

CMU 15-896

**KIDNEY EXCHANGE:
OPTIMIZATION**

TEACHERS:

AVRIM BLUM

ARIEL PROCACCIA (THIS TIME)


KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS

- Kidney failure can be fatal
- Options: dialysis, kidney transplant
- In 2010:
 - 4,654 people died waiting for a kidney transplant.
 - 34,418 people were added to the national waiting list
 - 10,600 people left the list by receiving a deceased donor kidney
 - The waiting list had 89,808 people, and the median waiting time is between 2-5 years, depending on blood type




KIDNEY EXCHANGE

- Best option: live donor
- In 2010 there were 5467 live donations in the US
- Most patients are incompatible with potential donors
- Kidney exchange = patients swap incompatible donors to obtain a compatible donor



MORE GENERALLY...

- Directed graph
 $G = (V, E)$
- Each $v \in V$ is a donor-patient pair
- Edge $(u, v) \in E$ if donor of u is compatible with patient of v
- Exchanges along cycles




CYCLE COVER

- Maximum cover by cycles
- If cycle length is unrestricted, problem is in P [homework 4 q3]
- Cycle cap is a medical necessity
- **Theorem [Abraham et al. 2007]:**
Given G , $L \geq 3$, computing a max cycle cover with cycles of length $\leq L$ is NP-hard
- Trivial for $L = 2$




PROOF BY ILLUSTRATION

- Reduction from 3D-MATCHING: Given disjoint sets A, B, C of size q and triples $T \subseteq A \times B \times C$, is there a disjoint $M \subseteq T$ of size q ?
- For each $x \in A \cup B \cup C$ construct v_x
- For each triple (a, b, c) construct gadget below
- 3D matching \Leftrightarrow perfect cycle cover



CYCLE COVERS IN PRACTICE

- In practice optimal cycle covers are computed on a weekly basis at CMU



[Abraham et al., 2007]









ARE LONG CYCLES NEEDED?




- Model of [Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2007]
- Four blood types: O, A, B, AB
- Donor is compatible with patient if latter has “more letters” (O is empty set)
 - Example: A can donate to A or AB, but not to B or O
- **Assumption:** There are no tissue-type incompatibilities between pairs



3-CYCLES CAN HELP






3-CYCLES CAN HELP



CLASSIFICATION OF PAIRS

- We classify donor-patient pairs into four types:
 - **Self-Demanded:** $X-X$
 - **Reciprocally demanded:** $A-B$ and $B-A$
 - **Over-demanded:** $X-Y$ that are blood-type compatible
 - **Under-demanded:** $X-Y$ that are blood-type incompatible
- **Assumption:** There is an endless supply of under-demanded pairs
- Next two slides show optimal allocations for 2-cycles and 3-cycles






3-CYCLES CAN HELP, REVISITED


- Why do 3-cycles help?
 1. Odd number of pairs in a self-demanded set
 2. Each AB-O pair can form a 3-cycle with O-A, A-AB or O-B, B-AB
 3. Remaining A-B or B-A pairs can be matched in 3-cycles, e.g., (A-B, B-O, O-A)
- Assume that we draw each pair from product dist. over blood types; each type has constant probability
- **Vote: Which item gives $\Omega(n)$ extra matches?**




Over demanded




Under demanded



Reciprocally demanded



Self demanded



A RANDOM GRAPH MODEL

- Each blood type X has probability μ_X
- Draw blood types for patient and donor
- Blood-type compatible donor and patient are tissue-type incompatible with probability $\gamma > 0$
- If donor-patient pair is internally compatible, remove them
- Otherwise, randomly generate edges to blood-type compatible pairs
- **Theorem [Ashlagi and Roth 2011]:** In large random graphs, w.h.p. \exists opt allocation with cycles of length ≤ 3



INTRODUCING: CHAINS


- Altruistic donors can initiate a **chain**
- Long chains can have a huge impact on #matches



Chain of length 60, from NYT





CHAINS IN REAL EXCHANGES



[Dickerson et al., 2012a]

CHAINS IN LARGE EXCHANGES

- Theorem [Ashlagi et al. 2012, Dickerson et al., 2012a]: In large random graphs, w.h.p. \exists opt allocation with cycles of length ≤ 3 and chains of length ≤ 3



[Dickerson et al., 2012a]





INTRODUCING: CROSSMATCHES


- Mixing cells and serum to determine whether patient will reject the kidney
- Adds another level of uncertainty: assume that **crossmatch** is negative (match possible) with some probability
- Optimization should now favor short cycles and short chains



RESULTS FROM REAL DATA



RESULTS FROM SIMULATIONS



INTRODUCING: DYNAMICS

- Every month new pairs enter the pool, and some pairs leave
- Matching myopically may not be optimal; should we save an AB-O pair for later?
- How can we look into the future?




VERTEX POTENTIALS

- Assign a potential to each donor-patient pair and each altruistic donor according to blood type [Dickerson et al., 2012b]
- In each round, maximize cardinality of matching **minus total potential removed**
- Optimize potentials using local search



VERTEX POTENTIALS ARE BAD?

- Opt matches $6k+4$
- Match pulsing cycles \Rightarrow total at most $4k+4$
- Do not match pulsing cycles \Rightarrow
 - $P_{AB-O} + P_{AB-A} > 2$
 - $P_{A-A} + P_{A-O} > 2$
- Either
 - $P_{AB-O} + P_{A-O} > 2$
 - $P_{A-A} + P_{AB-A} > 2$
- Do not match k cycles in first stage
- Match $4k+4$ overall



VERTEX POTENTIALS ARE GOOD

