MISSOURI CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                       v.

 STATE TAX COMMISSION of Missouri, J. E. Riney, Don G. Williams, Robert F. Love,

  Commissioners of State Tax Commission of Missouri, John K. Travers, Collector

   of Revenue, City of St. Louis, and Glenn J. McBrady, Assessor, City of St.

                         Louis, Defendants-Respondents.

                                   No. 59551.

                       Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

                                 Dec. 19, 1977.

                         Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1978.

  Church whose tangible personal property had been added to tax rolls by city

 assessor appealed to Board of Equalization and State Tax Commission and,

 obtaining no relief, sought judicial review, claiming exemption from ad valorem

 taxation on ground that its property was used exclusively for religious

 worship.  The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Lackland H. Bloom, J.,

 denied relief and appeal was taken.  The Supreme Court, Rendlen, J., held

 that: (1) twenty-two proposed exhibits which had been marked and identified

 during testimony of taxpayer's sole witness, but which were neither offered nor

 accepted as evidence by State Tax Commission would not be considered a part of

 record for judicial review, where Commission had before it no offer of evidence

 or objections thereto on which to rule and it had not been apprised of attitude

 of Tax Commission's counsel who stated to trial court and to Supreme Court in

 oral argument that he would not have objected to introduction of exhibits had

 they been offered; (2) constitutional and statutory exemption from ad valorem

 taxation of property used "exclusively for religious worship," the term

 "religious worship" embodies as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme

 Being, and (3) evidence supported Tax Commission's findings that church

 claiming exemption from ad valorem taxation on ground that its property was

 used exclusively for religious worship appeared to be more in applied

 philosophy which had religious connotations but which fell short of being

 devoted to worship of Supreme Being.

  Affirmed.

  Seiler, J., concurred in result in separate opinion file.



 [1] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

 Generally, scope of judicial review of administrative agency decisions is

 limited to determination of whether order is supported by competent and

 substantial evidence upon the whole record.  V.A.M.S. s 536.140, subd. 2(3).



 [1] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

 Generally, scope of judicial review of administrative agency decisions is

 limited to determination of whether order is supported by competent and

 substantial evidence upon the whole record.  V.A.M.S. s 536.140, subd. 2(3).



 [2] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

 Where case involves only application by agency of law to facts, court may weigh

 evidence for itself, giving due weight to opportunity of agency to observe

 witnesses and to expertise and experience of agency.



 [3] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

 Although technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative

 hearings, fundamental rules of evidence apply.



 [4] TAXATION

 Twenty-two proposed exhibits which had been marked and identified during

 testimony of taxpayer's sole witness but which were neither offered nor

 accepted as evidence by State Tax Commission would not be considered a part of

 record for judicial review, where Commission had before it no offer of evidence

 or objections thereto on which to rule and it had not been apprised of attitude

 of Tax Commission's counsel who stated to trial court and to Supreme Court in

 oral argument that he would not have objected to introduction of exhibits had

 they been offered.



 [5] TAXATION

 Within constitutional and statutory exemption from ad valorem taxation of

 property used "exclusively for religious worship," the term "religious worship"

 embodies as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme Being.

 V.A.M.S.Const. art. 10, s 6;  V.A.M.S. s 137.100;  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.



 [5] TAXATION

 Within constitutional and statutory exemption from ad valorem taxation of

 property used "exclusively for religious worship," the term "religious worship"

 embodies as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme Being.

 V.A.M.S.Const. art. 10, s 6;  V.A.M.S. s 137.100;  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.



 [6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

 Requiring devotion to worship of Supreme Being as sine qua non to

 classification as religion and entitlement to exemption from ad valorem

 taxation does not contravene First Amendment.  V.A.M.S.Const. art. 10, s 6;

 V.A.M.S. s 137.100;  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.



 [6] TAXATION

 Requiring devotion to worship of Supreme Being as sine qua non to

 classification as religion and entitlement to exemption from ad valorem

 taxation does not contravene First Amendment.  V.A.M.S.Const. art. 10, s 6;

 V.A.M.S. s 137.100;  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.



 [7] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE

 Administrative agency may base its decision solely on finding of lack of

 credible testimony, though such testimony is uncontradicted or unimpeached, but

 agency may not arbitrarily disregard or ignore undisputed testimony of witness

 not shown to have been impeached or disbelieved by Commission.



