#### **Rely-Guarantee Protocols** for Safe Interference over Shared Memory

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#### **Software Defects**

Our over reliance on software aggravates the impact of software defects ("bugs") on society:

- 1962 Mariner I Spacecraft (incorrect guidance signal transmission)
- 1985 Therac-25 radiation therapy machine (race condition)
- 1991 Patriot Missile Error (inaccurate tracking)
- 1996 Ariane 5 Flight 501 (overflow in 16-bit register)
- 1998 NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter (imperial to metrics conversion)
- 2006 Heathrow Terminal 5 Opening (baggage handling system)
- 2007 Microsoft Excel 2007 (wrong result on 850\*77.1)
- 2009 Toyota vehicles (sudden unintended acceleration)

Thus, there is a clear and increasing need for mechanisms to improve software reliability.

...

## Mutable State (I)

Mutable state can be useful in certain cases such as to improve efficiency, clarity, or even to enable greater extensibility.




We propose a new type-based technique to detect, at compile-time, a class of errors related to the unsafe use of shared mutable state.

### Mutable State (II)

We aim to precisely detect and avoid *unsafe interference* in the use of mutable state that is shared through aliasing.

By precisely tracking the properties of mutable state we can avoid a class of state-related run-time errors and eliminates the need for some defensive run-time tests.


```
File file = new File( "fillet" );
file.write( "foo" );
file.close();
file.write( "bar" );
```




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
```
class File {
    FileDescriptor fd;
    File( string filename ){
     fd = OS.createFile( filename );
    }
    void write( string s ){
    if(fd == null)
      throw Exception("invalid file descriptor");
     fd.write( s );
    }
    void close(){
    fd = null;
    }
```







#### Challenge: Interference


Aliasing allows different names to refer to the same mutable state.





However, uncontrolled aliasing can lead to interference-related errors, where the actions of different aliases break each other's (precise) assumptions on the contents of the shared state.











#### **Thesis Statement**

**Rely-Guarantee Protocols** provide a modular, composable, expressive, and automatically verifiable mechanism to control the interference resulting from the interaction of non-local aliases that share access to mutable state.

#### Overview




#### Language


- Polymorphic λ-calculus with mutable references (and immutable records, tagged sums, ...).
- We use a variant of L<sup>3</sup> [Ahmed, Fluet, and Morrisett.
   L<sup>3</sup>: A linear language with locations. Fundam.
   Inform. 2007.] adapted for usability and extended with new constructs, and our sharing mechanism.


**ref A** 




















x : ref þ	rw p string	
let $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{x}$ in		
<b>x</b> :=	1;	
delet	te y;	
<b>x</b> := false		
end		




<pre>let y = x in     x := 1;</pre>				
y:refp	x : ref þ	rw þ int		
delete y;				
<b>x</b> := false				
end				





#### How to use capabilities in **functions**?



#### left:refl

# fun( i : int :: rw l [] ). left := i

fun( i : int :: rw l [] ).
left:refl i : int :: rw l []

left := i

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# fun( i : int :: rw l [] ). left := i


#### (int :: rw l []) ⊸ ([] :: rw l int)

## How to build typestate abstractions?

# fun( i : int :: rw l [] ). left := i


#### (int :: rw l []) → ([] :: rw l int)






• Initialize each component separately.


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


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
• Initialize each component separately.





#### *initL* : ( int :: rw l [] ) → ( [] :: rw l int )

[ initL : ( int :: EL ) → ( [] :: rw l int ), initR : ( int :: rw r [] ) → ( [] :: rw r int ), sum : ( [] :: ( rw l int \* rw r int ) ) → ( int :: ( rw l int \* rw r int ) ) → destroy : ( [] :: ( rw l int \* rw r int ) ) → [] ) ] :: ( EL \* rw r [] ) [ initL : ( int :: EL ) → ( [] :: L ), initR : ( int :: rw r [] ) → ( [] :: rw r int ), sum : ( [] :: ( L \* rw r int ) ) → ( int :: ( L \* rw r int ) ) → destroy : ( [] :: ( L \* rw r int ) ) → [] ) ] :: ( EL \* rw r [] )



```
∃EL.∃L.∃ER.∃R.( [
    initL : !( int :: EL - ○ [] :: L ),
    initR : !( int :: ER - ○ [] :: R ),
    sum : !( [] :: L * R - ○ int :: L * R ),
    destroy : !( [] :: L * R - ○ [] )
] :: EL * ER )
```

