

Possession as Linear Knowledge

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Understanding Distributed Systems

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 - Logical **specification** of distributed authorization policies

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- Approach: **linear epistemic logic**
- Examples
 - Documents in the intelligence community of the US
 - Course management
 - Monetary instruments
 - File system

- 1 Background: Proof-Carrying Authorization
- 2 Logical Foundations
 - 1 Resources (linear logic)
 - 2 Possessions (linear epistemic logic)
 - 3 Effects (linear lax logic)
 - 4 From axioms to inference rules via focusing
 - 5 Persistent truth and knowledge (epistemic logic)
- 3 Policy Consequences
 - 1 State invariants
 - 2 Proving metatheorems
- 4 Speculation: linear epistemic logic programming

Background: Authorization Logic

- Logic for distributed authorization
 - Authorization policy is stated as a logical theory T
 - Principal K can perform operation O if authorization proposition $\text{may}(K, O)$ is true in T
 - The proof embodies the reason why action should be permitted
- Core: “ K **says** A ” for principal K and proposition A
 - Family of K -indexed modal operators
 - Precise definition not important for this talk

Background: Proof-Carrying Authorization

- Enforcement architecture for access control
- “ K says A ” can be realized in two ways
 - Proposition “ A ” digitally signed by K
 - Explicit proof using logical inference
- Policy theory consists of signed “ K says A ”
- Reference monitor grants access if formal proof object “ $M : K$ says may(L, O)” is correct (for resource owner K)
- Core: Proof checking and certificate verification
- Examples
 - Gray (office access with smartphones)
 - Nexus (document viewer application suite)
 - PCFS (proof-carrying file system)

Example: A Versioned File System

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A = \text{"}K \text{ says } A\text{"}$

Principals K, L : fs, \dots

Operations O : $create, on(F, A)$

Actions A : $read, write(s), delete$

Propositions: $\langle fs \rangle user(K)$

$\langle fs \rangle owns(K, F)$

$\langle fs \rangle may(L, O), \langle K \rangle may(L, O)$

Sample policy, file system

$create : \langle fs \rangle (user(K) \supset may(K, create))$

$delegate : \langle fs \rangle (owns(K, F) \wedge \langle K \rangle may(L, on(F, A))$
 $\supset may(L, on(F, A)))$

Example: Distributed Policy

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A = \text{"}K \text{ says } A\text{"}$

Sample policy, Alice

$$\langle \text{alice} \rangle (\langle fs \rangle \text{owns}(\text{alice}, F) \\ \supset \text{may}(\text{alice}, \text{on}(F, A)))$$
$$\langle \text{alice} \rangle (\text{friend}(K, \text{alice})) \\ \supset \text{may}(K, \text{on}(\text{embarassing.jpg}, \text{read}))$$
$$\langle \text{alice} \rangle (\text{friend}(K, \text{alice}) \wedge \langle K \rangle \text{friend}(L, K) \\ \supset \text{may}(L, \text{on}(\text{fun.jpg}, \text{read})))$$

Background: Single-Use Authorization

- Access to or with consumable resources
 - “ K **says** $\text{pay}(K, L, \$50)$ ”
 - “netflix **says** $\text{may}(L, \text{playmovie}(3))$ ”
- Core: **linear** authorization logic
- Enforcement
 - Linear digitally signed certificates
 - Linear proof checking
 - Reference counting in resource monitor
- Atomicity: multi-party contract signing

- Capture consequences of authorization policy
 - Information flow: what **knowledge** may principals gain?
 - Accounting: what **possessions** may principals obtain or relinquish?
- Which states of knowledge and possession can be reached?
- Verify desirable semantic consequences
 - “To learn the contents of a file, one must have read or write access”
 - “Banking machines fees for a single transaction will be no more than \$2”
 - “Every valid electronic vote will be counted”
- Caveat: we stay within the level of abstraction of the semantic description

Example: File System State

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A$ = "K says A"

$[K]A$ = "K has A"

$\llbracket K \rrbracket A$ = "K knows A"

$\{A\}$ = "A, with effect"

Command: $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, O)$ linear
Version: $[K] \text{current}(F, V)$ possession – linear
Contents: $\llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contains}(F, V, S)$ knowledge – persistent