 [8] TAXATION

 While State Tax Commission's findings are not insulated from review, court must

 give weight to opportunity of agency to observe the witnesses.



 [9] TAXATION

 Law places substantial burden on those claiming exemptions from ad valorem

 taxation on ground that property is used exclusively for religious worship to

 establish that their property falls within exempt class.  V.A.M.S.Const. art.

 10, s 6;  V.A.M.S. ss 137.100, 137.100(5).



 [10] TAXATION

 Taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception and exemption claims

 are not favored in the law.



 [11] TAXATION

 Evidence supported Tax Commission's finding that church claiming exemption from

 ad valorem taxation on ground that its property was used exclusively for

 religious worship was not devoted to worship of Supreme Being.  V.A.M.S.Const.

 art. 10, s 6;  V.A.M.S. ss 137.100, 137.100(5).

  *838 Alan C. Kohn, Thomas J. Frawley, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

  James J. Wilson, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, for defendants-

 respondents.



  RENDLEN, Judge.

  This proceeding arose with the addition of appellant's tangible personal

 property to the tax rolls for the year 1974 by the St. Louis City Assessor.

 Obtaining no relief by successive appeals to the Board of Equalization and the

 State Tax Commission, appellant sought judicial review claiming exemption from

 ad valorem taxation under Mo.Const. Art. X, s 6, and s 137.100,[FN1] on the

 ground its property was "used exclusively for religious worship".[FN2]  No

 challenge is made to the assessed valuation of appellant's property but only to

 the denial of the claimed exemption.



      FN1. All statutory references are to RSMo 1969.



      FN2. Mo.Const. Art. X, s 6 provides in pertinent part: "(A)ll property,

     real and personal, . . .  not held for private or corporate profit and used

     exclusively for religious worship, . . .  may be exempted from taxation by

     general law."  (Emphasis ours.) Pursuant to this authority, the legislature

     by s 137.100(5), RSMo 1969 exempted from state, county and local taxation,

     "All property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively

     for religious worship, for schools and colleges, or for purposes purely

     charitable and not held for private or corporate profit, . . ."  (Emphasis

     ours.)



  [1][2] Generally the scope of judicial review for administrative agency

 decisions is limited to a determination of whether the order is supported by

 "competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record" as provided in s

 536.140-2(3).  However, this case does not involve the exercise by the agency

 of administrative discretion in the light of the facts under s 536.140-2, but

 only the application by the agency of the law to the facts, accordingly the

 court may weigh the evidence for itself giving due *839 weight to the

 opportunity of the agency to observe the witnesses and to the expertise and

 experience of the Commission, s 536.140-3.  It is by this standard we examine

 appellant's contentions of error.

  [3][4] In the hearing before the Commission twenty-two proposed exhibits had

 been marked and identified during testimony of the appellant's sole witness

 though they were neither offered nor accepted as evidence by the Commission.

 [FN3]  Urging their consideration by this court, appellant cites Hilke v.

 Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, 441 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo.App.1969)

 as authority for such consideration, however, we perceive factual differences

 distinguishing Hilke from the case at bar.  There, in a claim for disability

 benefits, certain medical reports had not been properly offered before the

 Firemen's Retirement System Board.  On appeal the court stated: "Although the

 record does not show the reports were offered in evidence in ritualistic

 language, we hold that the method of putting them before the Board for its

 consideration fully met the less formal procedural requirements of an

 administrative hearing."  (l.c. 733) The items so considered, despite lack of

 formal offer, were medical reports prepared pursuant to the provisions of s

 87.160.2, for the express purpose of informing the Board of the facts and the

 conclusions and recommendations of the medical examiners.  It is clear the

 statute requiring the examining physicians to "report in writing to the board,"

 contemplated that the reports be available to assist the Board in its

 deliberation and equally important the Board and the parties intended the use

 of those reports as evidence.[FN4]  Those facts, not present here, were

 determinative of the issue.  Though counsel for the Tax Commission stated to

 the trial court and to this court in oral argument he would not have objected

 to the introduction of the exhibits had they been offered, the fact remains

 they were not and no stipulation waiving objection to their consideration has

 been presented.  The Commission had before it no offer of evidence nor

 objections thereto on which to rule, neither was the Commission apprised of

 counsel's later announced attitude on the matter.  Although technical rules of

 evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of

 evidence are applicable.  State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540

 (Mo.App.1957).  Consistent with these holdings, s 536.070 provides in

 subsection 2 that "each party" in an administrative hearing "shall have the

 right . . .  to introduce exhibits."  (Emphasis ours.) No mention is made of

 other procedures for admission of exhibits as a part of the record in such

 proceedings except subsection 5 which provides that "Records and documents of

 the agency (which also must be offered in evidence) . . .  may be considered as

 a part of the record by reference thereto when so offered," (Emphasis ours).

