Operating System Structure

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Synchronization

- P4 due tonight
- Homework 2 out today, due Friday night
- Book report due Friday night (late days are possible)
- Friday lecture exam review
- Exam room change in progress; discard any cached values

Outline

- OS responsibility checklist
- Kernel structures
 - Monolithic kernels
 - * Kernel extensions
 - Open systems
 - Microkernels
 - Provable kernel extensions
 - Exokernels
 - More microkernels
- Final thoughts

OS Responsibility Checklist

- It's not so easy to be an OS:
 - 1. Protection boundaries
 - 2. Abstraction layers
 - 3. Hardware multiplexers

Protection Boundaries

- Protection is "Job 1"
 - Protect processes from each other
 - Protect crucial services (like the kernel) from processes
- Notes
 - Implied assumption: everyone trusts the kernel
 - Kernels are complicated
 - * See Project 3:)
 - * Something to think about
 - Full OS is millions of lines of code


Abstraction Layer

- Present "simple", "uniform" interface to hardware
- Applications see a well defined interface (system calls)
 - Block Device (hard disk, flash card, network mount, USB drive)
 - CD drive (SCSI, IDE)
 - tty (teletype, serial terminal, virtual terminal)
 - filesystem (ext2-4, reiserfs, UFS, FFS, NFS, AFS, JFFS2, CRAMFS)
 - network stack ({Unix,Internet,Appletalk} × {stream,message})

Hardware Multiplexer


- Each process sees a "computer" as if it were alone
- Requires division and multiplexing of:
 - Memory
 - Disk
 - CPU
 - I/O in general (network, graphics, keyboard etc.)
- If kernel is multiplexing it must also apportion
 - Fairness, priorities, classes? HARD problems!!!

Pebbles Kernel




- Consider the lowly Pebbles kernel
 - Syscalls ≈ 20
 - * fork(), exec(), cas2i_runflag(), yield()
 - Lines of trusted code ≈ 3000 (to 24000)

• Linux Kernel... similar?



- Now consider a recent Linux kernel
 - Syscalls: ≈ 243 in 2.4, and increasing fast
 - * fork(), exec(), read(), getdents(), ioctl(), umask()
 - Lines of trusted code ≈ 7 million as of May 2007
 - * $\approx 200,000$ are just for USB drivers
 - * $\approx 15,000$ for USB core alone
 - * Caveats Many archs/subarchs, every driver EVER




- Advantages:
 - + Well understood
 - + Good performance
 - + High level of protection between applications
- Disadvantages:
 - No protection between kernel components
 - LOTS of code is in kernel
 - Not (very) extensible
- Examples: UNIX, Mac OS X, Windows NT/XP, Linux, BSD, i.e., common


Loadable Kernel Modules

- Problem Roger has a WiMAX card, and he wants a driver
- Dave doesn't want a (large, unstable) WiMAX driver muddying his kernel
 - Probing for the nonexistent hardware at boot time may crash his machine!
- Solution kernel modules
 - Special binaries compiled "along with" kernel
 - Can be loaded at run-time so we can have LOTS of them
 - Can break kernel, so loadable only by root
- done in: VMS, Windows NT, Linux, BSD, OS X

(Loadable) Kernel Modules


Linux Kernel





(Loadable) Kernel Modules

Linux Kernel with WiMAX module





Kernel Extensions

- Advantages
 - + Can extend kernel
 - + Extensions run at "full speed" once loaded into kernel
- Disadvantages
 - Adding things to kernel can break it
 - Must petition system administrator to get modules added
- Any alternatives?

Musings

- Monolithic kernels run reasonably fast, and can be extended (at least by root)
- Some pesky overheads, though...
 - System call: ≈ 90 cycles invoke PL0 code on x86
 - Address space: Context switch dumps TLB more painful over time
- Protection looks expensive...do we need it?





- Syscalls none!
- Lines of trusted code all of it!

- Applications, libraries, and kernel all sit in the same address space
- Does anyone actually do this craziness?
 - MS-DOS
 - Mac OS 9 and prior
 - Windows 3.1, 95, 95, ME, etc.
 - Palm OS
 - Some embedded systems
- Used to be very common

Advantages:

- + *Very* good performance
- + Very extensible
 - * Undocumented Windows, Schulman et al., 1992
 - * Mac OS and Palm OS each had associated extensions industry
- + Can work well in practice
- + Lack of abstractions can make real-time systems easier

• Disadvantages:

- No protection between kernel and/or applications
- Not particularly stable
- Composing extensions can result in unpredictable behavior


Musings

- Monolithic Kernels
 - Extensible (by system administrator)
 - User programs mutually protected
 - No internal protection makes debugging hard, bugs CRASH
- Open Systems
 - Extensible (by everyone)
 - Fast, flexible
 - No protection at all unstable, plus can't be multi-user
- Is there a way to get user extensibility and inter-module protection?