#### newPair :

 $!( [] \rightarrow \exists EL. \exists L. \exists ER. \exists R. ( ![$ 

initL	:	! (	int	::	EL	-0	[]	::	<b>L</b> ),
initR	:	! (	int	::	ER	-0	[]	::	<b>R</b> ),
sum	:	! (	[]	::	<b>L</b> * <b>R</b>	-0	int	::	L * R ),
destroy	:	! (	[]	::	<b>L</b> * <b>R</b>	-0	[]	)	
] :: <i>EL</i> *	r 1	ER	) )						


- Type expresses the changing properties of the object's state,
   typestate (EmptyLeft, Left, EmptyRight and Right).
- The types states *EL/L* and *ER/R* correlate to separate (disjoint) internal state that can operate independently of the other.


# So... Why sharing?

The capability is <u>linear</u>: it cannot be used *simultaneously* from two different parts of the program.


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


- We want to use state simultaneously, beyond linearly.
- We need a typing mechanism to safely coordinate access to shared state and avoid unsafe interference.




- We want to use state simultaneously, beyond linearly.
- We need a typing mechanism to safely coordinate access to shared state and avoid unsafe interference.

• One solution is to have each alias preserve an initially held invariant, *invariant-based sharing*.




• Instead, we adapt the *spirit* of rely-guarantee reasoning, to enable more precise uses.




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
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
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
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



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



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
### Shared cell







































## Disjoint

Linearity ensured the state was disjoint:
 only one capability to some cell may exist.




• Sharing enables the same cell to be used through seemingly different name.

Types that "look" disjoint, may in fact alias the same state - i.e. they are *fictionally* disjoint.

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
• Sharing enables the same cell to be used through seemingly different name.

Types that "look" disjoint, may in fact alias the same state - i.e. they are *fictionally* disjoint.

## Alias Interleaving

x := 1; doSomething(); !x // what do we get?

## Alias Interleaving



x := 1; doSomething(); !x // what do we get?



fun().x := false

fun().delete x

x := 1; doSomething(); !x // what do we get?

doSomething, although fictionally disjoint, may actually interleave zero or more uses of aliases to the same state as referenced by **x**.


## Alias Interleaving

x := 1; doSomething(); !x // what do we get?

Are the uses done in **doSomething** compatible with our local reasoning of how **x** changes?


## **Protocol Composition**

Checks if combining all local views creates a globally consistent, i.e. safe, use of the shared state mutable state independently of interleaving.




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## Rely-Guarantee Protocols

- An *interference*-control mechanism, permission to mutate the shared state is conditioned on what actions the protocol allows.
- I will focus on presenting the following:
  - I. Protocol Specification
  - 2. Protocol Use
  - 3. Protocol Composition

## Rely-Guarantee Protocols

- An *interference*-control mechanism, permission to mutate the shared state is conditioned on what actions the protocol allows.
- I will focus on presenting the following:

I. Protocol Specification

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- 3. Protocol Composition

# $P ::= (\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).P)[\overline{U_P}] \mid X[\overline{U_P}] \mid P \oplus P$ $\mid P \& P \mid R \Rightarrow P \mid R; P \mid \mathsf{none}$

States that it is safe to assume that shared state satisfies **R**, and requires the alias to obey the guarantee **P**.

# $P ::= (\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).P)[\overline{U_P}] \mid X[\overline{U_P}] \mid P \oplus P$ $\mid P \& P \mid R \Rightarrow P \mid R; P \mid \mathsf{none}$

Requires the client to establish (guarantee) that the shared state satisfies **R** before continuing the use of the protocol as **P**.