 *840 No provision is made that records of any other type may be received in

 this manner.  While we do not suggest that parties may not stipulate for the

 admission of such proposed evidence and waive objection thereto, no authority

 appears for the course contended by appellant.  The exhibits will not be

 considered a part of the record for review.



      FN3. These exhibits consist, among others, of the appellant's Articles of

     Incorporation and amendments thereto, bylaws, letters of commendation for

     charitable work done, a bound volume entitled "The Background and

     Ceremonies of the Church of Scientology of California, Worldwide" which

     appellant's witness, Rev. Rock, identified as "the ceremonies book that we

     use at Sunday services and we use this as a standard format for our other

     ceremonies: weddings, christenings, funerals.  And it is also background

     information which relate to philosophical roots of the church to other

     religions, Buddhism, Hinduism and early Christianity."  Another book

     entitled "Scientology: A World Religion Emerges in the Space Age" was

     described as a recently published work containing background information

     concerning the philosophy and ceremonies of the "Church of Scientology".



      FN4. The court in Hilke at 733 states: "Early in the hearing plaintiff's

     counsel referred to plaintiff's injury report lodged in one of the Board's

     two files and said, 'I imagine it is part of this official document that we

     have introduced in evidence here.'  Defendant's counsel agreed and

     thereupon the Board's files were marked as Exhibits 1 and 2.  Later,

     plaintiff's counsel formally offered other documents in evidence, but in

     speaking of documents already in Exhibits 1 and 2 he referred to them as

     'part of the file.'  Near the end of the Board hearing, defendant's counsel

     wished to introduce City Ordinance 50707 as Exhibit 3; he stated he wanted

     the record to show that the ordinance was introduced as an exhibit 'with

     the others.'  . . ."  (Emphasis ours.)



  The Commission (whose extensive findings and conclusions are set out in the

 attached appendix) properly found the office equipment and furniture in

 question were "used in the promotion of the organization including such

 purposes as record keeping and providing mailings to the membership."  As to

 the religious nature of appellant, the Commission concluded that "while the

 appellant has some of the trappings and accouterments of an organized religion,

 it appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a certain religious

 connotation, but which falls short of being devoted to the worship of the

 Supreme Being, which this Commission concludes is necessary for the property

 owner to have its property considered exclusively for religious worship."

 (Emphasis ours.) Further that "an applied religious philosophy" is not

 identical for purposes of exemption "with an organized religion devoted to

 religious worship."  The Commission then held: "The personal property of the

 appellant has not, therefore been shown to be used exclusively for religious or

 charitable purposes and therefore cannot be exempted from ad valorem

 taxation."  Considering the findings and conclusions in their entirety and

 particularly those immediately above cited, it appears the order rests not on

 the lack of exclusivity or extent of use, but on the failure to show the

 character of the use as "for religious worship."  The Commission determined the

 statutory and constitutional phrases "used exclusively for religious worship"

 postulate more than an "applied philosophy which has a certain religious

 connotation".  It found the statute and constitution instead require a belief

 in and devotion to a Supreme Being.  For reasons hereinafter discussed we

 affirm.

  The term religious worship in the commonly accepted sense includes as a

 necessary minimum a belief in the Supreme Being of the universe.  Generally

 religious worship is expressed by prayers, reverence, homage and adoration paid

 to a deity and include the seeking out by prayer and otherwise the will of the

 deity for divine guidance.  Webster's New World Dictionary of the American

 Language, Second College Edition, copyrighted in 1974, defines religion as

 "belief in a divine or superhuman power or powers to be obeyed and worshiped as

 the creator(s) and ruler(s) of the universe; b) expression of such a belief in

 conduct and ritual."  "Worship" is defined as "reverence or devotion for a

 deity; religious homage or veneration; b) a church service or other right

 showing this."  In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, copyrighted

 1976, religion is defined as "the personal commitment to and serving of God or

 a God with worshipful devotion, conduct in accord with divine commands esp. as

 found in accepted sacred writings or declared by authoritative teachers, a way

 of life recognized as incumbent upon true believers, and typically the relating

 of oneself to an organized body of believers."  Another definition suggested

 is "a personal awareness or conviction of the existence of a supreme being or

 supernatural powers or influences controlling one's own, humanity's, or all

 nature's destiny."  In this authority worship is defined as "the reverence or

 veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power; also: an act,

 process, or instance of expressing such veneration by performing or taking part

 in religious exercises or ritual."  Other dictionaries consulted provide

 similar definitions.

