Find the Bug(s)!

```
BlockingQueue queue = ...
```

BatchCommitLogExecutorService.java using BlockingQueue in Cassandra, one bug injected

Foundations of Software Engineering

Part 15: Inspections and Reviews

Michael Hilton



Administrivia

- Midterm on Thursday
- 1 page of notes allowed
- Exam review in recitation tomorrow





Software Peer Reviews



What are Code Reviews?

















RESEARCH


Ideal MediaWiki Workflow

- 1) pushes his patch
- 2) review others patches




Validates / rejects changes

Merge to WMF repository



WMF repo



Local

repo

Receives review, validation notifications



Reports verification status as a comment and +1/-1

JENKINS

GERRIT


Cherry pick patch then:

- lint check
- attempts MW install
- run tests suites



http://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Gerrit/Advanced_usage

```
rtm: X
                                                                                                        🛂 😉 🗯 😭
:://lkml.org/lkml/2014/10/16/359
       [lkml] [2014] [Oct] [16] [last100] RSS
       Views: [wrap] [headers] [forward]
                    Thu, 16 Oct 2014 14:47:41 +0200
        Date
        From
                   Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
        Subject
                    [PATCH] staging: android: binder: move to the "real" part of the kernel
       From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ad
       The Android binder code has been "stable" for many years now. No matter
       what comes in the future, we are going to have to support this API, so
       might as well move it to the "real" part of the kernel as there's no
       real work that needs to be done to the existing code.
       Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
       This was discussed in the Android miniconf at the Plumbers conference.
       If anyone has any objections to this, please let me know, otherwise I'm
       queueing this up for 3.19-rc1
        drivers/Kconfig
                                                            2 ++
        drivers/Makefile
                                                            1 +
        drivers/android/Kconfig
                                                           37 +++++++++++++++++
        drivers/android/Makefile
                                                            3 ++
        drivers/{staging => }/android/binder.c
        drivers/{staging => }/android/binder.h
                                                            2 +-
        drivers/{staging => }/android/binder trace.h
        drivers/staging/android/Kconfig
                                                           30 ---
        drivers/staging/android/Makefile
                                                            1 -
        include/uapi/linux/Kbuild
                                                            1 +
        include/uapi/linux/android/Kbuild
                                                            2 ++
        .../uapi => include/uapi/linux/android}/binder.h
        12 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
        create mode 100644 drivers/android/Kconfig
        create mode 100644 drivers/android/Makefile
        rename drivers//staging -> Wandroid/hinder c (100%)
        rename drivers
                       https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/SubmittingPatches
        rename drivers
        create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/android/Kbuild
        rename {drivers/staging/android/uapi => include/uapi/linux/android}/binder.h (100%)
```



"Many eyes make all bugs shallow"

Standard Refrain in Open Source

"Have peers, rather than customers, find defects"

Karl Wiegers



Isn't testing sufficient?

- Errors can mask other errors
- Only completed implementations can be tested (esp. scalability, performance)
- Design documents cannot be tested
- Tests don't check code quality
- Many quality attributes (eg., security, compliance, scalability) are difficult to test



A second pair of eyes

- Different background, different experience
- No preconceived idea of correctness
- Not biased by "what was intended"



Checklists!





The Checklist: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/12/10/the-checklist



Activity

Develop checklist for Code Review




Expectations and Outcomesof Modern Code Reviews




Code Review at Microsoft





Bacchelli, Alberto, and Christian Bird. "Expectations, outcomes, and challenges of modern code review." *Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Software Engineering*. IEEE Press, 2013.

Outcomes (Analyzing Reviews)



Bacchelli, Alberto, and Christian Bird. "Expectations, outcomes, and challenges of modern code review." *Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Software Engineering*. IEEE Press, 2013.


