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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: A New Theory of Free Will -- continuation of an Open Letter to Professor Penrose
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References: <jqbDLr3LD.CG4@netcom.com> <4el6ee$4t6@brtph500.bnr.ca> <4elb9h$qe@mp.cs.niu.edu> <4entdt$n55@brtph500.bnr.ca>
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Date: Wed, 31 Jan 1996 19:44:58 GMT
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In article <4entdt$n55@brtph500.bnr.ca>, Steve Glymph  <glymph@bnr.ca> wrote:
>rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) wrote:
>>In <4el6ee$4t6@brtph500.bnr.ca> Steve Glymph <glymph@bnr.ca> writes:
>>
>>>Please tell me you are joking.  The definition of Determinism states very 
>>>clearly that you have no free will.

No definition, including the one you give below from Webster, states any such
thing.  That is an implication thst you have found from the definition, one
that you will have to argue.  And the argument will hinge upon your treatment
of "free will", of which there are many in the literature.  Some of these are
classed as compatibilist (with determinism), and some are classed as
incompatibilist.  Your ignorance of this fact undermines the authority of your
later claims.

>>
>>There is no clear, watertight, widely accepted definitions of
>>determinism.  There is no clear, watertight, widely accepted
>>definitions of free will.
>>
>>Now what was that you were saying about the definition of determinism?
>>
>
>Well I don't know what you are reading but every classical philosopher
>I every read seemed to be using the same definition.  They made up sub
>classes of these but they all gave them names.

"seemed to using"?  If these authors stated their definitions, there would be
no seeming about it.  And if they didn't, then how could you know?  If the
definitions they had in mind had only subtle differences, then their writings
would still *seem* to make sense in relation to the definition you have in
mind.  This assumption that you have leapt to, that all are using the same
definition, is a common one in philosophical disputes, but it is particularly
unsophisticated when given as a response to an explicit claim that there are
different definitions.

>>>                Try to use the real meaning of words when you are 
>>>attempting to convey your beliefs.
>>
>>Perhaps you are under the illusion that there is such a thing as
>>"real meaning of words."
>>
>
>No hard and fast widely accepted definition?
>From Websters Dictionary

Webster's necessarily contains printed definitions of these words.  So in what
sense does this imply thst they are hard, fast, or widely accepted?  Have you
checked other dictionaries?  In particular, philsophical dictionaries that
deal in the subtle distinctions that a dictionary designed for lay use would
not address?

>
>Determinism - The doctrine that every event, act, and decision is the 	
>              inevitable consequence of antecedents that are independent
>              of the human will.
>
>Free Will   - The power, attributed esp. to human beings, of making free
>              choices unconstrained by external circumstances or necessity.
>
>This is the classical definition of determinism and free will.

"inevitable", "independent", "will", "power", "beings", "free", "choice",
"unconstrained", "external", "necessity": all of these words are packed with
assumptions that philosophers try to disentangle.  These dictionary
definitions are distressingly circular: determinism is inevitable, free will
is the power to be free.  A someone different definition of free will is
"given again the same conditions, one can will to do otherwise than what they
did do".  This notion of "could have done otherwise" has been treated at
length by modern thinkers, esp. Daniel Dennett.

>I'm sure 
>there are many books out there that try to tie determinism with free 
>will but there are just playing word games like you are.

Oh, right, its all hard and fast except for all those books and people who
think otherwise, and they're just playing word games (as opposed, I guess, to
quoting from Webster's).  Feh.  Look, either it is hard and fast, in which
case there is no controversy, or there is controversy, in which case it isn't
hard and fast.  Your stance is intellectually dishonest and unduly arrogant.

>Determinism and free will are mutually exclusive.

So say you by fiat.  But fiat won't do; you will need an argument.

>When I studied them

Perhaps there have been further developments, or perhaps you didn't get the
advanced treatment.  When I studied history in grade school, the U.S. had kept
every treaty it had ever made.

>there was 'hard' and 'soft' determinism but with soft determinism
>they just tried to redefine the concept of free will.

Oh, I thought you said it was hard and fast.  Why does the definition you
favor have special status?

>If that's what you
>are doing then you are a soft determinist.  I might add that the whole
>reason that soft determinism came into being was because so many people
>were upset at the concept of people being determined and not being held
>accountable for their actions.  Soft determinism was invented to justify 
>punishing people for their actions.

Given determinism, we can't help but punish people for their actions, now can
we?  Nor can we help but invent what we invent, now can we?  Just what place
does "justification" play in a determinist model?  You have no idea just how
philosophically naive you are, do you?  Of course, you can't help yourself,
and neither can I.

The proper place for justifications for punishing people for their actions is
in ethical theories.  Ethical theories are based upon assumptions of agency,
volition, etc.  What Dennett calls the intentional stance.

>If you really look at soft determinism
>you will find that in fact it does not support free will (the real
>definition) at all.

Perhaps you will enlighten us with Webster's definition of "soft determinism"
so we can shsare your great insights into this matter.

>You either have free will or you don't (i.e. you are determined).  You 
>don't exclusively have both.

Perhaps you should read Daniel Dennett's _Elbow Room_ so you at least know
what compatibilists are talking about, rather than simply denying that their
position exists.



-- 
<J Q B>