■ Sample rule: Creating a file

$\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{create})$
 $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{create})$
 $\multimap \{ \exists f. \exists v.$
 $! \langle fs \rangle \text{owns}(K, f)$
 $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(f, v)$
 $\otimes \llbracket fs \rrbracket \text{contains}(f, v, \text{""})$
 $\otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contains}(f, v, \text{""}) \}$

Example: Reading a File

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A$ = "K says A"

$[K]A$ = "K has A"

$\llbracket K \rrbracket A$ = "K knows A"

$\{A\}$ = "A, with effect"

- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{read}))$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{read}))$
- $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
- $\otimes \llbracket fs \rrbracket \text{contents}(F, V, S)$
- $\multimap \{ [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
 - $\otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contents}(F, V, S) \}$

Example: Writing to a File

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A =$ "K says A"

$[K]A =$ "K has A"

$\llbracket K \rrbracket A =$ "K knows A"

$\{A\} =$ "A, with effect"

- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S)))$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S)))$
- $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
- $\text{---} \circ \{ \exists v'. [fs] \text{current}(F, v') \}$
 - $\otimes \llbracket fs \rrbracket \text{contains}(F, v', S)$
 - $\otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contains}(F, v', S) \}$

Example: Deleting a File

Key to Syntax

$\langle K \rangle A =$ "K says A"

$[K]A =$ "K has A"

$\llbracket K \rrbracket A =$ "K knows A"

$\{A\} =$ "A, with effect"

- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete}))$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete}))$
- $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
- $\rightarrow \{\mathbf{1}\}$

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- Goal: define a suitable linear logic of (authorization), possession, knowledge, and effects — **linear epistemic logic**
- Use such a logic
 - Logically: specifying the consequences of authorization policies
 - Metalogically: reasoning about all possible action sequences
 - Operationally: implementing (or checking implementation against) linear epistemic specification

Proof-Theoretic Semantics

- How do we define the right logic?
- The crucial role of **proofs**
 - Explicit evidence for authorization
 - Explicit evidence for right-to-know
 - Explicit evidence for transactions
 - Explicit traces of system evolution
- In combination with cryptographic techniques
 - Digital signatures
 - Encryption and decryption

Judgments and Propositions

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \text{linear sequent} & \\ \underbrace{A_1 \text{ res}, \dots, A_n \text{ res}} & \Longrightarrow & \underbrace{C \text{ true}} \\ \Delta & & \gamma \\ \text{consumable resources} & & \text{goal} \\ \text{linear assumptions} & & \text{conclusion} \\ \text{antecedents} & & \text{succedent} \end{array}$$

Judgmental Principles

Identity: With resource A we can achieve goal A

$$\frac{\dots\dots\dots}{A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow A \text{ true}} \text{id}_A$$

Cut: If we can achieve A we can use it as a resource

$$\frac{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \text{ true} \quad \Delta', A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, \Delta' \Longrightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_A$$

- These must be **admissible rules** (metatheorems)
- **Harmony** between resources and goals

Simultaneous Conjunction $A \otimes B$

- Right rule: how to prove goal can be achieved

$$\frac{\Delta_A \Longrightarrow A \quad \Delta_B \Longrightarrow B}{\Delta_A, \Delta_B \Longrightarrow A \otimes B} \otimes R$$

- Left rule: how to use resource

$$\frac{\Delta, A, B \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, A \otimes B \Longrightarrow \gamma} \otimes L$$

(Elide *res* and *true* since clear from position)

Local Harmony

- Show how to expand

$$\frac{\dots\dots\dots}{A \Longrightarrow A} \text{id}_A \longrightarrow_E?$$

using identity on subformulas of A

- Part of proof of global identity proof by induction on A
 - Need primitive rule $P \Longrightarrow P$ for atomic P
- Show how to reduce

$$\frac{\frac{\mathcal{D}}{\Delta \Longrightarrow A} \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta', A \Longrightarrow \gamma}}{\Delta, \Delta' \Longrightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_A \longrightarrow_R?$$

using cut on subformulas of A

- Part of global cut proof by nested induction on $A, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E}$

Local Harmony for $A \otimes B$

- Identity expansion

$$\frac{\dots\dots\dots \text{id}_{A \otimes B}}{A \otimes B \Rightarrow A \otimes B} \longrightarrow_E \frac{\frac{\frac{\dots\dots\dots \text{id}_A}{A \Rightarrow A} \quad \frac{\dots\dots\dots \text{id}_B}{B \Rightarrow B}}{A, B \Rightarrow A \otimes B} \otimes R}{A \otimes B \Rightarrow A \otimes B} \otimes L$$

