15-213 Recitation: Attack Lab

12 Feb 2018
Agenda

- Reminders
- Buffer Overflow Attacks
- Attack Lab Activities
Reminders

- Bomb lab is due tomorrow (13 Feb, 2018)!
  - Don’t waste your grace days on this assignment

- Attack lab will be released tomorrow
  - Start early!! (no more penalties for mistakes like bomb lab)
We’re letting you hijack programs by running buffer overflow attacks on them...

To understand stack discipline and stack frames

To defeat relatively secure programs with return oriented programming
Stack Smashing Attack

- \textit{Callq} pushes the return address onto the stack
- \textit{Retq} pops this return address and jumps to it
Buffer Overflows

- Local string variables are stored on the stack
- C functions do not do size checking of strings
Buffer Overflows

- You can write a string that overwrites the return address
- Activity 1 steps through an example of overwriting the return address on the stack
Executing Commands on the Stack

■ What if instead of jumping to a predefined function, we jumped to code on the stack?

■ Activity 2 steps through an example of executing code on the stack
OS Countermeasures

- Executable code is not allowed on the stack (unless we specifically allow it – e.g. through mprotect like we do for activity 2)

- Thus, we have to use executable code already in the program to do what we want

- But code often doesn’t already contain our exploit function – so what can we do instead?
Return-Oriented Programming

- Goal: execute a small section of code, return, call another small section of code. Repeat until you execute your exploit

- Activity 3 steps you through an example of a return oriented programming exploit
Attack Lab Activities

■ Three activities
  ■ Each relies on a specially crafted assembly sequence to purposefully overwrite the stack

■ Activity 1 – Overwrites the return addresses (Buffer Overflow)

■ Activity 2 – Writes assembly instructions onto the stack

■ Activity 3 – Uses byte sequences in libc as the instructions (Return-Oriented Programming)
Attack Lab Activities

- Work in pairs: one student needs a laptop
- Login to a shark machine
  - $ wget http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213/activities/rec4.tar
  - $ tar xf rec4.tar
  - $ cd rec4
  - $ make
  - $ gdb act1
Activity 1

(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp
(gdb) backtrace

Q. Does the value at the top of the stack match any frame?
A. 0x400553 is the address to return to in main
Activity 1 Continued

(gdb) x /2gx $rdi // Here are the two key values
(gdb) stepi // Keep doing this until

(gdb)
clobber () at support.s:16
16 ret

(gdb) x $rsp

Q. Has the return address changed?
A. 0x400500 was the first number pointed to by $rdi

(gdb) finish // Should exit and print out “Hi!”
Activity 1 Post

- Clobber overwrites part of the stack with memory at $rdi, including the all-important return address
- In act1, it writes two new return addresses:
  - 0x400500: address of printHi()
  - 0x400560: address in main

Call clobber()

Clobber executes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x7fffffffe338</td>
<td>0x000000400560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x000000400553</td>
<td>0x000000400500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In printHi()

ret

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x000000400560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In main()

ret
Activity 2

$ gdb act2
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x $rsp

Q. What is the address of the stack and the return address?
A. 0x7fffffffe018 -> 0x40058a

(gdb) x/4gx $rdi

Q. What will the new return address be?
A. 0x7fffffffe020 (First address stored using $rdi)
Activity 2 Continued

(gdb) x /5i $rdi + 8    // Display as instructions
Q. Why $rdi + 8?
A. Want to ignore the 8-byte return address

Q. What are the three addresses?
A. 0x48644d, 0x4022e0, 0x4011a0

(gdb) break puts
(gdb) break exit

Q. Do these addresses look familiar?
A. puts – 0x4022e0, exit – 0x4011a0
Activity 2 Post

- Normally programs cannot execute instructions on the stack
  - Main used mprotect to disable the memory protection for this activity

- Clobber wrote an address that’s on the stack as a return address
  - Followed by a sequence of instructions
  - Three addresses show up in the exploit:
    - 0x48644d → “Hi\n” string
    - 0x4022e0 → puts() function
    - 0x4011a0 → exit() function
Activity 3

$ gdb act3
(gdb) break clobber
(gdb) run
(gdb) x /5gx $rdi

Q. Which value will be first on the stack? Why is this important?
A. 0x457d0c, this is the address to return to from clobber
Activity 3 Continued

(gdb) x /2i <return address>

Q. What does this sequence do?
A. Pops next stack value into $rdi, then returns

Q. Check the other addresses. Note that some are return addresses and some are for data. When you continue, what will the code now do?
A. Print “Hi\n”
Activity 3 Post

- It’s harder to stop programs from running existing pieces of code in the executable.

- Clobber wrote multiple return addresses (aka gadgets) that each performed a small task, along with data that will get popped off the stack while running the gadgets.

