Tuesday, February 21, 2017. 12:00PM. NSH 3305.

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Dirk Bergemann - Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Abstract: Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Genzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Bio: Dirk Bergemann is Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics at Yale University. He has secondary appointments as Professor of Computer Science at the School of Engineering and Professor of Finance at the School of Management. He received his Vordiplom in Economics at J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt in 1989 and his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 1994. Dirk Bergemann is the Chair of the Department of Economics since 2013. He joined Yale in 1995 as an assistant professor, having previously served as a faculty member at Princeton University. He has been affiliated with the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale since 1996 and a fellow of the Econometric Society since 2007. His research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation. Dirk Bergemann is currently a Co-Editor of Econometrica.