connection$, $Password$, and $Timer$ dimensions, respectively. Mitigation-rating variables are assigned an integer from 1-5.

We quantify experience using a $Score$ variable, which is an independent exploratory variable assigned an integer from 0-10 equal to the number of correct answers provided by the participant to the 10 security screening questions.

We analyze our data using multi-level modeling [58] to account for our mixed effect experiment design. We used R [59] and lme4 [60] as our tools to conduct the analysis. As described earlier, each participant rated all four levels of the $NetworkType$ dimension, while only rating one level of the remaining dimensions. Hence, our analysis simultaneously accounts for dependencies in the repeated measures, calculates the coefficients (weights) for each explanatory independent variable, and tests for
interactions. We test the multi-level models’ significance using the standard likelihood ratio test: we fit the regression model of interest; we fit a null model that excludes the independent variables used in the first model; we compute the likelihood ratio; and then, we report the chi-square, p-value, and degrees of freedom [58]. For fitted models that show statistical significance, we report the coefficient values from the regression model, which represents the dimension weight for predicting the dependent variable.

To determine sample size, we conducted a priori power analysis with G*Power [61] to test for the required sample size of repeated measures ANOVA. We estimated a sample size >96 per threat scenario for the recommended power level of 0.8 and a medium-sized effect [62].

4.1.4.2 Grounded Analysis

We analyzed the mitigation requirements by first excluding non-mitigation responses. We then apply open coding [30], [31] to code responses with short phrases (concept labels) and then group the phrases into six emergent categories: server, if the requirement is the responsibility of a web server, client, if the requirement is the responsibility of an application on the user’s computer (e.g., a browser); encryption, if the requirement primarily concerns encrypting data or communications; private network, if the requirement suggests switching to a non-public network; attack detection and prevention, if the requirements is aimed at preventing and/or addressing certain attacks; and identity and authentication, if the requirement concerns verifying the identity of the user or their device.

After first cycle coding and categorization, we conducted a second-cycle coding [45], wherein we linked the categories to vignette dimensions and a direction as follows: a refinement, if the requirement refines the dimension by extending it’s functionality; a reinforcement, if the requirement adds auxiliary security not directly related to the dimension; a generalization, if the requirement is more general than the dimension, but includes the dimension’s mitigation; and a replacement, if the requirement replaces the dimension. For example, two requirements, multi-factor authentication and password expiry policy, are coded by the password dimension, yet the former is a replacement, because it replaces passwords with new functionality, and the latter is a refinement, because it extends passwords with expiration.

4.2 Summary Results

We summarize our results for the composition study here. . We report our full results in our RE’15 paper [25].
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics

A total 174 participants responded to the Man-in-the-Middle threat survey, of which, 116 returned to respond to the Packet-Sniffing survey. These sample sizes exceed what we estimated prior to conducting the study. The sample consists of 26% females and 73% males (1% unreported gender). The age groups sorted by dominance in the sample are 18-24 (63%), 25-34 (33%), and 35+ (3%). Within the sample there are 101 graduate students, 42 undergraduate students and 2 university professors.

The average number of participants per vignette is: 22 for the Man-In-the-Middle threat, and 15 for the Packet-Sniffing threat; the number of participants is close but not equal across vignettes due to randomization. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of participant ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE RATING VARIABLES</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$OverallRating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$NetworkRating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ConnectionRating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$PasswordRating</td>
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<tr>
<td>$TimeRating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages are calculated with respect to each threat study sample; adequacy scale 5—Excessive, 3—Adequate, 1—Inadequate