Microkernels

- Replace the monolithic kernel with a "small, clean, logical" set of abstractions
 - Tasks
 - Threads
 - Virtual Memory
 - Interprocess Communication
- Move the rest of the OS into server processes


Mach "Multi-Server" Vision



Mach

- Syscalls: initially 92, increased slightly later
 - msg_send, port_status, task_resume, vm_allocate
- Lines of trusted code $\approx 484,000$ (Hurd version)
- Caveats several archs/subarchs, some drivers

- Started as a project at CMU (based on RIG project from Rochester)
- Plan
 - 1. Mach 2: BSD 4.1 Unix with new VM plus IPC, threads, SMP
 - 2. Mach 3: Saw kernel in half and run Unix as "single server"
 - 3. Mach 3 continued: decompose single server into smaller servers



Results

- 1. Mach 2: completed in 1989
 - "Unix" with SMP, kernel threads, 5 architectures
 - Used for Encore, Convex, NeXT, and subsequently OS X
 - Success!
- 2. Mach 3: Finished(ish)
 - Unix successfully removed from kernel (!!)
 - Ran some servers & desktops at CMU, a few outside
- 3. Mach 3 continued: ...?
 - Multi-server systems: "Mach-US," Open Software Foundation
 - Not really deployed to users

Advantages:

- + Strong protection (most of "Unix" outside of kernel)
- + Flexibility (special non-kernel VM for databases)

Disadvantages:

- Performance
 - * It looks like extra context switches and copying would be expensive
 - * Mach 3 ran slow in experiments
 - * Some performance tuning, but not as much as commercial Unix distributions
- Kernel still surprisingly large "It's not micro in size, it's micro in functionality"

Mach Microkernel as a hypervisor


- IBM's rationale
 - Our mainframes have done virtualization since the 1970's...
 - Can Mach microkernel be a multi-OS platform for tiny little machines?
- IBM Workplace OS (1991-1996)
 - * One kernel for MS-DOS, OS/2, MS Windows, OS/400, and AIX
 - * One kernel for x86 and PowerPC
 - * "One ring to rule them all..."
 - * Much time consumed to run MS-DOS, OS/2, and Unix on x86 kernel
 - * But people wanted x86 hardware to run MS Windows
 - * But Apple wanted PowerPC hardware to run MacOS
 - * But IBM decided not to really sell desktop PowerPC hardware

- Things to remember about Mach history
 - Mach 3 == microkernel, Mach 2 == monolithic
 - Code ran slow at first, then everyone graduated
 - Demonstration of microkernel feasibility
 - Performance cost of stability/flexibility unclear
 - (Mac OS X is Mach 2, not Mach 3)
- Other interesting points
 - Other microkernels from Mach period: ChorusOS, QNX
 - ChorusOS, realtime kernel out of Europe, now open sourced by Sun
 - QNX competes with VxWorks as a commercial real-time OS

Musings

- We want an extensible OS
- Micro-kernel protection and scheduling seem slow
- We don't want unsafe extensibility
- Can we *safely* add code to a monolithic kernel?

Provable Kernel Extensions




Provable Kernel Extensions

- Prove the code is safe to add to kernel
- Various (very conservative) approaches to "gatekeeper"
 - Interpreter (CMU: Packet filters)
 - * Slow but clearly safe can even bound time
 - Compiler-checked source safety (UW: Spin: Modula-3)
 - * Faster code, must trust compiler
 - Kernel-verified binary safety (CMU: Proof-carrying code)
 - * Language agnostic in theory any compiler can generate proofs
- Safe? If you trust base kernel and gatekeeper.

Provable Everything

What if *everything* were a proven kernel extension?



Provable Everything

Advantages:

- + Freely extensible by users (every application is a kernel extension)
- + Good performance because everything is in the kernel
- + "Provably" safe

Disadvantages:

- Effectiveness strongly dependent on quality of proofs
- Some proofs are hard, some proofs are impossible!
- Proof checking can be slow
- Code simple enough to prove correct might cost more than protection boundaries
- Current research: MSR's "Singularity" OS


Musings

- Monolithic kernel
 - Extensibility limited (kernel modules are privileged)
 - Large "base system" is mandatory for all users
- Open systems: unstable
- "Abstraction" microkernels (Mach)
 - Performance concerns; Were the best kernel abstractions chosen?
- Proof systems: feasible for complex applications?
- If applications control system, can optimize for their usage cases

Exokernels

- Allow application writers full control over hardware resources
- Kernel's job is to safely share hardware without abstractions
 - Application knows page-table format
 - Application flushes TLB when necessary
- Remove all of "operating system" from kernel, leaving threads and mini-VM
- Separates security and protection from the management of resources

Exokernels (Xok/ExOS)



Exokernel (Xok)

Xok

- Syscalls ≈ 120
 - insert_pte, pt_free, quantum_set, disk_request
- Lines of trusted code $\approx 100,000$
- Caveats One arch, few/small drivers

