Model Checking Overview

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What is Model Checking?

Cindy Crawford

Unfortunately, not that kind of model!!
What is Model Checking?

“The Rare Glitch Project”

Bad pun for cult movie “The Blair Witch Project”!!
Temporal Logic Model Checking

- Model checking is an automatic verification technique for finite state concurrent systems.

- Developed independently by Clarke and Emerson and by Queille and Sifakis in early 1980’s.

- Specifications are written in propositional temporal logic.

- Verification procedure is an exhaustive search of the state space of the design.
Some Advantages of Model Checking

• No proofs!!!
• Fast
• Counterexamples
• No problem with partial specifications
• Logics can easily express many concurrency properties
Main Disadvantage

State Explosion Problem:

- Too many processes
- Data Paths

Much progress has been made on this problem recently!
Basic Temporal Operators

The symbol “p” is an atomic proposition, e.g. DeviceEnabled.

- **Fp** - p holds sometime in the future.
- **Gp** - p holds globally in the future.
- **Xp** - p holds next time.
- **pUq** - p holds until q holds.
Model of computation

Microwave Oven Example
Temporal Logic

- The oven doesn’t **heat up** until the **door is closed**.

- **Not heat_up** holds **until door_closed**

- \((\neg \text{heat\_up}) \cup \text{door\_closed}\)
Model Checking Problem

Let $M$ be a state-transition graph.

Let $f$ be the specification in temporal logic.

Find all states $s$ of $M$ such that $M, s \models f$.

Efficient Algorithms: CE81, CES83
The EMC System

Preprocessor

Model Checker (EMC)

Specification

State Transition Graph
$10^4$ to $10^5$ states

True or Counterexamples
Breakthrough!

Ken McMillan implemented our model checking algorithm using **Binary Decision Diagrams** in 1987.

Now able to handle much larger examples!!
An Alternative Approach to Model Checking

• Both the system and its specification are modeled as automata.

• These automata are compared to determine if the system behavior conforms to the specification.

• Different notions of conformance have been explored:
  – Language Inclusion
  – Refinement orderings
  – Observational equivalence
• $M_{\text{imp}}$ corresponds to the implementation:

• $M_{\text{spec}}$ corresponds to the specification:

  “event C must happen at least once”:
Given two automata $M_{imp}$ and $M_{spec}$, check if

$$L(M_{imp}) \cap L(M_{spec}).$$

(If a sequence is accepted by $M_{imp}$ then it is also accepted by $M_{spec}$. This can be determined algorithmically.)
**Combating the State Explosion Problem**

- **Binary Decision Diagrams** can be used to represent state transition systems more efficiently.

- The **partial order reduction** can be used to reduce the number of states that must be enumerated.

- Other techniques for alleviating state explosion include:
  - Abstraction.
  - Compositional reasoning.
  - Symmetry.
  - Cone of influence reduction.
  - Semantic minimization.
Model Checker Performance

- Model checkers today can routinely handle systems with between 100 and 300 state variables.

- Systems with $10^{120}$ reachable states have been checked.

- By using appropriate abstraction techniques, systems with an essentially unlimited number of states can be checked.
Notable Examples- IEEE Futurebus+

• In 1992 Clarke and his students at CMU used SMV to verify the IEEE Future+ cache coherence protocol.

• They found a number of previously undetected errors in the design of the protocol.

• This was the first time that formal methods have been used to find errors in an IEEE standard.

• Although the development of the protocol began in 1988, all previous attempts to validate it were based entirely on informal techniques.
In 1992 Dill and his students at Stanford used Murphi to verify the cache coherence protocol of the IEEE Scalable Coherent Interface.

They found several errors, ranging from uninitialized variables to subtle logical errors.

The errors also existed in the complete protocol, although it had been extensively discussed, simulated, and even implemented.
Notable Examples-PowerScale

- In 1995 researchers from Bull and Verimag used LOTOS to describe the processors, memory controller, and bus arbiter of the PowerScale multiprocessor architecture.

- They identified four correctness requirements for proper functioning of the arbiter.

- The properties were formalized using bisimulation relations between finite labeled transition systems.

- Correctness was established automatically in a few minutes using the CAESAR/ALDÉBARAN toolbox.
Notable Examples - HDLC

- A High-level Data Link Controller was being designed at AT&T in Madrid in 1996.