4.2.2 Grounded Analysis of Suggested Mitigations

We elicited 905 mitigations from 108 participants: 540 for Man-in-the-Middle (104 participants) and 365 for Packet-Sniffing (64 participants). We organized the mitigations into 6 categories. Figure 3 shows all 6 categories with mitigation concepts under each category. We analyzed elicited mitigations in response to the network effect, because our statistical results suggest that the $NetworkType has the most influence on participants’ judgments. Table 9 shows for each $NetworkType, the number of mitigations provided by participants ($Mits.$), the number of respondents providing these mitigations ($Resp.$), and total mitigations. Table 10 shows the number of refinements ($Refine.$), which are elaborations on an existing security requirement in the vignette (e.g., SSL, VPN); reinforcements ($Reinf.$), which describe auxiliary or new security functionality intended to complement existing requirements; replacements ($Repl.$), which describe a requirement to supplant an existing requirement (e.g., WPA2 supplants
WEP); and generalizations (Gen.), which describe more abstract requirements (e.g., secure network v. VPN).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Number of Mitigation Requirements by Threat and Network Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$\text{NetworkType}$</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer’s Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Wi-Fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN over Unencrypted Wi-Fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPN over Encrypted Wi-Fi</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10. Refinements, Reinforcements, Replacements, and Generalizations Requirements by Network Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$\text{NetworkType}$</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer’s Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Wi-Fi</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPN over Unencrypted Wi-Fi</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPN over Encrypted Wi-Fi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 9, the weakest network type Public Wi-Fi has the highest number of mitigations for both threat types. Notably, Table 10 includes 155 auto-log off timer mitigations suggested by participants who observed no auto logoff timer in the vignette, and 107 complex-password mitigations suggested by participants who observed a weak password in the vignette. After removing such refinements that we expected to see in the lower security dimension levels, we found 125 refinements remaining. We now highlight some of the findings.

Several refinements served to remove ambiguity. For example, we found 51 mitigations that refine SSL, such as requiring updates or patching the heart bleed vulnerability [63]. One participant suggested using WPA2 encrypted Wi-Fi, because the Wi-Fi encryption was unspecified. Two participants stressed that VPN over encrypted network should use a reliably strong encryption.
Figure 3. The elicited requirements and their categories (numbers in parentheses correspond to number of statements)
Among reinforcements, we found 25 mitigations proposing attack detection / prevention techniques (see Figure 3), 24 mitigations adding email encryption under the email transaction condition, and 8 requirements to add browser security and pre-installed SSL certificates, among others. Some reinforcements were inspired by the vignette: four mitigations against man-in-the-middle attacks, four against packet sniffing, and two against email phishing attacks.

Replacement mitigations aim to replace a less secure requirement or constraint with a more secure alternative. We found 95 mitigations to replace the password with multifactor authentication. We also found 21 mitigations to replace SSL with TLS or HSTS, which is a recent security proposal receiving more attention[64], [65].

4.2.3 Requirements Composition and Priorities

Our results from the multi-level modeling and the grounded analysis suggest that risk perception varies with how requirements are composed. The coefficients obtained from the regression suggest that there are weights and priorities assigned to the requirements.

The $\text{OverallRating}$ variable is the major outcome dependent variable of interest, because this variable represents the experts’ security rating of the scenario based on the composition of the requirements. Our multi-level regression results indicate that the $\text{NetworkType}$ is the only dimension that had an effect on experts’ $\text{OverallRating}$ of the security scenario. This does not mean the other dimensions had no effect on expert judgment. These estimates imply that the network type had the most influence (weight) on judgments of overall rating and the importance of each network type depends on the type of $\text{Threat}$.

We observed composition across the participants’ $\text{PasswordRating}$, $\text{TimerRating}$, and $\text{ConnectionRating}$ and from the grounded analysis results. When participants rated the password level adequacy, the $\text{PasswordRating}$ was lowered by the Public Wi-Fi network level, even when the password level was strong. Similarly, the $\text{TimerRating}$ was lowered by the use of Public Wi-Fi or VPN over unencrypted Wi-Fi. When the $\text{NetworkType}$ changes to Public Wi-Fi, respondents rate the strong password and auto-logoff timer as less than adequate, because participants likely view these two requirements as reinforcements that raise the general level of security, but do not mitigate the threat. In our grounded analysis, we further saw participants focusing their attention on providing requirements to replace the weak network. One participant stated that the timer, password, and SSL are no longer effective, if the communication is happening over a vulnerable network like Public Wi-Fi. Another participant explained that, despite the use of employer’s VPN, a public unencrypted Wi-Fi could
still be vulnerable. In addition, our multi-level modeling results for the $ConnectionRating$ show that for the Man-in-the-Middle threat, participants generally rated SSL near adequate, but the ratings dropped in the presence of Public Wi-Fi. Moreover, we saw participants providing requirements refinements for SSL regardless of change in dimensions’ levels. For example, five participants suggested to update the SSL version, and five participants suggested to verify SSL certificates and they replicated these modifications for all four-network types.

