1 Recap

So far we have established that the best way to represent our beliefs are probabilities.

Second. From the book "Probability: The Logic of Science" we know that probabilities are a natural extension of logic by adding a "degree of belief" to it. More specifically the claim is, that probability is the only system which is consistent with logic and continuous. This is called the Normative view of the world: logic is rational, therefore probabilities are also, and you would be irrational not to use them. Interestingly, this view does not say anything as to what happens when we do approximations. It also gives no guarantees on the performance of probabilities in practice.

Third. Bayes rule which allows us to do induction:

1. use hypothesis about the world
2. use data to refine hypothesis
3. make predictions

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1Content adapted from previous scribes by Sankalp Arora and Nathaniel Barshay
Fourth. Bayes filters allow us to apply the Bayes rule recursively. Filtering is expensive, since sums and integrals are exponential in state variables, however we can make approximations to deal with this (e.g. particle filters).

Finally, we have graphical models, which allow us to add structure to our beliefs. This allows us to reason more easily, as well as leads to a compact representation of beliefs. We have seen that this still is computationally expensive and we have shown ways of doing exact inference. The fallback solution for cases when we cannot do exact inference is using a Gibbs sampler.

The question now is whether we can formulate a normative view of induction?

1.1 Three views of induction

1. David Hume view. This view effectively argues that induction doesn’t work. Consider a chicken in a farm. For 1000 days, every day, the farmer comes and feeds the chicken. Given the well known fact that all chickens are perfect Bayesians, what does the chicken think is going to happen to it on the 1001st day? Using induction it should assume that it will be fed, however it might be completely wrong and the farmer might have decided to eat it. The chicken might have a model that accounts for its imminent death, however using induction it will be unable to guess its death on day 1001. No matter what model the chicken uses, an adversarial farmer can always thwart it and force the chicken to make false inductive predictions. This view is correct, but not very useful.

2. The Goldilocks/Panglossian/Einstein Position. It just so happens that our world is set up in a way such that induction works. It is the nature of the universe that events can be effectively modeled through induction to a degree that allows us to make consistently useful predictions about it. In other words, we’re lucky. Once again, we do not find this view very satisfying or particularly useful.

3. The No Regret view. This view has evolved from game theory and computer science and is unique to the late 20th century. It postulates that while induction can fail, it is a near optimal strategy.

2 On-line learning Algorithms

To formalize the argument of the No Regret view we consider the problem of predicting from expert advice. Assume we are given a set of $n$ experts, each of which predicts a binary variable (for example whether the sun will rise or not tomorrow). These can be very simple experts, for example:

E1: Always predicts sunrise E2: Always predicts no sunrise E3: Flips a coin to decide whether the sun rises or not E4: Markov Expert: predicts previous days outcome. E5: Running average over past few days. ...

Similarly our algorithm predicts the same variable. After that we wait for the next day to come and observe whether the sun rose or not. We then compare the output of our algorithm to that of the best expert so far. For this purpose we define a loss function.
\[ L(you, world) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } you = world \\
1 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases} \]

From the Hume view it follows that there is nothing that makes

\[ L_t \rightarrow 0 \]

We even have no way of enforcing a weaker condition

\[ \frac{1}{t} \sum L_t \rightarrow 0 \]

We can however try to minimize a different quantity, something we call regret. We define regret, as our divergence from the best expert so far:

\[ R = \sum_t \left[ L_t(\text{algorithm}) - L_t(e^*) \right] \]

where \( e^* \) is the best expert at time \( t \). We will show that it is possible to make the regret scale slower than time:

\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{R_t}{t} = 0 \]

and this will happen even if the world is trying to trick you and even if the experts are trying to trick you.

An algorithm that satisfies the above formula is called “no regret.” Note that even though we cannot minimize loss, we can minimize regret. A side effect of this statement is that a no regret algorithm can still have high loss.

**Simplest algorithm: Follow the Leader**

Also called “best in hindsight” algorithm. This algorithm naively picks the expert that has done the best so far and use that as our strategy for the next timestep. Unfortunately, blindingly picking the leader can lead to overfitting.