- Researchers at Bell Labs offered to check some properties of the design using the FormalCheck verifier.

- Within five hours, six properties were specified and five were verified.

- The sixth property failed, uncovering a bug that would have reduced throughput or caused lost transmissions!
Notable Examples
PowerPC 620 Microprocessor

• Richard Raimi used Motorola’s Verdict model checker to debug a hardware laboratory failure.

• Initial silicon of the PowerPC 620 microprocessor crashed during boot of an operating system.

• In a matter of seconds, Verdict found a BIU deadlock causing the failure.
Notable Examples-Analog Circuits

• In 1994 Bosscher, Polak, and Vaandrager won a best-paper award for proving manually the correctness of a control protocol used in Philips stereo components.

• In 1995 Ho and Wong-Toi verified an abstraction of this protocol automatically using HyTech.

• Later in 1995 Daws and Yovine used Kronos to check all the properties stated and hand proved by Bosscher, et al.
Notable Examples-ISDN/ISUP

- The NewCoRe Project (89-92) was the first application of formal verification in a software project within AT&T.

- A special purpose model checker was used in the development of the CCITT ISDN User Part Protocol.

- Five “verification engineers” analyzed 145 requirements.

- A total of 7,500 lines of SDL source code was verified.

- 112 errors were found; about 55% of the original design requirements were logically inconsistent.
Notable Examples-Building

- In 1995 the Concurrency Workbench was used to analyze an active structural control system to make buildings more resistant to earthquakes.

- The control system sampled the forces being applied to the structure and used hydraulic actuators to exert countervailing forces.

- A timing error was discovered that could have caused the controller to worsen, rather than dampen, the vibration experienced during earthquakes.
Model Checking Systems

- There are many other successful examples of the use of model checking in hardware and protocol verification.

- The fact that industry (INTEL, IBM, MOTOROLA) is starting to use model checking is encouraging.

- Below are some well-known model checkers, categorized by whether the specification is a formula or an automaton.
Temporal Logic Model Checkers

- The first two model checkers were **EMC** and **Caesar**.
- **SMV** is the first model checker to use **BDDs**.
- **Spin** uses the **partial order reduction** to reduce the state explosion problem.
- **Verus** and **Kronos** check properties of **real-time systems**.
- **HyTech** is designed for reasoning about **hybrid systems**.
Behavior Conformance Checkers

- The **Cospan/FormatCheck** system is based on showing inclusion between w-automata.

- **FDR** checks refinement between CSP programs; recently, used to debug security protocols.

- The **Concurrency Workbench** can be used to determine if two systems are observationally equivalent.
Combination Checkers

- Berkeley’s HSIS combines model checking with language inclusion.

- Stanford’s STeP system combines model checking with deductive methods.

- VIS integrates model checking with logic synthesis and simulation.

- The PVS theorem prover has a model checker for model mu-calculus.
Directions for Future Research

• Investigate the use of abstraction, compositional reasoning, and symmetry to reduce the state explosion problem.

• Develop methods for verifying parameterized designs.

• Develop practical tools for real-time and hybrid systems.

• Combine with deductive verification.

• Develop tool interfaces suitable for system designers.
The Grand Challenge: Model Check Software!

Use a finite state programming language.

• Statecharts(125,108),(923,948)

• Esterel

• System C ?
Statechart for Brake Control

BRAKE_CONTROL

ACTUATOR

ACTUATOR_HOME

ACTUATOR_REGULATION

BRAKE_LATCHED

DYNAMIC

DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_OFF

DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_ON

[VEHICLE_SPEED>5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_SPEED>5 and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_SPEED>5]

[WHEELSIP>THRESHOLD and
in(RR_ACTUATOR_REGULATION) and VEHICLE_SPEED>5]

or

[WHEELSIP=THRESHOLD]

or

[VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and
not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON and
in(ACTUATOR_REGULATION)]

[VEHICLE_SPEED<5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and
not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

[VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and
not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]
The Grand Challenge: Model Check Software!

Unroll the state machine obtained from the executable of the program.

Use the partial order reduction to avoid generating too many states.

• Patrice Godefroid – Verisoft

• Scott Stoller -- Java
The Grand Challenge: Model Check Software!

Use static analysis to extract a finite state synchronization skeleton from the program. Model check the result.