The suggested refinements for SSL levels indicate that our proposed vignettes are incomplete, and that we should broaden the scope of our composition to include new dimensions/levels than what we proposed. Our grounded analysis also confirms that there are more dimensions to consider, such as browser security configurations. Secure communication relies on the browser’s configuration, as we found 17 browser security reinforcements that 11 participants proposed as mitigations to increase the overall security level. Among these, seven browser security reinforcements were suggested in the presence of the employer’s network and/or VPN over Encrypted Wi-Fi. After examining all the mitigations provided by these participants, we found that when $NetworkType$ is weak, because participants marked it as inadequate or propose to replace it. When the risk is lowered by using a more secure $NetworkType$, participants propose requirements that target other dimensions to increase the overall security level.

The grounded analysis in this study shows how experts identified ambiguous requirements proposed to reinforce, replace, and/or refine these requirements. The vignette dimensions were observed to affect participants’ risk perception leading them to list mitigations based on the dimensions and their levels. For example, participants focus attention on replacing weaker requirements with stronger levels (e.g. replacing Public Wi-Fi), and that explains the high number of replacement mitigations provided for public Wi-Fi (see Table 10). In addition, out of the total 907 mitigations, only 78 (9%) were not directly related to our dimensions in the study as they include categories such as browser security and device identifiers (see Figure 3 for categories). Regarding ambiguity, we note that participants might assume that the public Wi-Fi is unencrypted, because vignette description omits mention of encryption. Similarly, the vignette does not provide details about the SSL dimension and participants made their own assumptions that made them list mitigations of refinements (e.g. version update), reinforcement, (e.g. certificate verification), and even replacement (e.g. TLS). This observation suggests two things with regards to ambiguity resolution: 1) when participants make assumptions to resolve ambiguity, they might lean towards assuming lower security (e.g. unencrypted Wi-Fi, insecure SSL versions); and 2) adding and removing requirements in a composition can have interactions by increasing or decreasing levels linked to the refined requirement (e.g. SSL). The method we introduce
in this work allowed us to assess such composition, however, additional work is needed to evaluate the effect of these elicited mitigations on the overall and dimension-specific risk perceptions.

4.3 Summary Conclusions from the “Composition Study”

The purpose of the Composition Study is to empirically examine hypotheses generated earlier by the SA study. We summarize our findings from the Composition Study below:

Security requirements exist in composition. Our study showed some evidence that assessment of requirements relies on how they are composed together along with other requirements. Participants did not judge security requirements independent of other existing requirements in the scenario. For example; the network type affected the ratings of other requirements involved in the scenario (e.g. password, timer) as participants were evaluating everything involved in the scenario to make their judgment.

Certain security requirements have more weight. In the study, we have seen that until the security of some requirements are increased; other requirements may not be introduced or considered in depth. The evidence of this finding comes from our quantitative and qualitative results. For example, we have demonstrated how the public Wi-Fi had an impact on decreasing the ratings and participants wouldn’t consider other factors (e.g. connection, password) unless the network type requirements security level improves.
5 Proposed Research Work

Based on findings from the formative studies described in Sections 3, 4 above, I plan to conduct two more major phases in my research: collect agreed upon solutions of security scenarios by representing composite requirements to a diversity of security expert, and use the results to generate membership functions and rules for an Interval Type II Fuzzy Logic System (IT2FLS). We will explain below the two phases.

5.1 Advanced Security Requirements Composition Studies

Our initial study [25] that we explained in Section 4, uses simplified scenarios where participants were assumed to have first-hand experience from the user’s perspective. To study security requirements more effectively, I plan replicate this study design with the following changes:

Consider scenarios from various system administrative perspectives: the new vignettes should take into account that experts are providing their judgment not from an end-user standpoint, but from the role of a system administrator performing a security assessment role.

Consider variety of specialized areas in security: one of the observations in our SA study [29](shown in Section 3), suggest that security experts differ in their background knowledge and their skillsets could vary depending on the area of security that they are more specialized in. We have also shown in the Section 1 that other researchers had similar observations in their experiments [19]. Therefore, the improved study design should take into account scenarios representing security knowledge from different, concentrated technical areas with boundaries between their respective professions. We choose three areas: network security, database security, and mobile security.