  In 1890 the United States Supreme Court stated "The term 'religion' has

 references to one's view of his relations to his Creator, and to the

 obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of

 obedience to his will."  Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299,

 300, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890).  Similarly the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in

 McMasters v. State, 21 Okl.Cr. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922) defined religion as

 "all forms of belief in the existence *841 of superior beings, exercising

 power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct with future

 rewards and punishments."  Justice Hammer in Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and

 Consistory of Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, et al., 142 Misc. 894,

 255 N.Y.S. 653 (1962) described the term as "a bond uniting man to God and a

 virtue whose purpose is to render God the worship due him as the source of all

 being and the principle of all government of things."  Mr. Justice Hughes in

 his dissent in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633, 51 S.Ct. 570,

 578, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931) (the dissent involved another issue) stated: "The

 essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to

 those arising from any human relation."  Joining in this dissent were Holmes,

 Stone and Brandeis.  Hughes' isolation and identification of the indispensable

 ingredient of religion remains a basic guide in this area of the law.  When

 considering the exemption provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act

 of 1940 for those conscientiously opposed to participation in war "by reason of

 religious training and belief" the 9th Circuit in Berman v. United States,

 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) after citing the above quoted phrase on the

 essence of religion from Macintosh stated: (l.c. 380)

   "It is our opinion that the expression, 'by reason of religious training and

 belief' is plain language, and was written into the statute for the specific

 purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere

 devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's

 belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly

 one.  . . .  We are not saying that man's comprehension of religion is static

 and remains today the same as a short hundred and fifty odd years ago in the

 area of our constitution-making.  . . .  Nature and God seem so close to

 Oneness that some thinkers blend them inseparately."

  Commenting on the nature of religion the court stated, it "involves a

 process of vital and reciprocal interplay 'between the human and the

 supernatural.' " More recently the Supreme Court of Kansas in Board of Trustees

 of the Kansas East Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Cogswell,

 205 Kan. at page 847, 473 P.2d at page 1 (1970), adopted and applied the

 definition of religion enunciated in Davis v. Beason, supra, as that

 intended by the Kansas constitutional and statutory provisions permitting tax

 exemption for "all property used exclusively for . . .  religious purposes."

  The Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850,

 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), (urged as authority for reversal by appellant)

 interpreting the Universal Military Training and Service Act and claimed

 exemptions by conscientious objectors under s 6-J, when reversing the

 convictions, addressed the meaning of the expression "religious training and

 belief" as used in the Act.  The Act exempted those who opposed participation

 in war by reason of their "religious training and belief" and the court pointed

 out that the Act defined that phrase as "an individual's belief in a relation

 to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human

 relation, but (not including) essentially political, sociological, or

 philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."  (l.c. 165, 85 S.Ct.

 853) The court observed that Congress had adopted by this definition the

 language of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, supra, but

 substituted the phrase "Supreme Being" for the "Appellation God".  The Seeger

 court, however, construed this substitution of terms as license to extend the

 Congressional intent to include a definition of "belief in a Supreme Being" as

 follows: "It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief

 occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God

 holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption."

  Though announcing this diluted version as the intended legislative meaning of

 "religious . . .  belief", the court nevertheless acknowledged that Congress

 had referred in the Act to "this higher authority".  (l.c. 175, 85 S.Ct.

 850) The Seeger definition is not one of constitutional construction

 *842 but of statutory interpretation neither controlling nor persuasive here

 for a number of reasons.  Contrary to this appellant's argument that the Court

 in effect excised the concept of a Supreme Being from "religion" it can

 reasonably be said that when the court spoke of "claimed belief" as occupying

 "the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds

 in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption," (Emphasis ours), the term

 necessarily includes God or Supreme Being.  This because the "claimed belief"

 must equate qualitatively and quantitatively with the place God holds in the

 life of one clearly qualified for exemption (e. g., a devout member of the

 Society of Friends) and such would require a devotion to God (or an equivalent)

 accompanied by a divinely inspired rejection of violence in the form of war.