Mismatch of Expectations and Outcomes

- Low quality of code reviews
 - Reviewers look for easy errors, as formatting issues
 - Miss serious errors
- Understanding is the main challenge
 - Understanding the reason for a change
 - Understanding the code and its context
 - Feedback channels to ask questions often needed
- No quality assurance on the outcome


Code Review at Google


- Introduced to "force developers to write code that other developers could understand"
- 3 Found benefits:
 - checking the consistency of style and design
 - ensuring adequate tests
 - improving security by making sure no single developer can commit arbitrary code without oversight

Reviewing relationships











Formal Inspections



Formal Inspections

- Idea popularized in 70s at IBM
- Broadly adopted in 80s, much research
 - Sometimes replacing component testing
- Group of developers meets to formally review code or other artifacts
- Most effective approach to find bugs
 - Typically 60-90% of bugs found with inspections
- Expensive and labor-intensive




Inspection Team and Roles

- Typically 4-5 people (min 3)
- Author
- Inspector(s)
 - Find faults and broader issues
- Reader
 - Presents the code or document at inspection meeting
- Scribe
 - Records results
- Moderator
 - Manages process, facilitates, reports



Inspection Process



Checklists

- Reminder what to look for
- Include issues detected in the past
- Preferably focus on few important items
- Examples:
 - Are all variables initialized before use?
 - Are all variables used?
 - Is the condition of each if/while statement correct?
 - Does each loop terminate?
 - Do function parameters have the right types and appear in the right order?
 - Are linked lists efficiently traversed?
 - Is dynamically allocated memory released?
 - Can unexpected inputs cause corruption?
 - Have all possible error conditions been handled?
 - Are strings correctly sanitized?



Perspective-based Inspections

- Have inspectors with different specialties or different focuses/checklists
 - Encourages alternative thinking patterns
- Have reviewers start in different places in the document
 - Avoid loosing focus at the same location
- Especially in preparation phase
- Little published data, but considered an effective practice



Process details

- Authors do not explain or defend the code not objective
 - Author != moderator, != scribe, !=reader
 - Author should still join the meeting to observe questions and misunderstandings and clarify issues if necessary
- Reader (optional) walks through the code line by line, explaining it
 - Reading the code aloud requires deeper understanding
 - Verbalizes interpretations, thus observing differences in interpretation



Social issues: Egos in Inspections

- Author's self-worth in artifacts
- Identify defects, not alternatives; do not criticize authors
 - "you didn't initialize variable a" -> "I don't see where variable a is initialized"
- Avoid defending code; avoid discussions of solutions/alternatives
- Reviewers should not "show off" that they are better/smarter
- Avoid style discussions if there are no guidelines
- Author decides how to resolve fault



Social issues 2

- Moderator must move discussion along, resolve conflicts
- Meetings should not include management
- Do not use for HR evaluation
 - "finding more than 5 bugs during inspection counts against the author"
 - Leads to avoidance, fragmented submission, not pointing out defects, holding pre-reviews
- Responsibility for quality with authors, not reviewers
 - "why fix this, reviewers will find it"




Root Cause Analysis

- Beyond the immediate puzzle
- How to improve the development process to avoid this problem
 - Restructure development process
 - New policies
 - New development tools, new languages, new analysis tools



Review Checkpoints during Lifecycle

Also reviewable:
Business plan
Marketing documents
Project plans
Documentation




When to inspect

- Before milestones
- Incremental inspections during development
 - Earlier often better than later: smaller fragments, chance to influence further development
 - Large code bases can be expensive and frustrating to review
 - Break down, divide and conquer
 - Focus on critical components
 - Identify defect density in first sessions to guide further need of inspections




Reviews as part of a Milestone





Reviews as part of a Milestone






Guidelines for Inspections

- Collected over many companies in many projects and experiments
- Several metrics easily measureable (effort, issues found, lines of code inspected) ...

Source: Oram and Wilson (ed.). Making Software. O'Reilly 2010. Chapter 18 and papers reviewed therein


Focus Fatigue



Recommendation:
Do not exceed
60 minute session



Inspection speed




Above 400 LOC/h reviews get shallow Recommendation: Schedule less than 400 LOC for a 1h review session

Importance of Context

- Code with fewer context dependencies is easier to review
- Reviewers need to look at related files
- -> Modularity (small interfaces, high cohesion, low coupling, ...)



Are meetings required?




Most issues found during preparation, not in meeting. Suggested synergy seems to have only low impact Claim: Defects found in meetings often more subtle

False positives

- About 25% of found issues are false positives
- Avoid discussing during meeting
- Confusion during meeting is indicator that document could be clearer



Self-checks can find half the issues



Arguments against Reviews?