Provide means to map security background knowledge to performance in the new scenarios: we plan to test for correlations between different expertise areas and participant assessments of the scenarios. We achieve this by modifying our background questions to include new questions based on the background knowledge needed for the new scenarios. For example, we include questions about TLS/SSL certificate pinning and jail broken phones, because our scenarios related dimensions in the mobile security scenario.

Include attention checks: The security background questions are placed at the end of the survey. At this point, participants may experience fatigue and start selecting random answers. To ensure that participants are actually paying close attention to their answers, we include two attention-check questions where we ask
participates to select a specific option that should be easily known, if they are paying attention.

5.1.1 Improved Security Vignettes

Four templates are designed for this study. Two templates for the network administration scenario, and one template for each of the database security and mobile security scenarios. All scenarios share a common dimension: the risk $\text{Impact}$. We have two levels of risk $\text{Impact}$:

- **High risk**: to represent high risk we choose a theme of an online shopping website. The impact here is consumers’ credit card and billing information stored in company’s databases.
- **Low risk**: to represent low risk we choose a theme of free online news service website. The impact here is consumer’s first names and news category preferences.

Figures 4-7 show the templates used for our new proposed design. Variables in the template are preceded with a $\$, and they are replaced by a level in the corresponding dimension.

![Company X offers $\text{Theme}$. User information in the company’s databases includes $\text{Impact}$ for purchasing products/services in the future.](image)

You are a network administrator for company X who is responsible for hardening the network against attacks. Currently, you are evaluating the following setting:

- Employees are allowed $\text{NetworkAccess}$ to the employer’s network using $\text{NetworkAuthentication}$.
- The company implements a DMZ that contains $\text{DMZ}$ for public Web Services where clients can access their profiles and update their information.

The Man-in-the-middle attack is a serious security concern. Please answer the following questions with regards to mitigating this threat.

Please do not account for insider-threat in your answers. In other words, please assume that company employees are trustworthy and have no malicious intent.
Company X offers $Theme. User information in the company’s databases includes $Impact for purchasing products/services in the future.

You are a network administrator for company X who is responsible for hardening the network against attacks. Currently, you are evaluating the following setting:

- Mitigations at the company prevent all employees from accessing social media sites.
- The CFO of the company has a special laptop that provides unrestricted access to all company data. This laptop is using $LaptopOS. The CFO using their laptop can download from $CFOTransaction.

The Man-in-the-middle attack is a serious security concern. Please answer the following questions with regards to mitigating this threat.

Please do not account for insider-threat in your answers. In other words, please assume that company employees are trustworthy and have no malicious intent.

Company X offers $Theme. User information in the company’s databases includes $Impact for purchasing products/services in the future.

You are a database security developer responsible for securing a database against attacks. Currently, you are evaluating the following setting:

- User accounts and access control is handled by $DBAccess.
- $DBMonitor
- Errors are handled by $Error.

The Man-in-the-middle attack is a serious security concern. Please answer the following questions with regards to mitigating this threat.

Please do not account for insider-threat in your answers. In other words, please assume that company employees are trustworthy and have no malicious intent.
Company X offers $Theme. User information in the company’s databases includes $Impact for purchasing products/services in the future.

You are a mobile app security specialist responsible for securing the company’s mobile app. Employees will use the mobile app to access the company’s internal network. Currently, you are evaluating the following setting:

- Users are authenticated on the server-side by using $MobileAuth.
- For device authentication token, $DeviceAuth.
- The employees could use the mobile app to access their accounts and interact with the company’s internal system. TLS/SSL certificate pinning is used to mitigate CA compromise. The company $DevicePolicy.
- Sensitive data (passwords, encryption keys) is stored permanently on the server-side. For cache/temporary storage of sensitive data, encryption and a timer is enforced.
- The app is obtained via $Installation.

The Man-in-the-middle attack is a serious security concern. Please answer the following questions with regards to mitigating this threat.

Please do not account for insider-threat in your answers. In other words, please assume that company employees are trustworthy and have no malicious intent.