Local Harmony for $A \otimes B$

■ Cut reduction

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\mathcal{D}_A}{\Delta_A \Rightarrow A} \quad \frac{\mathcal{D}_B}{\Delta_B \Rightarrow B} \quad \otimes R \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta, A, B \Rightarrow \gamma} \quad \otimes L}{\frac{\Delta_A, \Delta_B \Rightarrow A \otimes B \quad \Delta, A \otimes B \Rightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, \Delta_A, \Delta_B \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_{A \otimes B}} \\
 \longrightarrow R \quad \frac{\frac{\mathcal{D}_B}{\Delta_B \Rightarrow B} \quad \frac{\frac{\mathcal{D}_A}{\Delta_A \Rightarrow A} \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta, A, B \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_A}{\Delta, \Delta_A, B \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_B}{\Delta, \Delta_A, \Delta_B \Rightarrow \gamma}
 \end{array}$$

Linear Implication $A \multimap B$

- Right rule: how to prove $A \multimap B$

$$\frac{\Delta, A \Longrightarrow B}{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \multimap B} \multimap R$$

- Left rule: how to use $A \multimap B$

$$\frac{\Delta_A \Longrightarrow A \quad \Delta_B, B \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Delta_A, \Delta_B, A \multimap B \Longrightarrow \gamma} \multimap L$$

Identity Expansion for $A \multimap B$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{A \multimap B \Rightarrow A \multimap B} \text{id}_{A \multimap B} \longrightarrow_E
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \frac{
 \frac{
 \frac{}{A \Rightarrow A} \text{id}_A \quad \frac{}{B \Rightarrow B} \text{id}_B
 }{A \multimap B, A \Rightarrow B} \multimap L
 }{A \multimap B \Rightarrow A \multimap B} \multimap R
 }{}$$

Cut Reduction for $A \multimap B$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\mathcal{D}}{\Delta, A \Rightarrow B} \multimap R \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}_A \quad \mathcal{E}_B}{\Delta_A \Rightarrow A \quad \Delta_B, B \Rightarrow \gamma} \multimap L \\
 \hline
 \Delta, \Delta_A, \Delta_B \Rightarrow \gamma \quad \text{cut}_{A \multimap B} \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{c}
 \mathcal{E}_A \quad \mathcal{D} \\
 \Delta_A \Rightarrow A \quad \Delta, A \Rightarrow B \\
 \hline
 \Delta, \Delta_A \Rightarrow B \quad \text{cut}_A \\
 \mathcal{E}_B \\
 \Delta_B, B \Rightarrow \gamma \\
 \hline
 \Delta, \Delta_A, \Delta_B \Rightarrow \gamma \quad \text{cut}_B
 \end{array} \\
 \longrightarrow_R
 \end{array}$$

Unit Resource 1

$$\frac{}{\bullet \Rightarrow \mathbf{1}} \mathbf{1}R \qquad \frac{\Delta \Rightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, \mathbf{1} \Rightarrow \gamma} \mathbf{1}L$$

$$\frac{\dots\dots\dots}{\mathbf{1} \Rightarrow \mathbf{1}} \text{id}_1 \quad \longrightarrow_E \quad \frac{\frac{}{\bullet \Rightarrow \mathbf{1}} \mathbf{1}R}{\mathbf{1} \Rightarrow \mathbf{1}} \mathbf{1}L$$

$$\frac{\frac{}{\bullet \Rightarrow \mathbf{1}} \mathbf{1}R \quad \frac{\Delta \Rightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, \mathbf{1} \Rightarrow \gamma} \mathbf{1}L}{\Delta \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_1 \quad \longrightarrow_R \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta \Rightarrow \gamma}$$

“•” denotes no resources

Example: Resources

- Example: $\$, \$, \$, (\$ \otimes \$ \multimap \text{coffee}) \Longrightarrow \text{coffee} \otimes \$$

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{}{\$ \Longrightarrow \$} \text{id}}{\$, \$ \Longrightarrow \$ \otimes \$} \otimes R \quad \frac{\frac{\frac{}{\text{coffee} \Longrightarrow \text{coffee}} \text{id}}{\$, \text{coffee} \Longrightarrow \text{coffee} \otimes \$} \otimes R \quad \frac{\frac{}{\$ \Longrightarrow \$} \text{id}}{} \otimes R}{\$, \$, \$, (\$ \otimes \$ \multimap \text{coffee}) \Longrightarrow \text{coffee} \otimes \$} \multimap L$$

