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From: Alan Smaill <smaill@dcs.ed.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: Consciousness -- humans have it, but can machines?
In-Reply-To: jampel@cs.city.ac.uk's message of 10 Jul 1995 14:41:47 +0100
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Date: Tue, 11 Jul 1995 16:20:27 GMT
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In article <3tramr$sgv@toves.cs.city.ac.uk> jampel@cs.city.ac.uk (Michael Jampel) writes:
jampel> I invite you to define consciousness. (OK, I accept that this
jampel> is difficult. I also accept that just because we cannot define
jampel> something, doesn't mean it doesn't exist.) Imagine you have
jampel> defined it in N sentences of English. In my opinion, I could
jampel> then construct a mechanism, or set of
jampel> mechanisms, to implement your definition. These mechanisms
jampel> might or might not be computer programs. They might contain
jampel> random elements, and they might allow interaction with the
jampel> outside world, and they might be non-terminating (all of
jampel> which, I think, mean that they are not Turing equivalent. I am
jampel> NOT interested in sticking just to Turning-equivalent
jampel> machines.)

jampel> In other words, in my opinion, once you have defined what
jampel> consciousness is, in a sufficiently detailed way, it will be
jampel> in principle possible to construct a conscious machine.

If you're saying that some physical artefact can (in principle) have
these properties, then very few will disagree with you -- not Penrose,
or Searle, as far as I can see; they both think humans are simply
physical systems, after all.  So, if you're quite happy to allow
any physical process at all here, there's not much of a dispute.



-- 
Alan Smaill                       email: A.Smaill@ed.ac.uk
LFCS, Dept. of Computer Science   tel: 44-31-650-2710
University of Edinburgh           
Edinburgh EH9 3JZ, UK.            
