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From: kovsky@netcom.com (Bob Kovsky)
Subject: Re: Chomsky on Consciousness and Dennett
Message-ID: <kovskyD9GBtw.DLu@netcom.com>
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References: <3q2put$p07@Mercury.mcs.com> <JMC.95May25182319@sail.stanford.edu> <D9EzC4.ILF@spss.com> <3qgdqu$ikt@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>
Date: Wed, 31 May 1995 16:44:20 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.lang:39638 comp.ai.philosophy:28484

In article <3qgdqu$ikt@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>,
Michael Feld <feld@cc.umanitoba.ca> wrote:
>In article <D9EzC4.ILF@spss.com> markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
>...
>#So let's take some declarations that one will do or not do something:
>#     I'm going to the bathroom.
>#     I'm not voting for Gramm.
>#     I'll kill that little pest.
>#     We're going to the Bahamas for our vacation.
>#     I'll have a Big Mac.
>#
>#You would maintain that those are promises?
>
>
>Just try telling your sweetie that, come to think of it, "we're NOT
>going to the Bahamas for our vacation", and rethink that example.  To
>extend your own point, I, and you, can easily think of contexts in
>which each of those declarations would constitute a promise.

	"To promise is to say something which creates an obligation for 
the promisor:  in order that words should have this kind of effect, rules 
must exist providing that if words are used by appropriate persons on 
appropriate occasions (i.e. by sane persons understanding their position 
and free from various sorts of pressure) those who use words shall be 
bound to do things designated by them."  H. L. A. Hart, <The Concept of 
Law> at 42.

	This is one among many definitions in the legal context.

	There is, for example, a legal doctrine called "promissory
estoppel" that creates an enforceable contract right (i.e. a court will
order damages for breach and apply ancillary rules applicable to contract
situations.) For example, a published statement that you will pay $1000 to
the first person who brings you an ostrich feather will <induce reliance>
on the part of a claimant and you will be prevented ("estopped") from
denying the enforceability of the promise even though you may never have
met or directly communicated with the claimant prior to the time he
appears, feather in hand. 

	It is noteworthy that many of the issues dealing with the
relationship of language to action have been considered in legal disputes
in a highly formal context where reason and consistency are chief
requisites.  In this context, practical answers <must> be given (the court
sometimes cannot, and usually does not, dodge the issue).  The means to
these ends include:  highly fact-specific explanations; ad hoc (but
reasonable) distinctions and analogies; context-limiting; and creativity. 
What is emphatically clear is that simple, general and comprehensive
answers just do not work. 

	(I am a practicing lawyer, with degrees in electrical engineering 
and physics and a longtime interest in matters discussed here.)
-- 

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    Bob Kovsky          |  A Natural Science of Freedom 
    kovsky@netcom.com   |  Materials available by anonymous ftp
                        |  At ftp.netcom.com/pub/fr/freedom
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