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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: A New Theory of Free Will -- continuation of an Open Letter to Professor Penrose
Message-ID: <Dn52o0.J6I@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <4el6ee$4t6@brtph500.bnr.ca> <4g5gse$qlq@nkosi.well.com> <Pine.SUN.3.91.960219014344.12599A-100000@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> <4gcehp$8an@amenti.rutgers.edu>
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Date: Wed, 21 Feb 1996 18:43:12 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.physics:172509 comp.ai:37204 comp.ai.philosophy:38038 sci.philosophy.meta:24938

In article <4gcehp$8an@amenti.rutgers.edu>,
Michael Huemer <owl@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>Aaron Boyden <6500adb@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> writes:
..............
>>  Free will is a concept 
>>sort of like God (it's interesting that free will really first became an 
>>issue in the West with Augustine; the Greeks say some things relevant to 
>>the issue, but it's clear they weren't concerned with it in anything like 
>>the way we are) in that it seems on the surface to explain things, but 
>>when you look closely, it completely stops making sense.
>
>(a) You're going to have to explain why it "completely stops making
>sense".

This has been thrashed around many times here, but for your benefit I'll
repeat it again:
whatever decision the "free will" is making (say 'a' instead of 'b')
there is always a question if this dacision was made for a reason or not.
If for a reason, then this reason determined the decision and the word "free"
does not apply. If there was no reason, then the decision was random and
the word "will" does not apply. Hopefully you will not raise the point that
you were 'free" to ignore the reason, because this just pushes the issue 
one step back: was the decision to ignore the reason (to choose 'a' and not 
'b') made for a reason or not? etc., etc. Some people talk about so called
"power to choose" or like but this does not remove the above dilemma - is
there a reason for a given choice or not?

>(b) The *philosophical discussion* over free will may have increased
>with Augustine - that's because only then did it become *challenged* -
>but the *concept* of free will did not originate with Augustine or the
>Greeks.  I'd wager people in every society understand the distinction
>between what they could have done and what they couldn't have done.
>
That you will make the above wager only proves that you are a gambler :-),
but does not say anything convincing about the issue. What is the evidence
that "people in every society ...."? On the contrary, I think that Greeks
were (and many cultures still are) very fatalistic. In fact I think that this
is mentally much healthier approach than go on dispairing that "I could have
done otherwise" :-). 

>>Now, on your specific comments, "choice" is a word which can sensibly be 
>>applied to a particular psychological process.  I'm sure that process 
>>goes on in you all the time.  Establishing that, however, does not in any 
>>way support your claim that anything mystical is going on; there's no 
>>immediate reason to think that these choice processes aren't completely 
>>determined by previous events.
>
>(a) What makes you think free will is mystical?

I can't speak for Aaron Boyden but, comatibilist version of free will 
excepted, any other notion is mystical, because you cannot escape the logical
dilemma I have described above without ignoring logic. In my vocabulary
a solution ignoring logic would be 'mystical'. If you disagree, please
explain what _you_ mean by 'mystical'.

>(b) What makes you think choices ARE determined by previous events?

I do not know what Aaron Boyden thinks, but I can accept that some choices
might not be determined by previous events, but be random. However, this
puts in doubt the 'will' component of "free will".

>(c) What makes you think that such determination is incompatible with
>free will?
>
Such determination puts in doubt the 'free' component of "free will", except
if it is meant in the compatibilist sense.

.....................
>Among those who claim to be just compelled to reluctantly relinquish
>free will, I so far have yet to hear a valid argument for this
>conclusion.  Is it possible that, in fact, they just don't like free
>will and don't *want* to believe in it?

I would not want to be interpretted as "relinquishing" free will, but I have
hopefully shown to you that from the point of view of logic the term "free
will" is self-contradictory except in the compatibilist sense. If you are
ready to accept the term in the compatibilist sense, then we have no
disagreement.
>-- 
>                                                         ^-----^ 
>   Michael Huemer <owl@rci.rutgers.edu>                 / O   O \ 
>   Rutgers Univ. (Philosophy Dept.)                     |   V   | 
>                                                         \     / 
>
>
Andrzej

-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons                   what they think and not what they see.
pindor@breeze.hprc.utoronto.ca                      Huang Po