5.2 Modeling the Results with IT2FLS

In this section, we will first give a brief background and explanation of IT2FLS, and then discuss how we apply it to the security requirements composition problem.

5.2.1 Fuzzy Logic and IT2FLS

Scientists and engineers realized in the late nineteenth century that uncertainty exists in real world problems [66]. The following is a good summary by Timothy J. Ross [67] of various research efforts to classify uncertain information:

Uncertainty can be manifested in many forms: it can be fuzzy (not sharp, unclear, imprecise, approximate), it can be vague (not specific, amorphous), it can be ambiguous (too many choices, contradictory), it can be of the form of ignorance (dissonant, not knowing something), or it can be a form due to natural variability (conflicting, random, chaotic, unpredictable)[67].

To account for uncertainty in systems, it was quantified and modeled based on probability theory[66]; an approach challenged by Max Black in 1937, who proposed to measure the degree of vagueness to account for uncertainty[66], [68]. Decision scientists argue that human thinking is reliant on approximate reasoning to handle imprecise uncertain information[66].
Fuzzy logic enables formalizing the vague notions in human languages [66]. Lotfi Zadeh introduced Fuzzy logic (FL) in 1965 [69] as a mathematical tool that complements the existing probability theory and handles the uncertainty that always exist in real world problems [66], [70]. Zadeh argues that in a classic “crisp” or “binary” set theory, everything is either true or false, whereas in the real world there are many phenomena that fall along a spectrum and in between the gray area of black and white. Humans tend to use linguistic terms like low, medium, high, too high, etc. to describe such phenomena in the world [69], [71]. The mathematical foundation of fuzzy logic that give up classical precision allowed for computational applications to handle approximations of input and output values that are difficult to quantify with traditional probability theory[66], [67], [70].

To illustrate, consider the proposition: “The system is secure”. In a classic binary logic, this proposition can be either true or false. However, if we present this proposition to a security expert, they might hedge and say, “it depends,” or question the word secure and it’s meaning, or as one of the experts in our SA study stated: “I hesitate to call something secure.” On the other hand, security experts in our composition study were able to use linguistic adjectives like inadequate, adequate, and excessive to evaluate the security of the scenarios (where the linguistic adjectives labeled a 5-point semantic scale). Consider that we are trying to mathematically represent, adequate. Let X be our universe of discourse $X = [1,5]$ and set A in the universe to represent “Adequate”. Lets try to define A as a “crisp” set. For illustration, lets assume that an interval between 2,3 is what makes values adequate as in to Figure 8 below:

![Figure 8. Definition of Adequate Security in Crisp Sets](image)

The function $\mu_A(x)$ is the membership function to describe A, such that:

$$A \Rightarrow \mu_A(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & 2 \leq x \leq 3 \\
0 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases} \quad (1)$$

We can also write: $A = \{x|x \geq 2 \text{ and } x \leq 3\}$. The problem with this definition is that it defines everything in terms of true or false; a value is either adequate or not.
Consider the value 3.1 for example, is it *adequate*? Based on the definition above, this value is not adequate, because 3 is the threshold value for the *adequate* set. But one might argue that this definition with its inclusion/exclusion criteria is not very accurate. A value like 3.1 is very close to *adequate* or is *adequate* with a lesser degree than 1, but greater than 0. To address this concern, fuzzy set theory allows one to express to what degree does a value \( x \) belong to a set \( A \). Fuzzy sets relax the boundaries and thresholds to account for the cases where it is unrealistic to draw a strict boundary [69], [28], [72]. Figure 9 below, shows how an *adequate* fuzzy set \( F \), could be defined:

![Figure 9. Definition of Adequate in Fuzzy Sets](image)

The membership function \( \mu_F(x) \) provides a *measure of the degree of similarity* [28] of an element in the fuzzy set. A fuzzy set \( F \) in \( X \) may be represented as a set of ordered pairs of its element \( x \) and its membership grade, i.e. [28],

\[
F = \{(x, \mu_F(x)) | x \in X\}
\]

In our running example, a fuzzy definition provides more granularity to our definition of the linguistic term *adequate*. For example, a security mitigation that has the rating of 3 is *adequate* with a degree of 0.5 in Figure 9, while a security mitigation with a rating of 2.5 has a degree of 1. The values 3.1 or 1.9 can also be considered *adequate*, but with a lesser degree of membership.