Cost Discussion in Context

- Formal inspections vs modern code reviews
 - Formal inspections very expensive (about one developer-day per session)
 - Passaround distributed, asynchronous
- Code reviews vs testing
 - -Code reviews claimed more cost effective
- Code reviews vs not finding the bug



Types of Code Reviews by **Formality**

- Ad hoc reviewPassaround ("modern code reviews")
- Pair programming
- Walkthrough
- Inspection

More formal

Source: Wiegers. Peer Reviews in Software. Addison-Wesley 2002

Types of Code Reviews by **Formality**

- Ad hoc review
- Passaround ("modern code reviews")
- Pair programming

When to use reviews? Which formality?

More formal

Source: Wiegers. Peer Reviews in Software. Addison-Wesley 2002

Differences among peer review types

Review Type	Planning	Preparation	Meeting	Correction	Verification
Formal Inspection	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Walkthrough	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Pair Programming	Yes	No	Continuous	Yes	Yes
Passaround	No	Yes	Rarely	Yes	No
Ad Hoc Review	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Wiegers. Peer Reviews in Software. Addison-Wesley 2002

Experience (studies/claims)


- Raytheon
 - Reduced "rework" from 41% of costs to 20%
 - Reduced integration effort by 80%
- Paulk et al.: costs to fix a space shuttle software
 - 1\$ if found in inspection
 - 13\$ during system test
 - 92\$ after delivery
- IBM
 - 1h of inspection saves 20h of testing
- R. Grady, efficiency data from HP

_	System use	0.21 defects/h
_	Black box testing	0.28 defects/h
_	White box testing	0.32 defects/h
_	Reading/inspection	1.06 defects/h



Security Audits





IsTrueCryptAuditedYet? **Yes!**

Update Apr 2, 2015: Phase II complete. TrueCrypt has been audited.

Update Feb 18, 2015: Matthew posted an update on the <u>Phase II cryptanalysis</u> today. The Phase I audit report <u>is available</u> on the Open Crypto Audit Project site, and a verified source and download archive for TrueCrypt v. 7.1a can be found on our <u>GitHub mirror</u>. We'll be posting further news <u>@opencryptoaudit</u> on Twitter in the months ahead.

TrueCrypt (TC) is an open source file and disk encryption software package used by people all over the world, but a complete cryptanalysis has not been performed on the software, and questions remain about differences between Windows, Linux and Mac OS X versions. In addition, there has been no legal review on the current TrueCrypt v. 3.0 open source license - preventing inclusion in most of the free operating systems, including Ubuntu, Debian, RedHat, CentOS and Fedora. We want to be able to trust it, but a fully audited, independently verified repository and software distribution would make us feel better about trusting our security to this software. We're pledging this money to sponsor a comprehensive public audit of TrueCrypt.

Support the Project

You can help support the Project on our FundFill site, or our new IndieGoGo site (note: both funds accept credit cards; FundFill also accepts Bitcoin, while IndieGoGo also takes PayPal & eChecks).

Goals

- Resolve license status on the <u>current (v. 7.1a) TrueCrypt source code</u> (license <u>v. 3.0</u>) copyright & distribution, in order to create a verified, independent version control history repository (signed source and binary)
- Perform and document repeatable, deterministic builds of TC 7.1a from source code for current major operating systems:

Windows 7

Mac OS X (Lion 10.7 and Mountain Lion 10.8)

Ubuntu 12.04 LTS and 13.04, RedHat 6.4, CentOS 6.4, Debian 7.1, Fedora 19


Conduct a public cryptanalysis and security audit of the TC 7.1a

Rules

"Many eyes make all bugs shallow"

Standard Refrain in Open Source





* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

The Shellshock vulnerabilities affect **Bash**, a program that various Unix-based systems use to execute command lines and command scripts. Bash is free software, developed collaboratively and overseen since 1992 on a volunteer basis by Chet Ramey, a professional software architect.

Analysis of the source code history of Bash shows the vulnerabilities had existed undiscovered since version 1.03 in 1989.



Further Reading

- Sommerville. Software Engineering. 8th Edition. Addison-Wesley 2007. Chapter 22.2
 - Overview of formal inspections
- Wiegers. Pecontrevianusting amtiwars. And the sested Wesley 2002
 - Entire bookarties rither is spectations; simple ointormalm and how to introduce them for you to fill out, and then we will
- Bacchelli and Peronit Leptolestrons, on the same species of modern code with the period with and so the same seriod international conference of the same serion. IEEE Press, 2013.
 - Detailed studies of modern code reviews at Microsoft
- Oram and Wilson (ed.). Making Software. O'Reilly 2010. Chapter
 18
 - Overview of empirical research on formal inspections