• Bandera -- Kansas State
• Java PathFinder -- NASA Ames
• Slam Project (Bebop) -- Microsoft
Statecharts

- Finite-state machines are used for modeling, but
  ....
  - Flat structure
  - Sequential, etc.
  - In summary, not expressive enough for modeling concurrent and reactive systems
- Statecharts are extended FSMs with hierarchy, parallel composition, broadcast communication.
Applications

• Highly expressive language
• Natural description for concurrent/reactive systems like:
  – Automobile and aero-space control systems
  – Nuclear control systems
  – Network management systems
• Over 1,000 organizations use them
Example: Break Control System

- **ACTUATOR_HOME**
  - [VEHICLE_SPEED >= 5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]
  - [VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]
  - [VEHICLE_SPEED < 5]

- **ACTUATOR_REGULATION**
  - [VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]
  - [VEHICLE_SPEED < 5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

- **BRAKE_LATCHED**
  - [VEHICLE_SPEED < 5 and PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON]

- **DYNAMIC**
  - **DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_OFF**
    - [WHEELSLIP > THRESHOLD and in(RR_ACTUATOR_REGULATION) and VEHICLE_SPEED >= 5]
    - [VEHICLE_SPEED < 5 or WHEELSLIP <= THRESHOLD or (VEHICLE_RUN_MODE and not PARKING_BRAKE_BUTTON and in(ACTUATOR_REGULATION))]

- **DYNAMIC_PARK_BRAKE_ABS_ON**
Goals of formal verification

• Contemporary CASE tools
  – Simulator
  – Analyzer
  – Code generator
• However, neither complete nor efficient
• Model checking statecharts
  – Complete
  – Great debugging aid with counter examples
Proposed Research

- Exploit hierarchy in statechart designs to reduce state explosion problem
- Investigate use of model checking for verifying hardware/software co-designs
- Apply methodology to real automotive examples
Hardware Verification Example

• What: formal verification of IEEE Futurebus+ cache consistency protocol
• How: construct abstract model, use BDD-based automatic verifier
• Results:
  – Identification of bugs and potential bugs in the protocol
  – Production of precise and readable model of the protocol

\[10^{40}\] states
Model Checking

- extracts a **finite model** from a system and checks some **property** on that model
- check is performed by an **exhaustive state space search**
- need **algorithms** and **data structures** that can handle very large models
- used mainly in **hardware** and **protocol verification** so far
- **challenge** is to verify **software systems**
- two general approaches:
  - *Temporal logic model checking*
  - *Behavior conformance checking*
Notable Examples- IEEE Futurebus+

- In 1992 Clarke and his students at CMU used SMV to verify the cache coherence protocol in the IEEE Futurebus+ Standards.
- They constructed a precise model of the protocol and showed that it satisfied a formal specification of cache coherence.
- They found a number of previously undetected errors in the design of the protocol.
Temporal Logic Model Checking

- Developed independently by Clarke and Emerson and by Queille and Sifakis in early 1980’s
- Specifications are expressed in **temporal logic**
- Systems are modeled as **finite-state transition graphs**
- A search procedure used to **check** if state graph is a **model** for specification

The term ”**model checking**” was coined by Clarke and Emerson
Computation Tree Logic (CTL)

- can succinctly express many properties of finite-state concurrent systems
- each operator of the logic has two parts:
  - Path quantifier
    - A-"for every path"
    - E-"there exists a path"
  - State Quantifier:
    - Fp-p holds sometime in the future
    - Gp-p holds globally in the future
    - Xp-p holds next time
    - pUq-p holds until q holds
Typical CTL Formulas

- EF (started ^ ¬ready): it is possible to get to a state where started holds by ready does not hold.

- AG (reg ==> AF ack): if a request occurs, then it will be eventually acknowledged.

- AG (AF device_enabled): device_enabled holds infinitely often on every computation path.

- AG (EF restart): from any state it is possible to get to the restart state.
Advantages of Model Checking

• In contrast to theorem proving, model checking is *completely automatic* and *fast*, frequently producing an answer in a matter of minutes.

• It can be used to check *partial specifications* and can provide useful information about correctness even if the system has not been completely specified.

• Above all, model checking’s *tour de force* is that it produces *counterexamples*, which usually uncover subtle errors in design that would be difficult to find otherwise.