 It is against this or a similar orthodox standard of another "clearly qualified

 for exemption" that an objector's "claimed belief" must measure.  In the

 alternative, Seeger may be said to mean that the "claimed belief" occupies the

 same place in the life of the objector as that which an orthodox belief in God

 holds in the lives of others clearly exempted, but the objector may choose not

 to use the word "God" or "Supreme Being".  In that sense Seeger's

 interpretation of the Act seems more a matter of semantics than substance, but

 in no sense can that case be considered as declaring a constitutional standard

 circumscribing state action in the field of tax exemption.

  [5][6] Appellant directs our attention to other authority, the most notable,

 a decision of the California court of appeals in Fellowship of Humanity v.

 County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957), which considered

 a claimed exemption from city and county property tax on the ground that the

 property was used "solely and exclusively for religious worship" within the

 meaning of the California Constitution.  When defining the term religion the

 court held it is improper to include in the concept a belief in God or a

 Supreme Being.  The court stated "the belief or nonbelief in a Supreme Being is

 a false factor," and went on to say "This simply means that 'religion' fills a

 void that exists in the lives of most men.  Regardless of why a particular

 belief suffices, as long as it serves this purpose, it must be accorded the

 same status of an orthodox religious belief.  . . .  (T)he proper

 interpretation of the terms 'religion' or 'religious' in tax exemption laws

 should not include any reference to whether the beliefs involved are theistic

 or nontheistic.  Religion simply includes: (1) a belief, not necessarily

 referring to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious

 association openly expressing the belief; (3) a system of moral practice

 directly resulting from an adherence to the belief; and (4) an organization

 within the cult designed to observe the tenets of belief.  The content of the

 belief is of no moment."  Under this loose concept it is readily apparent any

 organization espousing moral principles, without theistic foundation, to which

 the membership openly express belief might opt for the exempt status.  We are

 unwilling to ascribe such meaning to the expression "religious worship" in

 Missouri's tax law.  Instead we conclude that the constitutional and statutory

 term religious worship of Art. X, s 6 and s 137.100 embody as a minimum

 requirement a belief in the Supreme Being.[FN5]



      FN5. Appellant contends that requiring devotion to worship of the Supreme

     Being as a sine qua non to classification as religion and entitlement to

     exemption from ad valorem taxation would be in direct contravention of the

     First Amendment citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct.

     850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct.

     1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), and Everson v. Board of Education of the

     Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).

     Appellant gives little explanation how these cases support its position and

     the cases do not justify the contention made.  Seeger, discussed at length

     above, involves an interpretation of the Selective Service Act, with its

     main thrust defining the statutory terms religious belief and Supreme

     Being.  Torcaso does not define religion, holding only that a state may not

     require an oath declaring a belief in God as a prerequisite for holding

     public office but indicated nothing that would limit a legislative grant of

     tax exempt status to religious organizations.  Everson dealt with the

     constitutionality of the states (Maryland) providing bus service to

     parochial school students.  It did not suggest principles pertinent to the

     issues here.



  *843 Though appellant contends that worship of a Supreme Being is not

 indispensable to a definition of "religious worship", it argues nevertheless

 that Scientology "acknowledges the existence of God and recognizes and espouses

 devotion to a Supreme Being" establishing its entitlement to the exemption.  It

 further argues no evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that

 Scientology "appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a certain

 religious connotation, but which falls short of being devoted to the worship of

 the Supreme Being."  This brings us to the questions of credibility and burden

 of proof.

  [7][8] An administrative agency may base its decision solely on a finding of

 lack of credible testimony, though such testimony is uncontradicted or

 unimpeached.  Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686 (Mo.1959).

 Veal v. Leimkuehler, 249 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.App.1952); State ex rel. Kahler v.