Exokernels: VM Example

- There is no fork()
- There is no exec()
- There is no automatic stack growth
- Exokernel keeps track of physical memory pages
 Assigns them to an application on request
 - Application (via syscall):
 - 1. Requests frame
 - 2. Requests map of virtual → physical

Exokernels: simple fork()

- fork():
 - Acquire a new, blank address space
 - Allocate some physical frames
 - Map physical pages into blank address space
 - Copy bits (from us) to the target address space
 - Allocate a new thread and bind it to the address space
 - Fill in new thread's registers and start it running
- The point is that the kernel doesn't provide fork()


Exokernels: COW fork()

- fork(), advanced:
 - Acquire a new, blank address space
 - Create copy-on-write table in each address space
 - Add R/O PTE's for my frames into the blank address space
 - Replace each of my PTE's with a R/O PTE
 - Flush TLB
 - Application's page-fault handler (like a signal handler) copies/re-maps
- Each process can have its own fork() optimized for it
 - If I know certain pages will fault, I can "pre-copy" exactly those pages

Exokernels: Web Server Example

• Traditional kernel and web server:


- 1. read() copy from disk to kernel buffer
- 2. read() copy from kernel to user buffer
- 3. send() user buffer to kernel buffer
 - -- data is check-summed
- 4. send() kernel buffer to device memory



That is: six bus crossings

Exokernels: Web Server Example


- What fundamentally needs to happen:
 - 1. Copy from disk to memory
 - 2. Copy from memory to network device




That is: two bus crossings

Exokernels: Web Server Example

- Exokernel and Cheetah:
 - "File system" doesn't store files, stores packet-body streams
 - * Data blocks are co-located with pre-computed data checksums
 - Header is tweaked before transmission (TCP checksums can be "patched")
 - No need to re-chunk file data into packets, checksum all data bytes



Exokernels: Cheetah Performance



Exokernels

Advantages:

- + Extensible: just add a new "operating system library"
- + Fast: Applications intimately manage hardware, no obstruction layers
- + Safe: Exokernel allows safe sharing of resources


Disadvantages:

- Taking advantage of Exo may mean writing an OS for each app
- Nothing about moving an OS into libraries makes it easier to write
- Slow? Many many small syscalls instead of one big syscall
- sendfile(2) Why change when you can steal?
- Requires policy: despite assertions to the contrary

Exokernels

- Xok development is mostly over
- Torch has been passed to L4

More Microkernels (L4)



More Microkernels (L4)

L4 - http://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/L4/

- Syscalls < 20
 - memory_control, start_thread, IPC (send/recv on stringItem, Fpage)
- Lines of trusted code $\approx 37,000$
- Caveats one arch, nearly no drivers (add just what you need)

Microkernel OS'n (L4Linux, DROPS)

- L4Linux run Linux on L4
 - You get Linux, but a bit slower
 - You get multiple Linux's at a time
 - You get a realtime microkernel too
- DROPS a real-time OS for L4
 - Realtime, and minimal (no inter-application security)
- Combine the two for a real-time OS and Linux... (mostly dead)

More Microkernels (L4)


Advantages:

- + Fast as hypervisor, similar to Mach (L4Linux 4% slower than Linux)
- + VERY good separation (if we want it)
- + Supports multiple OS personalities
- + Soft real-time

Disadvantages:

- Smaller than Mach at present
- Still growing (capabilities, ...)
- No experience with multi-server OS (how will it perform?)

Summing Up



Summing Up

- So why don't we use microkernels or something similar?
- Say we have a micro-(or exo)-kernel, and make it run fast
 - We describe things we can do in userspace faster (like Cheetah)
 - Monolithic developer listens intently
 - Monolithic developer adds functionality to his/her kernel (sendfile(2))
 - Monolithic kernel again runs as fast or faster than our microkernel
- If monolithic kernels run fast, why consider other organizations?
 - Stability new device drivers break Linux often, we use them anyway
 - Complexity when everything interacts, debugging a large kernel gets hard

Summing Up

What's the moral?

- There are many ways to do things
- Many of them even work
- Surprisingly, we still haven't settled on a single notion of "kernel"

Further Reading

- Jochen Liedtke, On Micro-Kernel Construction
- Willy Zwaenepoel, Extensible Systems are Leading OS Research Astray
- Michael Swift, Improving the Reliability of Commodity Operating Systems
- An Overview of the Singularity Project, Microsoft Research MSR-TR-2005-135
- Harmen Hartig, The Performance of μ-Kernel-Based Systems

Further Reading

CODE: (in no particular order)

- Minix (micro)
- Plan 9 ("right-sized")
- NewOS/Haiku (micro'ish)
- L4 Pistachio (micro)
- Solaris (monolithic)
- NetBSD, DragonflyBSD (monolithic)