- In a proof, all resources have to be used exactly once

$$\$, \$, \$, (\$ \otimes \$ \multimap \text{coffee}) \not\Longrightarrow \text{coffee}$$

$$\$, (\$ \otimes \$ \multimap \text{coffee}) \Longrightarrow \$ \multimap \text{coffee}$$

- $\$ \otimes \$ \multimap \text{coffee}$ should be an **axiom** that we can use as often as we want

Example: Possession

- Previous example is imprecise: who has the dollars and who has the coffee? More precise (*tdo* = Tazza D'Oro)

$$[fp]\$ \otimes [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \multimap [fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$ \otimes [tdo]\$$$

- Need possession modality $[K]A$ (“**K has A**”)

Possession as a Judgment

- New judgment: K **has** A (used as assumption)
- Judgmental rule: K can **relinquish** possession

$$\frac{\Delta, A \text{ res} \implies \gamma}{\Delta, K \text{ has } A \implies \gamma} \text{ has}_L$$

- K **cannot gain** possession (arbitrarily)
- Judgmental definition: (always silently expanded on right)

$$\left[\frac{\Delta|_K \implies A \text{ true}}{\Delta|_K \implies K \text{ has } A} \text{ has}_R \right]$$

- $\Delta|_K$ only has antecedents of the form “ K **has** A ”

Identity and Cut

- No new identity principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\dots\dots\dots}{A \Rightarrow A} \text{id}}{K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow A} \text{has}_L}{K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow K \text{ has } A} \text{has}_R$$

- Derived cut principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\Delta|_K \Rightarrow A}{\Delta|_K \Rightarrow K \text{ has } A} \text{has}_R}{\Delta|_K, \Delta' \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_{\text{has}} \quad \Delta', K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow \gamma$$

Possession as a Proposition

- Internalize K **has** A judgment as a proposition $[K]A$

$$\frac{\Delta|_K \Longrightarrow A}{\Delta|_K \Longrightarrow [K]A} []R$$

$$\frac{\Delta, K \text{ has } A \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Delta, [K]A \Longrightarrow \gamma} []L$$

Identity Expansion for Possession

$$\frac{\dots\dots\dots \text{id}_{[K]A}}{[K]A \Longrightarrow [K]A} \longrightarrow_E \frac{\frac{\frac{\dots\dots\dots \text{id}}{A \Longrightarrow A} \text{has}_L}{K \text{ has } A \Longrightarrow A} []^R}{K \text{ has } A \Longrightarrow [K]A} []^L$$

Cut Reduction for Possession

$$\frac{\frac{\mathcal{D}}{\Delta|_K \Rightarrow A} \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta', K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow \gamma}}{\Delta|_K \Rightarrow [K]A} []R \quad \frac{\Delta', K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow \gamma}{\Delta', [K]A \Rightarrow \gamma} []L}{\Delta|_K, \Delta' \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_{[K]A}$$

$$\longrightarrow_R \frac{\frac{\mathcal{D}}{\Delta|_K \Rightarrow A} \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta', K \text{ has } A \Rightarrow \gamma}}{\Delta|_K, \Delta' \Rightarrow \gamma} \text{cut}_{K \text{ has } A}$$

- Axioms like Intuitionistic S4, but linear

$$\vdash [K](A \multimap B) \multimap ([K]A \multimap [K]B) \quad (K^\square)$$

$$\vdash [K]A \multimap [K][K]A \quad (4^\square)$$

$$\vdash [K]A \multimap A \quad (T^\square)$$

- Rule of necessitation

$$\frac{\vdash A}{\vdash [K]A} \text{ (nec)}$$

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The Effect Monad

- Applying rules such as

$$[fp]\$ \otimes [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \multimap [fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$ \otimes [tdo]\$$$

represent a **change of state**

- Proofs of authorizations such as $\langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{read}))$ do not involve a change of state
- Isolate changes in an effect monad
- Logically, this is a **lax modality** $\{A\}$
- Rewrite above as

$$[fp]\$ \otimes [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \multimap \{[fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$ \otimes [tdo]\$\}$$

Lax Judgment

- New judgment $A \text{ lax}$ (A is true with effect)
- Judgmental rule: truth entails lax truth

$$\frac{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \text{ true}}{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \text{ lax}} \text{ lax}_R$$

