

15-499: Algorithms and Applications

Cryptography I - Introduction

- Terminology
- Some primitives
- Some protocols

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Cryptography Outline

Introduction: terminology and background

Primitives: one-way hash functions, trapdoors, ...

Protocols: digital signatures, key exchange, ..

Number Theory: groups, fields, ...

Private-Key Algorithms: DES, Rijndael, RC4

Cryptanalysis: Differential, Linear

Public-Key Algorithms: Knapsack, RSA, El-Gamal,
Blum-Goldwasser

Case Studies: Kerberos, Digital Cash

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Some Terminology

Cryptography - the general term

Cryptology - the mathematics

Encryption - encoding but sometimes used as general term)

Cryptanalysis - breaking codes


Steganography - hiding message

Cipher - a method or algorithm for encrypting or decrypting

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More Definitions



Private Key or **Symmetric**: $Key_1 = Key_2$

Public Key or **Asymmetric**: $Key_1 \neq Key_2$

Key_1 or Key_2 is public depending on the protocol

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Cryptanalytic Attacks

C = ciphertext messages

M = plaintext messages

Ciphertext Only: Attacker has multiple **Cs** but does not know the corresponding **Ms**

Known Plaintext: Attacker knows some number of (**C, M**) pairs.

Chosen Plaintext: Attacker gets to choose **M** and generate **C**.

Chosen Ciphertext: Attacker gets to choose **C** and generate **M**.

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What does it mean to be secure?

Unconditionally Secure: Encrypted message cannot be decoded without the key

Shannon showed in 1943 that key must be as long as the message to be unconditionally secure - this is based on information theory

A **one time pad** - xor a random key with a message
(Used in 2nd world war)

Security based on computational cost: it is computationally "infeasible" to decode a message without the key.

No (probabilistic) polynomial time algorithm can decode the message.

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The Cast

Alice - initiates a message or protocol

Bob - second participant

Trent - trusted middleman

Eve - eavesdropper

Mallory - malicious active attacker

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Primitives

One-way functions

One-way trapdoor functions

One-way hash functions

One-way permutations

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Primitives: One-Way Functions

A function

$$y = f(x)$$

is **one-way** if it is easy to compute y from x but "hard" to compute x from y

Building block of most cryptographic protocols
And, the security of most protocols rely on their existence.

Unfortunately, not known to exist. This is true even if we assume $P \neq NP$.

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One-way functions: possible definition

1. $F(x)$ is polynomial time
2. $F^{-1}(x)$ is NP-hard

It is not hard to come up with such functions.

But, what is wrong with this?

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One-way functions: better definition

For most y no single PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) algorithm can compute x

Roughly: at most a fraction $1/|x|^k$ instances x are easy for any k and as $|x| \rightarrow \infty$

This definition can be used to make the probability of hitting an easy instance arbitrarily small.

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Some examples (conjectures)

Factoring:

$$x = (u, v)$$

$$y = f(u, v) = u \cdot v$$

If u and v are prime it is hard to generate them from y .

Discrete Log: $y = g^x \text{ mod } p$

where p is prime and g is a "generator" (i.e., g^1, g^2, g^3, \dots generates all values $< p$).

DES with fixed message: $y = \text{DES}_x(m)$

This would assume a family of DES functions of increasing size

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One-way functions in private-key protocols

y = ciphertext

m = plaintext

x = key

$$y = f(x) = E_x(m)$$

In a **known-plaintext attack** we know a (y,m) pair.

The m along with E defines $f(x)$

$f(x)$ needs to be easy

$f^{-1}(y)$ should be hard

Otherwise we could extract the key x .

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One-way functions in public-key protocols

y = ciphertext

x = plaintext

k = public key

$$y = f(x) = E_k(x)$$

We know k and thus $f(x)$

$f(x)$ needs to be easy

$f^{-1}(y)$ should be hard

Otherwise we could decrypt y .

But what about the intended recipient, who should be able to decrypt y ?

Note the change of role of the key and plaintext from the previous example

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One-Way Trapdoor Functions

A **one-way function** with a "trapdoor"

The **trapdoor** is a key that makes it easy to invert the function $y = f(x)$

Example: **RSA** (conjecture)

$$y = x^e \text{ mod } n$$

Where $n = pq$ (p, q, e are prime)

p or q or d (where $ed = (p-1)(q-1) \text{ mod } n$) can be used as trapdoors

In public-key algorithms

$f(x)$ = public key (e.g., e and n in RSA)

Trapdoor = private key (e.g., d in RSA)

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One-way Hash Functions

$Y = h(x)$ where

- y is a fixed length independent of the size of x .
In general this means h is not invertible since it is many to one.

- Calculating y from x is easy

- Calculating any x such that $y = h(x)$ give y is hard

Used in digital signatures and some other protocols.

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Protocols

Built out of the primitives.

Often the weakest point in terms of security

- Digital signatures
- Authentication
- Key exchange
- Secret sharing
- Timestamping services
- Zero-knowledge proofs
- Blind-signatures
- Key-escrow
- Secure elections
- Digital cash

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Protocols: Digital Signatures

Goals:

1. Convince recipient that message was actually sent by a trusted source
2. Do not allow repudiation, *i.e.*, that's not my signature.
3. Do not allow tampering with the message without invalidating the signature

Item 2 turns out to be really hard to do

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Using private keys




- k_a is a secret key shared by Alice and Trent
 - k_b is a secret key shared by Bob and Trent
- Sig is a note from Trent saying that Alice "signed" it.
To prevent repudiation Trent needs to keep m or at least $h(m)$ in a database

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
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Using Public Keys



K_1 = Alice's private key
Bob decrypts it with her public key

More Efficiently




$h(m)$ is a one-way hash of m

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Key Exchange

Private Key method



Public Key method