Recall from our composition study, we defined three linguistic labels: inadequate, adequate, and excessive. Figure 10 below shows two possible examples of the three membership functions for all of the three linguistic labels from our composition study:

![Figure 10. Possible membership functions for the “composition study”](image)
Membership functions (MF) for a certain linguistic variable are context dependent [28], [73]. Figure 10 only shows a hypothetical example, not the actual membership functions derived from the actual study results. Determining the membership functions for a fuzzy logic system relies on collecting data either from existing datasets or by conducting user surveys and experiments [28], [74].

Consider that we surveyed security experts to indicate the start and end points for an adequate interval (based on an 1-5 scale) in a certain security scenario. A possible approach would be to use the mean survey data to construct one membership function representing all the different adequate intervals collected from experts: The mean of for each end point will be the end points of a triangular MF and we use the mean of these two end points for the apex of the MF. This class of membership functions is called a Type-1 membership function.

The common phrase “words mean different things to different people [28], [74]” is a motivation for using fuzzy logic to “compute with words [28], [74]”. This statement acknowledges the uncertainty that exists among the meaning of words. Type-1 membership functions in a Type-1 fuzzy logic system summarize the results into one membership function, making the uncertainty in the data disappear. Alternatively, Type-2 membership functions model the uncertainty by providing a footprint of uncertainty [28], [74]. Figure 11 [75] below highlights an example of how a Type-2 membership function appears; as if we blurred the type-1 membership functions by including the uncertainties.

In the Type-2 approach, we account for the uncertainty around the end points. Instead of using a grand mean of all the responses that we collected from experts as in the Type-1 MF approach, we construct membership functions from each expert’s
response. The result would be $N$ membership functions that are sketched together as Figure 11 [75] illustrates. In Figure 11, the dashed line represents the Type-1 membership function or what we call the primary MF; the shaded region represents the footprint of (FOU). For each value $x$, there is $N$ possible grades or MFs associated with it: $MF_1(x), MF_2(x), \ldots, MF_N(x)$. Now for each of these MFs, we can think of the possibility of this MF value for a value $x$ by assigning a weight that represents the possibility. This is called the secondary MF (in 3-D) where at each $x$, the collection of MFs and their weights can be represented as: $\{(MF_i(x), w_{xi}), i = 1, …, N\}$. The vertical slice in the upper right corner of Figure 11 shows the weights, the wavy slice depicts the embedded T1 and T2 fuzzy sets [28], [75].

In order to make computation more feasible and applicable to the demand of applications and systems, fuzzy systems researchers simplified Figure 11 by assuming uniform weights (possibilities of MF grades at a point $x$), which would results in a uniform FOU as Figure 2 illustrates. This type if of fuzzy sets is called the Interval Type-2 Fuzzy set (IT2FS)[28], [75]. Looking at Figure 12, we can conjecture that the FOU has a Gaussian Primary MF where the standard deviation is fixed (since we assumed uniform weighting, but the mean is uncertain and could be any value in the interval $[m_1, m_2]$ [28], [75]. The IT2FS is analogous to the union of all the embedded T1 FS that are covered in the FOU [75].

Type-2 FS are used in a rule-based system that consists of four components: rules, a fuzzifier, an inference engine, and an output processor. Inputs and outputs to the system are crisp, and the heart of the system is the rule set, which are expressed as a collection of if-then statements. Rules can be collected by surveying experts in the field [75]. The following is an example of a one-antecedent rule in a Type-2 Fuzzy Logic System (IT2FLS):

**IF Network Type is Inadequate THEN Overall Security is Inadequate**
We can also have two-antecedent rules such as the following example:

\[ \text{IF Network Type is Inadequate AND Password is Excessive THEN Overall Security is Adequate} \]

There are two sources of uncertainties that can occur when surveying experts: 1) the words used can vary in meaning for different experts, and 2) the consequents for the same rule can vary by experts. In such situations, IT2FLS is a good fit since it can handle such uncertainties [74], [75].

5.2.2 Using IT2FLS to Model the Factorial Vignette Results

We plan to model our factorial vignette results with IT2FLS as follows:
1. Collect start and end intervals of words used in our surveys to create the membership functions of the chosen words.
2. Translate the outcome of the composite scenarios into if-then rules.

