

# Certified Robustness to Label Flipping Attacks via Randomized Smoothing

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# Motivation

## **Adversarial Input Manipulation**

- Modern classifiers are susceptible to many types of input manipulation.

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- **Label flipping attack**: a *train-time* attack where training labels are manipulated.
  - Objective is to cause resulting trained classifier to perform poorly.
  - E.g., mislabeling spam emails or fake reviews to cause detector to fail in production.

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- **Label flipping attack**: a *train-time* attack where training labels are manipulated.
  - Objective is to cause resulting trained classifier to perform poorly.
  - E.g., mislabeling spam emails or fake reviews to cause detector to fail in production.
- In comparison, adversarial examples are *test-time* attacks.

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- For train-time attacks, *no pointwise-certified defenses exist*.
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
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- For train-time attacks, *no pointwise-certified defenses exist*.
  - Pointwise is preferable when we care about each distinct classification (loans, parole grants, etc.)
- We present the first **pointwise-certified** linear classifier, with **no data assumptions**.
  - Makes a prediction by outputting an expectation over predictions with respect to a distribution over training labels.

# Randomized Smoothing for Test-Time Attacks

Given a classifier  $f$  and input  $x$ , don't directly certify  $f$ . Certify weighted majority vote of  $f$  applied to  $x$  perturbed by noise:  $g(x) = \mathbb{E}_{\epsilon \sim p(\epsilon)} [f(x + \epsilon)]$




- Robustness certificate is a function of margin between first and second class.
  - This means we need a lower bound on probability assigned to first class  $\underline{p}_A$ .



# Randomized Smoothing for Test-Time Attacks

“Input” is an image to be classified.  
(domain  $\mathcal{D}$  is combinations of pixels)



Certified robust to  
adversarial  
pixel perturbations.


“Noise” is pixel perturbations.

**Our Key Observation:**

The theory behind randomized smoothing applies to **arbitrary functions  $f$** , not just classifiers.

# Recast $f$ as the Whole Training Procedure

“Input” is  $n$  training points  $X$ , labels  $\mathbf{y}$ , test point  $x_{n+1}$   
( $\mathcal{D}$  is now training data and test point)



Certified robust to  
adversarial  
label-flipping attacks.

“Noise” is flipped training labels  $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}$ .

(smoothing over input pixels)

$$g(x) = \mathbb{E}_{\epsilon \sim p(\epsilon)} [f(x + \epsilon)]$$



(smoothing over training labels)

$$g(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{\mathbf{y}} \sim p(\mathbf{y})} [f(X, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}, x_{n+1})]$$

# One Major Caveat

Smoothed Classifier:

$$g(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{\mathbf{y}} \sim p(\mathbf{y})} [f(X, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}, x_{n+1})]$$

- Previous randomized smoothing applications probabilistically bound integral with sampling.
  - Implementing naively would require training *thousands of classifiers* per test point.
- We develop an algorithm to make classification tractable and **guaranteed**.
  - Certificate applies for **any features** with **no data assumptions**.

# Binary Classification via Ordinary Least-Squares

- Training points:  $X \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times k}$
- Binary labels:  $\mathbf{y} \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- Test point:  $x_{n+1} \in \mathbb{R}^k$

Solve:

$$\hat{\beta} = (X^\top X)^{-1} X^\top \mathbf{y}$$

Predict:

$$f(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = \mathbf{1}\{x_{n+1}^\top \hat{\beta} \geq 1/2\}$$

This can be precomputed and reused for each test point!

Evaluation per sampled  $\mathbf{y}$  is just an inner product!

*Equivalently,*

Solve:

$$\alpha = X(X^\top X)^{-1} x_{n+1}^\top$$

Predict:

$$f(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = \mathbf{1}\{\alpha^\top \mathbf{y} \geq 1/2\}$$

# From Probabilistic to Deterministic

With kernel representation  $\alpha$ , we don't need to even evaluate the classifier.

Recall our smoothed classifier:

$$g(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = \mathbb{E}[f(X, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}, x_{n+1})] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}\{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \tilde{\mathbf{y}} \geq 1/2\}]$$

Expectation of an indicator function is the probability it outputs 1:

$$g(X, \mathbf{y}, x_{n+1}) = P(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \tilde{\mathbf{y}} \geq 1/2)$$


This is a sum of independent random variables. Apply the **Chernoff Bound**:

$$P(\boldsymbol{\alpha}^\top \tilde{\mathbf{y}} \leq 1/2) \leq \min_{t>0} \left\{ e^{t/2} \prod_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}[e^{-t\alpha_i \tilde{y}_i}] \right\}$$

This is a one-dimensional optimization, solvable via Newton's method.

# Experiments: Binary Classification

- Hyperparameter ( $q$ ) represents probability of flipping label under noise distribution.
  - Controls tradeoff between accuracy and robustness.



For 68% of test points, our attack using 2000 flips was unable to cause misclassification.

64% certified accuracy against an adversary flipping 2000 labels *for each test point.*

# Multi-Class Classification

- Our algorithm derives a **guaranteed lower bound** on the probability assigned to a class.
- We can repeat for each class, choose the class with the highest lower bound.
- This generalizes robust certification to the multi-class case!

# Experiments: Multi-Class Classification

Features learned in an unsupervised fashion.

