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From: jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter)
Subject: Re: Putnam reviews Penrose.
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References: <3ss4sm$cjd@mp.cs.niu.edu> <BILL.95Jul10111232@pfc.nsma.arizona.edu> <jqbDBIt1o.K1t@netcom.com> <3ttuda$j5p@netnews.upenn.edu>
Date: Tue, 11 Jul 1995 15:56:24 GMT
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In article <3ttuda$j5p@netnews.upenn.edu>,
Matthew P Wiener <weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu> wrote:
>>Wiener, on the other hand, claims that he can *empirically* determine that
>>there is *no* sentence which is true but for which he cannot see that it is
>>true.
>
>Not at all.  I claim this has been empirically observed regarding a limited
>class of sentences that provably include statements that exceed any robot's
>knowledge.

We might get somewhere if you would offer an example of such a statement whose
truth you see and outline a proof that no robot could see it.  Of course, you
would have to provide an operational definition of "see" that we could apply
to the robot that isn't tautologically false, such as "published in a
reputable journal by a non-robot".  And simply saying "true by Goedelization"
or "true from a reading of Goedel's paper" begs the question, regardless of
how sure you are that it is true.  After all, such an approach to
demonstration would *not* be enough for a reputable journal.
-- 
<J Q B>