 State Tax Commission, 393 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.1965); and Scott v. Wheelock

 Bros., 357 Mo. 480, 209 S.W.2d 149 (1948).  However, the Commission may not

 arbitrarily disregard or ignore undisputed testimony of a witness not shown to

 have been impeached or disbelieved by the Commission.  Such was the case of the

 county assessor in Koplar, supra.  Unlike Koplar, the Commission here made

 the following findings as to credibility of the witness: "We find the testimony

 of the Reverend Frederick M. Rock generally not to be credible and worthy of

 belief in particular in respect to his description and categorization of the

 activities of the organization, its alleged religious services, its financial

 structure and the nature of the so-called donations which are made to the

 organization.  The Commission finds that there is no sufficient credible

 evidence presented by the appellant to satisfy the burden placed upon one

 claiming exemption from taxation."  The Commission then concluded "that with

 the lack of credibility found by this Commission in the testimony of the

 witness Rock and the lack of corroboration by any independent authority on

 contemporary religions that the property owner has not satisfied the burden

 placed on him."  While the Commission findings are not insulated from review,

 the court must "give due weight to the opportunity of the agency to observe the

 witnesses."  The Commission had ample opportunity to observe the demeanor as

 well as the words of the witness and make a determination of credibility from

 its point of vantage.  It recognized testimonial inconsistencies and those

 things petitioner failed to establish, finding that "appellant has some of the

 trappings and accouterments of an organized religion, it appears to be more an

 applied philosophy which has a certain religious connotation, but which falls

 short of being devoted to the worship of a Supreme Being."  The Commission

 could properly consider the financial interest of the witness in the outcome of

 the proceeding and the absence of corroborating testimony.[FN6]  Giving due

 *844 weight to the opportunity of the Commission to observe the witness and

 the factors noted we find nothing sufficient to disturb its finding that the

 witness was not credible.



      FN6. The Church of Scientology presented one witness, Frederick M. Rock, a

     recently ordained twenty-six year old minister of the church who detailed

     the beliefs, activities, functions and history of the church.  He testified

     the church teaches the existence of God; that man has a spirit analogous to

     a soul; that religious services are conducted each Sunday which include a

     sermon and prayers; ministers of the church can perform marriage services,

     funerals, and christenings; the church has a creed and worship services

     similar to those of other religions; a code or doctrine and religious

     tenets which preach: (1) man is good but must struggle to survive, (2) man

     has a spiritual nature which gives him inalienable rights, and (3) each

     person is responsible for and to the world; that the church is active in

     charitable works; a training program for ministers which was not

     characterized as a seminary; the church is an applied religious philosophy

     because it teaches a way of life relating to the spirit and to God; and

     finally that all the property in question is used to further the functions

     of the church.  However, this picture was clouded by admitted atypical

     features.  For example, Rev. Rock testified members of the Church of

     Scientology can actively practice and belong to other religious faiths (i.

     e., Catholic priests and Jewish rabbis belong and actively pursue the

     worship of the Church of Scientology); the church raises its funds by

     accepting "donations" for counseling services to members and non-members

     alike for which a fixed schedule sets the charges, in either service or

     cash, however about ten percent of the counseling sessions are gratuitous;

     the church has no structured seminary but offers courses in which the

     student sets his learning pace and at the end of which he may be ordained

     as a minister; theirs is an applied religious philosophy teaching

     methodology and the church keeps no formal membership rolls.  As to the

     interest of the witness he was in the employ of the church receiving about

     $3,000.00 annually from monies raised in the St. Louis area.  No attempt

     was made to corroborate Rock's testimony with that of church officials,

     parishioners, or others familiar with appellant and its system of beliefs.

     No income or expense statements were introduced and the sources of income

     and use of funds were ambiguous at best.



  [9][10][11] The law places a substantial burden on those claiming exemptions

 under the referenced constitutional and statutory provisions to establish that

 their property falls within an exempted class.  City of St. Louis v. State Tax

 Commission, 524 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.banc 1975).  It is firmly engrained that

 taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, Midwest Bible and

 Missionary Institute v. Sestric, 364 Mo. 167, 260 S.W.2d 25, 29-30 (1953),

 and such claims are not favored in the law.  Community Memorial Hospital v.

 City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.1967).  The extent of this burden has

 been characterized as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Fitterer v.

 Crawford, 157 Mo. 51, 57 S.W. 532 (1900).

  Weighing the evidence in light of the appellant's sole witness' want of

 credibility and against the substantial burden of proof required, we find the

 record supports the Commission findings.

  The judgment is affirmed.



  MORGAN, C. J., and BARDGETT, HENLEY, FINCH and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.



  SEILER, J., concurs in result in separate opinion filed.

                                    APPENDIX

                          MISSOURI STATE TAX COMMISSION

                                Findings of Fact

  1. The Missouri Church of Scientology was organized in 1969 and is a not-for-

 profit corporation.  The earliest incorporation of the Church of Scientology

 elsewhere in the United States was in 1954.