- Lax truth **does not** entail truth
- Judgmental definition: (always silently expanded on the left)

$$\left[\frac{\Delta, A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}}{\Delta, A \text{ lax} \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}} \text{ lax}_L \right]$$

- **Applies only with lax succedent, not truth**

Judgmental Principles

- No new identity principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\dots\dots\dots}{A \text{ res} \implies A \text{ true}}{A \text{ res} \implies A \text{ lax}}{A \text{ lax} \implies A \text{ lax}}}{\text{id}_A}{\text{lax}_R}{\text{lax}_L}$$

- Derived cut principle

$$\frac{\frac{\Delta \implies A \text{ lax} \quad \frac{\frac{\Delta', A \text{ res} \implies C \text{ lax}}{\Delta', A \text{ lax} \implies C \text{ lax}}{\text{lax}_R}}{\dots\dots\dots}{\text{cut}_{\text{lax}}}{\Delta, \Delta' \implies C \text{ lax}}$$

- Allow $\gamma ::= C \text{ true} \mid C \text{ lax}$ in all other rules with generic succedent

Lax Modality = Effect Monad

- Internalize lax judgment as proposition $\{A\}$

$$\frac{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \text{ lax}}{\Delta \Longrightarrow \{A\} \text{ true}} \{ \} R$$

$$\frac{\Delta, A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}}{\Delta, \{A\} \text{ res} \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}} \{ \} L$$

- Identity expansion

$$\frac{\dots \text{id}_{\{A\}}}{\{A\} \Longrightarrow \{A\}} \longrightarrow_E \frac{\frac{\frac{\dots \text{id}_A}{A \Longrightarrow A} \text{ lax}_L}{\{A\} \Longrightarrow A \text{ lax}} \{ \} L}{\{A\} \Longrightarrow \{A\}} \{ \} R$$

Cut Reduction for Lax Modality

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\mathcal{D}}{\Delta \Longrightarrow A \text{ lax}} \{ \} R \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\Delta' \Longrightarrow A \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}} \{ \} L \\
 \frac{\Delta \Longrightarrow \{A\} \quad \Delta', \{A\} \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}}{\Delta, \Delta' \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}} \text{cut}_{\{A\}} \\
 \hline
 \longrightarrow_R \quad \frac{\mathcal{D} \quad \mathcal{E}}{\Delta, \Delta' \Longrightarrow C \text{ lax}} \text{cut}_{A \text{ lax}}
 \end{array}$$

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Polarization

- **Focusing**: we can obtain a complete big-step proof system using two observations
 - Apply invertible rules eagerly
 - When all top-level propositions have non-invertible rules, **focus** on one of them and apply a run of non-invertible rules to its components
- Robust technique (all reasonable known logics?)
- **Polarization**: we explicitly categorize propositions into negative (invertible right) and positive (invertible left).
 - Here: exploit monad (other choices are possible)
 - Negative $A^- ::= P^- \mid A^+ \multimap A^- \mid \{A^+\}$
 - Positive $A^+ ::= A_1 \otimes A_2 \mid \mathbf{1} \mid [K]A^- \mid A^-$

Example: Focusing

Write **A** for formula in focus

Must apply rule to focus formula

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Delta, fp \text{ has coffee}, tdo \text{ has } \$ \implies C \text{ lax} \\
 \hline
 \Delta, fp \text{ has coffee}, [tdo]\$ \implies C \text{ lax} \quad []L \\
 \hline
 \Delta, [fp]\text{coffee}, [tdo]\$ \implies C \text{ lax} \quad []L \\
 \hline
 \Delta, [fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$ \implies C \text{ lax} \quad \otimes L \\
 \hline
 \Delta, \{[fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$\} \implies C \text{ lax} \quad \{ \}L
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{\$ \implies \$} \text{id} \\
 \hline
 fp \text{ has } \$ \implies \$ \quad \text{has}_L \\
 \hline
 fp \text{ has } \$ \implies [fp]\$ \quad []R \\
 \hline
 \frac{}{\text{beans} \implies \text{beans}} \text{id} \\
 \hline
 tdo \text{ has beans} \implies \text{beans} \quad \text{has}_L \\
 \hline
 tdo \text{ has beans} \implies [tdo]\text{beans} \quad []R \\
 \hline
 fp \text{ has } \$, tdo \text{ has beans} \implies [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \quad \otimes R \\
 \hline
 \Delta, fp \text{ has } \$, tdo \text{ has beans}, [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \multimap \{[fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$\} \implies C \text{ lax} \quad \multimap L
 \end{array}$$

