15-213 Recitation: Attack Lab

___TA___
11 Feb 2017
Agenda

- Reminders
- Stacks
- Attack Lab Activities
Reminders

- Bomb lab is due tomorrow (14 Feb, 2017)!
  - “But if you wait until the last minute, it only takes a minute!” – NOT!
  - Don’t waste your grace days on this assignment!

- Attack lab will be released tomorrow!
Stacks

- Last-in, first-out

- x86 stack grows down
  - lowest address is “top”
  - $rsp contains the address of the topmost element in the stack

- Uses the pushq and popq instructions to push and pop registers/constants onto and off the stack
Stack – pushq & popq

- **pushq** {value} is equivalent to
  - sub $8, %rsp
  - mov {value}, (%rsp)

- **popq** {reg} is equivalent to
  - mov (%rsp), {reg}
  - add $8, %rsp
Stack – Caller vs. Callee

- Function A calls function B
  - A is the caller
  - B is the callee

- Stack space is allocated in “frames”
  - Represents the state of a single function invocation

- Frame used primarily for two things:
  - Storing callee saved registers
  - Storing the return address of a function
Registers – Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

**Caller-saved**
- Registers used for function arguments are always caller-saved
- $\text{rax}$ is also caller-saved
- Called function may do as it wishes with the registers
- Must save/restore register in caller’s stack frame if it still needs the value after a function call

**Callee-saved**
- If the function wants to change the register, it must save the original value in its stack frame and restore it before returning
- The calling function may store temporary values in callee-saved registers
# x86-64 Register Usage Conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><code>%rax</code></td>
<td>return value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rbx</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rcx</code></td>
<td>argument #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rdx</code></td>
<td>argument #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rsi</code></td>
<td>argument #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rdi</code></td>
<td>argument #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rsp</code></td>
<td>stack pointer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%rbp</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r8</code></td>
<td>argument #5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r9</code></td>
<td>argument #6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r10</code></td>
<td>caller saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r11</code></td>
<td>caller saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r12</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r13</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r14</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><code>%r15</code></td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Registers – Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

**Before function call**
- rdi = first argument
- rsi = second argument
- rax = some temporary value
- rbx = some important number to use later (15213)
- rsp = pointer to some important buffer (0x7fffffffaaaaa)

**After function call**
- rdi = garbage
- rsi = garbage
- rax = return value
- rbx = some important number to use later (15213)
- rsp = pointer to some important buffer (0x7fffffffaaaaa)
x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

Current Stack Frame ("Top" to Bottom)
- "Argument build:"
  - Parameters for function about to call
- Local variables
  - If can’t keep in registers
- Saved register context
- Old frame pointer (optional)

Caller Stack Frame
- Return address
  - Pushed by call instruction
- Arguments for this call
Stack Maintenance

- Functions free their frame before returning

- Return instruction looks for the return address at the top of the stack

  - ...What if the return address has been changed?
We’re letting you hijack programs by running buffer overflow attacks on them. Is that not justification enough?

To understand stack discipline and stack frames

To defeat relatively secure programs with return oriented programming
Attack Lab Activities

- Three activities
  - Each relies on a specially crafted assembly sequence to purposefully overwrite the stack

- Activity 1 – Overwrites the return addresses
- Activity 2 – Writes an assembly sequence onto the stack
- Activity 3 – Uses byte sequences in libc as the instructions
Attack Lab Activities

- One student needs a laptop
- Login to a shark machine
  - $ wget http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213/activities/rec5.tar
  - $ tar xf rec5.tar
  - $ cd rec5
  - $ make
  - $ gdb act1
Activity 1

(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp
(gdb) backtrace

Q. Does the value at the top of the stack match any frame?
Activity 1 Continued

(gdb) x /2gx $rdi // Here are the two key values
(gdb) steipi // Keep doing this until

(gdb)
clobber () at support.s:16
16 ret

(gdb) x $rsp

Q. Has the return address changed?

(gdb) finish // Should exit and print out “Hi!”
Activity 1 Post

- Clobber overwrites part of the stack with memory at $rdi, including the all-important return address
- In act1 it writes two new return addresses:
  - 0x400500: address of printHi()
  - 0x400560: address in main

```
0x7fffffffde338
0x000000400553
0x000000400560
0x000000400500
0x000000400560
```

Call clobber()

```
Ret
In printHi()
Ret
In main()
```
Activity 2
$gdb act2
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp
Q. What is the address of the stack and the return address?