  2. The property in question was used in its headquarters at 4221 Lindell on

 January 1, 1974.

  3. There are ceremonies or services conducted on Sunday afternoons at the

 headquarters.  These are the only regular services (Tr. 14).

  4. These services are presided over by ministers.

  5. The founder of the Church is L. Ron Hubbard who is still living.

  6. There is literature which is disseminated which encourages other persons to

 join and there are other efforts made to achieve the same purpose.

  7. The Missouri Church of Scientology also engages in public affairs such as

 conducting a drug counseling program.

  8. The property in question consisting of office equipment and furniture is

 used in the promotion of the organization including keeping its records,

 providing mailings to the membership.

  9. The Church of Scientology does not have formal seminaries but requires that

 prospective ministers go through counseling courses which are conducted in

 their headquarter buildings.

  10. There is no formal membership roll for the Church of Scientology.

  11. The Church of Scientology is an applied religious philosophy having as its

 members persons who belong to other formal religions such as members of the

 Catholic and Lutheran churches and including Catholic priests and Jewish

 rabbis (Tr. 23).  Membership in other religious faiths does not preclude

 membership in the Church of Scientology.

  *845 12. There was no corroborative evidence from any independent witness

 presented to the effect that the Missouri Church of Scientology is recognized

 by any other religious faiths as being a bona fide religion.

  13. We find the testimony of the Reverend Frederick M. Rock generally not to

 be credible and worthy of belief in particular in respect to his description

 and categorization of the activities of the organization, its alleged religious

 services, its financial structure and the nature of the so-called donations

 which are made to the organization.

  14. The Commission finds that there is no sufficient credible evidence

 presented by the appellant to satisfy the burden placed upon one claiming

 exemption from taxation.

                               Conclusions of Law

  1. Under Article X, Section 6 of the Missouri Constitution and Section 137.100

 R.S.Mo. all property used exclusively for religious worship is exempt from

 taxation.

  2. This Commission has jurisdiction of this proceeding and the parties hereto,

 and is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses appearing before it.

  3. It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of

 witnesses and to judge what probative weight or value to give to their

 testimony.

  4. As to claims for exemption from taxation the burden is on the owner

 claiming his property to be exempt to establish that his property falls within

 the exempted class.  National Cemetery Ass'n. of Missouri v. Benson, 344 Mo.

 784, 129 S.W.2d 842 (1939).

  5. Exhibits which were marked and identified but which were never offered into

 evidence cannot be considered as such by this Commission in its capacity as the

 trier of fact.

  6. Claims for exemption from taxation are not favored in the law and

 provisions for exemption are strictly construed against one who claims to be

 exempt.

  7. It is concluded that with the lack of credibility found by this Commission

 in the testimony of the witness Rock and the lack of corroboration by any

 independent authority on contemporary religions that the property owner has not

 satisfied the burden placed upon him.

  8. While the appellant has some of the trappings and accoutrements of an

 organized religion, it appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a

 certain religious connotation, but which falls short of being devoted to the

 worship of the Supreme Being, which this Commission concludes is necessary for

 the property owner to have its property considered exclusively for religious

 worship.  The Commission does not believe that an applied religious philosophy

 is identical for purposes of exemption with an organized religion devoted to

 religious worship.

  9. The personal property of the appellant has not, therefore, been shown to be

 used exclusively for religious worship or charitable purposes and therefore

 cannot be exempted from ad valorem taxation.

  10. The decision of the Board of Equalization placing an assessment of

 $5,000.00 upon the personal property of the Missouri Church of Scientology for

 the year 1974 is herewith affirmed.



  SEILER, Judge, concurring in result.

  As I understand the situation, the only evidence offered by appellant before

 the commission was a witness whom the commission found not credible with

 respect to his testimony bearing on the issues.  We are not going to disturb

 that finding.  Beyond question, then, appellant has not carried the burden of

 establishing an exemption from taxation.  In my opinion, this disposes of the

 appeal.

  We should be careful not to do anything to restrict religious freedom and I am

 sure the principal opinion has no intention to do otherwise, but if it is

 necessary to define religious worship or religion, I do not believe we should

 restrict the definition to conventional orthodox religions, which it seems to

 me is what the principal opinion does.  History shows that what is

 orthodoxy *846 today was once heresy.  I therefore concur in result only.