see above

From Axioms to Inference Rules

- Focusing allows us to turn axioms such as

$$\text{buy} : [fp]\$ \otimes [tdo]\text{beans} \multimap \{[fp]\text{coffee} \otimes [tdo]\$\}$$

into a **complete set of derived inference rules** such as

$$\frac{\Delta, fp \text{ has coffee}, tdo \text{ has } \$ \implies C \text{ lax}}{\Delta, fp \text{ has } \$, tdo \text{ has beans} \implies C \text{ lax}} \text{ buy}$$

- Aside: to get this specific rule, some assumption on K 's possessions and other axioms are necessary
 - No axioms with “head” $\$$
 - Possessions are of the form $K \text{ has } P$ for atoms P
- The lax modality allows for somewhat stricter proof control than just focusing

Example Revisited: Deleting a File

Key to Syntax

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$\llbracket K \rrbracket A$ = "K knows A"

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- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{create})$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{create})$
- $\multimap \{ \exists f. \exists v. \begin{aligned} &!\langle fs \rangle \text{owns}(K, f) \\ &\otimes [fs] \text{current}(f, v) \\ &\otimes \llbracket fs \rrbracket \text{contains}(f, v, "") \\ &\otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contains}(f, v, "") \end{aligned} \}$

- To explain: **knowledge** $\llbracket K \rrbracket A$ and **persistent truth** $!A$
- Following our judgmental approach, we add new form of assumptions

Persistent Assumptions

- Sequents have form

$$\Gamma; \Delta \Longrightarrow \gamma$$

where

Persistent ants.	Γ	::=	$\bullet \mid \Gamma, A \text{ pers} \mid \Gamma, K \text{ knows } A$
Linear ants.	Δ	::=	$\bullet \mid \Delta, A \text{ res} \mid \Delta, K \text{ has } A$
Succedents	γ	::=	$A \text{ true} \mid A \text{ lax}$

- Persistent assumptions grow monotonically in bottom-up proof construction
- All present rules are updated to propagate Γ to all premises

Persistent Truth

- Persistent truths can be used

$$\frac{A \text{ pers} \in \Gamma \quad \Gamma; \Delta, A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Gamma; \Delta \Longrightarrow \gamma} \text{ pers}_L$$

- Truths whose proof requires no consumable resources are persistent

$$\left[\frac{\Gamma; \bullet \Longrightarrow A \text{ true}}{\Gamma; \bullet \Longrightarrow A \text{ pers}} \text{ pers}_R \right]$$

Cut and Identity for Persistent Truth

- No new identity principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\text{..... id}}{A \text{ pers}; A \text{ res} \implies A \text{ true}}{A \text{ pers}; \bullet \implies A \text{ true}}{A \text{ pers}; \bullet \implies A \text{ pers}} \text{ pers}_L}{\text{pers}_R}$$

- New derived cut principle

$$\frac{\frac{\Gamma; \bullet \implies A \text{ true}}{\Gamma; \bullet \implies A \text{ pers}} \text{ pers}_R \quad \Gamma, A \text{ pers}; \Delta \implies \gamma}{\text{..... cut}_{\text{pers}} \quad \Gamma; \Delta \implies \gamma}$$

The Exponential Modality of Linear Logic

$$\frac{\Gamma; \bullet \Longrightarrow A \text{ true}}{\Gamma; \bullet \Longrightarrow !A \text{ true}} \text{!R} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, A \text{ pers}; \Delta \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Gamma; \Delta, !A \text{ res} \Longrightarrow \gamma} \text{!L}$$

- Internalize persistent truth
- Identity expansion and cut reduction work easily

A Judgment of Knowledge

- K **knows** $A \sim$ knowledge as persistent possession
- Persistent knowledge can be used by K

$$\frac{K \text{ knows } A \in \Gamma \quad \Gamma; \Delta, A \text{ res} \implies \gamma}{\Gamma; \Delta \implies \gamma} \text{ knows}_L$$

- Truth whose proofs require only local knowledge can be known

$$\left[\frac{\Gamma|_K; \bullet \implies A}{\Gamma; \bullet \implies K \text{ knows } A} \text{ knows}_R \right]$$