(gdb) x /4gx $rdi
Q. What will the new return address be?
(i.e., what is the first value?)
Activity 2 Continued

(gdb) x/5i $rdi + 8  // Display as instructions
Q. Why rdi + 8?
Q. What are the three addresses?

(gdb) break puts
(gdb) break exit
Q. Do these addresses look familiar?
Activity 2 Post

- Normally programs cannot execute instructions on the stack
  - Main used mprotect to disable the memory protection for this activity

- Clobber wrote an address that’s on the stack as a return address
  - Followed by a sequence of instructions
  - Three addresses show up in the exploit:
    - 0x48644d → “Hi\n” string
    - 0x4022e0 → puts() function
    - 0x4011a0 → exit() function
Activity 3

$gdb act3
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x /5gx $rdi

Q. Which value will be first on the stack?
Q. At the end of clobber, where will the function return to?
Activity 3 Continued

(gdb) x /2i <return address>

Q. What does this sequence do?
Q. Do the same for the other addresses. Note that some are return addresses and some are for data. When you continue, what will the code now do?
Activity 3 Post

- It’s harder to stop programs from running existing pieces of code in the executable.

- Clobber wrote multiple return addresses (aka gadgets) that each performed a small task, along with data that will get popped off the stack while running the gadgets.

- \texttt{0x457d0c}: pop \%rdi; retq
- \texttt{0x47fa64}: Pointer to the string “Hi\n”
- \texttt{0x429a6a}: pop \%rax; retq
- \texttt{0x400500}: Address of a printing function
- \texttt{0x47f001}: callq \*\%rax
Activity 3 Post

- Note that some of the return addresses actually cut off bytes from existing instructions

```
457cfa: 48 83 c4 28    add    $0x28,%rsp
457cfe: 5b            pop     %rbx
457cff: 4a 8d d4 3d 00 lea    0x0(%rbp,%r15,1),%rax
457d04: 5d            pop     %rbp
457d05: 41 5c          pop     %r12
457d07: 41 5d          pop     %r13
457d09: 41 5e          pop     %r14
457d0b: 41 5f          pop     %r15
457d0d: c3            retq
457d0e: 48 83 7c 24 10 00 cmpq   $0x0,0x10(%rsp)
457d14: 74 8a          je      457ca0 <_IO_getline_info+0xd0>
```

```
0x457d0b ...0c ...0d
-----------------------------------------
pop %r15       retq
41 5f          c3
```

```
Operation | Register R
-----------|-------------------
popq R      | %rax  %rcx  %rdx  %rbx  %rsp  %rbp  %rsi  %rdi
-----------|-------------------
popq R      | 58    59    5a    5b    5c    5d    5e    5f
```

Carnegie Mellon
If you get stuck

- Please read the writeup. *Please read the writeup. Please read the writeup. Please read the writeup.*
- CS:APP Chapter 3
- View lecture notes and course FAQ at [http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213)
- Office hours Sunday through Thursday 5:00-9:00pm in WH 5207
- Post a `private` question on Piazza
- `man gdb`, `gdb's help command`
# Attack Lab Tools

- `gcc -c test.s; objdump -d test.o > test.asm`
  Compiles the assembly code in `test.s` and shows the actual bytes for the instructions

- `./hex2raw < exploit.txt > converted.txt`
  Convert hex codes in `exploit.txt` into raw ASCII strings to pass to targets
  See the writeup for more details on how to use this

- `(gdb) display /12gx $rsp`  `(gdb) display /2i $rip`
  Displays 12 elements on the stack and the next 2 instructions to run

GDB is also useful for tracing to see if an exploit is working