

Online Non-Convex Learning: Following the Perturbed Leader is Optimal



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Motivation

Many problems in ML, statistics involve **non-convex non-concave games**


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$$\min_x \max_y F(x, y)$$

► Generative Adversarial Networks




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- ▶ Generative Adversarial Networks
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$$\min_{\mathbf{x}} \max_{\mathbf{y}} F(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$$

- ▶ Generative Adversarial Networks
- ▶ Robust optimization
- ▶ Minimax Estimators

Outline

- Introduction
- Background
- Main Result
- FTPL
- Optimistic FPTL
- Min-Max Games

Setup

- ▶ Time: $1, 2, \dots, T$
- ▶ At time t , learner predicts $\mathbf{x}_t \in \mathcal{X}$
- ▶ Adversary simultaneously reveals loss function f_t
- ▶ **Goal:** minimize cumulative loss $\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t)$

Setup

- ▶ At time t , predict \mathbf{x}_t and observe loss function f_t
- ▶ **Goal:** minimize cumulative loss $\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t)$.
- ▶ **Benchmark:** $\min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x})$ - best fixed policy in hindsight.
- ▶ **Regret:** $\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x})$

Minimize Regret

History

- ▶ Online **linear** learning: dates back to [Brown and Von Neumann, 1950]
- ▶ Online **convex** learning: heavily studied since [Zinkevich, 2003]
- ▶ **Regret**

$$\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}) = O(\sqrt{T})$$

Online Non-Convex Learning

- Computationally intractable even if all $f_t(\cdot)$ are the same

What can we do?

1. Weaker notions of regret (such as stationarity in optimization) [Hazan et al., 2017]
2. Assume access to offline optimization oracles (only deal with learning) [Agarwal et al., 2018]

Main Result

Theorem

Suppose:

- ▶ $f_t(\cdot)$ is Lipschitz continuous
- ▶ $\mathbf{x}_t \in \mathcal{X}$ with bounded diameter
- ▶ we have access to offline optimization oracle

There exists a randomized algorithm such that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}) \right] = O(\sqrt{T}).$$

- ▶ Previous best: $O(T^{2/3})$ [Agarwal et al., 2018]

Algorithm: Follow The Perturbed Leader

Algorithm

- ▶ $\sigma_t \sim \text{Unif}(0, \sqrt{T})$
- ▶ $\mathbf{x}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma_t, \mathbf{x} \rangle$
- ▶ Studied by [Hannan, 1957, Kalai and Vempala, 2016] for linear losses
 - ▶ $\text{Regret} = O(\sqrt{T})$

Main Intuitions

Step 1

Reduction to oblivious adversary [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]

- ▶ assume adversary fixes choices ahead of time
- ▶ suffices to work with a single random vector σ

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Reduction to oblivious adversary [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]

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Step 2

Be the perturbed leader lemma

- ▶ Recall, $\mathbf{x}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma, \mathbf{x} \rangle$
- ▶ $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_{t+1}) - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} f_t(\mathbf{x}) \right] = O(\sqrt{T})$, since $\sigma \leq \sqrt{T}$

Main Intuitions (contd.)

Step 3

Stability

- ▶ Recall: $\mathbf{x}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma, \mathbf{x} \rangle$
- ▶ $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) - \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_{t+1}) \right] \leq L \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E} [\|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}\|]$

Stability Question

- ▶ Recall: $\mathbf{x}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma, \mathbf{x} \rangle$
- ▶ How large can $\mathbb{E} [\|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}\|]$ be?
- ▶ [Agarwal et al., 2018]: $\mathbb{E} [\|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}\|] = O(T^{-1/3})$

Our Improvement


$$\mathbb{E} [\|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}\|] = O(T^{-1/2})$$

Weak Monotonicity Property

$$\blacktriangleright \mathbf{x}_t(\sigma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma, \mathbf{x} \rangle$$

Weak Monotonicity Property

$$\blacktriangleright \mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma + c\mathbf{e}_i) \geq \mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma) \text{ for all } \sigma, c \geq 0$$




Strong Monotonicity Property

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Strong Monotonicity Property (1D)

For all $c \geq L$

$$\blacktriangleright \max \{ \mathbf{x}_t(\sigma), \mathbf{x}_{t+1}(\sigma) \} \leq \min \{ \mathbf{x}_t(\sigma + c), \mathbf{x}_{t+1}(\sigma + c) \}$$



Strong Monotonicity Property

- Recall: $\mathbf{x}_t(\sigma) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma, \mathbf{x} \rangle$

Strong Monotonicity Property (High Dim.)

- Suppose $\|\mathbf{x}_t(\sigma) - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}(\sigma)\|_1 \leq 10d \cdot |\mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma) - \mathbf{x}_{t+1,i}(\sigma)|$
- Then for $\sigma' = \sigma + 100Lde_i$

$$\begin{aligned} \max(\mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma), \mathbf{x}_{t+1,i}(\sigma)) &\leq \min(\mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma'), \mathbf{x}_{t+1,i}(\sigma')) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{10} |\mathbf{x}_{t,i}(\sigma) - \mathbf{x}_{t+1,i}(\sigma)| \end{aligned}$$

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- The two monotonicity properties give us $O(T^{-1/2})$ stability bound

Recap

- ▶ Follow the perturbed leader
- ▶ Be the leader lemma: playing \mathbf{x}_{t+1} at time t is very good
- ▶ Stability: With perturbations, $\|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_{t+1}\|$ is very small
- ▶ Key technical results: Tight monotonicity lemmas

Upshot

FTPL with access to offline optimization oracle achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret

Optimistic FTPL

- ▶ Better regret bounds when **sequence of losses** are **predictable**
- ▶ $g_t[f_1, \dots, f_{t-1}]$: guess for f_t at iteration t

Algorithm

- ▶ $\sigma_t \sim \text{Unif}(0, \sqrt{T})$
- ▶ $\mathbf{x}_t \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \arg \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} f_i(\mathbf{x}) + g_t(\mathbf{x}) - \langle \sigma_t, \mathbf{x} \rangle$

Optimistic FTPL

► Regret

$$\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}_t) - \min_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(\mathbf{x}) = O(L_t \sqrt{T})$$

L_t is Lipschitz constant of $(g_t - f_t)$

Non-Convex Non-Concave Games

- ▶ Two player zero-sum game

$$\min_x \max_y F(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$$

$F(\cdot, \mathbf{y})$ non-convex in \mathbf{x} , $F(\mathbf{x}, \cdot)$ non-concave in \mathbf{y}

Non-Convex Non-Concave Games

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- ▶ Both players use online learning algorithms against each other

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	Lipschitz + Smooth
FTPL	$O(T^{-1/2})$
Optimistic FTPL ($g_t = f_{t-1}$)	$O(\textcolor{red}{T}^{-3/4})$

Table: Rate of convergence to equilibrium

Conclusion

- ▶ FTPL achieves **optimal** $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret for online non-convex learning
- ▶ Optimistic FTPL can provide better rates if losses are **non-adversarial**

Conclusion

- ▶ FTPL achieves **optimal** $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret for online non-convex learning
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Questions?

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