## **Shared Pipe**


Shared by two aliases interacting via a common buffer, here modeled as a singly linked list.


- The **Producer** alias may **put** new elements in or **close** the pipe.
- 2. The **Consumer** alias may only **tryTake** elements from the buffer.


The result of **tryTake** is one of the following: either there was some **Result**, or **NoResult**, or the pipe is fully **Depleted**.




















#### tail: Empty ⇒ (Filled ⊕ Closed); none




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
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Α	::=	!A	(pure type)
	1	$A \multimap A$	(linear function)
	1	$\forall X.A$	(universal type quantification)
	1	$\exists X.A$	(existential type quantification)
		$[\overline{\mathbf{f}:A}]$	(record)
		$\sum_i t_i #A_i$	(tagged sum)
		ref p	(reference type)
	1	$(\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).A)[\overline{U}]$	(recursive type)
		$X[\overline{U}]$	(type variable)
		A :: A	(resource stacking)
		A * A	(separation)
		$\forall l.A$	(universal location quantification)
		$\exists l.A$	(existential location quantification)
		$A \oplus A$	(alternative)
		A & A	(intersection)
		rw pA	(read-write capability to p)
		none	(empty resource)
		$A \Rightarrow A$	(rely type)
	- 1	A;A	(guarantee type)

A	::= !A	(pure type)
Π		
	$  A \multimap A$	(linear function)
	$  \forall X.A$	(universal type quantification)
	$\mid \exists X.A$	(existential type quantification)
	$  [\overline{\mathbf{f}:A}]$	(record)
	$  \sum_i t_i #A_i$	(tagged sum)
	<b>ref</b> <i>p</i>	(reference type)
	$  (\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).A)[\overline{U}]$	(recursive type)
	$  X[\overline{U}]$	(type variable)
	A :: A	(resource stacking)
	A * A	(separation)
	$  \forall l.A$	(universal location quantification

A	::= !A	(pure type)
	$  A \multimap A$	(linear function)
	$\forall X.A$	(universal type quantification)
	$  \exists X.A$	(existential type quantification)
	$  [\overline{\mathbf{f}:A}]$	(record)
	$ \sum_i t_i #A_i $	(tagged sum)
	<b>ref</b> <i>p</i>	(reference type)
	$  (\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).A)[\overline{U}]$	(recursive type)
	$  X[\overline{U}]$	(type variable)
	A :: A	(resource stacking)
	A * A	(separation)
	$  \forall l.A$	(universal location quantification

A	::= !A	(pure type)
	$  A \multimap A$	(linear function)
	$  \forall X.A$	(universal type quantification)
	$  \exists X.A$	(existential type quantification)
	$  [\overline{\mathbf{f}:A}]$	(record)
	$ \sum_i t_i #A_i $	(tagged sum)
	<b>ref</b> p	(reference type)
	$  (\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).A)[\overline{U}]$	(recursive type)
	$  X[\overline{U}]$	(type variable)
	A :: A	(resource stacking)
	A * A	(separation)
	$  \forall l.A$	(universal location quantification

	<b>ref</b> p	(reference type)
	$(\operatorname{rec} X(\overline{u}).A)[\overline{U}]$	(recursive type)
	$X[\overline{U}]$	(type variable)
	A :: A	(resource stacking)
	A * A	(separation)
	$\forall l.A$	(universal location quantification
	$\exists l.A$	(existential location quantificatio
	$A \oplus A$	(alternative)
	A & A	(intersection)
	rw p A	(read-write capability to p)
	none	(empty resource)
I	$A \Rightarrow A$	(rely type)
I	A;A	(guarantee type)

#### **Producer** (tail) **Protocol**:

- $T[t] = rw t Empty#[] \Rightarrow$ 
  - ((rw t Node#[...]) ⊕ (rw t Closed#[])); none

#### **Consumer** (head) **Protocol**:

#### H[h] =

- (rw h Empty#[] ⇒ rw h Empty#[] ; H[h])
- $\oplus$  (rw h Node#[...]  $\Rightarrow$  none ; none)
- $\oplus$  (rw h Closed#[]  $\Rightarrow$  none ; none)