- `0x457d0c: pop %rdi; retq`
- `0x47fa64: Pointer to the string “Hi\n”`
- `0x429a6a: pop %rax; retq`
- `0x400500: Address of a printing function`
- `0x47f001: callq *%rax`
Activity 3 Post

Note that some of the return addresses actually cut off bytes from existing instructions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Register R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>popq R</td>
<td>58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If you get stuck…

- **Please read the writeup!**
- CS:APP Chapter 3
- View lecture notes and course FAQ at [http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~213)
- Office hours Sunday through Thursday at 5:00-9:00 in WH 5207, Friday at 3:00-5:00 in Gates Commons
- Post a **private** question on Piazza
- man gdb – gdb’s help command
Attack Lab Tools

- `gcc -c test.s; objdump -d test.o > test.asm`
  Compiles the assembly code in test.s and shows the actual bytes for the instructions

- `./hex2raw < exploit.txt > converted.txt`
  Convert hex codes in exploit.txt into raw ASCII strings to pass to targets
  See the writeup for more details on how to use this

- `(gdb) display /12gx $rsp    (gdb) display /2i $rip`
  Displays 12 elements on the stack and the next 2 instructions to run

GDB is also useful for tracing to see if an exploit is working
Stack Review
Stacks

- Last-in, first-out

- x86 stack grows down
  - lowest address is “top”
  - $rsp contains the address of the topmost element in the stack

- Uses the pushq and popq instructions to push and pop registers/_constants onto and off the stack
Stack – pushq & popq

- **pushq {value}** is equivalent to
  - `sub $8, %rsp`
  - `mov {value}, (%rsp)`

- **popq {reg}** is equivalent to
  - `mov (%rsp), {reg}`
  - `add $8, %rsp`
Stack – Caller vs. Callee

- Function A calls function B
  - A is the caller
  - B is the callee

- Stack space is allocated in “frames”
  - Represents the state of a single function invocation

- Frame used primarily for two things:
  - Storing callee saved registers
  - Storing the return address of a function
Registers – Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

- **Caller-saved**
  - Registers used for function arguments are always caller-saved
  - $rax$ is also caller-saved
  - Called function may do as it wishes with the registers
  - Must save/restore register in caller’s stack frame if it still needs the value after a function call

- **Callee-saved**
  - If the function wants to change the register, it must save the original value in its stack frame and restore it before returning
  - The calling function may store temporary values in callee-saved registers
Registers – Caller-saved vs. Callee-saved

- Before function call
  - rdi = first argument
  - rsi = second argument
  - rax = some temporary value
  - rbx = some important number to use later (ex: 15213)
  - rsp = pointer to some important buffer (ex: 0x7fffffffaaaa)

- After function call
  - rdi = garbage
  - rsi = garbage
  - rax = return value
  - rbx = some important number to use later (ex: 15213)
  - rsp = pointer to some important buffer (ex: 0x7fffffffaaaa)
# x86-64 Register Usage Conventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Usage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%rax</td>
<td>return value</td>
<td>%r8</td>
<td>argument #5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rbx</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
<td>%r9</td>
<td>argument #6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rcx</td>
<td>argument #4</td>
<td>%r10</td>
<td>caller saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rdx</td>
<td>argument #3</td>
<td>%r11</td>
<td>caller saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rsi</td>
<td>argument #2</td>
<td>%r12</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rdi</td>
<td>argument #1</td>
<td>%r13</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rsp</td>
<td>stack pointer</td>
<td>%r14</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%rbp</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
<td>%r15</td>
<td>callee saves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
x86-64/Linux Stack Frame

■ Current Stack Frame (“Top” to Bottom)
  ■ “Argument build:”
    - Parameters for function about to call
  ■ Local variables
    - If can’t keep in registers
  ■ Saved register context
  ■ Old frame pointer (optional)

■ Caller Stack Frame
  ■ Return address
    - Pushed by call instruction
  ■ Arguments for this call
Stack Maintenance

- Functions free their frame before returning

- Return instruction looks for the return address at the top of the stack

  - ...What if the return address has been changed?
Byte Ordering Example

- Example
  - Variable x has 4-byte value of 0x01234567
  - Address given by &x is 0x100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Big Endian</th>
<th>0x100</th>
<th>0x101</th>
<th>0x102</th>
<th>0x103</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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Reading Byte-Reversed Listings

- **Disassembly**
  - Text representation of binary machine code
  - Generated by program that reads the machine code

- **Example Fragment**

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<td>5b</td>
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<td>81 c3 ab 12 00 00</td>
<td>add $0x12ab,%ebx</td>
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<td>83 bb 28 00 00 00</td>
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- **Deciphering Numbers**
  - Value: 
  - Pad to 32 bits: 0x000012ab
  - Split into bytes: 00 00 12 ab
  - Reverse: ab 12 00 00

Example Fragment

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