1 Getting Started

1. The struct is allocated on the stack, as a local variable.

2. Each `callq` instruction pushes the (correct) return address onto the stack.

3. This function call overwrote the return address for `fun()` with an address pointing to some non-program memory, causing attempted execution of either invalid operations or non-executable operations.

2 Gets

1. We don’t!

2. When it encounters a newline or the end of the user input stream.

3. No, they purely depend on how many characters the user inputs.

4. `strcpy()`, `strcat()`, `scanf()`, `puts()`, `fputs()`, etc.

3 Overwriting Stack

1. The input buffer is at most 0x18 (24) bytes long. (Note that the compiler may have inserted padding to align the stack.) The user may or may not enter a string shorter than this safe length.
2. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+0x00</td>
<td>user string</td>
<td>$rsp = 0x414140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x08</td>
<td>user string</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x10</td>
<td>user string</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x18</td>
<td>return address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x20</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x28</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The given solution is using ASCII bytes written left-right (in order of increasing address).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Address</th>
<th>Value</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+0x00</td>
<td>12345678</td>
<td>$rsp = 0x414140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x08</td>
<td>12345678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x10</td>
<td>12345678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x18</td>
<td>@AA000001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x20</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0x28</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Assuming the upper 4 bytes of the original return address was all 0's
4 Exploit

1. Starting from `echo()`'s call to `gets()`, at 0x4006d6:

   0x4006d6 -> 0x4006db (mov) -> 0x4006de (.puts) -> 0x4006e3 (add) ->
   0x4006e7 (retq) -> [USER INPUT] 0x414140 (xor) -> 0x414143 ... etc.

2. When control was going to be returned to `echo()`'s caller, control was instead transferred to user input on the stack.

1. `movl $decafbad, %eax`
2. The instruction bytes would replace the first 1–5 characters of the input string.

1. See footnote 1, question 3.3

5 Defense

1. Execution would jump to an unknown section of memory, almost certainly executing non-exectuable or invalid code before being terminated by the OS.

2. By randomizing the starting address of the stack at runtime.

1. `<...echo()’s code...>
   %rax = 0x28;
   *(%rsp + 8) = %rax;
   %rax = 0;
   <...echo()’s code...>
   %rax = *(%rsp + 8);
   if (%rax != 0x28) stack_chk_fail()
   <...echo()’s return...>

2. We would overwrite *(%rsp + 8), causing `stack_chk_fail()` to be executed and our program to terminate.

3. This method of defense makes our program slower to compile, as the compiler needs to determine where and how to insert these ‘canaries,’ slower to execute, as it involves adding instructions, and makes our program larger (in the given example `echo()` grew by 37 bytes).
6 ROP

1. We overwrote the return address for `echo()`'s caller before executing `retq`.
2. `c3`
3. `0x4004d3`
4. `movq %rax, %rdi`
   `retq`
   `<...instructions starting at the second next stack address
       prior to running this code block...>`