∃P.∃C.( ![
 put : !( ( !int :: P ) → ( ![] :: P ) ) ,
 close : !( ( ![] :: P ) → ![] ) ,
 tryTake : !( ( ![] :: C ) → Depleted#![] +
 NoResult#(![] :: C) + Result#(!int :: C) )
 ] :: ( C \* P ) )

∃**P.**∃**C.**( ![

put : !( ( !int :: P ) → ( ![] :: P ) ) ,
close : !( ( ![] :: P ) → ![] ) ,
tryTake : !( ( ![] :: C ) → Depleted#![] +
NoResult#(![] :: C) + Result#(!int :: C) )
] :: ( C \* P ) )


∃**P.**∃**C.**( ![

put : !( ( !int :: P ) → ( ![] :: P ) ) ,
close : !( ( ![] :: P ) → ![] ) ,
tryTake : !( ( ![] :: C ) → Depleted#![] +
NoResult#(![] :: C) + Result#(!int :: C) )

] :: ( C \* P ) )

**rw p** ∃**p.**((!**ref** p) :: **T**[p])

∃**P.**∃**C.**( ![



### Rely-Guarantee Protocols

- An *interference*-control mechanism, permission to mutate the shared state is conditioned on what actions the protocol allows.
- I will focus on presenting the following:

I. Protocol Specification

- 2. Protocol Use
- 3. Protocol Composition

### Rely-Guarantee Protocols

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### Syntax

$v \in VALUES$	::= x	(variable)
	ΙP	(address)
	$\lambda x : A.e$	(function)
	$ \langle X\rangle e$	(type abstraction)
	$ \langle l\rangle e$	(location abstraction)
	$ \langle A, v \rangle$	(pack type)
	$\langle p, v \rangle$	(pack location)
	$  \{\overline{\mathbf{f}} = \mathbf{v}\}$	(record)
	t#v	(tagged value)
$e \in \text{Expressions}$	::= v	(value)
	v[A]	(type application)
	v[p]	(location application)
	v.f	(field)
	V V	(application)
	let $x = e$ in $e$ end	(let)
	open $\langle X, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end	(open type)
	open $\langle l, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end	(open location)
	case v of $\overline{t \# x \to e}$ end	(case)
	l new v	(cell creation)
	delete v	(cell deletion)
	!v	(dereference)
	v := v	(assign)
	share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$	(share)
	focus A	(focus)
	defocus	(defocus)