The first step is straightforward; we plan to conduct a survey where we ask security experts to provide us with the start and end points of an interval that represent a word in the context of security. This way we will be able to create membership functions for the terms: adequate, inadequate and excessive.

The second step is more unique to our approach. In their previous studies, Mendel et al. have showed that experts can be shown the antecedents of rules and asked to fill in the consequences, directly. We take a less direct approach, as we prefer to show experts scenarios of possible security situations (using factorial vignettes). Next, we plan to use the results of that study to derive the if-then rules to be used in an IT2-FLS.
6 Conclusions

The motivation for this work is to improve current security practices by assisting the security analyst with tools that go beyond checklists and guidelines, which only serve compliance goals. We explained why security is a wicked problem, wherein a human is needed to understand security requirements composition while assessing the risk. In this setting, the analysts need assistance that lead them to better understanding and, hence, more informed mitigation selection. We mainly focus on three aspects that make security a wicked problem: 1) security experts’ diversity of knowledge and skillsets, 2) the composition of security requirements in different contexts and its effect on security-decision making, and 3) the uncertainty involved in security decision-making. In Section 3, we show results of our exploratory SA study where we instrumented situation awareness and used grounded theory to discover differences in security decision-making and the challenges that face security novices and experts. In Section 4, we present results of our composition study, where we instrument factorial vignettes as a method to extract from security experts the proper mitigation requirements, and the weights/priorities of those requirements. In Section 5, we explain our proposed studies that aim to extract expert knowledge in certain security contexts while taking into account the varying skillset of experts. Finally, we explain how we plan to model the results using IT2FLS: a formal method that accounts for uncertainty that is either caused by the diversity of experts, the context effect, or both. This work aims to serve the research community with important findings that advance our knowledge toward improved security decision-support systems.
7 Remaining Tasks and their Timeline

This section lists down all the remaining tasks for accomplishing the dissertation goals. Table 11 below shows the breakdown of tasks and their corresponding months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execute the surveys and collect data</td>
<td>Jan 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze empirical results of the new surveys</td>
<td>Jan - Feb 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract rules and membership functions for the IT2FLS using existing RE’15 data</td>
<td>Jan - Feb 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write the RE’16 paper</td>
<td>Feb 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend the RE’15 paper to a journal paper using data from the new study</td>
<td>Mar 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extract rules and membership functions for IT2FLS using data from the latest surveys.</td>
<td>April 2016, May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write ICSE Paper</td>
<td>Aug – Sep 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write dissertation</td>
<td>Fall 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend the thesis</td>
<td>Jan 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hopefully) graduate</td>
<td>Spring 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography


Appendix

Appendix I

List of Requirements Used in Artifact ND2

R1. Company X’s network, with the exception of the publicly available services which will reside in a demilitarized zone (DMZ), will be unavailable for connections initiated from the Internet to Company X’s network.

R2. The employees of Company X will be required to use a web proxy server for connections to the World Wide Web.

R3. Company X will harden and secure the services and operating systems of critical systems.

R4. Company X will implement web content filtering and shall block inappropriate (pornographic) web sites.

R5. Company X will implement a Windows domain, and will manage server and user system configurations through group policy centrally on the network.

R6. Company X will implement a electronic mail relay, relaying mail from the Internet through a mail filter, which will filter spam and malware as mail enters Company X’s network.

R7. Company X will require strong passwords (8 characters with complexity) for all user accounts.

R8. Company X will implement multiple networks (management, user, data center), and will implement strict access controls between each network.

R9. Company X will deploy system logging capabilities at all critical systems and will gather the logs centrally for review and response.

R10. Company X will implement system time synchronization on the network for logging and auditing capabilities.

R11. Company X will implement multiple Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in multiple places on the network and shall audit regularly.

a. File System Integrity IDS sensors shall be implemented

b. Network packet pattern matching IDS sensors shall be implemented.

R12. Company X shall implement split Domain Name System (DNS) services.

R13. Company X will monitor network traffic with packet sniffers.

R14. Company X will implement centralized system/service availability monitoring.

R15. Company X will administer all systems either interactively from the console or remotely from an isolated management network.