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From: shankar@netcom.com (Shankar Ramakrishnan)
Subject: Re: Consciousness -- humans have it, but can machines?
Message-ID: <shankarDBIpMH.2Aq@netcom.com>
Organization: VLSI Libraries Incorporated
References: <3ti16e$ka8@bell.maths.tcd.ie> <DBD1 <3trrri$5cs@aurora.cs.athabascau.ca>
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 1995 20:44:41 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.philosophy:29881 sci.logic:12135

In article <3trrri$5cs@aurora.cs.athabascau.ca> burt@cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:
>>I invite you to define consciousness. (OK, I accept that this is
>>difficult. I also accept that just because we cannot define something,
>>doesn't mean it doesn't exist.) Imagine you have defined it in N
>>sentences of English. In my opinion, I could then construct a mechanism,
>>                                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>or set of mechanisms, to implement your definition. These mechanisms
>
>... <deleted>
>
>>In other words, in my opinion, once you have defined what consciousness
>>is, in a sufficiently detailed way, it will be in principle possible to
>>construct a conscious machine.
>
>>If you claim that it is in principle impossible to define consciousness
>>in sufficient detail, then that is a strong claim that needs proving.
>
>>Michael
>
>My favorite "definition" of consciousness is that
>it is beyond all possible distinctions; i.e., it
>is the field within which distinctions occur.  This
>goes back to Parmenides "definition" of "what is",
>and clearly is not your standard definition which
>requires distinctions.  With consciousness,
>in the definition I've suggeste, we can point to
>the idea, but cannot say what it is in terms of
>other things.
>
>There are at least two things which satisfy Parmenides
>criteria for "what is" (i.e., homogeneous, isotropic,
>unbounded, eternal, etc.,etc.)  One is empty space
>infinitely extended in all directions (or, folded into
>a boundaryless sphere), and the other is consciousness.
>
>Can you make a machine which impliments this definition?
>
>bv

My favorite definition is this: The perception of a non-empty set
of qualia. Of course, this leads to the definition of qualia, which
is no easier than of consciousness. Or we can essentially follow
Dennett ("Cosciousness Explained"), deny the existence of qualia,
and therefore of consciousness.

Shankar