EXPRESSIONS ::= $v$ (value)   v[A] (type application)   v[p] (location application)   v.f (field)   vv (application)   let x = e in e end (let) $  open \langle X, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open type) $  open \langle l, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open location) $  case v of t #x \rightarrow e end$ (case)   new v (cell creation)   delete v (cell deletion)   v := v (assign) $  share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $  focus \overline{A}$ (focus)   defocus			t#v	(tagged value)
$v[p]$ (location application) $v.f$ (field) $vv$ (application) $ et x = e in e end$ (let) $open \langle X, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open type) $open \langle l, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open location) $case v of t \# x \rightarrow e$ end(case) $new v$ (cell creation) $delete v$ (cell deletion) $ v := v$ (assign) $share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $focus \overline{A}$ (focus)	EXPRESSIONS	::=	V	(value)
$v.f$ (field) $vv$ (application) $  let x = e in e end$ (let) $open \langle X, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open type) $open \langle l, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open location) $case v of t #x \rightarrow e$ end(case) $new v$ (cell creation) $delete v$ (cell deletion) $!v$ (dereference) $v := v$ (assign) $share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $focus \overline{A}$ (focus)		1	v[A]	(type application)
$vv$ (application) $  let x = e in e end$ (let) $open \langle X, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open type) $open \langle l, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open location) $case v of t \# x \rightarrow e$ end(case) $new v$ (cell creation) $delete v$ (cell deletion) $!v$ (dereference) $v := v$ (assign) $share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $focus \overline{A}$ (focus)		1	v[p]	(location application)
$  let x = e in e end$ (let) $  open \langle X, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open type) $  open \langle l, x \rangle = v in e end$ (open location) $  case v of t \# x \rightarrow e$ end(case) $  new v$ (cell creation) $  delete v$ (cell deletion) $  !v$ (dereference) $  v := v$ (assign) $  share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $  focus \overline{A}$ (focus)		1	v.f	(field)
$ $ open $\langle X, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end(open type) $ $ open $\langle l, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end(open location) $ $ case $v$ of $\overline{t\#x} \rightarrow e$ end(case) $ $ new $v$ (cell creation) $ $ delete $v$ (cell deletion) $  v v$ (dereference) $  v := v$ (assign) $ $ share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$ (share) $ $ focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)			vv	(application)
$ $ open $\langle l, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end(open location) $ $ case $v$ of $\overline{t#x} \rightarrow e$ end(case) $ $ new $v$ (cell creation) $ $ delete $v$ (cell deletion) $  v$ (dereference) $v := v$ (assign) $ $ share $A_0$ as $A_1    A_2$ (share) $ $ focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		I	let $x = e$ in $e$ end	(let)
$ $ case $v$ of $t \# x \rightarrow e$ end(case) $ $ new $v$ (cell creation) $ $ delete $v$ (cell deletion) $  !v$ (dereference) $  v := v$ (assign) $ $ share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$ (share) $ $ focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		1	open $\langle X, x \rangle = v$ in $e$ end	(open type)
$ $ new $v$ (cell creation) $ $ delete $v$ (cell deletion) $ $ $!v$ (dereference) $ $ $v := v$ (assign) $ $ share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$ (share) $ $ focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		1	open $\langle l, x \rangle = v$ in <i>e</i> end	(open location)
$ $ delete $v$ (cell deletion) $  !v$ (dereference) $  v := v$ (assign) $ $ share $A_0$ as $A_1    A_2$ (share) $ $ focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		1	case v of $t \# x \to e$ end	(case)
$  !v$ (dereference) $  v := v$ (assign) $  share A_0 as A_1    A_2$ (share) $  focus \overline{A}$ (focus)		1	new v	(cell creation)
v := v  (assign)   share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$ (share)   focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		1	delete v	(cell deletion)
$   share A_0 as A_1    A_2 $ (share)   focus $\overline{A}$ (focus)		1	!v	(dereference)
$  focus \overline{A} $ (focus)			v := v	(assign)
		1	share $A_0$ as $A_1 \parallel A_2$	(share)
defocus (defocus)		1	focus $\overline{A}$	(focus)
		1	defocus	(defocus)

### 2. Protocol Use

- Protocols are used through focus and defocus constructs.
- They serve two purposes:
  - a) **Hide** *privates* changes from the other aliases of that shared state.
  - b) **Advance the step** of the protocol, by obeying the constraints on *public* changes.


focus Empty

. . .

#### **Empty** ⇒ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 

Foc	us /	Defocus
	Empty)⇒	Filled ; Next
focus	Empty	
•••		



#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 

#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 

**Empty**, **Filled**; **Next** 

#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 

**Empty**, **Filled**; Next

**PartiallyFilled**, **Filled**; **Next** 

#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 

Empty ,	Filled ; Next
• • •	
Filled ,	Filled ; Next

#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 





#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

focus **Empty** 





#### **Empty** $\Rightarrow$ **Filled** ; **Next**

#### focus **Empty**

Empty,	Filled ; Next
Filled ,	Filled ; Next

#### defocus

#### Next

### Rely-Guarantee Protocols

- An *interference*-control mechanism, permission to mutate the shared state is conditioned on what actions the protocol allows.
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  - 2. Protocol Use
  - 3. Protocol Composition

### Rely-Guarantee Protocols

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3. Protocol Composition

# 3. Protocol Composition

• Protocols are introduced explicitly, in pairs, through the **share** construct:

#### share A as B || C


"type **A** (either a capability or an existing protocol) can be safely *split* in types **B** and **C** (two protocols)"

- Arbitrary aliasing is possible by continuing to split an existing protocol.
- **share** type checks only if the protocols compose safely (i.e. no unsafe interference is possible).