Let us assume there are 2 experts:

E1: Sun always rises
E2: Sun never rises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>E1</th>
<th>E2</th>
<th>You</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this particular example you are doing worse than either expert.
Majority Vote

Given many experts, this algorithm goes with the majority vote. In a sense, it never gets faked out by observations, because it doesn’t pay attention to them. In a statistical sense, we can say that this algorithm is “high bias, low variance,” since it is robust but not adaptive, while algorithm #1 is “low bias, high variance,” since it is adaptive but not robust. This algorithm can clearly perform much worse than the best expert as it may be the case that majority of the experts are always wrong but one is always correct. To overcome this fallacy we need a method that adapts and decides what experts to respect while predicting, based on the past performance of the experts. To this end we try weighted majority algorithm.

2.1 Weighted Majority

Another approach is to notice that at each timestep, each expert is either right or wrong. If it’s wrong, we can diminish the voting power of that particular expert then predicting the next majority vote.

More formally, this algorithm maintains a list of weights $w_1, ..., w_n$ (one for each expert $x_1, ..., x_n$), and predicts based on a weighted majority vote, penalizing mistakes by multiplying their weight by half.

Algorithm

1. Set all the weights to 1.
2. Predict 1 (rain) if $\sum_{x_i=1} w_i \geq \sum_{x_i=0} w_i$, and 0 otherwise.
3. Penalize experts that are wrong: for all $i$ s.t. $x_i$ made a mistake, $w_i^{t+1} \leftarrow \frac{1}{2} w_i^t$.
4. Goto 2

Analysis of Algorithm  The sum of the weights is $w \leq \left( \frac{3}{4} \right)^m n = \left( \frac{4}{3} \right)^{-m} n$, where $m$ is the number of mistakes. The weight of the best expert $w^*_t = \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)^{m^*} = 2^{-m^*} \leq w$. Therefore,

$$2^{-m^*} \leq w \leq \left( \frac{4}{3} \right)^{-m} n.$$

Taking the log2 and solving for $m$ gives,

$$m \leq \frac{m^* + \log_2 n}{\log_2 \frac{4}{3}} = 2.41(m^* + \log_2 n).$$

Thus, the number of mistakes by this algorithm is bounded by $m^*$ plus an amount logarithmic in the number of experts, $n$.

To get a more intuitive feel for this last inequality, imagine the case when one expert makes no mistakes. Due to the binary search nature of the algorithm, it will take $\log_2 n$ iterations to “find’
it. Furthermore, if we keep adding good experts, the term \( m^* \) will go down, but the term \( \log_2 n \) will rise (a fair trade in this case). Adding bad experts will probably not change \( m^* \) much and will serve only to add noise, showing up in a higher \( \log_2 n \). Thus, we can see the trade-offs involved when adding more experts to a system.

### 2.2 Randomized Weighted Majority Algorithm

In this algorithm, we predict each outcome with by picking an expert with a probability proportional to its weight. We also penalize each mistake by \( \beta \) instead of by one-half.

**Algorithm**

1. Set all the weights to 1.
2. Choose expert \( i \) in proportion to \( w_i \).
3. Penalize experts that are wrong: for all \( i \) s.t. \( x_i \) made a mistake, \( w_i^{t+1} \leftarrow \beta w_i^t \).

**Analysis** The bound is

\[
E[m] \leq \frac{m * \ln(1/\beta) + \ln(n)}{1 - \beta}.
\]

It is important to note here that the expectation in the expression is caused by probabilistic nature of the method of selecting an expert for prediction. Also note that since we are picking a single expert, we don’t have to worry about figuring out a way to combine multiple experts and can easily work in a space where the experts are predicting abstract things like whether the object seen is a phone, ocean or moon.

Generally, we want \( \beta \) to be small if we only have a few time steps available and vice-versa. Although \( \beta \) can also be time-varying, for example if you start with a large number of experts with a belief that some of the experts are good at predicting the world at the next timestep. In such a case we would want the \( \beta \) to be high initially to reach to the correct experts quickly and then decrease the value of \( \beta \) with time to avoid over-fitting. This algorithm serves to thwart an adversarial world that might know our strategy for picking experts, or any potential collusion between malicious experts and the world.

### 3 Suggested Readings

1. Avrim Blum Online Learning survey (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ avrim/Papers/survey.ps.gz)