- $\Gamma|_K$ restricts to antecedents of the form K **knows** _

Cut and Identity for Knowledge

- No new identity principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\dots}{K \text{ knows } A; A \text{ res} \implies A \text{ true}}{K \text{ knows } A; \bullet \implies A \text{ true}}}{K \text{ knows } A; \bullet \implies K \text{ knows } A}}{\text{id} \text{ knows}_L \text{ knows}_R}$$

- New derived cut principle

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\Gamma |_{K; \bullet \implies A \text{ true}}}{\Gamma; \bullet \implies K \text{ knows } A}}{\Gamma, K \text{ knows } A; \Delta \implies \gamma}}{\Gamma; \Delta \implies \gamma}}{\text{cut}_{\text{knows}}}$$

Knowledge as a Modality

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \kappa; \bullet \Longrightarrow A \text{ true}}{\Gamma; \bullet \Longrightarrow \llbracket K \rrbracket A \text{ true}} \llbracket \rrbracket R \qquad \frac{\Gamma, K \text{ knows } A; \Delta \Longrightarrow \gamma}{\Gamma; \Delta, \llbracket K \rrbracket A \Longrightarrow \gamma} \llbracket \rrbracket L$$

- Identity expansion and cut reduction as usual
- Knowledge is like indexed judgmental S4

- 1 Background: Proof-Carrying Authorization
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Characterizing State

- Need to characterize the system states so we can reason about the policy
- System states are pairs $\Gamma; \Delta$
 - Γ is persistent
 - Δ is linear
 - We do not care about the right-hand side, but it must have the form $C \text{ lax}$ to permit effects
- Using this characterization, we turn each semantics rule into (one or more) rewrite rules for system states
- Using the rewrite rules we can prove theorems about the semantics

Example: Characterizing File System State

- Each persistent judgment in Γ is one of
 - A policy rule or semantics action
 - fs **knows** contents(F, V, S) or K **knows** contents(F, V, S)
 - $\langle fs \rangle$ user(K) or $\langle fs \rangle$ owns(K, F)
- Each linear judgment in Δ is one of
 - fs **has** current(F, V)
 - $\langle K \rangle$ do(K, A)
- For each file F , there is at most one V such that fs **has** current(F, V)

Example: Reading a File

■ Specification

- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete}))$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete}))$
- $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
- $\multimap \{\mathbf{1}\}$

■ Rewrite step

$$\begin{array}{l} \Gamma; \Delta, \langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete})), fs \text{ **has** current}(F, V) \\ \rightarrow \Gamma; \Delta \end{array}$$

provided $\Gamma \vdash \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{delete}))$

Example: Writing to a File

■ Specification

- $\langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S)))$
- $\otimes \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S)))$
- $\otimes [fs] \text{current}(F, V)$
- $\multimap \{ \exists v'. [fs] \text{current}(F, v')$
 - $\otimes \llbracket fs \rrbracket \text{contains}(F, v', S)$
 - $\otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{contains}(F, v', S) \}$

■ Rewrite interpretation

$\Gamma; \Delta, \langle K \rangle \text{do}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S))), fs \text{ has current}(F, V)$
 $\rightarrow \Gamma, fs \text{ knows contains}(F, v', S), K \text{ knows contains}(F, v', S);$
 $\Delta, fs \text{ has current}(F, v')$

for a new v' provided $\Gamma \vdash \langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, \text{on}(F, \text{write}(S)))$

Analysis Example: Policy Controls Knowledge

Theorem (Knowledge Safety)

If $\Gamma; \Delta$ is a file system state such that

$$\Gamma; \Delta \rightarrow \Gamma', K \text{ **knows** contents}(F, V, S); \Delta'$$

*then either K **knows** $\text{contents}(F, T, S) \in \Gamma$ or the step was a create, read, or write action A on F by K permitted by the policy (as evidenced by a proof of $\langle fs \rangle \text{may}(K, A)$)*

Proof.