# **Checking** share


- We must check that a protocol is aware of all possible states that may appear due to the *interleaving* of the actions of other aliases to that shared state.
- Checking a split is built from two components:
  - a) simulating a single use of a protocols, a single **focus-defocus** block (i.e. a step of the protocol).
  - b) ensuring that each protocol considers all possible protocol interleaving.


### Protocol Composition Example





### Protocol Composition Example













#### Configurations:

 $\langle E \Rightarrow rec X.(N \Rightarrow none \oplus C \Rightarrow none \oplus E \Rightarrow E; X) \parallel E \Rightarrow (N \oplus C) \rangle$  $\langle N \oplus C \Rightarrow rec X.(N \Rightarrow none \oplus C \Rightarrow none \oplus E \Rightarrow E; X) \parallel none \rangle$  $\langle none \Rightarrow none \parallel none \rangle$ 


#### State:




#### **Configurations:**



#### State:




#### Producer




#### **Configurations:**

 $\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C}) \rangle \\ \langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \\ \langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \end{array}$ 




#### **Configurations:**

 $\langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C}) \rangle$  $\langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle$  $\langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle$ 




#### **Configurations:**

 $\langle E \Rightarrow rec X.(N \Rightarrow none \oplus C \Rightarrow none \oplus E \Rightarrow E; X) \parallel E \Rightarrow (N \oplus C) \rangle$  $\langle N \oplus C \Rightarrow rec X.(N \Rightarrow none \oplus C \Rightarrow none \oplus E \Rightarrow E; X) \parallel none \rangle$  $\langle none \Rightarrow none \parallel none \rangle$ 



 $\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \left( \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C}) \right) \\ \langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \\ \langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \end{array}$ 


#### State:



### Configurations:


 $\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \left( \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} ) \right) \\ \langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \\ \langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \end{array}$ 

#### State:





### Configurations:

 $\begin{array}{l} \langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \left( \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C}) \right) \\ \langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \operatorname{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E} \,; \, X \,) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \\ \langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle \end{array}$ 




 $\langle \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow (\mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C}) \rangle$  $\langle \mathsf{N} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{rec} X.(\mathsf{N} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{C} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \oplus \mathsf{E} \Rightarrow \mathsf{E}; X) \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle$  $\langle \mathsf{none} \Rightarrow \mathsf{none} \parallel \mathsf{none} \rangle$ 






#### State: none



### Configurations:

### State: none



### Configurations:

## Rely-Guarantee Protocols

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## Protocols

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
A few more details:

- Improved Locality of Protocol Specification
- Fork/Join Concurrency


H[h] =
 ( rw h Empty#[] ⇒ rw h Empty#[] ; H[h] )
 ⊕ ( rw h Node#[...] ⇒ none ; none )
 ⊕ ( rw h Closed#[] ⇒ none ; none )

 $T[t] = rw t Empty#[] \Rightarrow$ 

( ( **rw t Node**#[...] ) ⊕ ( **rw t Closed**#[] ) ); none



## **Protocol Specification** 2.0



### $T = Empty#[] \Rightarrow Full#int; none$

## H = (Empty#[] ⇒ Empty#[]; H)⊕ (Full#int ⇒ none; none) ⊕ (Close#[] ⇒ none; none)

### $T = Empty#[] \Rightarrow Full#int; none$

## $H = \exists X ( Empty \# X \Rightarrow Empty \# X ; H )$ $\oplus ( Full \# int \Rightarrow none ; none )$ $\oplus ( Close \# [] \Rightarrow none ; none )$

H no longer sees the content of **Empty**, and **T** can now use that part of the state unilaterally.  $T = (Empty#[] \Rightarrow Empty#[]; T)$ & (Empty#[]  $\Rightarrow$  Full#int; none)  $H = \exists \times (Empty#X \Rightarrow Empty#X; H)$  $\oplus (Full#int \Rightarrow none; none)$  $\oplus (Close#[] \Rightarrow none; none)$  T remembers the local information.T is free to unilaterally change tagged type.

 $\mathbf{T}[\mathbf{Y}] = (\mathbf{Empty} \# \mathbf{Y} \Rightarrow \forall \mathbf{Z}.(\mathbf{Empty} \# \mathbf{Z}; \mathbf{T}[\mathbf{Z}]))$ & (\mathbf{Empty} \# \mathbf{Y} \Rightarrow \mathbf{Full} \# \mathbf{int}; none)

- $H = \exists X.(Empty \# X \Rightarrow Empty \# X; H)$ 
  - $\oplus$  (Full#int  $\Rightarrow$  none; none)
  - $\oplus$  ( **Close**#[]  $\Rightarrow$  **none** ; **none** )

# Improved Locality

- Protocols can be more "generic" and more isolated (decoupled) from other protocols' actions, while remaining free from unsafe interference.
- Protocol re-splits can take advantage of this flexibility by means of more flexible specializations, such as via nested re-splits.

# **Protocol Specialization**

## $T[Y] = (Empty # Y \Rightarrow \forall Z.(Empty # Z; T[Z]))$ & (Empty # Y \Rightarrow Full#int; none)

re-split

(Empty#(Wait#[]) ⇒ Empty#(Ready#int); none) ⊕ (Empty#(Ready#int) ⇒ Full#int; none)

## **Protocol Specialization**

## $\mathbf{T}[\mathbf{Y}] = (\mathbf{Empty} \# \mathbf{Y} \Rightarrow \forall \mathbf{Z}.(\mathbf{Empty} \# \mathbf{Z}; \mathbf{T}[\mathbf{Z}]))$

& (**Empty**# $Y \Rightarrow$  Full#int; none)


re-split

(Empty#(Wait#[]) ⇒ Empty#(Ready#int); none ) ⊕ (Empty#(Ready#int) ⇒ Full#int; none )

"Nesting", the specialization works within the original interference.

## **Protocol Composition** 2.0

- Configurations are checked "symbolically", each representing a *class* of configurations, up to renaming and weakening.
- Well-formedness conditions on types ensures the number of different sub-terms of a type is bounded, guaranteeing decidability.



# Concurrency

- Protocol Composition protects against all possible interleaving that may occur.
- Same static set of possible interleaving, even if concurrency may non-deterministically pick different interleaving at run-time.

focus/defocus >> lock/unlock, adds fork e

• *Caveat*: no deadlock avoidance, nor termination/liveness guarantees.

# **Overview of Main Technical Results**

- Standard Progress and Preservation results.
- Data race freedom and memory safety (no dereference of null pointers, etc).
- Stepping of configurations preserves safe Protocol Composition.
- Protocol Composition is a partial commutative monoid.
- Protocol Composition is decidable.

# Thesis also includes

- All technical details such as the axiomatic definition of Protocol Composition, algorithm, and formal system for sequential and concurrent settings.
- Additional examples, including:
  - Full pipe code example
  - Encoding (non-distributed) typeful message-passing concurrency (buyer-shipper-seller example)
- Soundness proof.
- Prototype implementations.

## Prototypes

### JavaScript-based implementations, run in the browser.

## Summary

• Typestates using existential abstraction.

[Militão, Aldrich, Caires. Substructural Typestates. PLPV'14.]

- *Rely-Guarantee Protocols* for handling safe interference:
  - I. Protocol Specification ("local view on public changes")
  - 2. Protocol Use ("hidden, private changes")
  - 3. Protocol Composition ("ensure safe alias interleaving")

[Militão, Aldrich, Caires. Rely-Guarantee Protocols. ECOOP'14.]

- Safe, decidable composition of protocols even when parts of a protocol are abstracted.
- Interference control over sequential and concurrent settings.