By case analysis of the possible rewrite step schemata. □

Stratification

- The proofs still apply as long as the signed policy statements do not involve any effects or possessions
- In general, the system should be **stratified** so proofs of authorization are effect-free
 - Uses of authorizations are the effect
 - Linear theorem proving of authorization theorem does not consume the certificates!
- Located certificates and proofs
 - File system example abstract away from location of proofs
 - Could specify client of server to produce the proof

Another Example: Electronic Voting

va = voting authority

- $\langle va \rangle \text{hasvote}(K)$ (linear certificate)
- $\otimes !\langle va \rangle \text{candidate}(L)$ (persistent certificate)
- $\otimes [K]\langle K \rangle \text{votefor}(L)$ (linear possession of cert.)
- $\otimes [va]\text{voting}$ (linear “token”)
- $\otimes [va]\text{votecount}(N)$ (linear “token”)
- $\multimap \{ [va]\text{vote}(L)$ (linear vote result)
 - $\otimes [va]\text{count}(N + 1)$
 - $\otimes [va]\text{voting} \}$

Example: Counting Electronic Votes

- $[va]voting$ (linear “token”)
- $\otimes \langle va \rangle pollclosed$ (linear trigger)
- $\otimes [va]votecount(N)$ (linear “token”)
- $\rightarrow \{[va]counting(N)\}$ (new token)

- $[va]counting(0)$ (vote counting done)
- $\rightarrow \{[va]done\}$

- $[va]counting(N) \otimes !N > 0$ (token and condition)
- $\otimes [va]vote(L)$ (vote for L , being tallied)
- $\otimes [va]numvotes(L, K)$ (vote counter)
- $\rightarrow \{[va]counting(N)$
 - $\otimes [va]votes(L, K + 1)\}$

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Speculation: Linear Epistemic Logic Programming

- Idea: Give a forward chaining (“bottom-up”) logic programming interpretation as a distributed programming language
- By design, the implementation will satisfy the specification
- By design, the implementation will satisfy the theorems proven about the specification
- Based on the polarized, focusing interpretation
 - Some additional restrictions will be necessary
 - Mode checking, staging verification, . . .
- Must execute protocols on multiple hosts

Example: A Binary Counter

- State invariants for each principal (= bit) K
 - For each K , either K **knows** $\text{next}(L)$ or K **knows** last
 - For each K , either K **has** zero or K **has** one
 - For one K , K **has** inc may be present
- Program

$$[K]\text{inc} \otimes [K]\text{zero} \multimap \{[K]\text{one}\}$$

$$[K]\text{inc} \otimes [K]\text{one} \otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{next}(L) \multimap \{[K]\text{zero} \otimes [L]\text{inc}\}$$

$$[K]\text{inc} \otimes [K]\text{one} \otimes \llbracket K \rrbracket \text{last} \multimap \{[K]\text{zero}\}$$

- Have hand-compiled version in Meld on “blinky-blocks”

Atomicity

- In general, complex multi-party contract signing protocols may be necessary to ensure atomicity of the rules
- Example (with conditions from two parties)

$$\llbracket L \rrbracket_{\text{prev}}(K) \otimes [K]_{\text{carry}} \otimes [L]_{\text{zero}} \multimap \{ \llbracket L \rrbracket_{\text{one}} \}$$

$$\llbracket L \rrbracket_{\text{prev}}(K) \otimes [K]_{\text{carry}} \otimes [L]_{\text{one}} \multimap \{ [L]_{\text{zero}} \otimes [L]_{\text{carry}} \}$$

- Inference system suggests “truth” as a trusted third party that leaks no information
- Looking for a suitable lower-level calculus to compile to for expressing communication protocols

- Goals
 - Logical **specification** of distributed authorization policies
 - Reliable **enforcement** of such high-level policies (PCA)
 - Implemented in practical proof-carrying file system
 - Mechanized **reasoning** about consequences of policies:
 - Evolution of **system state**
 - Principals' **knowledge** (information)
 - Principals' **possessions** (consumable resources)
- Approach: **linear epistemic logic**
 - Pedantic definition from judgmental principles
 - **Possession is linear knowledge**
 - Specification at extremely high level of abstraction

Ongoing and Future Work

- Define distributed forward chaining linear epistemic logic programming language
- Compile to distributed code executing multi-party communication protocols
- Prove correctness with respect to rewriting semantics
 - Atomicity of rules most difficult
 - Identify tractable language subset
 - Eliminate some uses of trusted third party (= truth)
- Mechanize reasoning about policies
 - “See” my talk at LFMTTP yesterday

- H. DeYoung and F. Pfenning, *Reasoning about the Consequences of Authorization Policies in a Linear Epistemic Logic*, Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security (FCS), 2009.
- D. Garg et al., *A Linear Logic of Affirmation and Knowledge*, European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 2006.
- Further pointers from this workshop, I hope!